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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a comprehensive study which examines the economic, social and 
political ideology underpinnings of microfinance institutions in Ireland. It also 
analyses the sources, uses, and consequences of microfinance for the borrower 
individually and the Irish economy as a whole. The thesis studies the developments of 
a number of microfinance institutions that operated in nineteenth century Ireland: loan 
funds, savings banks (TSB and POSB), joint stock banks, Monts-de-Piété, Raiffeisen 
banks, state-funded land purchase, and emigrant remittances. It utilises financial and 
microfinancial history as a prism to analyse Irish economic and social history. 
The thesis concludes by outlining four reoccurring themes that are present 
throughout: legislative constraints, institutional imitation, economic versus social 
goals and state intervention. It argues that all the institutions studied experienced 
legislative constraints, but that only the joint stock banks were able to overcome such 
constraints. Furthermore, it argues that the legislation encouraged moral hazard which 
resulted in fraud as it absolved the management of loan funds and savings banks from 
any liability for the running of those institutions. The thesis argues that the joint stock 
banks were the only successful institutional imitation as the propagators of these 
institutions took the existing market into consideration, something not done by others 
such as the Mont-de-Piété and Raiffeisen Banks. It argues that many of the 
institutions were promoted on the basis of social rather than economic motivation, and 
as a result the promoters did not assess economic conditions in the market. Finally, 
the thesis argues that government intervention in the economy distorted financial 
markets, through involvement in savings markets and as a long term lender. It argues 
that the long term lending activities of the state encouraged inefficient investment and 
hindered long term Irish economic development. 
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Microfinance institutions in nineteenth century Ireland 
 
...Pensé que nada hay menos material que el dinero, ya que cualquier 
moneda (una moneda de veinte centavos, digamos) es, en rigor, un 
repertorio de futuros posibles. El dinero es abstracto, repetí, el dinero es 
tiempo futuro… [I reflected that there is nothing less material than money, 
since any coin (a twenty-centavo piece, for instance) is, in all truth, a 
panoply of possible futures. Money is abstract, I said, over and over, 
money is future time.] 
 
(Jorge Luis Borges, ‘El Aleph’) 
 
1. Introduction 
Microfinance institutions were prevalent in nineteenth century Ireland, yet to date 
they have been understudied by historians of Ireland. This thesis is a study of 
microfinance institutions, and it aims to use microfinance institutions as a lens with 
which to analyse Irish economic and social history in the nineteenth century. 
The term microfinance was introduced into Irish historiography via the work of 
Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman who studied the history of Loan Fund Board 
(LFB) loan fund societies1 in nineteenth century Ireland.2 This thesis is a broader and 
more encompassing study of the origins and development of microfinance institutions 
in nineteenth century Ireland. The study aims to enhance the scholarship of Hollis and 
Sweetman, whilst contributing new discourse to the nascent literature. 
Firstly, in relation to this thesis, it is important to clarify what is intended by the 
term microfinance, as it was noted by The Economist that there has been considerable 
confusion and disagreement regarding what actually constituted microfinance.3 For 
the purposes of this thesis we shall use the definition of microfinance used by Joanna 
Ledgerwood, who defined it as: 
                                                 
1
 There were three variants of loan funds; one strand was registered with the LFB, a second strand was 
known as Reproductive loan funds (RLF), and a third strand is referred to here as Friendly Society loan 
funds. The prefix LFB is used to distinguish between LFB loan funds and the other two. 
2
 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microcredit: Can we learn from the past?’ in World 
Development, xxvi, no. 10 (1998), pp 1875-1891; Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microcredit in 
prefamine Ireland’ in Explorations in Economic History, xxxv (1998), pp 347-380; Aidan Hollis and 
Arthur Sweetman, ‘The life-cycle of a microfinance institution: the Irish loan funds’ in Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, xlvi (2001), pp 291-311;  Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, 
‘Microfinance and Famine: The Irish Loan Funds during the Great Famine’ in World Development, 
xxxii, no.9 (2004), pp 1509-1523. 
3
  ‘The hidden wealth of the poor: A survey of microfinance’ in The Economist (5 November, 2005), p. 
5. 
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The provision of financial services to low-income clients, including the self-employed. 
Financial services generally include savings and credit; however, some microfinance 
organisations provide social intermediation services such as group formation, 
development of self-confidence, and training in financial literacy and management 
capabilities among members of a group. Thus, the definition of microfinance often 
includes both financial intermediation and social intermediation. Microfinance is not 
simply banking, it is a development tool.4  
 
The most common activities associated with microfinance are: small loans, 
informal appraisal of borrowers and investments, collateral substitutes, access to 
repeat and larger loans based on repayment performance, streamlined loan 
disbursement and monitoring, and secure saving products.5  
Microfinance providers target low income groups of varying degrees of poverty. 
The common misperception regarding microfinance is that it only targets the poorest 
of the poor. This is not necessarily the case, either through accident or design. The 
extent to which a microfinance institution reaches groups with very high poverty 
levels is defined as the depth of their outreach capacity. But it is not always possible 
to have maximum outreach depth with microfinance services. Modern experience is 
that there has been a failure of many microfinance providers to include the hardcore 
poor in their portfolios. Asif Dowla and Dipal Barua observed that: 
Microfinance providers in Bangladesh, including Grameen Bank have been criticised for 
their failure to include the hardcore poor… The low representation of the very poor in the 
client base of MFIs [microfinance institutions] has been called “mission drift”. After all, 
the original mission of microfinance institutions was to help the poor irrespective of the 
intensity of their poverty…The poorest do not have supporting inputs such as land, 
capital, additional working family members, human capital in the form of education, and 
knowledge of running a business. As a result, these individuals will receive a low return 
from using credit in non-farm activities, which, in turn, discourages them from 
participating in a risky, low-return credit program.6  
 
Microfinance institutions in nineteenth century Ireland were targeted towards 
the ‘industrious poor’, which, by definition, excluded those whom contemporaries did 
not deem to be industrious.  This targeting policy brought microfinance within the 
reach of different socio-economic groupings but may also have excluded the poorest 
groupings. 
The providers of these microfinance services can be multifaceted. They can 
focus on one particular aspect of microfinance, either credit or savings. They can also 
engage in financial intermediation which combines elements of credit provision and 
                                                 
4
 Joanna Ledgerwood, Microfinance handbook: an institutional and financial perspective (Washington 
DC, 1998), p.1. 
5
 Ibid, p.1. 
6
 Asif Dowla and Dipal Barua, The poor always pay back: the Grameen II story (Connecticut, 2006), 
pp 202-203. 
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savings accumulation. The specialisation and prioritisation of the microfinance 
supplier is determined by its structure and raison d'être.  There are three main sectors 
- formal, semiformal and informal - which traditionally engage in financial activity, 
and each of which can supply microfinance services. Ledgerwood gave an outline of 
each sector: 
 Formal financial institutions [that] are chartered by the government and are subject to 
banking regulations and supervision… Semiformal institutions [that] are not regulated by 
banking authorities but are usually licensed and supervised by other government 
agencies…Informal financial intermediaries [that] operate outside the structure of 
government regulation and supervision. They include local money lenders, pawnbrokers, 
self help groups, and NGOs, as well as the savings of family members who contribute to 
the microenterprise.7 
  
In contemporary microfinance it is the semiformal and to a lesser extent the informal 
sector that engage in microfinance for non-profit based motives. 
All three sectors were found in nineteenth century Ireland. The formal sector 
consisted of the joint stock banks, the Trustee Savings Banks (TSBs) and the Post 
Office Savings Bank (POSB). The Bank of Ireland, chartered in 1782 and opened in 
1783, was the first joint stock bank formed in Ireland, and following market 
liberalisation in the 1820s other joint stock banks were established. The system of 
TSBs had been in existence since the early 1810s and the POSB began operating in 
Ireland in 1862. These institutions were subject to banking regulations and 
supervision.  
The joint stock banks were not directly pursuing microfinance as a business 
model. In the early nineteenth century the joint stock banks found microfinance 
provision to be a very cumbersome and expensive process. They did not go to any 
great lengths to encourage the spread of microfinance. Their participation in 
microfinance was a by-product of general banking development, in particular branch 
expansion and the competition for deposits. The branch-banking model enabled the 
joint stock banks to lend small amounts of money at interest, provided that a borrower 
had a reputable surety known to the bank. This form of microfinance was innovative, 
but it was expensive from the borrowers’ perspective as they were required to provide 
expenses for their sureties, commonly known as treating, and at times provide labour 
services. There was an opportunity cost for borrowers in terms of lost time due to the 
process, and this cost was higher the further a borrower lived from a joint stock bank 
                                                 
7
 Joanna Ledgerwood, Microfinance handbook: an institutional and financial perspective (Washington 
DC, 1998), pp 12-13. 
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branch. But in an environment of imperfect information the surety system was 
necessary as the joint stock banks required additional security to overcome any 
potential moral hazards due to their isolation from the potential borrowers. 
The savings banks, both TSBs and the POSB, ostensibly targeted the lower 
income groups of society but they offered a different microfinance service. Their 
apparent aim was to encourage thrift amongst them and they offered security for the 
savings of the lower income groups whilst paying a fixed interest on deposits; but it 
was not always the lowest income groups that utilised these services.8 Unlike similar 
contemporary institutions in continental Europe and the USA, these savings banks did 
not offer private intermediary services; instead they lent money to the central 
government. 
The semiformal sector was dominated by the loan fund societies for the 
majority of the nineteenth century. The loan fund system had been in existence since 
the early 1700s but the system proliferated in the early nineteenth century when 
numerous societies were founded. The rapid increase in the number of loan fund 
societies led to the establishment of a Board, the LFB, designed to regulate the loan 
fund system as constituted in the 1830s. LFB loan funds were the main examples of 
semiformal microfinance institutions until the emergence of credit cooperatives in the 
late 1890s.  
The loan funds were financial intermediaries that targeted the lower income 
groups in Irish society. Initially they had been devised as an urban institution to cater 
to the needs of urban wage earning labourers but in the nineteenth century they were 
increasingly rural based and geared towards members of the agricultural community. 
This shift of focus from urban to rural communities did not correspond with a change 
in institutional structure. The loan funds offered small loans, with a legally 
constrained maximum loan of £10 available. These loans were for limited periods and 
were renewable if they were repaid on time and with the stipulated interest payments. 
The loan funds also had the capacity to receive deposits from the public and pay 
interest on these deposits. The loan funds used collateral substitutes in the form of 
local sureties to act as guarantors for loans given. The loan funds were a sizeable 
source of microcredit up until the mid nineteenth century, but then subsequently 
declined in relative importance in the latter nineteenth century. There was no single 
                                                 
8
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘The early history of Irish savings banks’ in UCD Centre for Economic Research 
working paper series, WP08/04 (February 2008). 
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specific reason for their decline. The causes of the decline were numerous, such as 
poor management, fraud, institutional ossification and inflexibility. There was also a 
decline in their target base caused by emigration.  Further, they experienced 
increasing competition from the formal sector in the latter nineteenth century. 
Cooperative banks emerged in the late 1890s and were based on the German 
model of Raiffeisen cooperative banking. They were similar to the loan funds in some 
respects. Notably they also had maximum loans, £50 in their case, but they had longer 
term limits for loans, a lower interest rate on loans, and they received deposits on 
which they paid interest. Unlike the loan funds, they were mutual societies in that 
membership was required to borrow from the society. They used collateral substitutes 
in the form of group collateral and also made use of sureties. The credit co-operatives 
suffered from a problem similar to that suffered by the loan funds, that of poor 
management. The credit co-operatives also suffered from the fact that they did not 
effectively mobilise savings. There was a demand for the credit services that they 
provided, but there was no uptake in their saving services as these services were not 
promoted by many of the societies. 
 The informal microfinance sector was comprised of moneylenders, 
pawnbrokers and shopkeepers. These were informal intermediaries. They were not 
intermediaries in the classical banking sense of mobilising deposits for lending. 
Rather they intermediated between the joint stock banks and people requiring credit.9 
They overcame the banks’ aversion to lending to certain groups of people and thus 
offered microcredit services. There was less likely to have been loan limits and 
interest payments were alleged to have been quite high. Their loan ceilings were 
higher than the formal and semiformal sectors’ and their rates of interest were also 
much higher. These groups did not offer savings products. Familial financial relations 
were also prevalent in the informal sector. These sources of microfinance would have 
included loans and remittance transfers from friends and family. Such familial finance 
relations existed throughout the nineteenth century but increases in emigration saw 
corresponding increases in emigrant remittances. 
The nineteenth century witnessed an increasing state involvement in the Irish 
economy. The savings banks, TSBs and POSB, were an example of state activity in 
savings markets. The state also became an active agent in credit markets in Ireland. 
                                                 
9
 Liam Kennedy, ‘A sceptical view on the reincarnation of the Irish “Gombeenman”’ in The Economic 
and Social Review, viii, no. 3 (1977), p. 219. 
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Long-term loans were available from the Board of Public Works from the 1840s 
onwards,10 and in the late nineteenth century government bodies such as the Land 
Commission, the Estates Commission and the Congested Districts Board began 
offering loans for land purchase. There were also government schemes offering short-
term loans; these were available from the Congested Districts Board and also from the 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. 
Information economics provides the underlying theoretical framework of this 
thesis. Credit transactions involve principal-agent problems such as adverse selection 
and moral hazard due to a lender’s lack of information regarding a potential 
borrower.11 These information asymmetries can lead to credit rationing, redlining,12 
and lower economic welfare. A way in which a lender can overcome such information 
asymmetries is by collecting more relevant information regarding borrowers. But such 
information collection, or screening, has a cost, and if the cost of screening exceeds 
the benefits, as measured by interest payment for loans, then the lender will not lend 
to the borrower.  
Adverse selection in the credit transaction arises when borrowers are not 
homogenous in that they are not of the same risk type. For example, one borrower 
may be deemed safe in that the probability of repaying the loan is quite high, and 
another borrower may be deemed risky in that there is a low probability that the 
borrower can repay the loan. This is a stylised example for it is possible that there 
may be borrowers with varying degrees of riskiness. With a problem of adverse 
selection a lender cannot decipher which borrower is of a type deemed safe and which 
is of a type deemed risky. Therefore, there is a likelihood that the lender could lend 
money to a risky borrower and lose both principal and interest as a result. A lender 
may wish to raise interest rates to overcome the problem, but raising interest rates 
actually exacerbates the problem. Higher rates of interest will reduce the return of a 
project, leading to negative returns, for safe borrowers. As a result they will feel that 
the rate of interest is too high and will withdraw from the market. This only leaves the 
risky borrowers who are willing to accept the higher rates of interest, because if their 
                                                 
10
 A. R. G. Griffiths, The Irish Board of Works, 1831-1878 (London, 1987). 
11
 Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss, ‘Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information’ in 
The American Economic Review, lxxi, no. 3 (June, 1981), pp 393-410 and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Peer 
monitoring and credit markets’ in The World Bank Economic Review , iv, no. 3 (September, 1990), pp. 
351-366. 
12
 Redlining is the practice of refusing, or increasing the cost of, financial services to groups based on 
their geographic location or social status.  
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risk are not realised then the return of their projects will be positive. The problem is 
that the banks are not willing to take these risks but by increasing interest rates it is 
these risks that are in fact encouraged.    
Lenders can face both ex ante and ex post moral hazard problems. Ex ante moral 
hazard occurs when a borrower is not truthful about what the funds will actually be 
financing. A borrower may say that the funds are for investment purposes but use the 
funds for some other purpose, then subsequently default on repayment of both 
principal and interest. Ex post moral hazard can occur if the borrower is not truthful 
about the outcome of the investment. The investment may have been successful, but 
the borrower may claim otherwise and resist repaying the amount lent.13  
These problems of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric 
information if unresolved can hamper the efficiency of financial markets. A way to 
overcome both is through the collection of information regarding the activities of 
borrowers. A difficulty with this is that there is often a lack of good information. 
Hayek observed that: 
 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined by the 
fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.14 
 
Hayek advocated decentralisation as a solution to information problems and for 
a greater utilisation of local knowledge in economic organisation. It is this use of local 
knowledge which theoretically made microfinance institutions operable. Many of the 
microcredit providers discussed in this thesis were decentralised institutions that were 
able to utilise local information and as such overcome information constraints. 
Informal lenders were also able to utilise local information. Hence in some cases, as 
argued by Kennedy,15 they were the only lenders willing to give loans to certain 
borrowers. 
There were also information asymmetries involved in savings transactions, but 
in the case of savings the roles were reversed with savers experiencing information 
asymmetries as to actions of the institution, something which can also result in moral 
                                                 
13
 Beatriz Armendáriz and Jonathan Morduch, The economics of microfinance (Massachusetts, 2005), 
pp 85-114. 
14
 F. A. Hayek, ‘The use of knowledge in society’ in The American Economic Review, xxxv, no. 4 
(September, 1945), p. 519. 
15
 Liam Kennedy, ‘A sceptical view on the reincarnation of the Irish “Gombeenman”’ in The Economic 
and Social Review, viii, no. 3 (1977), p. 220. 
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hazard.16 For example, savers might not have information regarding what a financial 
intermediary would do with their savings. This information asymmetry can influence 
the development of financial intermediation as savers might not trust financial 
institutions. In the case of financial institutions that experience some level of 
government intervention (in nineteenth century Ireland these were the savings banks 
and loan funds),17 this may lead to cases of moral hazard or exacerbate existing moral 
hazard problems. Managers of such financial institutions may be lax in their 
monitoring and screening of staff and loans because of the belief that the state will 
make good any losses.  
This thesis is also underpinned by the literature of institutional economics, in 
the most part the work of Douglass C. North.18 Economic historians, such as North, 
have argued that institutions matter, and in this thesis we will explore how the 
institutions were structured and how they interacted with formal (legal) and informal 
(cultural) constraints. One of the main arguments that North et al make is that 
institutions are important as they influence economic development through the 
principle of path dependence. North stated that: 
 
Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s choices (and 
define them in the modelling of economic performance) without tracing the incremental 
evolution of institutions. But we are just beginning the serious task of exploring the 
implications of path dependence.19  
 
In this thesis we will explore how path dependence influenced the development of 
microfinance institutions in Ireland. 
The influence of Samuel Smiles is an important theme of this thesis. Samuel 
Smiles published a number of works in the mid to late nineteenth century and they 
were highly influential. The importance of Smilesian thought in the context of Irish 
microfinance is that it influenced social elites. Smiles valued microsavings as a 
greater moral service than microcredit. Reference will be made throughout the thesis 
to areas where the influence of Smilesian thought is particularly evident.  
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 Beatriz Armendáriz and Jonathan Morduch, The economics of microfinance (Massachusetts, 2005), 
pp 147-172. 
17
 In the twentieth century many government introduced deposit insurance schemes, but these were not 
in existence in nineteenth century Ireland. 
18
 For example see Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance 
(Cambridge, 1990). 
19
 Ibid, p. 100. 
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Where long-run financial data is analysed, these have been weighted using a cost of 
living index compiled by Liam Kennedy.20 The weighting was done to give an 
indication of the real value of the financial data taking account of deflation in the 
period of what was formerly known as the ‘Great Depression’ and the inflationary 
effects of the Great War. Liam Kennedy compiled three indices, a rural, an urban, and 
a weighted average of the two, and the base year is given as an average of 1850-1900. 
Figure 1  
Cost of living index: 1850-1925
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Source: Liam Kennedy, ‘The cost of living in Ireland, 1698-1998’ in David Dickson and Cormac Ó 
Gráda (eds.), Refiguring Ireland, essays in honour of L. M. Cullen (Dublin, 2003), pp 249-276. 
 
2. The social backdrop to microfinance: the Irish poor law 
 
An important social backdrop to this thesis is the introduction of a public poor relief 
system in Ireland in the early nineteenth century that was financed through local 
taxation. This system was intended to be an Irish parallel to the existing poor law in 
England and Wales. This is important because many of the microfinance institutions 
described in this thesis were designed, and promoted, in an attempt to avoid the 
compulsory tax imposed to provide for poor relief. Many commentators have noted 
that the poor relief system was designed to deter people from consuming poor relief, 
for example the treatment of the poor in the workhouses and their routine diet. There 
                                                 
20
 Liam Kennedy, ‘The cost of living in Ireland, 1698-1998’ in David Dickson and Cormac Ó Gráda 
(eds.), Refiguring Ireland, essays in honour of L. M. Cullen (Dublin, 2003), pp 249-276.  
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were also complementary policies aimed at evading the poor rate; the promotion of 
microfinance institutions was one of these policies.  
The English poor law system dated from 1601, when it was first introduced by 
Elizabeth I. Prior to the Reformation in England, poor relief had been provided 
privately in monasteries and parish churches. The charitable market was dislocated by 
political and religiously motivated actions, and it was necessary to replace the private 
religiously run charity market with a state-organised alternative. Johnson observed 
that: 
The protestant reformation signalled a drastic reform in the charity market. Since the 
protestants never developed a central organisation comparable to the Catholic Church, 
the reformation resulted in the transfer of charitable activity from the religious realm into 
the state realm.21  
 
The dissolution of monastic orders required an alternative to be formed, and this 
came in the form of the Poor Law. The Poor Law replaced private charity relief and 
made charity payments a compulsory obligation, through the levying of taxes to pay 
for poor relief. Johnson stated that ‘a system whereby charitable funds had been raised 
by hell-or-heaven alternative was changed to one offered by national states’.22 
Johnson’s argument is that the poor rate grew out of legislatively imposed 
institutional constraint on church bodies. An alternative perspective could argue that 
other factors were important in determining the necessity for state-sponsored 
charitable relief. For example, in eighteenth century France population growth and 
shifts in cultural attitudes towards poverty have been cited as motivations for the 
introduction of publicly funded poor relief.23 But the intricacies of such arguments are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The reformation also dislocated the charity institutions in Ireland, but the Irish 
charity market was not reformed along English lines. By 1800 there were different 
charitable systems for poor relief within the United Kingdom, one private and one 
public.  The Irish charity market would possibly have remained neglected had the 
issue not became politically significant. Population increases in Ireland, which were 
not matched with similar increases in industrial capacity, led to an increase in relative 
poverty between the two islands. The short distance between the two islands 
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facilitated Irish migration. Migration took place as the decreasing incomes in Ireland 
forced many to migrate to Great Britain. Irish immigration was contentious for two 
reasons. Firstly, there were some poor Irish immigrants who, when they were 
destitute, claimed poor relief in England, at the expense of the English ratepayer. 
Secondly, there was a fear that Irish migrants were putting downward pressure on 
wages in England and decreasing the standard of living. This in turn would place a 
burden on the English poor rates in the future. The issue is not that Ireland did not 
have a poor law, but that pressure was put on the English poor rate. The provision of 
poor relief and the payment of the poor rate had always been a contentious issue in 
England and Wales, with eligibility and entitlement to poor relief being divisive 
issues.24 There is evidence to suggest that Friendly Societies, Co-operatives, and 
Savings Banks had been encouraged to relieve pressure on the poor rates and make 
the poor more self-reliant.25 Political lobbyists in England encouraged the 
introduction of an Irish Poor Law in an attempt to improve the economic situation in 
Ireland and reduce pressure on the English poor rate. Irish interests opposed this, 
claiming that the financial burden would be too great, and they had support from 
notable contemporary economists such as Torrens26 and Malthus.27  
Johnson argued that: ‘When a majority of individuals approve the provision of a 
public good in a political market with a majority voting rule, that good is provided 
even if the minority disapproves’.28 The evidence suggests that the minority, Ireland, 
did not approve of the provision of the poor laws. Therefore, it appears that a 
prominent reason for the introduction of an Irish poor law in 1838 was actually to 
relieve pressure on the English poor rate payers, by placing the incidence of Irish 
poverty on Irish rate payers. Or alternatively, by imposing constraints on the Irish free 
riders who took advantage of English rate payers.  
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Prior to the poor law of 1838, charitable relief was primarily provided by private 
individuals, but there were some regional variations. Although there were examples of 
government grants to some institutions providing relief, notably the Dublin 
workhouse, these grants were not widespread. Evidence of the role of private charity 
before the poor law was provided by various parliamentary committees in the early 
nineteenth century, such as the 1823 report on the condition of the labouring poor and 
the 1830 report of the select committee on the state of the poorer classes in Ireland.29 
The second and third reports of the commissioners for inquiring into the condition of 
the poorer classes in Ireland showed a wide array of private networks that were 
dealing with poor relief and other charitable activities. The third report stated that: 
…The institutions existing in Ireland for the relief of the poor are Houses of Industry, 
Infirmaries, Fever Hospitals, Lunatic Asylums, and Dispensaries; that the establishment 
of these, except as to Lunatic Asylums, is not compulsory, but dependent upon private 
subscriptions, or the will of Grand Juries; that there are but nine Houses of Industry in 
the whole country; that while the provision made for the sick poor in some places is 
extensive, it is in other places utterly inadequate; and that there is no general provision 
made for the aged, the impotent, or the destitute. Much is certainly given in Ireland in 
private charity, but it is not given upon any organised system of relief, and the abundant 
alms which are bestowed, in particular by the poorer classes, unfortunately tend, as we 
have already observed, to encourage mendacity with its attendant evils.30 
 
The poor law act was introduced in 1838 and established a system of publicly 
funded poor relief.31 The public funds were raised from a tax on the owners and 
holders of landed property; it was effectively a tax to pay for charity. The following 
quote is taken from the preface of A history of the Irish poor law in connexion with 
the condition of the people. Nicholls, one of the architects of the Irish poor law 
system, stated in 1856 that:  
 
I hardly need say that this object is distinct from charity, in the ordinary sense of the 
term, although it is undoubtedly charity in its largest acceptation, embracing the whole 
community – It is in truth the charity of the statesman and the philanthropist, seeking to 
secure the largest amount of good for his fellow man, with the smallest amount of 
accompanying evil.32 
 
The poor laws were intended to provide a safety net for people who were unable 
to take care of themselves. They were designed to provide the minimum comfort to 
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those using the services, so as to discourage the overuse of them.33 The poor laws saw 
Ireland divided into a number of poor law unions, with each poor law union having its 
own workhouse where local poor could go to receive poor relief. The poor law system 
was designed so that the poor would not get the comfort of outdoor relief, but instead 
would have to go to the poor house if they needed relief. As such the poor law system 
was not popular with those who used it, and it was also opposed by those who had to 
fund it.34 Funding was intended to come from a tax on local land owners and 
occupiers, rather than be provided by central government,35 but there were some loans 
given by central government to pay for initial outlays of the programme. 
The importance of the introduction of the poor law was that it introduced a new 
tax that was payable by ‘every occupier of rateable hereditaments’.36 The new tax was 
legally enforceable and had to be paid within two months of the stated date; otherwise 
legal action would be taken to recover the tax arrears.37 An important piece of the 
legislation was the fact that there was an exemption for tenants of properties valued 
less than £5,38 but their tax burden was transferred to the lessor of the property.39 
Another relevant piece of the legislation was the fact that a portion of the rates could 
be deducted from rents due.40 Given that the majority of the Irish population was 
rural, the 1838 poor relief act was essentially a tax on landlords. A return in 1846 of 
the number of occupiers liable to pay the poor rate showed that there were 712,005 
occupiers, holding an estimated 15,856,009 acres of land, liable to pay the poor rate 
and that there were 519,248 herediments, holding an estimated 2,079,685 acres of 
land, exempt from paying the poor rate, with their obligation transferred to the 
incumbent landlord.41 The mean percentage ratio of rate payees to rate exemptees was 
190 per cent, i.e. more payees than exemptees by about 2 to 1, but importantly there 
was very high variation across the island with a standard deviation of 138 per cent. So 
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in some areas the percentage ratio of rate payees to rate exemptees was quite high, 
while in others (mainly in the west) the ratio was very low. For example, the mean 
percentage ratio of rate payees to rate exemptees in the principal Poor Laws Unions in 
Mayo was 31 per cent.42 Given that the incidence of taxation was concentrated on 
landlords and larger farmers, it would not be surprising if this tax influenced their 
behaviour and if there was some coordinated attempt to try and reduce this incidence 
by implementing tax avoidance schemes. 
In terms of this thesis it is possible to link a number of the institutions studied to 
the introduction of the poor law, the most notable example of this being the loan 
funds. 
Figure 2 
Number of loan funds registered with the loan fund board, 1838 
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Source: LFB annual reports, various years. 
 
Figure 2 shows the number of registered LFB loan funds between 1838 and 
1850. It is interesting that a large number of loan funds registered with the LFB 
between 1838 and 1843, a period when the poor law system was being introduced. Is 
this a spurious correlation, or was there a genuine relationship between the Poor Law 
and loan fund activity? The evidence to support the claim that the loan funds were 
influenced by the poor law comes from two sources, firstly from official support and 
encouragement and secondly from propagators of loan funds.  
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The increase in loan funds may be explained by legislative encouragement, or 
perceived encouragement. The 1830 select committee on the poorer classes in Ireland 
published three reports, the third of which was published in 1836. This report was 
contentious as it did not advocate the introduction of compulsory poor rates in Ireland, 
as was the case in England, but recommended a mixture of voluntary contributions 
and poor rates. In the third report of the commissioners for inquiring into the 
condition of the poorer classes in Ireland, there was support for loan funds. In section 
twenty-five, it was stated that: 
It appears from the evidence before us, that the poor who have occasion to borrow small 
sums of money have in general to raise them at exorbitant interest, and that when they 
are obliged to purchase any necessaries they stand in need of on credit, they are 
compelled to pay double, or nearly double, the market price; we therefore recommend 
that there shall be a loan fund established in each district, and that it be administered 
according to such regulations as the Commissioners shall approve.43  
 
There was also loan fund legislation in 1836 and 1838 that encouraged the 
formation of loan fund societies.44 The 1836 loan fund act was the first act that 
legalised the issuance of 6 per cent debentures, whereas formerly the loan funds had 
not been financed by debentures or deposits.45 The 1836 act also stated that loan funds 
had to use their profits for charitable purposes.46 Both of these factors may have given 
people an incentive to establish a loan fund, but admittedly there does not appear to be 
a direct link between the loan funds and the poor law. 
However, there were also a number of loan fund proponents who advocated the 
introduction of loan funds in Ireland. A common argument for loan fund formation 
was that one of its benefits would be to decrease poor law expenditure, and therefore 
decrease the pressure on rate payers. The following are extracts from various 
pamphlets which all seem to have been in circulation at the same time; the date of 
publication of the pamphlets are between 1836 and 1838. 
P. B. Ryan wrote a pamphlet with the provocative title Provision for the poor of 
Ireland, without any additional taxation. P. B. Ryan dedicated his pamphlet to Ashton 
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Yates, who was a liberal Member of Parliament representing County Carlow,47 and in 
the dedication stated that: 
With a view to assisting in the accomplishment of your benevolent intentions, I beg leave 
to dedicate to you this SECOND EDITION of my little work, entitled “PROVISION FOR THE 
POOR IN IRELAND, WITHOUT ADDITIONAL TAXATION,” hoping that your advocacy of my 
plan may induce other influential members to co-operate with you in effecting its general 
adoption in Ireland, and thus obviate the necessity of a compulsory payment to carry into 
effect the projected Poor Laws. (capitals sic)48 
 
Ryan was not in favour of the Poor laws. He opposed them on the grounds that 
they were to be funded by taxes on landed property, that this would mean taxing 
industrious farmers, and that ‘taxing them is only imposing burdens on the more 
meritorious classes, in order to support the less worthy’.49  P. B. Ryan proposed a plan 
where the private system of loan funds was given public support instead of the 
planned system of public poor relief, and he believed that it would have greater 
economic benefit.50 Ryan’s plan proposed that if the funds raised were used in a loan 
fund fashion, where the money would be lent to industrious poor on interest, and if 
additional funds were raised through the issuance of debentures, the resulting profits 
from the loan fund system could be used to finance a workhouse system for those 
unable to care for themselves, the poor and the old. He also believed that this loan 
fund system would encourage the reform of idle poor as there would be 
discriminating practices in poor relief. Ryan’s proposed system may have had some 
adherents, as the growth in the number of loan funds indicates, and to poor rate payers 
it would have shown good promise. Firstly, such a loan fund system could address 
poverty by both the provision of loans and the funding of workhouses. Perhaps more 
importantly, it would not have been as expensive as paying the poor rate. Ryan 
wanted ‘rates’ to be paid as interest paying debentures, effectively a social and 
financial investment. So instead of paying a tax, people would be making an 
investment. This may account for the initial support for loan funds, since the loan 
fund system could have been used as a way of decreasing the burden of the poor rates 
through decreasing the level of poverty.   
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Ryan concluded his argument by weighing a loan fund system against a poor law 
system:  
In conclusion, the writer hopes that owners and occupiers of land will seriously consider 
the merits of his plan, as compared with the poor laws about to be introduced. The one 
relieves millions without expense. The other only thousands by enormous taxation. All 
must acknowledge that there are as many paupers in Ireland as in England in proportion 
to their population. If then 14 millions population pay six and a half millions sterling 
what will eight millions pay? Answer £3,700,000 a year, or about five shillings per acre 
for all the arable land in the country.51 
 
Another writer who advocated a loan fund system was J. Caldwell, an agent for 
the ‘Labourer’s Friend Society’. Caldwell also argued that the introduction of a loan 
fund system could reduce pressure on the poor rates in Ireland, and also in England.52 
Caldwell stated that a universal loan fund system ‘might eventually supersede the 
necessity for the levy of the compulsory poor rate’.53 Caldwell wrote about a tour that 
he did of Ireland and he stated that the argument for a reduction in poor rates was very 
persuasive. Caldwell stated that:  
The manifest tendency of our measures to obviate or abate “the necessity of Poor’s 
rates,” I found to be a very persuasive argument with not only the landed proprietors, but 
all clear-sighted men of business, whose comprehensions soar above petty jealousies 
between the various interests in the state.54 
 
Caldwell also saw a benefit in a system where profits could be used for 
charitable expenditure: 
£240,000 being thrown into circulation by the society, and £240,000 being invested in 
trust, as security to the public; viz: - £200 circulating in each branch, and £200 in trust 
for each, in consideration of the privilege of being allowed half profits for factoring the 
money of the people (the deposits and subscriptions in aid of the system) and for giving 
ubiquity and uniformity to the practice of small loan funds: the institution would then be 
placed on a permanent foundation, and a growing and unalienable revenue would be 
secured under the surveillance of the Government Loan Fund Board, for public charities, 
or for other local exigencies. (italics sic)55 
 
Caldwell writing in his report for the Labourer’s Friend Society argued that if 
deposits from savings banks could be used in loan funds they would yield ‘a 
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considerable sum for each district in aid of the existing compulsory Poor Rates. On 
these principles might be constituted real CHARITABLE BANKS TO FEED LOAN FUNDS 
(capitals sic)’ .56 
Another writer who used the threat of poor laws to make loan funds was 
Matthew Barrington, the founder of Limerick Mont-de-Piété. In reference to what 
could be done with the profits of the Monts de Piété, Barrington stated: 
But if to this surplus be added the amount of all fines, penalties, forfeited recognizances, 
&c. which are now almost unproductive in this country, (and which on the Continent are 
applied to the support of the poor) the amount, if properly collected, may fairly be 
estimated at £32,089, making the whole £500,000. After supporting, as is seen, all the 
Medical charities, this sum would go far in preventing the necessity of Poor Laws, by 
supporting the aged and infirm, and affording employment to a large portion of the 
labouring population of the country.57 
 
Another exponent of the loan funds was James Connery. He too believed that 
loan funds were an alternative to the poor law system. He argued that poor laws 
actually increased poverty,58 but that the benefit of his proposed system would reduce 
the poor rate. Connery reasserted the claims about the effect of loan fund principles 
on poor rates. He stated that: 
The most experienced persons contend that the principle of this plan is applicable to 
every part of the empire; that its operation would gradually diminish the poors’ rate, and 
might ultimately supersede the poor law system, even in England.59 
 
Coincidentally, this exact phrase appeared in the work of Caldwell printed in his 
supplement on the Reproductive Loan Funds,60 so perhaps these advocates were not 
acting in isolation. Connery was consistent with the other writers in his dislike of the 
poor law system. He stated that the debate about the poor law system was like ‘the 
unskilful physician in administering medicine, will prescribe something, kill or cure; 
and as parliament have not yet come to a decision on this paramount question, it is 
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still as much in season as ever, and will be the means of reconciling many whose 
minds are divided on that all important subject.’61 
The majority of the publications that encouraged the establishment of loan funds 
came before the introduction of the poor law in 1838. The loan funds increased in 
number as can be seen in figure 2, but declined after 1843 following a restrictive loan 
fund act62 and, more significantly, famine.  
The poor rate was a compulsory tax with severe costs associated with non-
payment. In fact, the 1850 franchise act made the right to vote conditional on the 
prompt payment of the poor rate.63 The loan fund system did not have similar costs 
for non-payment attached, or enforcement mechanisms to prevent free riding. The 
exogenous shock of the potato blight in the 1840s put a strain on the resources of 
many in Ireland. Johnson observed that charity is income sensitive. During the famine 
there was increased use of the poor law system and the poor rate payers were exposed 
to this. Therefore I believe that poor rate payers would have found it difficult to 
finance and supervise a private charity venture when the demands on their income 
were so high. 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3 shows the total poor relief expenditure and loan fund circulation and capital 
from 1840 to 1898, and as can be seen, loan fund circulation was greater than poor 
relief expenditure before 1846, effectively before the famine. But the economic 
climate induced by the potato crop failure forced many loan funds to decrease their 
lending activities. This also had an effect on the number of people seeking poor relief. 
The amount spent on poor relief peaked in 1847, the height of the famine, and at that 
point the loan fund circulation amounted to almost half the poor law expenditure. 
In regards to loan fund charitable expenditure, the figures are beyond 
comparison. There was a complete failure of the part of the loan funds as charitable 
institutions. The loan funds were designed to fund charitable activity from their 
profits, but their profits were pro-cyclical, i.e. they were profitable in an economic 
boom. In recessionary periods it would have been difficult to maintain such profit 
levels, and as a result almost impossible to maintain charitable expenditure. 
Charitable expenditure would have been most required during economic downturns, 
and as such the loan funds as institutionally structured were not an alternative to the 
poor law. 
Throughout the period covered by this thesis there was a continued decrease in 
the amount of loan fund expenditure on charitable relief, although there was a slight 
increase during the famine period. Overall the performance of the loan funds as agents 
for funding poor relief is very poor. This indicates a failure on the part of the loan 
funds, or rather a failure on the part of the aspirations of loan fund propagators, to 
realise their benefits in regard to eradicating the poor law. It would be a pointless 
exercise to show loan fund charitable expenditure and poor law expenditure, as the 
poor relief operation dwarfed the loan fund charitable expenditure. 
Savings banks established in the UK were given legislative support in an 
attempt to encourage ‘thrift’, the underlying motive of which was to encourage poor 
people to save when times were good so that they would have savings to support 
themselves when times were bad. Emigration was also seen as a way of reducing the 
poor rate, especially the assisted emigration of those most likely to be a burden on the 
poor relief. In an article on emigration and emigrant remittances, W. N. Hancock 
compared the amount remitted with the amount expended on poor relief to see if there 
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was an increase in remittances at times when the poor rate was increasing.64 Hancock 
did this to see if remittances reduced expenditure on poor relief. 
After the famine there was acquiescence towards legislatively imposed poor 
relief, coupled with the failure of proposed alternatives, and as a result attempts were 
made to reduce the incidence of the poor rate. These included attempts to promote 
thrift, educate the population65 and improve the general well-being of the poorer 
elements of the population. Thus, the poor rate is an important consideration when 
analysing the economic and social history of nineteenth century Ireland.  
 
 
3. Thesis structure and sources 
 
The thesis is composed of eight chapters, with each chapter devoted to a separate 
topic relating to microfinance institutions in nineteenth century Ireland. 
The first two chapters are written in relation to the LFB loan funds. The first 
chapter introduces the loan funds in terms of their origins and their development in 
the early nineteenth century. It analyses the legal structure and constraints under 
which the loan funds operated. There was a flurry of loan fund legislation between 
1820 and 1843. The 1843 was the act which regulated the loan fund system until the 
last loan funds were wound up in the 1970s.  
The second chapter covers the LFB loan funds from the period 1860 to 1914. 
The chapter begins in the 1860s as it is has been assumed that there was a structural 
break following a parliamentary inquiry in the late 1850s and also because of the 
introduction of the Post Office Savings Bank in 1862. The chapter analyses long-run 
indicators for the period 1860-1914 and argues that there was a ‘bubble’ in the 1880s 
and early 1890s. The chapter then argues that this ‘bubble’ led to a situation whereby 
the loan funds generated and instituted debt peonage and that this was caused by the 
regulatory capture of the LFB. 
The third chapter is an account of the history of the joint stock banks in Ireland. 
It outlines the origins of the joint stock banking system and argues that the Irish banks 
were successful imitators of the principle of ‘Scotch banking’. The chapter discusses 
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the history of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland which was an 
example of a profit-motivated microfinance institution. The chapter argues that the 
branch banking policy of the joint stock banks created information about borrowers 
and enabled the joint stock banks to be effective lending agents in nineteenth century 
Ireland. The chapter illustrates how the joint stock branch banking policy increased 
competition in the microfinance sector. 
Chapter four outlines the history of savings banks in Ireland. The early 
nineteenth century saw the introduction of savings bank institutions based on similar 
institutions in England and Scotland. These institutions were contemporaneous to the 
loan fund institutions that are discussed in chapter one, and as such the two 
institutions are compared. Following the uncovering of a number of unrelated frauds 
in a Dublin savings bank and two savings banks in Kerry the savings bank system was 
in a state of turmoil. Contemporaneous frauds and difficulties in the English savings 
bank system led to the introduction of the Post Office Savings Bank. The chapter 
outlines the impact of the POSB in Ireland, which was the largest branch banking 
institution on the island. 
The fifth chapter introduces some new information regarding urban experiences 
of microfinance. These include Monts-de-Piété, Penny Savings Banks, and Friendly 
Society loan funds. The Monts-de-Piété were charitable pawnbrokers and were an 
imitation of French systems of pawnbroking; the chapter outlines their brief history 
and explains the reasons for their failure. The Penny Savings banks discussed in 
chapter five were administered by the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul. They are used 
as an example to illustrate the prevalence of Smilesian thought in nineteenth century 
Ireland and to illustrate the effect of financial failures on social memory. Friendly 
Society loan funds have previously not been referred to in the literature on 
microfinance in Ireland. They were mutual savings and loans societies that operated 
in urban environments. The chapter concludes with a comparative study illustrating 
the differences between Monts-de-Piété and loan fund societies.  
Chapter six is a discussion on the introduction of Raiffeisen co-operative 
societies in Ireland by the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society in 1894. These were 
co-operative banking institutions modelled on German Raiffeisen societies. The 
chapter illustrates the diffusion strategy implemented by the IAOS, and argues that 
the strategy was flawed. The chapter concludes by comparing the experience of the 
Raiffeisen societies with that of credit unions in the mid-twentieth century. 
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In chapter seven the thesis addresses the issue of state loans to the agriculture sector 
in the form of state-funded land purchase. From 1870 until 1909 there were a number 
of land acts passed into law that enabled the government to provide loans to tenant 
farmers to purchase their land. The chapter outlines how accessible these lending 
schemes were, by comparing them to the other microfinance institutions discussed in 
the thesis. The chapter also discusses whether or not such lending schemes were 
economically justifiable, or whether they were politically motivated. 
Chapter eight is a discussion on emigration and microfinance and attempts to 
demonstrate the link between emigration and microfinance. Firstly, it discusses the 
existing evidence on emigration and remittances, and then discusses the importance of 
the post office as a conduit for remittances. The chapter shows that one of the most 
accessible methods of sending remittances was also linked to one of the largest branch 
banking institutions in Ireland: the POSB.  
The majority of the primary source material used in this thesis came from the 
institutions that were being studied rather than from users of the services provided by 
the institution. This essentially means that the thesis is written from a supply, as 
opposed to a demand, angle. 
There are a variety of primary sources used in this thesis but, as there was a 
strong element of dirigisme in the Irish economy, the majority of the sources came in 
the form of parliamentary papers and parliamentary legislation. The LFB loan funds 
discussed in chapters one and two were legally required to submit annual returns to 
the LFB and these in turn were submitted to parliament for publication. These were an 
invaluable source. There were also three separate parliamentary inquiries in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century that dealt with the issue of loan fund 
societies.66 Manuscript sources found in the National Library of Ireland and the 
National Archives of Ireland were also used. The records of the LFB itself are cited in 
the Hayes Catalogue as being found in the Stationery office. I searched for these in 
the National Archives of Ireland but they have not been catalogued. They are listed in 
the Chief Secretary Office papers, but this is a very time-consuming search process 
and I was unsuccessful in locating any individual records. I searched the years 1871 
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 Select committee on loan fund societies (Ireland). Report, Proceedings, minutes of evidence, 
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and 1881 in an attempt to find references to loan funds, but the reference numbers 
cited were inaccurate so I relied on other sources. The inaccessibility of these sources 
is not an insurmountable burden to research as the annual reports of the LFB were 
published. In fact, there is a manuscript copy of the eleventh report of the LFB in the 
National Archives and this is identical to the published eleventh report.67 There were 
also a number of pamphlets and articles in contemporary journals written in relation 
to the loan funds. It has been difficult to locate individual accounts of loan funds. 
There are two held in the National Library of Ireland, but of these only one is in good 
condition. Cormac Ó Gráda has stated that there is a similar deficiency regarding 
savings bank accounts.68 
The sources used for chapter three were also parliamentary publications and 
banking information contained in Thom’s Directory. Banking was heavily regulated 
and as a result of this regulation it produced a plethora of statistical source material. 
There were also periodic public inquiries into banking in the UK. Lists of joint stock 
bank branches were also published in Thom’s and these were used for mapping 
purposes. 
The state was involved in the savings bank sector. Legislation required savings 
banks to submit annual returns to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the 
National Debt, and this in turn led to the publication of information relating to savings 
banks. From 1861 onwards the state administered its own savings bank and there were 
annual returns published in the annual reports of the Postmaster General. These 
returns gave aggregate information at a UK level, but Irish statistics were published in 
parliamentary returns and in Thom’s Directory. An Irish postal directory was 
published annually in Thom’s and so too was information on the location of TSBs. 
The sources used for the discussion of Monts-de-Piété in chapter five came 
from parliamentary sources. Matthew Barrington lobbied parliament for an inquiry 
into pawnbroking in 1838 and a number of key figures relating to the Monts-de-Piété 
gave evidence at that inquiry.69 The Monts-de-Piété were also affiliated with the LFB, 
so the annual reports of the LFB were an invaluable source. The annual reports of the 
Society of Saint Vincent de Paul gave information on the development of Penny 
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Banks run by the society; the annual reports used are found in the Head Office of the 
Saint Vincent de Paul in Ireland in Seán MacDermott Street, Dublin. There were 
records of Friendly Society loan funds in the reports of the Irish registrar of friendly 
societies and a parliamentary inquiry into friendly societies in 1872.70 But following 
this inquiry the office of the Irish Registrar of Friendly Societies was amalgamated 
with the English and Welsh office, and from thereon in the reports from the Irish 
Registrar of Friendly Societies were not as detailed. 
The co-operative banks established in 1894 were promoted by the Irish 
Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS), and information about their activities was 
published in the IAOS annual reports. These reports can be found in the head office of 
the Irish Co-operative Organisation Society (ICOS) in Merrion Square, Dublin, and 
also in the National Library of Ireland. The IAOS kept an archive of correspondence 
between itself and affiliated societies. This is a private archive kept in the National 
Archives of Ireland. There are records relating to these societies in the archive of the 
Registrar of the Friendly Societies, also found in the National Archives of Ireland. 
The co-operatives received public assistance and as such there are records relating to 
the credit co-operatives in government publications, most notably the 1914 report on 
agricultural credit. 
The Land Commission, the Estate Commission, and the Congested Districts 
Board were the main bodies that administered government land policy in Ireland. 
These bodies published annual reports which were used in the chapter on land 
purchase. There were also a number of parliamentary inquiries into land purchase, 
reports on land purchase and land purchase finance. Information on agricultural 
structure was found in the annual parliamentary publications on agricultural statistics, 
first published in 1847. 
The discussion in chapter eight was based on evidence from the annual reports 
of the emigration commissioners and also on reports of the Board of Trade. 
Information on the money order system was published annually in the Postmaster 
General reports, and information of the location of money order offices was found in 
Thom’s Directory. 
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The fact that the majority of the sources used in this thesis were government 
publications indicates the extent of state influence on the Irish economy. But other 
source material was also used in this study, most notably contemporary publications. 
 
4. Contribution to literature and limitation of the study 
In another context D. B. Johnson observed that ‘the very non-existence of such 
analysis suggests that the marginal benefit of the first explorations may be higher than 
if one’s efforts and energies were allocated to subjects that are overcrowded but more 
amenable to analysis’.71  I believe the same holds for this thesis. 
This thesis will contribute to Irish historiography by engaging with the existing 
secondary literature on the number of topics addressed in the thesis. In the first two 
chapters the main secondary literature is that of Hollis and Sweetman. Prior to the 
work of Hollis and Sweetman the topic of loan funds had been understudied and 
overlooked by Irish historians. One of the few secondary references to the loan fund 
societies is the following passage taken from an article written by the H. D. Gribbon 
in A new history of Ireland. Gribbon made the following brief reference to the loan 
funds: 
Finally, there was the loan fund board, whose constituent societies made available sums 
of up to £10 to very small borrowers among the ‘industrious agricultural poor.’ From 
198,000 loans issued and £900,000 in circulation in 1860 the boards activities fell to 
89,000 loans issued and £428,000 in circulation in 1880, and the fall continued. This was 
less an indication that farmers’ credit needs were diminishing than that in the 1880s 
money was required for more urgent purposes than capital investment. But banks, 
traders, and the loan fund board were equally averse to meeting, for example, rent 
arrears.72 
 
The thesis will go further than Gribbon’s comments and analyse the loan funds 
from the 1820s until 1914. This thesis will engage with Hollis and Sweetman by 
questioning and contextualising some of their findings. Hollis and Sweetman argued 
that the famine was a turning point in loan fund activity because loan funds over-lent 
and suffered high debt defaults. The argument that will be pursued in this thesis 
agrees that the famine was a significant event, but that this significance is attributed to 
a number of frauds that were uncovered during the period. Warren Buffet famously 
said ‘it’s only when the tide goes out that you find out who’s has been swimming 
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naked’.73 The same holds true for the loan funds. During and immediately after the 
famine crisis there were allegations of frauds perpetrated by the officers of these 
societies, something which suggests that greater attention was given to the screening 
and monitoring of borrowers than to monitoring staff. The analysis of the later history 
of the loan funds in this thesis will place greater emphasis on the ‘bubble’ of the 
1880s and 1890s and the repercussions from the legal decision in the mid-1890s. This 
thesis will give a broader interpretation of nineteenth century microfinance and will 
show the dynamism of the sector. The work on loan funds will also be approached 
from a spatial perspective, something under-represented in the work of Hollis and 
Sweetman.  
There are a number of works written in relation to banks in Irish history,74 but 
none of these is written from an information economics perspective. The chapter on 
joint stock banking in Ireland contributes to the existing literature by writing from the 
perspective of microfinance and also from analysing the development of the Irish 
financial system. By approaching banking history from a microfinance perspective we 
can see how and why banks operated in nineteenth century Ireland. The argument of 
the chapter is that the banks created information both through branch banking and 
through savings mobilisation. The chapter emphasises the importance of branch 
banking and contributes to the existing literature by mapping the spatial distribution 
of branch banks in Ireland.   
The existing literature on savings banks in Ireland is essentially confined to the 
recent work of Cormac Ó Gráda who has analysed savings banks in the early 
nineteenth century.75 This thesis expands Ó Gráda’s work by analysing savings banks 
over the course of the nineteenth century and by emphasising the importance of the 
frauds in the 1840s which Ó Gráda outlined. The chapter will also contribute to the 
existing literature by analysing the history of the POSB, the largest branch banking 
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institution on the island. The POSB was significant in terms of Irish savings markets 
as it was the largest branch bank offering interest rates above the market clearing rate 
and also offered government security for deposits. Surprisingly little has been written 
about the POSB by Irish economic historians. The coincidental increase in POSB 
deposits during the ‘land war’ ought to have attracted attention amongst mainstream 
historians. The loss-making activities of both savings institutions show the extent to 
which the Irish economy was subsidised by the British state. 
Chapter five contributes to the existing literature on the basis that not much had 
been written about pawnbroking, and little to nothing about Penny Savings Banks in 
Ireland or Friendly Society loan funds. The contents in chapter five can therefore be 
seen as a primer of urban experiences of microfinance and can be of use to urban 
historians.  
The study of the Irish experience of Raiffeisen co-operatives has been neglected 
by many economic historians and overlooked by mainstream historians. Tim 
Guinnane is one of the few scholars who has studied Raiffeisen banks in Ireland and 
further afield.76 The arguments that are presented in chapter six engage with Tim 
Guinnane’s views of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and offer some alternative explanations 
for the failure of Raiffeisenism to be adopted in Ireland. The Irish experience will be 
addressed from an innovation diffusion perspective, and the distribution of the 
Raiffeisen societies is mapped to give us a better understanding of the spatial 
distribution of these societies. The Raiffeisen experience is important in terms of the 
history of co-operation in Ireland as the societies received support from both the 
IAOS and government bodies. They comprised the second largest body of co-
operatives registered with the IAOS in the period 1900 to 1914, and second only to 
the co-operative creameries. Therefore as co-operation is discussed in most general 
histories of nineteenth and early twentieth century Ireland,77 the failure of the 
Raiffeisen societies ought likewise to be elaborated. 
Chapter seven engages with a broader range of historical writing than chapters 
one to six. It deals with the issue of state-funded land purchase and as such trespasses 
into the realms of mainstream Irish history. The ‘land question’ and the land acts are 
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considered integral to the understanding of nineteenth century Irish history. Therefore 
the chapter contributes to this literature by offering to place the land purchase 
schemes into the context of the existing financial structure. The chapter outlines how 
state-funded land purchase was made accessible, through the issue of government 
guaranteed bonds, and how the terms offered to borrowers were better than anything 
that the private market could provide. The chapter also assesses the economic 
necessity of the land purchase schemes by analysing the structure of the agricultural 
economy in terms of land distribution, land ownership, agricultural output and prices. 
The chapter argues that land purchase was not the panacea for Irish agricultural 
development and that in fact in the long run it was a negative influence on Irish 
economic development. 
Chapter eight is another chapter that engages with a wider literature. The topics 
discussed in the chapter refer to emigration and remittances. The chapter discusses the 
existing evidence on emigrant remittances and argues the case that the Post Office 
was an important and accessible institution for the transmission of remittances 
(monetary and non-monetary). The chapter challenges the existing literature by 
illustrating how the money order service operated by the post office was also linked 
with the POSB. The chapter challenges the views of Arnold Schrier, one of the 
authorities on Irish emigration, who believed that remittances were not saved.78 
As was outlined above, there are three sectors that are involved in microfinance: 
the formal, semiformal and the informal. The institutions analysed in this thesis 
consist in the most part of formal and semi-formal institutions. Therefore one of the 
limitations of this study is that there has been an insufficient treatment of informal 
suppliers of microfinance. The informal supply of microfinance has been addressed in 
chapter two by analysing shopkeeper credit based on evidence from the CDB baseline 
reports and also in chapter six from evidence to the money lending committee, but it 
did not treat the issue of shopkeeper credit as a distinct object of study. The reason for 
this was that the thesis focused on the development of financial institutions that acted 
as bona fide intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Informal agencies such as 
shopkeepers, moneylenders and pawnbrokers do not enter this description of a 
financial intermediary. In terms of pawnbrokers these have been somewhat addressed 
in chapter five via the analysis of the Mont-de-Piété charitable pawnbroking 
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institution. The Mont-de-Piété was chosen as an object of study as it was unusual in 
the sense that it was a financial intermediary. This was because it raised capital 
through the issue of bonds, whereas a pawnbroker was a private establishment which 
utilised the capital of the owner. This also holds true for shopkeepers and 
moneylenders, as they were more reliant on their own private capital, rather than 
deposits, to make loans. Although this thesis does not fully address informal 
institutions it does attempt to address both issues, and to direct readers to other 
sources of information for their discussion. 
Another limitation to the study is the treatment of building societies and of 
microinsurance which is admittedly a form of microfinance. Building societies have 
not been entirely neglected. They are briefly referred to in chapter five, but more 
remains to be done on this topic. This thesis adhered to modern studies of 
microfinance where the attention was on microcredit and microsaving. The 
institutions analysed in this thesis primarily offered savings and loans services, and 
did not offer insurance. The existing literature on microfinance in nineteenth century 
Ireland was focused on the loan funds as an example of microcredit. This thesis has 
broadened the scope of study to include microsavings, but it was not so inclusive as to 
include microinsurance. The topic of microinsurance has been understudied in Irish 
economic history,79 and the scale of the work required to redress this balance is 
beyond the reach of this current study, but it is something which should be addressed 
in future scholarship. 
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1 The Irish loan fund system; origins and mid-century consolidation 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
A system of independent loan fund societies, societies that lent small loans to 
borrowers on personal security, operated in Ireland in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Jonathan Swift,1 the Dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral Dublin,2 has been 
credited with establishing the first such society in Dublin in the eighteenth century,3 
and his actions were replicated by the Charitable Musical Society who operated a 
small branch system in the country.4 The system of lending small sums of money to 
the industrious poor gradually increased in popularity in the late eighteenth century 
and early nineteenth century with a number of loan fund societies being established 
throughout the island.   
Loan funds were in vogue from the 1820s to the mid-1840s, and in that period 
there was an increase in the number of loan funds, a greater geographic distribution of 
loan fund societies, and a significant change in the modus operandi of the loan funds, 
whereby they provided savings as well as credit services. By the early 1840s there 
were three distinct types of loan fund societies operating in Ireland, societies 
registered with the Central Loan Fund Board (LFB) whose office was in Dublin 
castle, Reproductive Loan Funds (RLFs) associated with a London Board, and 
societies that were unregistered under specific loan fund legislation.5 There were also 
several charitable pawnbrokers, Mont-de-Piété, that operated in various cities 
throughout the island; these were also registered with the LFB.6 
This chapter will begin by tracing the historical origins of the loan fund system. 
The loan fund societies in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century differed from 
the later loan funds that developed after the 1820s. This chapter will analyse the laws 
which regulated the loan fund system in the nineteenth century and assess the internal 
monitoring and screening mechanisms which the loan funds utilised. The chapter will 
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also assess the performance of the LFB in its formative years, to see whether the LFB 
was an adequate central authority, and highlight limitations which were to hinder it in 
the latter years of the nineteenth century. 
In order to gauge the activities of loan funds this chapter will look at the 
operations of the loan funds and compare their activities to available statistics on the 
wages of agricultural labourers. Agricultural wage statistics are used for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, they give us a variable for the lowest wage grouping on the island for 
which to help make reasonable comparison, secondly because the primary source 
literature on loan funds recommended their use for labourers, and finally the 
demarcation between labourer and small farmer was very faint.7 These statistics on 
agricultural wages will be used as an indicator to see whether the loan funds were 
providing ‘microcredit’ and ‘microsavings’ services.  
The chapter will also analyse the spatial distribution of the activities of the loan 
funds associated with the LFB to determine where these loan funds operated.8 The 
geographic distribution of loan funds is analysed to determine whether or not loan 
funds were active in regions which were considered to have been the poorest on the 
island. This is done in order to see whether loan funds operated in areas which could 
maximise the benefits of outreach to Irish society and as such maximise the impact 
that such microfinance services could have had on the poorest socio-economic groups 
in Ireland.9 Finally the chapter will look at a number of alleged abuses of and 
limitations to the loan funds. Many of these abuses and defects, it was believed, could 
have been checked by adequate legislative reform. Such reform was not forthcoming 
and the defects remained unchecked for the duration of the system.10 
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1.2 Origins of the loan fund system 
 
R. R. Madden, a civil servant and a literary figure in nineteenth century Ireland, 11 was 
a longstanding secretary of the LFB from 1850 until 1880.12 Madden wrote a number 
of volumes on the loan fund system in Ireland and he traced the origins of the loan 
fund system to Italy and the Lombard system of lending money on pledges and 
personal security.13 This system diffused throughout continental Europe and Madden 
believed that it was a similar version of the Lombard system operating in Amsterdam 
that influenced early loan fund practitioners in Ireland.  Madden in his writings on the 
origins of the loan fund system in Ireland highlighted two pamphlets which he felt 
were important to the early philosophical development of loan fund principles in 
Ireland.14 These were Henry Maxwell’s Reasons offer’d for erecting a bank in 
Ireland15 and David Bindon’s A scheme for supplying industrious men with money to 
carry on their trade and for better providing for the poor of Ireland.16 Maxwell’s 
pamphlet argued for the creation of a national bank in Ireland. He argued that if a 
bank was established in Ireland, among its benefits would be an increase in 
employment through an expansion of credit.17 Bindon’s pamphlet argued for the 
creation of lending institutions along similar principles to the Amsterdam bank.  
Bindon, through comparing the rate of interest in Ireland to that in Holland, believed 
that the lower rate of interest in Holland gave Dutch traders an unfair advantage over 
those in Ireland as they had cheaper access to capital. Bindon’s argument was that the 
export of specie from Ireland caused by absentee landlords and spending of money 
abroad decreased the money supply in Ireland.18 Bindon believed that ‘the scarcity of 
money in Ireland, deprives the common people of a great part of the necessary means 
of their subsistence: And this encreases (sic.) the number of beggars and idle people 
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among us, and makes others fly the country.’19 He believed that if banks were 
established nationwide using a similar model to that used by the Amsterdam bank, 
which lent money on pledge, this would reduce interest rates in Ireland, and enable 
Ireland to compete with Dutch trade. He believed that the increased production caused 
by the greater circulation of credit would increase the amount of goods produced in 
the Irish economy, and ergo increase the national wealth in Ireland. 
There is a slight flaw with Bindon’s argument as he seems to have confused two 
distinct Dutch financial institutions. The more commonly known Bank of 
Amsterdam,20 the Wisselbank, was primarily a payments and exchange bank.21 
According to Dehing and ’T Hart: 
Not included were tasks like the discounting of bills of exchange, portfolio management, 
the issue of bank notes and the provision of credit. Its business was predominantly a 
matter of transfer between accounts with the aim to undo the confusion of the currency.22 
 
The Bank which bears closest resemblance to that described by Bindon is the 
Amsterdam Banken van Leening (Banks of Loans) which was established in 1614.23 
The Banken van Leening was derived from a number of pawnbroking institutions that 
were nationalised. Following their nationalisation municipal authorities outlawed 
other pawnbroking institutions and the Banken van Leening were given monopoly 
status. Bindon is correct in his view that these institutions lowered interest rates for 
borrowers,24 but it must also be borne in mind that Amsterdam, at the time when 
Bindon wrote his pamphlet, was the largest financial centre in the world. The reason 
why interest rates were low was more likely due to the actions of the Bank of 
Amsterdam rather than the Banken van Leening, and also to the fact that large 
amounts of capital flowed into Amsterdam and pushed down rates.25  The Dutch 
financial system also improved on a number of financial innovations, most notably 
the joint stock company. For example the Dutch East India Company (VOC from the 
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initials for Vereenigte Oost-Indiche Compagnie) was a joint stock company financed 
through the issue of shares, and these shares were also traded on secondary markets.26 
This again would suggest that there was more to Dutch commercial success than a 
pawnbroking institution. 
 That being said, Bindon’s economics are not what are important to the current 
argument; rather it is the institution which he advocated. Bindon’s proposed loan fund 
system was one that would lend sums of money on pledges.27 Loan terms would be 
for one year and pledges could be recovered if the sum was repaid at the end of the 
year. If a loan was not repaid, then the pledge would be sold at auction. Discount 
would be charged on the principal borrowed,28 and higher discount rates were to be 
charged on small sums being borrowed.29 Bindon’s system also advocated that profits 
accruing from lending be used to finance ‘persons incapable of earning a living’.30 
Bindon preferred lending to be secured with pledges rather than with personal 
security. This was because he believed pledges to be more practical and that a surety 
system would likely be abused. Bindon observed that: 
It may perhaps be objected against establishments of this kind, that our common people 
have nothing of value to pawn for the money they want, and that therefore it wou’d 
answer the end better, to lend them money on personal securities. But tho’ it is allowed 
our people are, for the most part, in the miserable condition of having little of value 
about them, yet it is known that most of them, who now borrow money, do so on pledges 
of one kind or another, and if they are able any way to live under the usury they now pay, 
must it not follow, that in a little time, their circumstances will be much bettered, by the 
ease they will find in these houses. But to lend money on personal security, besides that 
it would render the repayment of the money less secure, will too much fetter the industry 
of the people. For as it is a true observation that the borrower is a slave to the lender, so 
he, especially among the common sort of people who is obliged to procure another to be 
bound for him stands in the same degree of servitude not only towards the lenders, but 
also to the person who is bound for him. Insomuch that whilst money can only be had by 
them on personal securities, such loans will ever be attended with great inconveniences, 
but when the common people find they can on any emergency, obtain money on pledges, 
it is not natural to believe, and the experience of Holland proves this, that they will grow 
thrifty in their expences, and careful to furnish themselves, and their houses, with good 
and decent apparel, ornaments and utensils, which in time of need, may become sureties, 
(if I may express it) for them…(sic.)31 
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Bindon’s proposed plan was not introduced in the eighteenth century, and the loan 
funds that were established differed in key areas. Primarily they did not charge 
interest, had shorter loan terms and lent on personal security rather than on pledges. 
As noted above, the first loan fund that operated in Ireland is believed to have 
been established by Dean Swift. There is some contemporary evidence of Swift’s loan 
fund in the work of Samuel Madden.32 This contemporary evidence seems credible, as 
Samuel Madden was reported to have been a personal friend of Dean Swift.33 But it is 
uncertain where Swift encountered the idea of lending money to the industrious poor. 
R. R. Madden postulated that perhaps Dean Swift was introduced to it by his friend 
William Temple.34 It is also possible that he had read Bindon’s pamphlet or arrived at 
the idea independently. When Samuel Madden was discussing Swift’s loan fund, he 
linked it with his discussion of Bindon’s proposal. Samuel Madden advocated micro-
level solutions for the Irish economic malaise and Bindon’s proposal for Lombard 
houses in Ireland appealed to him, although he stated that: 
…till we can find many such publick spirited persons as the Dean of St. Patrick’s to lend 
considerable sums, in this charitable way, at the common interest to the poor, it would be 
very desirable, that we were allowed to try the effects it wou’d have on our people and 
trade for a few years at least. (sic.)35 
 
Swift operated a loan fund in the area of Dublin where he resided. He lent 
money to ‘industrious poor’ weavers in his diocese. The mode of operation of Swift’s 
scheme was as follows. Before applicants came to the manager they needed a 
recommendation from a reputable person.36 The borrower would then be given a 
small sum of money, interest free, and was required to repay this within a given 
period of time. Larger sums could be obtained if there were reports made of the 
borrower being thrifty and industrious. The repaid loans were then re-circulated as 
loans among other industrious persons. As a deterrent, the idle and improvident were 
excluded from further loans.37 The success of Dean Swift’s loan fund can be 
attributed to the screening and monitoring arrangement that he practised. Allegedly he 
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personally monitored all borrowers by continuously checking up on them to see how 
they were progressing.38  
Perhaps the success of the Dean Swift’s loan fund can be found in the practice 
of discriminating between those who were deemed ‘industrious poor’ and those 
deemed to be ‘undeserving’ poor.39 An outline of the dichotomy of deserving and 
undeserving poor,40 which was to be constant throughout the nineteenth century, can 
be seen in A proposal for giving badges to the beggars in all the parishes of Dublin by 
the Dean of St. Patrick’s.41 There was a distinction between the deserving poor, who 
were not responsible for their state of poverty, and the undeserving, whose actions 
were believed to have brought about their state of poverty. For example Dean Swift 
wrote that: 
There is generally a vagabond spirit in beggars, which ought to be discouraged and 
severely punished. It is owing to the same causes that drove them into poverty, I mean, 
idleness, drunkenness, and rash marriages without the least prospect of supporting a 
family by honest endeavours, which never came into their thoughts. It is observed that 
hardly one beggar in twenty looks upon himself to be relieved by receiving bread or 
other food; and they have in this town been frequently seen to pour out of their pitcher 
good broth that had given to them, into the kennel; neither do they much regard clothes, 
unless to sell them; for their rags are part of their tools with which they work; they want 
only ale, brandy, and other strong liquors, which cannot be had without money; and 
money, as they conceive, always abounds in the metropolis.42  
  
So perhaps Swift’s screening and monitoring processes, of choosing those 
whom he deemed industrious and making sure they used the money accordingly, 
ensured a successful loan fund operation. Or rather, that borrowing was not an 
entitlement but instead borrowers had to prove that they were eligible for a loan.43 It 
appears as though the loan fund administered by Dean Swift ceased working with his 
death.44 
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Another loan fund society that adhered to similar principles as Dean Swift’s loan fund 
principles was the Charitable Musical Society (CMS) of Dublin, which began 
operating in the mid-eighteenth century. The CMS raised funds from an annual 
concert it held in Dublin and also from bequests and donations from ‘people of 
distinction’.45 The fund operated in a similar fashion to Dean Swift’s, in that loans 
were small and confined to the industrious poor in a given locality. The operation of 
the CMS grew steadily from its establishment in 1756 until its incorporation in the 
parliamentary session of 1777-7846 for lending money to ‘indigent tradesmen.’47  The 
first annual report of the LFB, in 1839, stated that: 
…The existing mangers of that society were, with several public officers, incorporated in 
1778 (by the 17 & 18 Geo. 3, c. 12,) as a Charitable Loan Society, giving them extensive 
 powers to hold property, and to open branches throughout the country. Legacies have 
been left to the Society, but its funds are now greatly diminished, many of the branches 
are extinct, and such as remain have no connexion whatever to the parent Musical 
Society in Dublin.48 
 
The legislation facilitated the recovery of debts from defaulting borrowers and 
the Irish legislature also wished to encourage the spread of similar loan fund 
institutions.  
A pamphlet written by the registrar of the CMS, Charles Laurent, in 1792 
outlined the potential benefits if similar loan fund societies were established 
throughout the island. Charles Laurent stated that: 
Experience for some years past, has proved that in Dublin, loans interest free to indigent, 
industrious manufactures, and tradesmen have been of very great service. But as it is 
universally allowed, large cities are not proper places for manufacturers, it is proposed to 
introduce cash loans, loans for looms, wheels, hosier’s frames, &c. at the discretion of 
each society into the different baronies, parishes, and towns throughout the kingdom, 
where provisions are much cheaper, temptations to corruption, frauds &c. do not so often 
present themselves, and where opportunities to drunkenness are less frequent. From these 
and many other considerations, it is much to be wished that charitable loans were 
established throughout the several parts of this kingdom49 
 
Laurent calculated that if a society had a cash fund of £350, it could within 6 
months ‘relieve’ 287 people, although he did not specify what exactly it would 
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‘relieve’ them from. This would be done if 3 guineas50 were lent to each person and 
repaid on a monthly basis of ½ a guinea. Laurent then assumed that each family had 5 
members; thus, 1285 people could be relieved with a £350 initial loan fund.51 It is 
unclear whether Laurent meant that the fund would be continually relent as loan 
repayments were made, since his initial calculations do not seem to add up.52 Laurent 
also believed that the expansion of loan funds could influence the behaviour of the 
lower classes. Laurent suggested that: 
Instead of the ruinous corporations which now retard the progress of industry, and 
threaten ruin to the trade of this kingdom, an honest emulation would be introduced 
among manufactures; they would by experience know the infinite value of honest, 
industry, and sobriety; by their good moral conduct and strict observation of the laws, 
they would establish such character as would recommend them to the notice of their 
superiors, and entitle them to the benefits of the loan.53 
 
Laurent’s view seems to be that if a loan is not extended to a borrower, because 
of bad character, the borrower would be forced to reform himself if he valued the 
loan. Although the CMS opened a number of branches, the legislation in 1778 seems 
to be its apogee. Madden summarised the working of the CMS as such: 
Subscriptions, and charitable bequests, preserved that institution several years, and many 
branches throughout Ireland were long in useful operation, but as no interest was 
chargeable to borrowers, the system languished – and might be said to have died out in 
the limited and unavailing efforts of a few benevolent individuals to carry on its objects, 
in the vestry of St Anne’s Church Dublin…The several charitable loan funds throughout 
the country connected with the musical society and those in the capital continued for 
many years under the sole management of benevolent individuals.54  
 
It was the efforts of benevolent managers that maintained the CMS, and when 
those managers passed away the branches fell into desuetude. However, there was 
evidence that the CMS was still operating in the 1840s; most notably it was registered 
with the LFB. In 1841 it was stated by the LFB that the capital of the CMS was 
invested in government bonds and that it was the interest from these investments that 
were issued as loans.55 A notice in Thom’s Directory for 1849 stated that: 
The governors of the Charitable Musical Society, incorporated by act of parliament in 
1777 (sic.), for lending money, interest free, to indigent tradesmen, meet at St. Anne’s 
vestry room, the first and second Tuesday in every month, at 12 o’clock, to lend not less 
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than two pounds, nor more than five, to any one person at any one time, which sums are 
to be repaid at sixpence in the pound weekly.56 
 
A number of societies formed on a loan fund basis in the early nineteenth 
century, one of which was the Meath Loan Society. It was established in 1809. This 
society lent sums of money, to be repaid on a weekly basis.57 A notice in the 1849 
Thom’s Directory stated that:  
The committee of managers meet every second Tuesday, and no. 37 Thomas court, for 
the purpose of lending on good security, sums not under five, and not exceeding twenty 
pounds (subject to the small charge of six pence in the pound in lieu of interest), to be re-
paid by weekly instalments of 2s 6d for £5; 5s for £10; 10s for £20. 
Applications for loans are received every day through the letter box in the office 
window.58 
 
Other societies formed on this basis were found in Derry, Kilkenny, 
Enniscorthy, Carrigaline Cork, Londonderry and Tyrone.59 Some information is 
available from the Derry charitable loan institution regarding borrower profile and 
loan size. The average loan size can be seen in figure 1.1. The average loan size 
decreased in the period 1810 to 1823. Tentatively this decrease can be explained by 
the end of the Napoleonic wars and the recession that ensued. 
Figure 1.1 
Real and nominal average loan in the Derry Charitable loan institution, 
1810-1823
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Sources: Society for improving the condition of the Irish peasantry, Charitable loan institutions 
(Dublin?, 1823?) and Frank Geary and Tom Stark, ‘Trends in real wages during the industrial 
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revolution: a view from across the Irish Sea’ in Economic History Review, lvii, 2 (2004), pp 
362-395. 
 
Information on the borrowers and the loan procedures can be seen from the following 
extract: 
The borrowers consisted of weavers, glaziers, carpenters – to purchase tools, &.c; basket 
women, butchers, bakers, colliers, poor housekeepers & c. &c., in short, of all industrious 
poor people who could procure security for the repayment of it, publicans were not 
admitted as claimants or as sureties. The loan was repaid at the rate of 6 d in the pound 
per week, and re-lent as received. The advantages of this system, were proved in many 
ways; in a moral point of view, they have been great, particularly since it was the 
obvious interest of the borrowers to preserve their characters of honesty, sobriety, and 
punctuality, or they could not procure sureties.60  
 
The earlier loan fund societies shared some features that were to be 
characteristic of the loan fund societies that developed from the 1820s onwards. These 
were the repayment procedures: all three utilised a regular weekly repayment of an 
equal amount of money. The complete principal of the loan did not remain in the 
hands of the borrower for the entire loan term, and normally repayment commenced 
after one week. Each loan fund had a preference for personal security and the use of 
sureties to secure the loan. The main divergence of later loan fund societies was in the 
introduction of the payment of discount on loans, and in the acceptance of interest 
bearing deposits.    
 
1.3 Loan fund legislation and regulation, 1823-1844 
 
The loan fund system in Ireland underwent significant changes in the early 1820s and 
received the attention of the UK legislature.61 Acts of parliament in 1823, 1836, 1838 
and 1843 culminated in a regulated system of loan funds that were supervised by a 
legislatively imposed body. The 1843 act solidified the regulatory apparatus of the 
LFB system in Ireland and the system was essentially unchanged for the duration of 
its existence.62 
It was alluded to in the introductory chapter of this thesis that the clamour to 
introduce legislatively imposed poor relief in the 1830s may have influenced the 
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development and expansion of loan fund societies in Ireland. Another highly 
significant backdrop to the expansion of loan funds was a number of banking crises 
and failures in the 1810s and early 1820s; these are discussed in chapter 3. Thus, for a 
brief period, due to a flux in the banking market, the loan funds introduced in the 
early nineteenth century occupied a significant role in the Irish financial structure.  
 
Table 1.1: Acts of parliament relating to loan funds in Ireland 1778-1906  
Act Year 
Incorporation of the charitable Musical society in Dublin’, 17 & 18 
Geo 3. c 12., [Ire.] 
1777-78 
An Act for the Amendment of the Laws respecting Charitable Loan 
Societies in Ireland (4 Geo 4) c. 32.  
1823 
An Act to amend an Act of the Fourth Year of His present Majesty, for 
the Amendment of the Laws respecting Charitable Loan Societies in 
Ireland (10 Geo. 4) c. 42. 
1829 
An Act to amend the Laws relating to Loan Societies in Ireland (6 & 7 
Will. 4) c. 55. 
1836 
An Act for the Amendment of the Laws relating to Loan Societies in 
Ireland (1 & 2 Vict.) c. 78. 
1838 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws for the Regulation of 
Charitable Loan Societies in Ireland (6 & 7 Vict.) c. 91. 
1843 
An Act to amend an Act of the last Session, to consolidate and amend 
the Laws for the Regulation of Charitable Loan Societies in Ireland (7 
& 8 Vict.) c. 38. 
1844 
Loan Societies ( Ireland) Act, 1843, Amendment Act, 1872 (35 & 36 
Vict.) c. 17. 
1872 
Charitable Loan Societies ( Ireland) Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vict.) c. 25. 1900 
Charitable Loan Societies ( Ireland) Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7) c. 23. 1906 
 
 
1.3.1 Organisation and management 
 
In the preamble to the 1823 act it was stated that: 
 
Whereas certain Institutions for charitable loans have been and may be established in 
Ireland, as well as for providing implements of industry for the labouring classes of His 
Majesty's Subjects there; and it is expedient to amend the laws concerning the same, and 
to give protection to the funds of such institutions, and to afford encouragement to the 
formation of other institutions of a like kind…, that if any number of persons who have 
formed or shall form any society in any part of Ireland, for the purpose of establishing a 
society for a charitable Loan, or for providing implements of labour by way of Loan, for 
the industrious classes in Ireland, or for providing implements of labour, and receiving 
back payment for the same by instalments, with the legal Interest due thereon, 
reinvesting the capital of the said societies, and the interest thereof, for the like purposes, 
and only deducting therefrom so much as shall be required to be retained for the payment 
of the necessary expences attending the management of such institutions, according to 
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such rules, orders and regulations as shall have been or shall be agreed to for such 
purpose, but deriving no benefit whatever from such capital, or the interest thereof…63 
 
An extremely important point to note from the preamble to the 1823 act, and 
from subsequent acts, is that the Irish LFB loan funds were not  financial mutuals in 
the sense that membership was a requirement for borrowing and savings rights. 
Membership in LFB loan fund societies was confined to debenture holders or the 
trustees of a fund for lending to the ‘industrious classes’, but the borrowers were not 
members. This is an important point in the context of financial institutions that we 
will discuss in other chapters of this thesis, and therefore it is important to clarify it 
here.  The preamble to the 1836 act was very much the same as the 1823 act stating 
that: 
 …it shall and may be lawful to and for any number of persons in Ireland to form 
themselves into and to establish a society in Ireland, for the purpose of raising from time 
to time, by loans from the members of such society or from other persons at a rate of 
interest not exceeding six per cent per annum, or by donations, a stock or fund for the 
purpose of granting loans to the industrious classes resident therein…64 
 
The 1843 act had the same stipulation, except that the society was able to 
borrow from members and non-members for the purpose of lending to the industrious 
poor at a rate of 5 per cent per annum: 
That it shall and may be lawful to and for any number of persons in Ireland, subject to 
the restrictions and regulations herein-after provided, to form themselves into a society in 
Ireland in any district or place in which it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the said 
Loan Fund Board that such society is required, and such society shall and may raise from 
time to time by loans from the members of such society, or from other Persons, at a rate 
of interest not exceeding five pounds per centum per annum, or by donations, a stock or 
fund for the purpose of granting loans to the industrious classes resident therein…65 
 
The most notable change in the citations from the acts of parliament is that by 
1843 is was becoming more difficult to establish societies for the purpose of lending 
to the ‘industrious classes’. We can see that by 1843 there were significant barriers 
erected for the establishment of new socieities. They had to first get the approval of 
the LFB, but also they were no longer permitted to pay 6 per cent on borrowed funds.  
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The loan fund legislation was to apply to any society that submitted its rules to the 
Clerk of the Peace.66 These rules and regulations were to show how each individual 
loan society would operate, and to show that it was a charitable concern. Further 
legislation had the same requirements, although with the creation of the LFB the 
societies were required to register their rules for them to be certified.67 The rules of 
loan fund had to be produced in any legal action involving the society. 
The acts stated that no officers should receive any remuneration for the 
positions they held.68 This meant that trustees, treasurers and secretary positions were 
voluntary. The only persons who could receive any salary from a loan fund were 
clerks,69 as they were responsible for the day-to-day running of the society. This was 
reiterated in the various acts. The loan funds were effectively trustee credit banks.70 
The legal recognition of the loan fund societies enabled lending contracts to be 
formally acknowledged and this facilitated the operations of the loan funds as it 
enabled debt enforcement. There were consistent features in all of the acts, 
specifically in relation to loan recovery and stamp duty. Loan fund activities were 
excluded from tax in the form of stamp duty.71 The societies were also to be given 
some assistance in recovering debts by being able to sue for the amounts in the Petty 
Sessions rather than in quarter sessions or with the Justice of the Peace in the district 
of the society. Hollis and Sweetman observed that ‘this made loan funds preferred 
over creditors (such as merchants, landlords, and moneylenders) who had not paid the 
stamp tax since “A loan fund decree can always be obtained sooner than a quarter 
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sessions decree.” Banks typically required borrowers to pay for the stamp to ensure 
their priority as a creditor.72 
There were no special arrangements for loan recovery under the 1823 loan fund 
act, with loan funds required to sue under civil bills at before either Barristers at 
Quarter Sessions or before Justices at the Peace in the areas where the loan fund was 
established, provided that the amount being sued was not over £10.73 From 1836 the 
loan fund societies registered under the acts had access to quicker legal proceedings in 
Petty Session courts when pursuing debt defaulters, in either the jurisdiction of the 
loan fund or where the borrower resided.74  Under the arrangements from 1836 
onwards, the Justice of the Peace could issue summonses to defaulting borrowers to 
appear before the Petty Sessions. This gave them a more streamlined, frequent and 
inexpensive method of debt recovery. This entitlement for loan funds held under the 
condition that the amount for which they were suing did not exceed £10, and therefore 
was not violating the acts. Other areas of the legislation differed from act to act, 
notably in terms of lending policies, savings and regulation. 
 
1.3.2 Loans, savings and profits 
 
The 1823 act set a limit on the amount which loan funds could lend to a single 
individual. This was set at £10 in a 12-month period. The limit of £10 was a 
consistent feature of all the loan fund legislation,75 but with shorter twenty-week loan 
terms,76 and both the limit and term were to remain in place until the discontinuation 
of loan fund societies in the mid-twentieth century.77 Loan renewals were also illegal 
                                                 
72
 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microcredit in prefamine Ireland’ in Explorations in Economic 
History, xxxv (1998), p. 361. 
73
 An Act for the Amendment of the Laws respecting Charitable Loan Societies in Ireland, 1823 (4 Geo 
4), c. 32, section v. 
74
 An act to amend the laws relating to loan societies in Ireland (6 & 7 Will. 4), c. 55, section xvi; An 
Act for the Amendment of the Laws relating to Loan Societies in Ireland, 1838 (1 & 2 Vict.) c. 78, 
section xxiv; and An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws for the Regulation of Charitable Loan 
Societies in Ireland, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict.) c. 91, section xxx. 
75
 An act for the amendment of the laws respecting charitable loan societies in Ireland, 1823 (4 Geo. 
4.), c. 32, section iv; An act to amend the laws relating to loan societies in Ireland, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 
4), c. 55, section xiii; An act to consolidate and amend the laws for the regulation of charitable loan 
societies in Ireland, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict.), c. 91, section xxiv. 
76
 An Act to amend the Laws relating to Loan Societies in Ireland, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4) c. 55, section 
xv; An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws for the Regulation of Charitable Loan Societies in 
Ireland, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict.) c. 91, section xxvii. 
77
 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘The life-cycle of a microfinance institution: the Irish loan 
funds’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, xlvi (2001), p. 309. 
 46 
under the legislation, as ‘no second or other loan shall be made to the same Individual 
until the previous loan is repaid’.78 The limit of £10 was quite high for the period, and 
will be discussed later in this chapter. The 1823 act did not place any limit on the rate 
of interest that could be charged on loans; this was decided by the loan funds 
themselves. But abuses in the use of profits derived from lending led to restrictions on 
the amount of interest charged in subsequent acts. The 1836 and 1838 acts placed a 
limit on the amount of interest that could be charged. The rate of discount on loans 
was 6 pence in the pound.79 This was calculated by contemporaries as being an 
annualised rate of interest of 12 per cent per annum.80 The loan term was set at 20 
weeks, and loans were repaid in weekly instalments. The 1843 act reduced the rate of 
discount from 6 pence in the pound to 4 pence in the pound,81 which corresponded to 
a decrease in interest from 12 per cent per annum to 8 per cent per annum.82  
Whilst this reduction in the interest charged on loans would have been 
immediately beneficial to borrowers who were paying higher rates, it also decreased 
the revenue from loans to the loan fund societies and thereby decreased profitability 
and commercial sustainability. A useful comparison for the analysis of the Irish loan 
fund societies is the experience of the Parisian Mont-de-Piété, a charitable money 
lender in Paris. The Parisian Mont-de-Piété reduced its interest rates under the 
auspices that the decrease in interest would attract more interest sensitive borrowers 
from higher socio-economic groups, and that a greater number of larger borrowers 
would cross-subsidise the smaller borrowers. The findings of the Parisian Mont-de-
Piété were that small loans were actually cost neutral or even loss making; thus it was 
imperative to lend to larger borrowers.83 What does this tell us about the Irish loan 
funds? Firstly, small loans are costly and a reduction in interest rates will reduce the 
revenue per loan from a loan fund society’s perspective. Secondly, the £10 restriction 
meant that cross-subsidisation would not have been possible. Loan fund societies 
were not able to lend larger amounts to more profitable borrowers. Thus, societies 
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operating at a loss could not continue operating and would have to cease lending. But 
the acts gave the loan fund societies another source of revenue in the form of fines. 
Borrowers who were late in their repayments were required to pay fines. It seems that 
fines were frequently used by many loan funds in lieu of lost interest, as fines were 
included in the calculation of sources of revenue in many of the LFB annual reports. 
The 1823 act did not make reference to savings functions of loan fund societies, 
but subsequent legislation did. The 1836 act gave loan fund societies the right to hold 
interest paying deposits. The preamble to the 1836 act stated: 
That it shall and may be lawful to and for any number of persons in Ireland to form 
themselves into and to establish a Society in Ireland , for the purpose of raising from 
time to time, by loans from the members of such society or from other persons at a rate 
of interest not exceeding six per cent. per annum , or by donations, a stock or fund for the 
purpose of granting loans to the industrious classes resident therein, and receiving back 
payment for the same by Instalments, with Interest thereon.84 
 
The maximum rate of interest that loan funds could pay was 6 per cent per 
annum on debentures and deposits. The holding of deposits to make loans effectively 
transformed the loan fund societies from simple lending institutions into financial 
intermediaries. The loan fund societies were able to offer a higher interest rate than 
was offered by other contemporary savings institutions. The 1843 act reduced the 
maximum amount of interest that was payable by the loan fund societies from 6 per 
cent to 5 per cent.85 This reduction in the maximum amount of interest that could be 
offered by loan fund societies corresponded to the decrease in the maximum amount 
of interest charged on loans. The decreases in interest rates reduced the potential 
interest spread from 6 per cent to 3 per cent.86 This reduction in interest spread 
effectively made the business of loan fund societies, operating at the margins of 
efficiency, unsustainable.  The reduction of interest rates was not to be changed by 
further legislation during the course of the nineteenth century. The importance of 
deposits to the loan funds, as to other financial intermediaries, is that they enable an 
intermediary to expand its operations by increasing the potential to lend larger sums. 
Legislatively imposed interest maximums prevented loan funds charging rates above 
the limit and thereby restrained the loan funds from adequately pursuing expansion 
via savings mobilisation. 
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The 1838 act stated that the officers of a loan fund were not personally responsible for 
the security of a debenture in a loan fund, and if a society was wound up the officers 
would not be responsible for the repayment of deposits or debentures unless they 
declared they would do so in writing.87 This lack of security for debentures put 
debenture holders in a precarious position if a society collapsed; there would be no 
way of retrieving their investment. The LFB could also not be held responsible, as it 
was not the body that issued the debenture. This lack of security for debenture holders 
led many debenture holders to become more actively involved with the running of 
loan fund societies.  
The issue on the application of profits accruing from the activities of loan fund 
societies was inadequately addressed by the 1823 act and led to the possibility of 
abuses taking place within loan funds. The acts of 1836 and 1838 stated that profits 
arising from the operation of the loan fund societies, rather than be used to create a 
reserve fund for the individual societies, were to be applied to any charitable venture 
in the locality of the loan funds.88 This reiterated the charitable nature of the loan 
society system, in that any potential profit that was made from the intermediary nature 
of the loan fund was not to be used for the benefit of anyone associated with the 
society, but rather for the benefit of a local charitable consideration. The issue of what 
to do with the profits accrued by the operation of a loan society was dealt with in the 
1843 act. A loan fund was required to create a reserve fund from no less than one-
tenth of profits for the ‘security of debenture holders’, and to use the remainder for 
‘such other charitable or useful local purpose’.89 The benefit of applying the profits to 
charitable causes was that it enabled the loan fund socieites to serve two charitable 
functions in the one institution. It enabled the loan fund societies to offer cheap 
sources of credit to those who were in need, and it enabled them to apply any profit 
derived from such activity to local charitable institutions who were in need of such 
money. The financing of charitable ventures hypothetically gave dual benefits to the 
loan fund societies. Firstly, they would give loans to the poor and address issues of 
poverty. Secondly, any profits derived from these activities would be used to finance 
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a local charitable institution, such as a hospital or infirmary,90 but only if the society 
received ‘the approbation of the said Loan Fund Board’.91  
 
1.3.3 Supervisory body – the Loan Fund Board 
 
The early legislation in relation to the loan fund system was concerned with the 
demarcation of loan fund activities, but the legislation from 1836 to 1843 created a 
supervisory body delegated to regulate the loan fund system. The 1836 act established 
a Board, the LFB, for ‘the general control and superintendence of all loan fund 
societies established in Ireland under the authority of this act’.92  The LFB was given 
authority over the existing loan fund societies, and authority over any societies that 
wished to form following the acts.  
The supervisory powers of the LFB were ostensibly quite vast, and the acts of 
1838 and 1843 refined its role. The 1836 act gave the LFB powers ‘to inspect the 
books, accounts, and papers of or belonging to such societies.’93 These powers were 
renewed in subsequent acts.94 The LFB had no powers to dissolve societies under the 
1836 act. The only action it could take to reprimand an offending society was to 
publicise its misdeeds in a local newspaper and disqualify the offending society from 
the benefits of the act.95 The 1838 act gave the LFB the authority to reduce salaries 
and expenses of a society if they were deemed to be excessive.96 The LFB was given 
greater powers in relation to loan societies which did not adhere to their stated rules, 
or to charlatan societies. Under the 1838 legislation the LFB was given the power to 
wind up any such society whereas previously all that could be done was to have the 
offending loan society gazetted. Now, after investigation to see whether a society had 
not adhered to its rules or had misapplied profits, instead of simply advertising this 
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fact the LFB, after notifying the society and the Clerk of the Peace, could have the 
society wound up and place the society in receivership.97 Although the LFB was no 
longer a toothless administrative body, its powers were limited by the fact that the 
said loan societies were given leave to appeal, and the process could, in relative terms, 
evolve into an expensive undertaking. This potentially expensive process was 
exacerbated by the board’s shortage of money.  The 1843 act did not make major 
alterations to the LFB’s ability to deal with offending societies. The LFB’s powers 
were marginally increased in relation to its ability to deal with loan societies that 
reneged on their stated rules or misapplied their profits. It was stated that after due 
investigation, it would withdraw the certificate from the offending society, the notice 
would be advertised in a local newspaper, and the society could be dissolved. 
Although the offending party had the right of appeal.98 Loan fund societies were 
required to register and submit a copy of their rules to the LFB.99 If a loan fund 
society failed to register, or violated the rules under which it had registered, then it 
was to be excluded from the benefits of the acts and disallowed from suing for any 
outstanding loans.  
The LFB’s role was limited to that of supervisory body; thus the loan fund 
societies operated on a decentralised basis. Under the 1838 act and the 1843 act, each 
loan fund society was required to produce an annual report for submission to the LFB 
and in turn the LFB was required to produce an annual report on the workings of the 
loan fund system for parliament. The annual reports were essentially dual reports, a 
report on the operations of loan funds in a given calendar year and on the operations 
of the LFB in the same year. 
Although the LFB was established by the 1836 act, there was no specific 
reference to the financing of the body within the act. It was only stated that the LFB 
would be financed by ‘public grant or private donations.’100 Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
additional legislation was required to rectify this problem. The LFB was given a 
budget of £600 a year for salaries and offices in the 1838 act.101 The 1838 act also 
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enabled the LFB to make loans to individual loan fund societies.102 This gave the LFB 
the potential importance to act as a lender to the funds under its supervision which 
required additional funds or were experiencing financial difficulties. In theory this 
would have made a great addition to the system, as it could have created a shadow 
non-profit banking sector, but the LFB was never to have the sustained finances  to 
allow it to occupy this role. 
 While the budget of the LFB was established by the 1838 act, the source of 
funds to finance the budget was not specified. This was rectified by the 1843 act 
which stated that the LFB would derive income from the sale of notes to the 
individual loan fund societies. The notes sold by the LFB came in the form of 
promissory notes for loan applications and forms for debentures for savings.103 The 
price for each promissory note for borrowers applying for a loan was 1 penny and the 
price of a form for someone wishing to lodge a debenture was 2 shillings. In 1855 an 
inquiry was held into the general loan fund system in Ireland, the LFB loan funds and 
RLF loan funds. Evidence from this committee showed that during the period 1843 to 
1860 the LFB did not have major difficulties regarding finance through the sale of 
notes. This is evident in the schemes for the creation of an auditing system for the 
savings banks104 and loan funds that R. R. Madden, the LFB secretary, proposed be 
funded by the LFB’s streams of revenue.105 The LFB held some government bonds, 
and the dividend payments on such bonds was also a source of income. 
The 1843 and 1844 acts were the last significant pieces of legislation in relation 
to the loan fund system. However, the loan fund system was seriously affected by the 
famine in the 1840s. Since the provisions of the 1843 act were based on the workings 
of the loan fund system prior to the famine, they were inadequate for the system as it 
evolved after the famine. Despite calls from the LFB, and recommendations from the 
1855 committee of inquiry,106 no new legislation was passed in the immediate 
aftermath of the famine. The legislation and regulation which supported the loan fund 
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system in the pre-famine era was to be the same in the post-famine environment. This 
is significant, as the lack of reform was to have serious repercussions in the late 
nineteenth century. 
 
1.4 Information asymmetry: Monitoring and screening 
 
The loan fund system, before the creation of the LFB, was based on informal 
screening and monitoring in local areas. The LFB added an external monitoring 
mechanism to this structure. Theoretically, the loan funds used local information to 
overcome asymmetric information problems that were hindering banking 
development in Ireland. The loan funds were a well screened and monitored 
institutional group, and there should not have been failures due to a shortage of 
screening or monitoring. Therefore, in theory exogenous shocks may explain failures 
but endogenously created shocks ought not to, assuming that the monitoring structures 
functioned perfectly and that everyone did their duty.  
The argument of this thesis is that more emphasis was placed on monitoring 
borrowers, lower tier agency problems, than on monitoring staff, higher tier agency 
problems, and this may explain loan fund failures during the famine period. 
 
1.4.1 Lower tier agency problems: Screening and monitoring borrowers 
 
The loan funds used a screening process to overcome problems of adverse selection, 
where bad borrowers are chosen instead of good borrowers. They overcame the 
problem of adverse selection by screening the potential borrowers when borrowers 
applied for a loan. The committee was supposed to have some local knowledge and 
the committee, combined with the clerks, would be able to informally screen 
borrowers. The procedure for a loan application worked as follows.  Aspiring 
borrowers would fill out an application card, and provide two solvent sureties. The 
cost of the application card was 1 penny, and it was paid to the clerk.  
Charles Piesse, the first secretary to the LFB, wrote instructions for the 
formation of a loan fund in 1841. In these instructions, Piesse recommended that: 
These papers are to be laid weekly before the Committee, who should have sufficient 
local knowledge to enable them to judge of the sufficiency of the sureties offered, and of 
the moral worth of the applicant.107 
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Piesse advocated that the management of the loan fund make enquiries into the object 
of the loan. There was a division amongst practitioners as to the extent to which 
inquiries should go, and whether overly zealous inquisitions were a violation of 
privacy. Charles Piesse stated that: 
The most active supporters of the Loan Fund System are divided in opinion as to the 
principles on which it should be conducted – the one party maintaining that the Loan 
Fund should be a mere Bank of Discount, issuing loans solely on the solvency of sureties 
without reference to the character of the borrower, or the object for which he procures 
the loan; deprecating what they deem a petty inquisitorial tribunal unnecessarily prying 
into the affairs of the people; the other – which were are bound to say is by far the largest 
section – arguing, that the Loan Fund should be if not a decidedly charitable, at least a 
moral institution, and that every application for a loan should be scrutinised not only as 
regards the solvency of the security offered, but with reference to the moral characters of 
the parties offering as borrowers and sureties, and the object to which the money is to be 
applied.108 
 
Rev. Irwin in his evidence to the committee on loan fund societies in 1855 
described the situation in the Portadown loan fund where borrowers had to go to the 
loan fund and give notice that they wished to apply for a loan.109 These transaction 
costs could also have acted as a screening method to ensure that only good borrowers 
applied, since if a borrower lived some distance from the loan fund he or she would 
have to forego a day’s work in order to apply. Rev. Irwin calculated the costs of 
screening to a borrower, which were 1 penny for the application card, 1 penny for the 
promissory note and approximately 2 shillings for the cost of hiring sureties for the 
day.110 The sureties had to be present when a borrower was applying for a loan. 
Monitoring arrangements undertaken by loan funds also enabled them to 
overcome problems of ex ante and ex post moral hazard. One of the monitoring tools 
utilised by the loan funds was the repayment schedule that they used. Charles Piesse 
believed that the loan fund system adapted specifically to the indolent Irish working 
classes in that the weekly repayment of loans was intended to ensure that the loan 
fund received its money back and that there was no default from borrowers. If there 
was a default problem it would be noticed within a week and swift action could be 
taken by the loan fund society. Piesse stated that the repayment schedule was: 
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….adapted to the correction of some marked defects in the character of the working 
classes of Ireland. Their lack of energy is stimulated by the necessity of making the 
weekly repayments, and habits of punctuality are superinduced.111 
  
The cost of monitoring was borne by the borrower. Rev. Irwin estimated the 
cost of this monitoring arrangement as being 1 shilling, or 1 penny for each trip to the 
loan fund to repay loans.112 Rev. Irwin’s calculations were based on the distance that a 
borrower lived from a loan fund, so that the cost actually varied depending on the 
borrower’s distance from a loan fund.  
The loan funds also used fines as means of ensuring effective repayment. If a 
borrower missed a repayment he was fined 1penny, and the fines would increase with 
each default. There was supposed to be a limit to the amount that could be fined, or 
rather a limit to the number of permitted defaults, until legal action would be taken. 
Loan funds took legal action if a borrower did default, so the knowledge of this would 
have shown borrowers that there were costs to defaulting.  
Another monitoring tool was a condition for borrowing which required the 
borrower to provide two sureties. These sureties would act as guarantors for the loan 
in the case of default by the borrower. This meant that the monitoring of the borrower 
was delegated to the borrowers sureties. As they would be called on to repay the loan 
if the borrower defaulted, it was believed that they would monitor the borrowers 
behaviour, essentially transferring the risk of default from the loan fund to the surety. 
Piesse stated that: 
The effect of this arrangement is more certainly beneficial than at first sight would 
appear. It stimulates the borrower to the utmost exertion to keep well with his friends, 
who, if called on to pay any part of the debt, would naturally refuse to incur future risk; 
and beyond this consideration is a feeling of shame and disgrace attaching to the man 
who could let his friends be subjected to such loss; and those know little of the peasantry 
of Ireland who deem lightly of this feeling. It acts extensively and powerfully. Many 
cases have occurred in which the borrowers have submitted to the greatest privations 
rather than subject their sureties to be called upon…Nor are the persons who have 
become security idle spectators in the matter; they naturally feel an interest in the persons 
for whom they stake their credit, and have of course a certain influence with them.113 
 
These social pressures, or ‘peer monitoring’,114 from the sureties were effective 
monitoring instruments. Evidence to the parliamentary enquiry does not seem to 
suggest that there were faults with the system of ‘peer monitoring’, or of collusion 
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between borrowers and sureties, hence implying that these arrangements functioned 
adequately.  
The costs of screening and monitoring were passed on to the borrowers, thereby 
increasing the cost of borrowing. If 6d in the pound was calculated to be an interest 
rate of around 12 per cent per annum, the Rev. Irwin calculated an interest rate, 
including all transaction and supplementary costs, at being 130 per cent per annum.115 
Admittedly Rev. Irwin’s calculations include the maximum travel costs and surety 
costs; perhaps a borrower lived close to the loan fund and his kin acted as sureties. 
Rev. Irwin also said that ‘a very eminent mathematician differs from me.’116 Rev. 
Irwin’s experience of loan funds was that the borrowers repaid personally every week 
and presented themselves at the loan fund, but there was conflicting evidence that in 
some societies borrowers pooled their repayments and sent one person to repay, rather 
than everyone repaying at once.  But such a high cost may lead a reader to question if 
loan funds really did reduce the cost of credit. 
 
1.4.2 Higher tier agency problems – Screening and monitoring of staff 
The loan funds were not only credit disbursement institutions, they were also savings 
institutions. Agency problems can also affect savings institutions. Problems relating to 
adverse selection can arise if, for example, a manager is not competent to run the loan 
fund, and moral hazard can arise if the manager neglects to perform his duty, thereby 
endangering the depositors’ assets. It was necessary to monitor the institutions to 
protect against fraud and defalcation, but given that the management, the trustees, 
were not liable for deposits held by the society, this essentially created an ideal 
situation for moral hazard.117  The main flaw in the loan fund monitoring 
arrangements seems to have been in the monitoring of clerks. This would imply moral 
hazard in the role of management as they had no incentive to actively monitor the 
actions of clerks.  
Given how loan funds were structured, a considerable amount of power was 
devolved to the clerks. In many cases they were responsible for the day-to-day 
running of many societies and they also did the bookkeeping as they were responsible 
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for accepting loan repayments and deposits. The clerks were supposed to be 
monitored by the managers of the society, being the trustees, the secretary and the 
treasurer.  
The trustees were local notables and took up the positions voluntarily and did 
not receive any monetary rewards for their actions.118 Perhaps initially they became 
involved with the management out of some enthusiasm to improve the conditions of 
the industrious poor who resided in their locality. But after a period of time, and given 
that small credit and savings services do not have instantaneous effects, they might 
have become disillusioned with the operations as they had expected the loan funds to 
be a panacea for rural poverty. This could be classified as volunteering fatigue, and 
also, given that a humanitarian crisis unfolded in the form of the famine, there might 
have been a limit to the amount of time that the trustees could devote to the 
management of a loan fund. Whatever may have been the case it appears as though, in 
a number of the societies that failed, the managers did not perform their monitoring 
tasks. These tasks included periodically checking the accounts of the society and 
monitoring the activities of the clerk. As the trustees did not monitor the clerk and 
trusted him/her to run the loan fund, the clerk had both an incentive and an 
opportunity to commit fraud. 
The question must be asked, if the internal monitoring arrangements were not 
preventing fraud taking place, then perhaps some external monitoring mechanisms 
were available that could have stopped the fraud. Such external monitoring 
mechanisms did exist in the shape of the LFB. The LFB’s monitoring took two forms. 
One was the checking of the annual accounts which societies sent to it, and the other 
was the periodic audit of societies by an inspector hired by the LFB.  
Nevertheless, fraud still occurred. This came about since there was a shortage of 
staff in the LFB to deal with the annual accounts. Under the 1843 loan fund act LFB 
loan fund societies were supposed to have uniform accounting practices ‘in such 
manner and form as shall be directed or approved by the said Loan Fund Board’.119 
The evidence given by R. R. Madden portrayed the process of ordering annual 
accounts as being disorderly. Admittedly, this was not because of a fault of the LFB 
but was more due to a lack of standardisation in the accounting practices of the loan 
                                                 
118
 According to the law they were not supposed to receive payment. 
119
 An act to consolidate and amend the laws for the regulation of charitable loan societies in Ireland, 
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funds. Madden stated that the largest part of the LFB’s work was actually in arranging 
the accounts.120 The way in which the LFB dealt with the accounts was as follows: 
firstly the clerk in the LFB would examine the society’s report, and then if he noticed 
any discrepancy he would notify the inspector and the inspector would investigate.121 
The checking of accounts in such a way is not really great protection against fraud 
because if the books had been manipulated before being sent up to the LFB it might 
be very difficult to find where ‘creative’ accounting took place. 
The LFB hired one inspector on a salary of £300 and during the period 1838 to 
1855 there were three separate inspectors hired by the LFB.122 The on-site inspection 
of the loan funds was flawed and this was due to incompetence and the neglect of 
duty by the first two LFB inspectors, both of whom were subsequently replaced.123 
The inspectors of the LFB were appointed by the Lord Lieutenant124 but there was no 
requirement that they have any formal experience of accounting. The two inspectors 
who were dismissed from their positions had been inspectors during the 1840s and 
early 1850s, the period when most failures took place. One inspector had inspected 
the books of the Lucan Loan Fund Society, and said that the society was ‘in a 
satisfactory state.’125 This inspection did not go in depth into the accounts of the 
society, and later when John Kingsmill, a member of the LFB from 1850 to 1854,126 
inspected the accounts he found that there was a long-running fraud taking place 
which had not been noticed by the inspector.127 
The evidence of a number witnesses associated with the loan funds puts into 
question assumptions regarding the reason for failures of loan funds during the 
famine.  Hollis and Sweetman used evidence from the Reproductive Loan Funds 
(RLFs)128 when discussing the affects of the famine on the loan funds in Ireland. The 
RLFs did not share the same external monitoring structure; they incurred numerous 
bad debts during the famine and were wound up in 1848. Hollis and Sweetman stated 
that ‘funds operating under the Loan Fund Board generally fared better than those 
under the RLFI [Ireland], but fund records show over £10,000 of losses to depositors 
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during the famine, which tarnished their reputation as depositary institutions.’129 
Hollis and Sweetman also stated, in a different article, that:  
Loan funds that strictly enforced loan requirements during the famine may have been 
more likely to survive, but those funds may also have been less beneficial, or harmful, to 
the starving poor during the crisis.130  
 
They found that the survival of a loan fund during the famine was highly dependent 
on the manager of the loan fund. Before the famine many loan funds were 
administered by local clergy. Hollis and Sweetman undertook some econometric 
analysis of data from LFB reports and found that ‘having a religious minister is 
strongly and consistently negatively related to fund survival.’131 It appeared to Hollis 
and Sweetman that the clergy did not energetically pursue defaulters of debt through 
the court system and many funds under their administration were wound up.  
 In contrast, this thesis will posit an alternative interpretation of the econometric 
findings of Hollis and Sweetman. Rather than the problem being that religious 
ministers did not pursue defaulters, the evidence suggests that the clergy may have 
been lax monitors of their own staff. R. R. Madden, secretary of the LFB, believed 
that the problems were in the majority not caused by default, but by fraud and 
defalcation. The evidence of R. R. Madden to the committee on loan funds in 1855 is 
quite interesting. This is an extract from his evidence: 
In the year of the last famine, in 1847, did not a great number of the Loan Funds fail? – 
There was a great number failed.  
Was not that in consequence of the inability of the peasantry to meet the engagements 
that they had entered into? – Yes, but I think also an advantage was taken by fraudulent 
clerks, to an enormous extent, who embezzled and endeavoured to get out of the charge, 
by laying it to the account of the borrowers. 
Have you found many clerks who had embezzled? – Yes. 
Have you found fraud on the part of the treasurer in many instances? – It is almost 
always on the part of the clerks. 
Have you found negligence on the part of the trustees? – Very often. 
But not in general, fraud? – No, by no means. 
In several instances have not both borrower and sureties been stated to have emigrated? – 
Yes, when I have inquired about them, I found where clerks had been robbing largely, it 
was said that the borrowers were in three or four categories; one was among the dead; 
another among the absent in America; another in the poorhouse; very often the money 
was never in the hands of the borrowers at all, but in the pockets of the clerks.132  
 
Perhaps fraud was not the only cause of loss to depositors, and perhaps the 
clergy were guided by empathetic concerns rather than commercial responsibilities. 
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But given that evidence exists to suggest that fraud took place, it ought not to be 
ignored and should be given greater weight in the debate. 
 
1.5 Loan funds before and after the famine, 1839 to 1860 
 
The following discussion and graphs primarily relates to loan funds registered with 
the LFB. The loan fund system was regulated by the LFB under the aegis of the 1843 
act and this system remained intact and unchanged until the LFB was dissolved in 
1914.133 The decrease in the charges on loans introduced by the 1843 act, although 
beneficial to borrowers from the funds, was potentially detrimental to the profitable 
maintenance of some societies.  The number of societies which ceased operating due 
to this 1843 act is not possible to exactly determine as shortly after the passage of the 
act there was the outbreak of the Great Famine in Ireland. The famine had an 
enormous effect on many of the loan funds as it mainly afflicted the class of 
borrowers who had utilised their services. The 1914 report on agricultural credit in 
Ireland stated that:  
The Board mainly attributed the huge decline of £906,750 in the loans made in 1847 to 
the fearful famine of that year (the number of loans made was almost 240,000 less that in 
1846). “Many depositors, having no longer confidence in any institution issuing loans to 
the humbler classes in Ireland, have withdrawn their deposits, or served notice on the 
Trustees of their intention to do so; whilst others of this class have withdrawn their little 
accumulated capital, so invested, for the purpose of emigrating. But whilst the Board 
notice the famine as the chief cause of the diminishing circulation of the Loan Funds, it 
appears to them that there are others in operation.” 134 
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Figure 1.2  
Number of registered loan fund societies, 1838-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
In figure 1.2 it can be seen that there was substantial growth in the number of loan 
funds registered with the LFB between 1838 and 1843.  In order to put this rapid 
growth in context we can use parliamentary returns of the number of loan funds in 
Ireland for 1836 and 1838.135 In 1836 there were 150 loan funds who had submitted 
returns to Clerks of the Peace, and in 1838 the number had risen to 247. These returns 
are interesting as they are one of the few references we have to the number of both 
RLFs and loan funds that were registered with the LFB. What this may suggest is that 
there was a large number of RLFs and also that the LFB was slow to register the 
existing loan funds in Ireland. So perhaps the low value for 1838 in figure 1.2 is not 
indicative of the level of LFB loan funds operating at that time. The year 1842 had 
the highest recorded number of loan funds attached to the LFB, with a total of 300 
loan funds registered. After 1842 the number of loan funds declined steadily to 113 in 
1855. 
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Figure 1.3  
Number of loans issued by loan funds, 1838-1860
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 Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the number of loans issued by loan funds between 1838 and 1860. 
In pamphlets written by Connery and Ryan,136 both made an assumption that there 
were 4 per family, and as such the half million loans granted before the famine had 
the potential to affect the lives of 2 million people.  Put differently, Hollis and 
Sweetman found that the loan funds were lending to over 20 per cent of Irish 
families.137  A slight problem with these exercises is that they did not take into 
consideration either the fact that loan terms were for 20 weeks or that loan renewals 
were reported to be commonplace. If one takes these facts into consideration it would 
reduce the amount of people directly effected by loan funds as the number of loans 
shown in figure 1.3 are loans per annum, and there are 52.14 weeks in a year. Given 
that it was reported that loans were renewed, this would mean that the number of 
loans in figure 1.3 does not necessarily equate to the number of borrowers.138  
Because of the conditions brought on by famine the level of lending in the 
earlier years in figure 1.3 was not sustained. Can the decrease in the number of loans 
issued after the famine be explained by a reduced demand for loans? Possibly not. 
Two factors can explain the decrease in the number of loans issued by loan funds. 
One is a supply side factor. Loan funds had less of an incentive to issue loans during a 
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recession, such as the famine, because of fears concerning a borrower’s ability to 
repay and may have applied more stringent screening and monitoring conditions to 
better assess this ability. Evidence of this can be seen in a letter circulated by the LFB 
on 3 February 1846 which warned societies about the delicate nature of the economy 
and not to offer over-generous lending accommodation. The letter, written by C. A. J. 
Piesse, secretary of the LFB, stated that:             
The Loan Fund Board wish to direct the especial attention of your Committee to the 
necessity which exists at the present time for great caution being exercised in the issue of 
loans. The Board apprehend that in certain districts a pressure may be felt during the 
ensuing season which may render it difficult for borrowers to meet engagements 
previously made with the managers of Loan Fund Societies.  The board also consider it 
desirable to direct the attention of the Managers to the importance of retaining at all 
times a sufficient Reserve Fund, which will place beyond all risk the security of the 
funds entrusted to their care by the depositors, and which will enable them, whenever 
such a course may be considered desirable, to dissolve their society, without loss being 
sustained by any parties who may have been connected with it. 139  
 
This letter appears to be contrary to the nature of a charitable society to 
withdraw from charitable support when charity was needed most, but the loan funds 
had evolved into a hybrid institution. With the acceptance of deposits at interest the 
loan funds were no longer an institution which offered cheap loans; they were also an 
institution who were responsible for the savings of people in their area. These savings 
were of varied amounts from people of differing socio-economic backgrounds. The 
loan societies had responsibilities to their depositors and these responsibilities 
dominated the considerations of the LFB. This conflict between commercial interests 
and charity was also seen in the Parisian Mont-de-Piété,140 an institution that was 
structured in a similar fashion to the LFB loan funds. A similar problem that the 
Parisian Mont-de-Piété saw was a withdrawal of capital during downturns, and this 
made it difficult to finance the operations of the institution as it did not have a 
permanent capital base.141 It is a flaw in the design of the institution, as the demand 
for the charity element of the institution, i.e. funding charities, would be strongest in 
downturns, whilst the profitability of the institution was strongest in boom times.  
Another example of supply side retraction can be seen from the report of the 
Cashel loan fund in 1848. The report stated that: 
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Towards the close of our last report we ventured to express a hope that by a strict 
scrutiny into all applications for loan during the ensuing year, we might on its close be 
enabled to report still more favourably on the progress of the society.142 
 
 Despite this strict scrutiny the Cashel loan fund still suffered some losses owing 
to the famine conditions.143 There is also some evidence that there was practice of 
retracting credit in difficult economic conditions. As part of an appeal to the Lord 
Lieutenant against a decision of the LFB not to sanction its new rules, the Tyrell’s 
Pass charitable society gave an outline of its history. It was stated in the appeal that: 
The distress prevailing generally through the agricultural districts of Ireland in the year 
1841 and the subsequent years induced the managers gradually to contract the issues of 
the society and according in the year 1842 the issues were reduced below those of the 
preceeding (sic.) year by a sum of £10735 10s 0d and in the year 1843 the pressures still 
operating with unabated force the issues were still further contracted and the borrowed 
capital [deposits] of the society was reduced from £7826 to £1876.144 
 
Perhaps there may have also been a difficulty for borrowers obtaining people 
willing to become guarantors. Evidence of this is seen in a newspaper article written 
by a member of the LFB, the Earl of Belmore, during the agricultural recession in the 
early 1860s. The difficulty with the loan fund’s arrangement was that if there was a 
general economic malaise reliable and willing sureties would be in short supply. This 
was because they would be either reluctant to undertake debt or were not solvent 
themselves. An example of this was given by the Earl of Belmore in 1862 during the 
early 1860s recession.145 The Earl of Belmore stated that: 
When a loan fund issues a loan to an applicant, it is required that the latter should be 
provided with two securities for repayment, and, in consequence of the losses incurred by 
the small farmers in 1861 a larger number than usual were unable to meet their 
engagements, which had the effect of causing many of their securities to be sued for the 
amounts of their liabilities, to the several funds. The consequence of which was that in 
1862, the circumstances of the country being as bad or worse than in the previous year, 
there was a greater difficulty, or rather less facility in finding persons who were able or 
willing to incur such responsibility for their friends or neighbours.146 
 
Hollis and Sweetman determined this to be a trade-off between outreach, 
lending to the poorest, and commercial sustainability.147 But the question must be 
asked: was this trade-off what loan fund managers really faced during the famine? 
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Did they have to decide whether to enforce their normal rules for borrowers or 
whether to grant loans knowing that there was little likelihood of receiving 
repayment? This is uncertain, as the loan fund business model was based on making 
as many loans as possible to maximise capital turnover. Therefore, in the loan fund 
model, outreach and sustainability are interlinked. A more likely trade-off was 
between a guaranteed loss and a minimised loss. If the loan funds retracted credit 
supply they had a better chance of minimising their losses than if they made loans 
where there was no chance of repayment.  
Figure 1.4 shows the circulation of loan funds from 1838 to 1860.148 The 
circulation of the loan funds reached its apogee in 1845 with a circulation of 
£1,857,457. Thereafter the amount of money circulated by the loan funds rapidly 
decreased, owing to the effects of the famine and the famine environment. The 
financial activity of the loan funds began to pick up slightly in the late 1850s, but 
another economic recession in the early 1860s hampered any recovery. 
 
Figure 1.4  
Loan fund circulation, 1838-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.5 shows loan fund capital from 1841 to 1860. Loan fund capital 
reached its highest level of £444,427 in 1845, but subsequently decreased due to 
famine pressures, and possibly factors related to contagion which shall be discussed 
elsewhere.149 
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Figure 1.5  
Loan fund capital, 1841-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.6 shows the net profit and charity expenditure of loan funds from 1838 to 
1860. Figure 1.6 shows that during the period the loan funds managed to maintain a 
profitable level, although profits gradually decreased. It is interesting to note that 
there was a consistent divergence between the level of charitable expenditure and net 
profits. Only in one year did the two variables converge to a similar level, which was 
in 1847, the height of the famine. 
 
Figure 1.6  
Net profit and charity expenditure in loan funds, 1838-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
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That the loan funds were profitable should not be a surprise. They had a very high 
capital turnover ratio.150 Figure 1.7 shows the capital turn over ratio of loan funds 
across counties from the period 1841 to 1860. Minimum and maximum values and 
standard deviation have been included to give an indication of the variance between 
counties. 
Figure 1.7  
Min, max, average and stdev of capital turnover in 
loan funds at county level, 1842-1860
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Note: the max value in 1847 is for county Mayo. This is because the LFB report only gave 
capital statistics for 2 out of the 3 county loan funds, but circulation figures for all 3 societies. 
 
Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
An explanation for the high capital turnover of the loan fund system may be the 
way the system operated. Loans were made for 20-week periods and had to be repaid 
in weekly instalments. This meant that in a given week, money would be repaid and 
then re-circulated in another loan, rather than sitting idle. There was a dip in the 
average capital turnover during the famine period, but it soon returned to pre-famine 
levels after the famine.151 
As has been shown in figure 1.2, not all the loan funds ceased to function after 
the famine. The 1843 and 1844 loan fund acts, and the famine, affected each loan 
fund differently. The loan fund system survived the famine and this can be accounted 
for  by the fact that it was not a centralised system- mainly due to the fact that the loan 
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funds were not interdependent and each fund operated in isolation from each other. 
Hollis and Sweetman stated that ‘the fact that the entire system did not collapse 
during the famine was almost certainly due to the fact that each fund was financially 
independent.’152 Such independence was important because it enabled funds to 
continue operating even if another loan fund was wound up. This enabled the system 
to continue operating through and after the famine. The famine and the 1843 act had 
the effect of pruning the loan fund system so that by 1860 there were 110 loan funds 
in operation throughout the country. Although the number of loan funds was to 
continue to decline, the level of loan funds remained consistent for the remainder of 
the nineteenth century. The number and amount of loans also decreased and the 
percentage decline from 1841 to 1851 was in proportion to the percentage decrease in 
the number of loan funds.153 
 
1.6 Reproductive Loan Funds 
In the 1820s there was an outbreak of famine in the west of Ireland and counties in 
Munster and Connaught were worst affected by it. A fund was started in London, 
called the London Relief Committee (LRC), to raise money to relieve those suffering 
distress.154 The subscription was mainly for the immediate relief of people affected by 
the famine conditions, as the organisers of the fund believed that the inability to 
purchase food due to a want of employment was the cause of the famine.155 Despite 
initial fears that the subscription would be inadequate to deal with the crisis, these 
fears were not realised. In fact the fund was oversubscribed, with considerable funds 
being raised not only in England but also in other parts of the British Empire.156 The 
LRC met to discuss what should be done with ‘the balance of the subscription 
remaining at their disposal.’157 It was decided to use the surplus funds for purposes to 
try and pre-empt future famines similar to that in the 1820s. As the LRC believed that 
the 1822 famine was due to the low levels of income of the people in the areas 
affected, the LRC decided to use the funds to establish income generating activities in 
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the areas affected. At a meeting of the LRC it was decided to distribute the surplus 
fund as shown in table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2: Distribution of the London Relief Committee’s estimated surplus 
Purpose Amount 
(£) 
To the board of fisheries, for the assistance of poor fishermen, to enable 
them to resume their accustomed modes of gaining their livelihood 
5,000 
(In addition to a like sum previously granted) to be applied in aid of the 
general contribution of clothing for the use of the most indigent in the 
distressed districts 
5,000 
For the relief of extraordinary cases of distress 2,000 
In aid of the funds of the mansion house committee of Dublin, to be 
applied to the promotion of industry in the distressed districts of the south 
and west of Ireland 
5,000 
To the British and Irish ladies society, for improving the condition and 
promoting the industry and welfare of the female peasantry of Ireland 
1,500 
To be appropriated under trustees to the encouragement and assistance of 
the poor of the distressed Provinces of Ireland, in the manufacture of flax 
and wool, by means of small loans repayable with interest 
40,000 
Total  60,000 
 
Source: Report of the committee for the relief of the distressed districts 1823,  p. 24. 
 
It was stated that ‘the committee [LRC] are led to entertain the most sanguine 
hopes, that this grant will prove a substantial and permanent advantage to those for 
whose relief it was specially intended.(sic.)’158 As can be seen from table 1.2 the 
largest portion of the surplus was intended to be used to lend money to the poor for 
the manufacture of flax and wool. The LRC decided on flax and wool as they believed 
that those industries were not alien to Connaught and Munster159 and that those 
industries were ‘particularly well adapted to improve the habits and condition of the 
peasantry’.160 
 Following the decision to encourage flax and woollen industries by offering 
small loans, the next step was to try and establish a means to disburse the loans to the 
poor in the designated areas. The LRC stated that: 
 
Having appropriated £40,000 to the ten counties on an estimated proportion, it was 
determined to confide the expectation of this important measure of relief to the 
gentlemen of each county, without whose zealous and active co-operation, no plan 
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whatever could be permanently successful. Trustees were accordingly chosen for each 
county, who were requested to associate for the purpose of carrying these objects into 
effect. To these trustees was confided the management of the funds, and the appointment 
of District Committees, for the purpose of conducting the details of the business under 
their own immediate superintendence. A board of directors was also appointed in 
London, to whom the trustees are to make annual returns of the administration of this 
grant.161 
 
The loan funds associated with the LRC were designated as being Reproductive 
Loan Funds (RLFs). They were supposed to give non-monetary loans and repayments 
were permitted to be non-monetary in nature. It was stated in the report that:  
No aid to be given in money, but in flax-seed, flax, wool, yarn, or implements, estimating 
these articles at prime cost, and not exceeding in value to any one person within one year 
the sum of ten pounds, or the value of two looms.162  
 
It seems as though it was the actions of the LRC which inspired the loan fund 
act in 1823. Evidence of this is seen by the fact that some of the clauses in the act 
relate to the recovery of non-monetary loans,163 but also that the LRC report also 
contained a copy of the act. Loans made by RLFs were supposed to be for yearly 
terms, repayable monthly at a rate of 5 per cent, and management of the funds was 
delegated to local trustees.164  These RLFs were ostensibly answerable to a central 
authority in London.  Table 1.3 shows the distribution of the fund in 1824 and from 
1843 to 1845. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161
 Report of the committee for the relief of the distressed districts 1823, p. 26.  
162
 Ibid, p. 294. 
163
 An Act for the Amendment of the Laws respecting Charitable Loan Societies in Ireland, 1823 (4 
Geo 4) c. 32, section x. 
164
 The report stated that they received support from the local gentry: Report of the committee for the 
relief of the distressed districts 1823, pp 296-297. 
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Table 1.3: Distribution of the capital of the Reproductive Loan Funds, 1824- 
1845 
County Pop 1821 
(%) 
Grant 1824 
(£) 
1843 (£) 1844 (£) 1845 (£) 
Clare 7.20 3,000 5,697 5,909 5,919 
Cork 25.28 5,500 8,028 8,844 10,155 
Galway 11.68 6,000 7,060 8,551 8,592 
Kerry 7.48 4,000 5,777 5,908 5,999 
Leitrim 4.32 2,000 1,200 1,805 1,859 
Limerick 9.60 5,300 6,370 7,381 7,465 
Mayo 10.14 4,500 9,377 11,038 11,083 
Roscommon 7.22 4,000 4,500 7,313 7,392 
Sligo 5.06 3,200 3,870 5,106 5,215 
Tipperary 12.01 2,500 2,500 3,078 3,105 
Total 2,889,320 40,000 54,379 64,934 66,784 
 
Sources: Census of Ireland, 1821.  
First report of the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution. H. C. 1844 (173), xlii, 531. 
Report of the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution. H.C. 1845, (591), xxvi, 265. 
Second annual report of the Corporation of the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution. H.C. 1846, 
(539), xxii, 405 
Third annual report of the Corporation of the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution. H.C. 1847, 
(714), xvii, 331. 
Fourth annual report of the Corporation of the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution. H.C. 1847-
48, (730), xxix, 425. 
 
As can be seen from table 1.3 the RLFs only operated in Connaught and Munster, the 
area for which the initial fund was designated. From 1836 the RLFs ran on a similar 
basis to the loan funds associated with the LFB, as they were regulated by the same 
acts of parliament but with the notable exemption from the LFB, discussed below. 
The loan term was 20 weeks with weekly repayments and the discount rate was 6d in 
the pound. The average loan in the RLFs was between 2 and 3 pound, and loans were 
made to small traders.165  
 The London board delegated control to local trustees, but failed to establish 
any power over the trustees. A classic principal-agent problem ensued whereby the 
London board was unaware what the trustees in Ireland were doing. There was no 
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 Select Committee on loan fund societies 1854-55, paragraph 716, p. 44. 
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supervisory arrangement and there was a lack of monitoring in the form of external 
inspectors. F. R. Bertolacci, a clerk appointed by the Treasury to inspect the RLFs, 
stated that:  
It was originally intended by the Relief Committee of 1822, that the Board of Directors   
should have the power of control, and general supervision of the funds. But it turned out, 
by the mode which these trusts were made, from the money being accidentally sent over 
by the Relief Committee instead of by the Directors, and, therefore, not going through 
the hands of the directors, that in a legal point of view it was not possible to enforce it, if 
the trustees opposed themselves to it…166  
 
The LFB, which was established after the RLFs, had offered to assist the 
London Charitable Association by inspecting their societies, but the London board of 
the Association declined the offer. During the 1855 inquiry into loan fund societies in 
Ireland, an accusation was raised that Piesse, the former secretary of the LFB, had 
only offered the inspection services in order to augment his own salary.167 An internal 
inquiry by the London board in 1846 into the state of the RLFs returned some very 
unsatisfactory results.168 The years shown for the 1840s in table 1.3 above suggest 
that there was steady growth in the capital of the RLFs. But the reality was quite 
different as a number of RLFs had fabricated their accounts. The RLFs were wound 
up and their combined capital was transferred to the UK Treasury to be spent in the 
counties that were the intended beneficiaries of the fund.169  The RLF was used for 
various government projects in Munster and Connaught, and was used by the 
Congested Districts Board to fund its fishery loans scheme in the 1890s and 1900s.170 
During the period 1836 to 1848 the RLFs existed as a separate body of loan 
funds to those registered with the LFB because of lobbying by their London board. 
Initially the legislation in 1823 and 1836 did not make a distinction between loan 
funds whose capital was raised in Ireland and those whose capital was raised further 
afield. The 1838 act concluded with a clarification of the difference between the 
societies registered and administered under the LFB, and those which were 
established in connection with the London Charitable Association which were known 
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 Fourth annual report of the Corporation of the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution. H.C. 
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169
 The Treasury acted as a Trustee for the fund; Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Act, 1848, (11 & 12 
Vict.) c. 115. 
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designated for relief by the London Relief Committee in 1822. See the CDB accounts for example in 
Sixth report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, of proceedings under the Congested Districts 
Board (Ireland) Acts, 1891-1896 (54 & 55 Vict. ch. 48, section 41) [C. 8622]. H.C. 1897, lxxii, 439. 
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as the RLFs. The 1838 act stated that ‘nothing herein contained shall extend to any 
Loan Societies in Ireland which have been established by or are in connexion with the 
London (sic.) Charitable Association commonly called The Irish (sic.) Reproductive 
Loan Fund Institution.’171 The act also called for the RLF to send a list of all the 
societies operating that were aligned to it. This was to make sure that there was no 
cross-registration of societies between the two institutions. The reason for this 
exemption for RLFs was at the behest of the LRC which lobbied for exclusion from 
the act. 
 The London Board also obtained exclusion from the 1843 act. The lobbying 
activities of the London Board are observable from the petitioning of the Queen for a 
charter in 1843172 and the subsequent charter received by the London board in 
1844.173 The lobbying actions of the London Board were much to the annoyance of 
Viscount Clements, a member of parliament of Whig principles representing 
Leitrim.174 When Viscount Clements was debating the 1843 act he pondered whether 
‘Ireland is to be ever made subservient to the interests or wishes of a London citizen – 
and I ask you, if this is just or right?’175 This is a question of whether there was one 
law for English interest groups, and another one for Irish interest groups.  
The 1843 act concluded in a similar fashion to that of the 1838 act in that it 
stated that the Irish RLFs were to be excluded from the act, and that the societies 
associated with the Irish RFL Institution were to be outside the remit of the LFB. The 
confusion between the LFB and the Irish RLF Institution was to persist despite the 
acts’ attempt to clarify matters. Although the systems had different origins, this 
distinction was not very pronounced to many outside observers, even to 
contemporaries, as they carried out similar functions. In the LFB’s thirty-sixth annual 
report from 1874, the LFB made the following statement: 
The Board deem it necessary to remove an erroneous impression that has caused 
communications to be made to them, and statements to be made to Parliament, to the 
effect that the Loan Fund Institution now existing in virtue of the Act 6 & 7 Vict., cap. 
91, of 1843, is the same as the Reproductive Loan Fund Society [RLF established by the 
London relief fund], which dates from 1822, the year of one of those periodical famines 
which have visited this country twice in the present century, on which occasion a 
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subscription was raised in England and throughout the British empire for the relief of the 
suffering poor of Ireland, and out of which circumstances, the late Reproductive Loan 
Fund Society [RLF] had its origins, but has long ceased to exist, and never was 
connected in any way with the existing Loan Fund Institution [LFB], but on the contrary 
was specially placed beyond the control of the Loan Fund Board by the 47th section of 
the existing Loan Fund Act. 176 
 
 Clearly a body of loan funds operating outside of the power of the regulatory 
body is not an ideal situation. According to Viscount Clements, at the time of the 
debate of the 1843 act there were 100 societies legally exempt from the regulatory 
apparatus of the LFB.177 Although 100 is a suspiciously round number there is some 
support for this statement from the returns of loan funds in 1836 and 1838. From these 
returns we can see that there were a high proportion of loan funds located in 
Connaught and Munster. This is in contrast to the low proportion of loan funds 
registered with the LFB from those provinces. In 1836 there were 93 loan funds, 62 
per cent, located in Connaught and Munster.178 Perhaps a more telling statistic is the 
fact that there were no loan funds registered in Waterford, a county in Munster that 
was not designated to receive funds from the LRC as shown in table 1.3.179 In 1838, 
127 loan funds, 51 per cent of the total, were located in Connaught and Munster.180 Of 
these, 3 were located in Waterford. In contrast to these statistics there was not a strong 
tendency of LFB loan funds to be located in Connaught as will be discussed below. 
This seems to support the statement of Viscount Clement that there were a large 
number of societies legally exempt from the LFB.  
The situation of legally exempt loan funds is even less desirous when these 
unregulated loan funds are unsupervised by their parent body. Complaints were raised 
about the conduct of the RLFs in that they were charging usurious rates of interest, or 
that they were misappropriating profits. These complaints were made to the LFB. 
There were complaints about loan funds as a whole, but the LFB was only responsible 
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for the loan funds which had registered with it.181 Perhaps the existence of a rival 
unregulated system eroded confidence in the loan fund system in general.  
 
1.7 Microcredit, loan use and microsavings 
 
The loan funds were financial intermediaries that offered credit and saving services. 
The following section will compare the loan sizes and savings sizes to data on the 
wages of agricultural labourers from 1840 to 1860 and Joel Mokyr’s estimated 
personal income of the poor in the pre-famine period.182 This section will also analyse 
what loans were used for, to see whether or not the loan funds provided microcredit. 
The data on loan funds are derived from the annual reports of the LFB and as such 
they only relate to loan funds registered with the LFB; hence they exclude RLFs and 
unregistered loan funds. The RLFs kept very poor records, but as stated previously, 
the average loan was said to have been between £2 and £3.183 This is similar to the 
average loan of loan funds that registered with the LFB. 
  
1.7.1 Microcredit 
 
The primary function of loan fund societies was the provision of loans to the 
‘industrious poor’. They also provided savings services, although these were not 
advertised as prominently. 
This section will analyse the loan funds as a ‘microcredit’ institution by using 
Bowley’s agricultural wage index. It will use Bowley’s nominal index184 and a 
weighted version to give a sense of real wages. The wage series is weighted using the 
composite cost of living index compiled by Geary and Stark.185 Geary and Stark’s 
goal in creating their cost of living index was to find a real wage index for Ireland to 
compare with the rest of the United Kingdom. To do this they used Bowley’s index, 
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and although Bowley’s index suffers from some flaws it has been deemed reliable by 
other authorities on Irish economic history.186 
The motive for using Bowley’s index on agricultural wages is that agricultural 
wages would have been the lowest wages available, and so it will give a sense of scale 
to the loan fund loans. Were the average loan fund loans greater than this agricultural 
wage? Were they lower? Were they equal to it? Nothing can be said about loan funds 
until this is known. Thankfully, given that Bowley’s index gives the wage level of the 
lowest socio-economic strata in Ireland at the time, the loan fund data also give an 
impression of what the wages would have been like for a semi-skilled worker. Clerks 
in the LFB filled a position that would have required some elementary schooling and 
possibly secondary schooling. These positions required employees to be both 
numerate and literate. The wages for these positions were given in the report of the 
select committee on loan fund societies. The annual salary for the secretary of the 
LFB was £300. There were two clerks working for the LFB. The senior clerk received 
£80 and the junior clerk received £50.187 So it will not stretch the realms of 
plausibility to say that the difference between the agricultural wage and the £50 for 
the clerk can be seen as a skill premium. Figure 1.8 shows the annual real and 
nominal wages for agricultural labourers; they are derived from the above cited 
articles.188 
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 Chapter 2 has more discussion and critique of the applicability of using agricultural wage rates in 
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Figure 1.8  
Real and nominal annual wage of Irish agricultural labourers, 1791-1860
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Sources: Wages: A. L. Bowley, ‘The statistics of wages in the United Kingdom during the last hundred                    
 years. (Part iv): Agricultural Wages’ in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, lxii, no. 3 
(September, 1899), pp 555-570. 
Cost of living index: Frank Geary and Tom Stark, ‘Trends in real wages during the industrial 
revolution: a view from across the Irish Sea’ in Economic History Review, lvii, 2 (2004), pp 
362-395. (Henceforth, Bowley 1899, Geary & Stark 2004) 
 
Mokyr made estimates for the personal income of the Irish poor per person, shown in 
table 1.4. Mokyr estimated the wage income from evidence given to the 1836 Poor 
Law Commission. He also estimated income from potatoes and pigs that was not 
stated in evidence. In conclusion Mokyr believed that Irish national income was about 
£9 or £10.5 per capita.189 
 
Table 1.4: Personal income of the Irish poor (per person) 
Province Labour income Income from 
potatoes 
Income from 
pigs 
Total 
Ulster 2.67 1.40 0.12 4.19 
Leinster 2.88 1.44 0.19 4.51 
Munster 2.11 1.87 0.22 4.20 
Connaught 1.84 1.73 0.12 3.69 
Ireland 2.42 1.61 0.16 4.19 
 
Source: table 2.1 Joel Mokyr, Why Ireland starved: a quantitative and analytical history of the Irish 
economy, 1800-1850, 2nd ed. (London, 1985), p. 10 
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As can be seen from table 1.4, Mokyr’s income estimates are lower than Bowley’s 
wage statistics, and seem closer to Bowley’s adjusted figures for want of work. 
The data used to construct the following graphs are taken from the annual 
reports of the LFB.  The aggregate county level data have been used and these data 
are found in the annual reports of the LFB. Bowley’s annual agricultural wage index 
has been chosen primarily because it is an aggregate national wage index, and it 
would be best to compare like with like. The average loan size shown in this section is 
the mean of the average loan sizes of the loan funds operating in different counties. 
These mean figures were derived from the LFB data on ‘loan circulation’ and on the 
number of ‘loans issued’. To give a sense of the variation in the average loan sizes 
across counties, measures of standard deviation, minimum values, and maximum 
values across time have been included in the graphs. 
Figure 1.9 shows the average loan size in loan funds plotted over time. This 
gives a sense of the impact of a loan to a given person. As can be seen the loan size 
varied across time, but the general trend is of an increasing mean loan size from just 
over £3 in the early 1840s to above £4 by 1860. 
 
Figure 1.9  
Mean loan sizes in loan fund societies (across counties), 1840-1860
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 Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.10 shows the annual agricultural wage level plotted against the average 
loan size over time, from 1840 to 1860. This graph gives a sense of the impact of the 
loan funds. The agricultural wage level appears to have been sticky in the early years 
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that this graph shows. Agricultural wages were stuck at £12 per annum and only 
increased in the early 1850s. As the average loan size was roughly £3 in the 1840s, 
this was nearly half the amount of the annual wage. The data using real values, taking 
into consideration the cost of living, show the same effect. Given the low average 
values of the loan fund loans, it may be possible to state that these loans satisfy the 
criteria of being ‘microcredit’. When compared against Mokyr’s estimated personal 
income of the poor, the average loan size from the loan funds are quite large. This 
suggests that if the loan funds lent to the poorest, then their loans would have had a 
high impact. 
 
Figure 1.10  
Real and nominal agricultural annual wage and average loan size 
from loan funds, 1840-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years, and Bowley 
1899, Geary & Stark 2004 (full reference see fig 8). 
 
Figure 1.11 shows the percentage ratio of the average loan sizes to the annual 
agricultural wage. It is interesting to note that the percentage ratio is consistent in the 
period 1840 to 1860. From looking at figure 1.11 it appears as though borrowing may 
have been an income augmenting strategy on the part of borrowers from the loan 
funds. In the period 1840 to 1860, the nominal average loan size grew by 37 per cent, 
whereas the nominal annual wage of the agricultural labourer grew by 55 per cent in 
the same period. The higher growth in agricultural wages may explain the slight 
decrease in figure 1.11 in the 1850s. What is interesting is that, from figure 1.11, it 
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appears as though borrowers from the loan funds were not leveraged, but rather were 
borrowing within existing income limits. 
Figure 1.11  
Percentage ratio average and max loan sizes to agricultural wage, 
1840-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years, and Bowley 
1899, Geary & Stark 2004 (full reference see fig 8). 
 
Figure 1.11 also shows the ratio of the average agricultural wage and the 
maximum loan available from the loan funds. The maximum loan from a loan fund 
was set by the loan fund acts at £10. As can be seen from the data, this £10 limit was 
less than the agricultural wage in the 1840s, and the ratio continued to decrease in the 
1860s as the agricultural labourers’ wages continued to grow. But it must be borne in 
mind that loan amounts of £10 were seldom given in this period.  
Given that the loan term was in fact 20 weeks, agricultural wages have been 
estimated for a 20-week period. This has been done by using a simple arithmetical 
procedure of dividing the annual wage by the number of weeks in a year. Given that 
seasonality is quite prevalent in agriculture, it is a flawed estimate of a 20-week 
period. But the cost of constructing a similar index on wage data is significantly 
higher and the benefit of using it would be marginal; for it must be taken into 
consideration that the loan fund data also suffer from similar seasonality effects that 
cannot be adjusted owing to the manner in which the data have been collected. 
Therefore, this method of estimation has been chosen.  
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Figure 1.12  
Average loan sizes and agricultural wages for 20 weeks, real and nominal, 
1840-1860
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1840 1845 1850 1855 1860
Year
£(1
=
24
0d
) 20 week nominal wage
Nominal average loan
20 week real wage
Real average loan
 
 
Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years, and Bowley 
1899, Geary & Stark 2004 (full reference see fig 8). 
 
Figure 1.12 shows the real and nominal agricultural wages constructed for a period of 
20 weeks and the average loan sizes, real and nominal. The main reason why the data 
have been represented in this form is due to the fact that the contemporary literature 
stated that loans were to be repaid on a weekly basis out of wages. Admittedly there 
are serious imperfections in the estimation technique used, and any prior savings that 
agricultural labourers may have had have not been factored into the calculations. But 
the aim is to highlight the fact that the average loan size was slightly less than the size 
of an agricultural labourer’s wage for the same period. This would give support to the 
statements made by Reverend Charles King Irwin to the committee on loan fund 
societies. Rev. Irwin, who had been involved in a loan fund in Portadown, stated that 
the business in the local pawnbroker had experienced an increase which coincided 
with the establishment of the local loan fund.190  The principle of loan funds was that 
the loan was to be repaid out of the profits from the loan, but according to King, 
borrowers were unable to meet these repayments and were instead compelled to pawn 
goods in order to make repayments. R.R. Madden, giving evidence to the same 
committee, stated, ‘I think, where the societies are well managed, it is peculiarly 
beneficial to small traders, more so than to agricultural labourers.’191 
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Figure 1.8 showed that the level of agricultural wages were static for a long period of 
time and then increased after the 1840s.192 But what caused the sudden and continued 
increase in agricultural wages? There is considerable debate on this topic with some 
commentators believing the increased productivity of Irish agriculture was 
responsible,193 others arguing that continued emigration pushed wages up.194 A 
plausible theory would be that the reduction in the number of agricultural labourers, a 
shift in the supply curve, pushed up the wage level for agricultural labourers. An 
indicator for the decrease in agricultural labourers can be seen from census returns for 
landholding distribution shown in figure 1.13. 
Figure 1.13  
Landholding distributions in Ireland, 1841-1861
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Source: Census of Ireland, 1841-1861 
 
In the period 1841 to 1861 there was a 72 percentage decrease in the number of 
small holdings, while in the same time period there was a 55 percentage increase in 
the annual wages of agricultural labourers. The consistent ratio of average loan sizes 
to annual wages, shown in figure 1.11, corresponded with a decrease in the number of 
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loans issued. This seems to indicate that loans were used to augment income (but as 
incomes increased there was less of a need for income augmenting loans) or that there 
were more readily available substitutes.  But it must be acknowledged that there is 
considerable debate regarding the reliability of the census data prior to 1861. For 
example, Donnelly stressed that the early census data exaggerate the amount of 
holding fragmentation, and Mokyr has echoed this view.195  More significantly, P. M. 
Austin Bourke was highly critical of the agricultural data in the 1841 census returns. 
Bourke showed that the number of holdings was not reported in a consistent unit of 
measurement, with some reported in terms of Irish acres, Cunningham Acres and 
Statute acres.196 This in turn led to discrepancies between the 1841 and 1851 
landholdings returns. Bourke warned that: 
 
Much more serious is the interpretation of direct comparisons of the 1841 census figures 
with the 1847 and with the 1851 census returns of farm size as an accurate reflection of 
the effect of the famine on agricultural economy, when in fact what is being presented is 
predominantly the difference between the Irish and the statute acre.197 
 
Therefore, the data presented for 1841 in figure 1.13 must be treated with 
caution. 
 
1.7.2 Loan use  
 
An important consideration regarding the loans made by loan funds is what the loans 
were actually used for.  If this can be determined, then perhaps we can understand 
whether these institutions had positive impacts on the income levels of users.  
Loan funds were required to state what loans were used for when they made 
their returns to the LFB, but it is possible that many loan funds did not fulfil this 
obligation. For example, the Cashel loan fund made a return to the LFB using 
stationery supplied by the LFB but did not enter all the details that the document 
asked for.198 
 To overcome the problem of a lack of knowledge on the loan usage of loan 
funds, use will be made of two seemingly independent sources from the period to 
                                                 
195
 James S. Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth century Cork: The rural economy and the 
land question (London, 1975), p. 16; and Joel Mokyr, Why Ireland starved: a quantitative and 
analytical history of the Irish economy, 1800-1850 (2nd ed., London, 1985), pp 31-32. 
196
 P. M. Austin Bourke, ‘Uncertainties in the statistics of farm size in Ireland, 1841-1851’ in Journal 
of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, xx, 3 (1959-60), pp 20-26. 
197
 Ibid, pp 25-26. 
198
 ‘Report and account of the Cashel loan fund 1848’, 1848 ( N.L.I., MS 41,872). 
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determine what loans were used for. Henry John Porter presented a paper of the 
statistics of loan funds in Ireland in 1840 to the London Statistical Society, and also 
the Ballycastle loan fund in County Antrim sent details of its activities to the LFB. 
Both of these sources date from the early 1840s.  
Henry John Porter was a loan fund advocate and presented a statistical paper on 
the operation of loan funds in 1840. Porter just prior to presenting this paper had 
himself established a loan fund in Portadown199 and ironically, given that he 
advocated the adoption of loan funds, his loan fund was defrauded by one of its 
clerks.200 Porter contacted all of the loan funds associated with the LFB that were in 
operation on the island at the time and asked them to fill out a questionnaire. He wrote 
to 215 societies; 163 replied and 52 did not. The problem he encountered was that a 
lot of loan funds did not keep accurate records of their operations. In some areas the 
records were well kept; in others there were no records. Henry Porter’s survey is the 
most in-depth statistical account that has been encountered while researching the 
operation of the loan funds, and it is a statistical account which Hollis and Sweetman 
seem to have overlooked.201 Porter made inquiries under a number of headings, and 
these will be referred to in other parts of this thesis.  
What are of particular interest to this section are the inquiries made regarding 
loan use. Of the 163 loan fund only 83 who responded kept records of the objects for 
which loans were granted, ‘80 of those who forwarded returns to the queries having 
kept no record of the objects for which loans were granted.’202 This gives a better idea 
of loan use than the sample used by Hollis and Sweetman, which was comprised of 
data from 2 loan funds.203 Henry Porter made 9 categories for the purpose of loans use 
and these are shown in table 1.5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
199
 Anonymous, Report of the directors of the Portadown Mont de Piete and loan fund to the central 
board in Dublin; shewing the formation, progress, and winding up of the Portadown loan fund society 
(Portadown, 1855), p. 3. 
200
 Ibid, p. 9. 
201Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microcredit in prefamine Ireland’ in Explorations in Economic 
History, xxxv (1998), p. 362. 
202
 Henry John Porter, ‘A statistical account of loan funds in Ireland, for the year 1840’ in Journal of 
the Statistical Society of London, iv, no. 3 (October, 1841), pp 209-224. 
203
 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microcredit in prefamine Ireland’ in Explorations in Economic 
History, xxxv (1998), p. 363. 
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Table 1.5: Loan use, number of loans and amount of loans 
Loan use Number of loans Amount (£) of loans 
 % % 
Loans for horses, cows and pigs 31.4 36.02 
Loans for seeds, manure, 
implements, and other 
agricultural purposes 8.23 7.74 
Loans for meal, potatoes and 
other provisions 19.58 15.45 
Loans for wood, flax, yarn, and 
other manufacturing purposes 8.68 7.41 
Loans for looms 0.4 0.31 
Loans for iron, coal, leather, 
timber and other mechanical 
purposes 9.09 8.43 
Loans for rent 6.84 9.13 
Loans for debts 2.31 2.05 
Loans for dealing 13.46 13.46 
 
Henry John Porter, ‘A statistical account of loan funds in Ireland, for the year 1840’ in Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London, iv, no. 3 (October, 1841), pp 209-224. 
 
As can be seen, there were a large number of loans given for the purpose of 
purchasing livestock, 31 per cent, which is unsurprising for an economy that had a 
large agricultural sector. This large proportion of loans for the purchase of livestock 
may explain how the pre-famine practice of labourers purchasing pigs was 
financed.204 A large percentage of loans were used for purchasing meal and potatoes; 
this would indicate that the users were either labourers or small farmers. Another 
large percentage of loans were used for the purposes of dealing, which would support 
the views of Madden, cited above, that it was dealers who benefited from these loan 
funds as they had access to sources of credit. The lowest grouping was for the purpose 
of purchasing looms, which was less than one per cent. It should also be noted that 
loans for the purpose of paying rent were not insignificant, which correlates with the 
sample used by Hollis and Sweetman. 
The returns from the Ballycastle loan fund in the third annual LFB report gave a 
detailed account of loan use from the years 1838 to 1840. There were 20 loan 
                                                 
204
 For example see James S. Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth century Cork: The rural 
economy and the land question  (London, 1975), p. 43. 
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categories. Table 1.6 below shows the loan categories, the number of loans and the 
amount of money lent for each category. 
 
Table 1.6: Loan use in the Ballycastle loan fund, 1838 to 1840 
Loans use 
Number 
of loans 
(percent)  
Amount 
of loans 
(£) 
(percent) 
Pigs , cows, goats 17.67 24.51 
Horses or asses 2.4 3.33 
Poultry 0 0 
Corn, hay, or grass seeds 2.95 3.41 
Farm implements 0.28 0.17 
Dairy utensils 0 0 
Tools or handicraft trades 0.12 0.09 
Looms 0 0 
Yarn (for manufacture) 6.6 6.72 
Wool or flax (for manufacture) 9.48 5.32 
Timber (for manufacture) 1.11 1.43 
Iron (for manufacture) 1.02 0.75 
Leather (for manufacture) 2.65 2.36 
Shop goods as clothes, hardware, grocery 12.16 14.83 
Fishing tackle, nets or boats 0.39 0.3 
Rent 14.35 17.6 
Debts 1.25 1.06 
Provisions for use 26.7 17.26 
Wearing apparel or house furniture 0.48 0.38 
House or land 0.39 0.49 
 
Source: Third Annual Report of the Commissioners of the central Loan Fund Board of Ireland, p. 12. 
[319], H.C. 1841 Session 1, xii, 109. 
 
 
Table 1.6 is similar to Porter’s returns where the two highest ranking categories 
for loan uses were the purchase of livestock and the purchase of provisions. The 
greatest amount was used to purchase livestock. 
Both statistical samples would lead one to believe that the loan funds were 
primarily agricultural banking institutions. But one must take care not to assume too 
much. Porter’s sample is biased as it is collected from loan funds that kept accurate 
records, and the Ballycastle loan fund is an outlier in the level of detail of its records.  
 
 
 
 86 
1.7.3. Microsavings? 
 
The loan fund act of 1836 was the first that permitted loan funds to raise capital by 
accepting debentures and deposits. Data on savings are unavailable from some earlier 
reports of the LFB and only become available from 1841 onwards. The annual reports 
of the LFB give data on ‘capital’ and ‘number of depositors owning said capital.’ 
Figures for average deposit size have been derived from these data, or more 
accurately a ratio of capital per depositor, for the years 1843 to 1860, by using the two 
sets of data. A slight problem arises in the data set because from 1854 the LFB began 
using two different definitions of capital. The ‘amount of capital to be accounted for 
on 31st December’ and the ‘actual amount of capital working on 31st December’. The  
category of ‘actual amount of capital working’ is used in the following graphs. The 
difference between the two observations is minimal, so the margin of error is quite 
low. The argument which this thesis wishes to put forward is that the loan funds had a 
small outreach capacity in terms of microsavings and that the main savers/investors 
were not the ‘industrious poor’. Chapter 4 discusses contemporary savings institutions 
that were also targeted towards the ‘industrious poor’, and they had significantly 
lower savings balances that the LFB loan funds. 
Figure 1.14  
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.14 shows the number of depositors in the loan funds from 1841 to 
1860. As can be seen, in the early years there was quite a large number of depositors 
in the loan funds, but the number of depositors decreased from 1845 until 1853, when 
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the number of depositors began to stabilise. Coincidently, as the number of depositors 
decreased, the average deposit size increased, indicating that perhaps there were some 
small depositors in the loan funds. Most of the decreases from 1846 can perhaps be 
explained most by the effects of the famine. The interest reduction came into affect in 
1845, and the response to the interest rate reduction was marginal. The number of 
depositors increased by 9.2 per cent from 1844 to 1845, but then decreased by 5 per 
cent from 1845 to 1846. The number of depositors decreased by 35 per cent between 
1846 and 1847. As both famine and interest rate shocks overlap, it is quite difficult to 
isolate which shock predominated. Nevertheless, given that the greatest decline came 
during the famine years, it would be reasonable to suggest that the famine was a more 
significant influence on the decline in the number of depositors in the loan funds.  
Figure 1.15 shows the percentage change in the number of depositors, average 
deposit size, and the capital in loan funds from 1844 to 1860. It is interesting to note 
that as there was a negative percentage change in both capital and the number of 
depositors during the famine, there was an increase in the average deposit size in the 
loan funds. The remainder of this section will attempt to explain why this may have 
been. 
Figure 1.15  
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Firstly, in order to put the average deposit size in context it is useful to compare its 
value with Bowley’s agricultural labourers’ wage series. As stated previously, 
Bowley’s wage represents the wage of the lowest socio-economic grouping in Ireland, 
and as such gives a sense of scale to the following discussion. It must also be noted 
that the loan funds derived their capital from three sources: small savings, larger 
debentures and philanthropic capital. Debentures were issued when the sum was 
above £20 and deposit receipts when the sum was under £20.205 Philanthropic capital 
was money either donated, or loans given interest-free to the loan funds by individuals 
with philanthropic concerns. In analysing the average deposits in loan funds and 
comparing them with Bowley’s wage series the aim is to see if the savings were of a 
similar level, or if they were higher or lower. A higher level would indicate that the 
debentures or philanthropic capital predominated, and thus a limited outreach on 
behalf of the loan funds in providing savings services. In contrast, if the average 
deposit level is low it would indicate that the loan funds had a greater outreach in the 
provision of savings services. Obviously the existence of philanthropic capital can 
distort such findings.206 Evidence given by R. R. Madden to the committee on loan 
fund societies provides support for this methodology:   
You have stated that there are two sorts of capital; one sort given by debenture holders 
for which they get interest, and the other, money which is given by benevolent 
individuals which may be called free capital? – Yes. 
Is a large proportion of the capital, free capital? – No, a very small proportion. 
Have you any idea of what that amounts to? – No, it forms a very small portion of the 
whole. 
Did it amount to a very considerable sum at one time? – I do not think it was a very large 
sum. 
Did it amount to between 40,000 l. [£] and 50,000 l. [£] at one time? – I do not think free 
capital derived from donations or bequests amounted to anything of the kind.207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
205
 Select Committee on loan fund societies 1854-55, paragraph 141, pp 8-9. 
206
 In later reports the LFB made a distinction between free and interest paying capital. These are 
analysed in chapter 2. 
207
 Select Committee on loan fund societies 1854-55, paragraph 455-458, p. 24. 
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Figure 1.16  
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.16 is a representation of the average deposit size in loan funds at the county 
level in Ireland.  Minimum values, maximum values and standard deviation are shown 
in figure 1.16 to give a representation of the variance between loan funds across 
counties. This graph is uninformative due to the fact that the maximum value in the 
data set is considerably higher than the average value. There is also a high level of 
standard deviation throughout the period. 
Figure 1.17 shows the average deposit, real and nominal, plotted against the 
agricultural labourer’s wage, real and nominal. Unsurprisingly, the average deposit 
size is greater than the wage level. Figure 1.17 uses the same cost of living index as a 
deflator for the agricultural labourers’ wages and the average deposits in the loan 
funds. Given the divergence between the two, perhaps the cost of living index would 
not be reflective of the true cost of living for the deposit holders in the loan funds. 
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Figure 1.17  
Average deposits in loan funds and agricultural wages, real and 
nominal, 1842-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years, Bowley 1899, 
Geary & Stark 2004 (full reference see fig 8). 
 
This would imply that the majority of ‘savers’- perhaps it would be better to call them 
investors - were not the ‘industrious poor’. This is not to say that the ‘industrious 
poor’ did not save in loan funds; rather it indicates that the number of depositors in 
the loan funds was not very large. Figure 1.17 suggests that the capital of the loan 
funds was mainly derived from debenture holders, i.e. large depositors, rather than 
from small depositors. This can be seen as evidence that the loan funds were not 
agents promoting thrift, but rather, as their name suggests, they focused on credit. 
Hence, the evidence from figure 1.17 supports the argument outlined at the start of 
this section that the loan funds did not have a great outreach capacity with their 
savings services. 
Using graphs on average deposit may not tell the true story of the savings 
activity in the loan funds. Porter’s statistical inquiry into the operations of loan funds 
in 1840 includes observations on the number of depositors. Porter made inquiries of 
215 societies; 163 made returns, 52 did not. Figure 1.18 is a pie chart of the 
distribution of loan sizes. The highest percentage, 44 per cent, are depositors who 
hold £50 and upwards. Interestingly, smaller deposits make up the remaining 56 per 
cent of the deposits. Porter’s statistical inquiry is divided into county categories and it 
is possible to see whether the observations in figure 1.18 are universal throughout the 
island. 
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Figure 1.18  
Percentage distribution of the sizes of deposits held by 
depositors in loan funds, 1840
19%
17%
20%
44%
£5 and under
£5 to £10
£10 to £20
£50 and upwards
 
Henry John Porter, ‘A statistical account of loan funds in Ireland, for the year 1840’ in Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London, iv, no. 3 (October, 1841), pp 209-224. 
 
Hollis and Sweetman found that the influence of depositors in a loan fund ensured 
that funds’ efficiency and prevented defalcation taking place.208 However, given the 
high level of average deposits, the reason for the findings of Hollis and Sweetman 
was because the deposit holders actually had a role in the management of the society 
or could influence the management of a society. As was illustrated above, in the 
structure of the loan fund societies the members were debenture holders; therefore the 
findings of Hollis and Sweetman are probably influenced by endogeneity. If we 
assume that there was a committee of 10 in each loan fund, and that each committee 
member held a debenture, this could account for a good proportion of debenture 
holders in a loan fund. 
The loan funds were microfinance institutions but the outreach in their provision 
of microsaving services does not appear to be as strong as the outreach of their 
microcredit services. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208
 This is a finding from a working paper of Hollis and Sweetman: Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, 
‘The Role of Local Depositors in Controlling Expenses in a Microfinance Organization’ (WP 
November, 2005). 
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1.8 Spatial distribution209 
 
So far in this chapter loan fund societies have been analysed on a national level, but 
there were some regional variations in the operation of loan funds during this period. 
These regional variations shall be discussed in this section, but it must be borne in 
mind that given the dearth of information on RLFs, discussed above, this discussion 
mainly refers to LFB loan funds. The importance of a spatial analysis is to determine 
where exactly the loan funds were located, in particular if they were located in areas 
deemed poor by contemporaries, hence with high outreach capacity. The spatial 
distribution of loan funds over time has not been approached in the present 
historiography of loan funds.210  
The earliest accounts of loan funds are the parliamentary returns from 1836 and 
1838; these are shown in figure 1.19. It is uncertain how to assess the increase in 
registration from 1836 to 1838 as they may have existed as independent bodies before 
registration was required under the 1836 act. For example, the Tyrell’s Pass society 
stated that it was established in 1824 but that it registered under the Loan Fund act in 
1837. The delay in registration may be accounted for by the fact that from 1824 until 
1834 the Tyrell’s pass loan fund was operated solely by private donations, and it was 
not until 1834 that interest was paid on deposits received from external sources.211 
Indeed what figure 1.19 does show us is that there were a large number of loan funds 
present in Connaught, and that in 1836 and 1838 they comprised the largest 
proportion of registered loan funds in Ireland. 
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 Appendix 3, maps 1.1 to 2.6, contain maps of the spatial distribution of loan funds from 1836 to 
1911. 
210
 Hollis and Sweetman mapped the loan funds at their height. But their map was one of county 
concentration. They did not offer an explanation for the spatial distribution: See Fig. 1 ‘Ireland, loan 
fund activity per county in 1843’ in Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman ‘Microcredit in prefamine 
Ireland’ in Explorations in Economic History , xxxv (1998), p. 354. 
211
 ‘Loan Fund Board copy appeal and other papers on behalf of Tyrell’s Pass charitable loan society’, 
1844 (N.A.I, MS OP 1844/18). 
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Figure 1.19  
Percentage distribution of registered loan funds in 1836 and 1838
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Sources: Return from Clerks of the Peace in Ireland of transcripts of Rules and Regulations of Loan 
Funds. (230) H.C. 1836, xlvii, 539; and A return of the number of loan societies which have been 
registered in the United Kingdom under the regulations of the Loan Societies Acts, specifying the name 
of each place where they are established,  H.C. 1837-38, (683), xlv, 235. 
 
From the establishment of the LFB and its annual reports to parliament we get another 
perspective on the spatial distribution of loan funds. Interestingly, LFB loan funds 
were located nationwide, although in some counties there were no loan funds in 
operation, such as Kerry and Sligo in the early 1840s. At the time, where there were 
no loan fund societies, there were alternatives to be found in these two counties.212 
Most notably RLFs were present in Kerry and Sligo. They may have been present, but 
not particularly active213 (see table 1.3 above). There were complaints made that 
trustees in Kerry made loans for purposes not deemed reproductive and that they lent 
money to themselves. The Kerry RLFs also deposited money in the ill-fated Kerry 
TSBs that crashed.214 
The aim of the following discussion is to show that regional variations existed, 
and that banks lending to ‘industrious poor’ were not found in areas which have been 
associated with the highest levels of poverty, hence indicating mistargeting and 
limited outreach on the part of the loan fund societies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
212
 Henry John Porter, ‘A statistical account of loan funds in Ireland, for the year 1840’ in Journal of 
the Statistical Society of London, iv, no. 3 (October, 1841), p. 209. 
213
 Irish reproductive loan fund institution report, pp 2-3, H.C. 1845, (591), xxvi, 265. 
214
 Irish reproductive loan fund institution third report, p. 3, H.C. 1847, (714), xvii, 331. 
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Figure 1.20  
Provincial distribution of registered LFB loan fund societies, 
1838-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.20 shows the provincial distribution of the number of registered LFB loan 
fund societies in Ireland. As can be seen from the graph the distributions in Leinster, 
Munster and Ulster were quite similar. Leinster had the greater proportion of 
registered loan funds in the 1840s, but then Ulster took over this position from 1855 
onwards. Munster started off with a low proportion of registered loan funds in the 
early years of the LFB, but then the number of registered loan funds increased and 
converged with the level in Leinster. Connaught had a consistent proportion of 
registered loan fund societies during this period. Connaught was underrepresented.  
There are possibly two factors that can adequately explain Connaught’s outlier 
status. Firstly, the RLF system was quite prevalent in Connaught, but then again it 
was also prevalent in Munster. Comparing figures 1.19 and 1.20 we see a discrepancy 
in the percentage of registered loan funds in Connaught, which suggests that the 
discrepancy is due to the presence of RLFs. The RLF system may have stifled the 
development of, or simply crowded out, loan fund societies that would have registered 
with the LFB. This leads to the second question: why did the levels in Munster 
converged with those of Leinster, while those in Connaught did not? A subjective 
ranking of the provinces according to commercial development would place Ulster 
first, followed by Leinster and Munster and then Connaught. This ranking can be seen 
in the distribution of loan fund societies in figure 1.20. But the capital of RLFs was 
imported and this can explain the high proportion of loan funds in figure 1.19.    
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Figure 1.21 shows the provincial distribution of loan fund circulation from 1839 to 
1860. The loan fund societies were lauded by Hollis and Sweetman for the fact that 
they were able to issue £1,500,000 of loans at their zenith. But they did not account 
for regional variation in loan disbursement. 
Figure 1.21  
Provincial distribution of loan fund circulation, 1842-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
As can be seen from figure 1.21, the distribution of loan fund circulation was 
greatest in Ulster for the majority of the period. There was convergence between 
Leinster and Ulster during the famine, but they again diverged, with around 50 per 
cent of the loan fund circulation being found in Ulster by the later 1850s. Again it can 
be seen that Connaught has the lowest share of loan fund circulation, with less than 10 
per cent between 1839 and 1855, and slightly about 10 per cent from 1857 to 1860.  
Figure 1.21 is similar to figure 1.22 except that Ulster predominated in the early 
1840s and slipped below the level of Leinster during the famine. After the famine 
there was greater divergence between Ulster and the three other provinces. Ulster held 
over 50 per cent of loan fund capital by 1855. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
Figure 1.22  
Provincial distribution of loan fund capital, 1842-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years 
 
Figure 1.23 shows the provincial distribution of loan fund depositors. Figure 1.23 
again continues the same trend, with Ulster having a greater predominance. By 1860 
Ulster had 50 per cent of loan fund depositors in Ireland. 
Figure 1.23  
Provincial distribution of depositors in loan funds, 
1842-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years 
 
Figure 1.24 shows the provincial distribution of the average deposit size in loan 
fund societies. Unlike the previous provincial distribution graphs which showed 
Connaught as the poorest performer, in figure 1.24 Connaught has the highest average 
deposit size by the 1860s. All provinces start off quite close to each other in the early 
1840s and suffer a drop during the famine period. After the famine the average 
deposit increases in Connaught, with a spike from 1852 to 1854 which sees the 
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average deposit size increasing to £220. The other provinces see an increase in the 
average deposit size, but not as great as that seen in Connaught. The average deposit 
size in Ulster reaches £150 by 1860. 
 
Figure 1.24  
Average deposit size in loan funds by province, 
1842-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years 
 
 
Figure 1.25 shows the provincial distribution of deposit sizes in loan funds in 
1840. It is worth noting how Ulster had a lower percentage of deposits that were £50 
and upwards. This piece of information may explain the success of loan funds in 
Ulster. 
Figure 1.25  
Provincial distribution of deposit size
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source: Henry John Porter, ‘A statistical account of loan funds in Ireland, for the year 1840’ in Journal 
of the Statistical Society of London, iv, no. 3 (October, 1841), pp 209-224. 
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Figure 1.26 shows the provincial distribution of the number of loans issued by loan 
funds between 1839 and 1860. At the start of the period Munster has the highest 
percentage of loans issued. This can be accounted for by the fact that Monts-de-Piété, 
charitable pawnbrokers that issued a large number of small loans, were included in the 
figures and the Limerick Mont-de-Piété was the first established on the island. When 
the LFB separated the statistics for the Monts-de-Piété and the loan fund societies, 
Munster’s position changed and its percentage share of loans issued decreased. Ulster 
gained pre-eminence as the province with the greatest percentage of loans issued by 
1848. There is greater divergence between Ulster and the rest of the island after 1847. 
Again, figure 1.26 shows the low percentage representation of Connaught in the 
activities of the loan fund societies in Ireland. 
Figure 1.26  
Provincial distribution of the number of loans issues by loan funds, 1839-
1860
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 Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years, 
 
Figure 1.27 shows the provincial distribution of the average loan size in loan 
funds. Unsurprisingly the average loan size in Ulster was consistently the highest in 
the island, with loans averaging amounts greater than £5 by the mid-1850s. Rather 
surprisingly, the average loan size in Connaught is the second highest on the island. 
Loans in Connaught started off at around £3 but increased after the famine, and were 
just short of £5 by the 1860s. Munster had the lowest average loan size during the 
whole period, starting off below £3 in the early period of the graph, and from 1850 
being between the range of £3 to £4.  
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Figure 1.27  
Average loan size in loan funds by province, 
1839-1860
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 1.27 shows that the average loan sizes gradually increased in all provinces 
during the time period. Arguably, this is due to the fact that the loan funds in 
Connaught played the role of banks more so than in the other provinces. The average 
loan sizes were higher in Connaught than in Munster and Leinster, both having well 
developed banking systems, and the average deposit sizes were also greater in 
Connaught. Connaught, the least developed province on the island, was the one which 
could have had the greatest use for loan fund societies, but not many established there. 
They had the lowest circulation and capital amongst the provinces and the lowest 
number of loans issued. The province which perhaps needed it the most did not get it. 
The LFB system which developed after 1860 was path dependent,215 with the events 
of the 1840s shaping its development. It was the 1840s system which persisted during 
the remainder of the post-famine period, with very few loan funds forming during this 
period. In fact, there were more exits from the market than entrants in the years after 
1860. Connaught was left with a lower loan fund representation and scale of loan fund 
activity for this period.  
 
1.9 Conclusion: Abuses, defects and limitations 
 
Loan funds were not perfect institutions, and this thesis does not aim to portray them 
as such. So it is only fair to highlight the negative aspects of their operations, negative 
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aspects which contemporaries were aware of.  Allegations were made about abuses 
and defects in their operations. However, it must be remembered that, as Madden 
noted in the closing statement of his evidence to the committee on loan funds in 1854, 
although there were ‘a great many badly managed societies, there are also some very 
well managed ones, which are productive of great good’.216  
R. R. Madden’s reports on the state of the loan fund system regarding its abuses 
and defects were written in the immediate aftermath of the famine and the reduction 
in the operations of the LFB loan fund system. Madden made a number of 
observations regarding the limitations of the system and possible corrections. What is 
interesting was that Madden had solutions to the abuses and defects, and he envisaged 
corrections to the system. But Madden’s plans were never implemented, and the 
system remained as it was until the mid twentieth century. Thus the abuses and 
defects which Madden outlined in the 1850s went unchecked. This is a significant 
factor in the LFB scandal in the late 1890s, discussed in chapter 2.  
Madden highlighted a number of areas where there were evident abuses and 
defects. Madden asked eight questions of the loan funds, which are paraphrased 
below: 
1. Does the present system guarantee its successful operation?  
2. Is management throughout the country successful and satisfactory?  
3. Are tendencies to improvidence encouraged by injudicious loan fund 
accommodation?  
4. Is excessive interest charged?  
5. Are deposits insecure?  
6. Is the system subservient to jobbing purposes.  
7. ‘Are the abuses so great as to countervail the advantages of the 
system?’ 
 8. Should the institution be abolished?217  
 
These were philosophical questions regarding the inherent tendencies within the 
loan fund system itself. A consistent concern for the LFB after the famine was the use 
of fines by societies. Fining was not standardised and some societies had different 
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methods of fining.  Madden noticed that fines had become a stream of income for 
some societies.218 Either the borrowers were struggling to repay their loans, or the 
loan funds were arbitrarily fining borrowers; in either case it is an issue that raises 
moral concerns about the benefits of such an institution. In a public letter to the Lord 
Lieutenant, Thomas Hincks, a member of the LFB, complained that the 1843 loan 
fund act did not address the issue of fines.219 Hincks attributed the high profits 
obtained by loan funds to their excessive use of fines, and believed that the acts’ 
attempt to curb interest charges, the reduction from 6d to 4d, would be 
circumnavigated by the unrestrained fining of borrowers.220 Hincks went so far as to 
recommend that fines be made illegal, but this was not done and the issue of fines was 
prominent in the effective collapse of the loan funds in the 1890s.221  
It could be argued that fines were needed as a way to enforce loan repayment, 
but this is in contrast to the experience of mutual (membership was required for 
borrowers and savers) loan fund societies in England and Wales. It was illegal for the 
English loan societies to fine borrowers for the late repayments222 and as such it was 
not done.223 By contrast, it appears as though they were more prepared to use the legal 
system as a means to recover loans.224 It may be a case that the legal structure 
influenced the decision-making apparatus of the LFB loan funds. If fines, an 
inexpensive instrument, were made illegal then the LFB loan funds would have been 
forced to utilise the legal system more readily as was the case with the English loan 
societies. This is important as fining was readily used as an income generating 
instrument by LFB loan funds until the 1890s. 
Another problem which arose was that of loan renewals. As a result of inquiries 
into a number of loan funds R. R. Madden reported that the practice of loan renewals 
was frequently used.225 Loans were being renewed without the previous loan being 
repaid, and then the old loan was repaid, with a discount, from the renewal. This 
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raises the question of whether the borrowers were maximising the returns from their 
investments. 
There was a lack of security for depositors.  Although officers of a society gave 
security in the form of a bond, such security was effectively without value. This was 
because it was impossible to prove the liability of these officers in the case of a loan 
fund being wound up, unless you could prove they were guilty of neglect. Also, as 
stated in the legislation, officers and trustees of a loan fund were not liable for the 
security of depositors and debenture holders unless they stated in writing that they 
were. There was a danger of embezzlement on the part of clerks. The danger of 
embezzlement was that it weakened the entire system. Madden stated that ‘the society 
[was] intentionally ruined by this embezzlement and defalcations of the institution 
itself deprived of all confidence in the minds of the people far lower’.226 The exact 
number of frauds that took place within the loan fund system is unknown, but 
according to a parliamentary enquiry in 1896 there were 250 societies dissolved ‘in 
many cases owing to defalcations by officials’.227 As most of these reported 
dissolutions took place in the formative years of the LFB’s existence, the period 
covered in this chapter, this may be evidence to suggest that fraud was commonplace. 
The threat to savings from mismanagement was apparent to Madden.  
Numerous classes saved with the loan funds, not just large debenture holders. Madden 
stated that the reason they saved was because of the ‘supposed connexion of the 
government with their institution, arising from the controlling power given to the L. F. 
Board’.228 Small depositors saved in the loan funds because they had confidence in 
the institution. Madden stated that ‘they confide in them moreover and perhaps 
chiefly on account of the connexion with them on trustees & treasurer of gentlemen of 
fortune and high station, of clergymen’.229 This confidence was eroded by the actions 
of inadequately monitored clerks.  
There were problems with the loan fund surpluses. There were 
misappropriations taking place, and also loan fund surpluses were spent on charitable 
objects when in fact there was no apparent profit. Madden stated that loan fund 
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surpluses, used to fund works on a landlords estate ‘but [were] of no service to the 
industrious poor from whose hard earnings the large sums thus expended were 
obtained’.230 There were cases of loan fund societies building schools or buildings in 
the pretence of them being charitable spending, but when the society was wound up, it 
transpired that there was no security for depositors and debenture holders.231  
Another problem regarding this was that the societies were being run in order to 
finance the charitable spending, without any regard for the borrowers, from whom the 
revenue was derived. Madden stated that: 
The Board fear very much that where transactions of this nature are embarked in, that the 
primary object of the loan fund is altogether lost sight of, and the institution becomes 
fully banks of discount for the purpose of realising profits to build with, under the 
charitable loan funds granting loans to the industrious classes at a reasonable rate of 
interest.232 
 
This was a problem with institutions that have conflicting constitutions. For 
example, the Parisian Mont-de-Piété was structured as a lending institution to provide 
low interest loans to the ‘poor’ and its profits were supposed to fund the Hôpital 
General.233 The problem with this structural arrangement was that in order to 
maximise profits to fund the Hôpital, the Mont-de-Piété had to charge (subjectively) 
high interest rates.234 The goal of funding social relief works conflicted with the goal 
of providing low interest loans. The same conflict would have been the case in 
Ireland.  
There were also allegations of sectarianism levelled against the loan funds. A 
controversial incident was relayed by Madden regarding the Castletown Devlin loan 
fund. It links in with the preceding passage, as the society failed but the managers of 
the society had decided to use profits to build a school. When the society failed the 
school was unable to be sold and debenture holders lost their investments. Where this 
case is interesting is that ‘the great majority’235 of debenture holders were Roman 
Catholic, whereas the school was built for the use of the established church.236 When 
the society was liquidated the school was not sold to repay debentures because the 
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school was useless. It was built on glebe land belonging to the church and was 
overpriced. 
 
That school is not in connexion with the National Board? – The school does not exist, 
and no use is made of the house now, and I could not dispose of it when I was down 
there regulating the affairs of the society, because it was built on glebe land. 
The proceeds of that might otherwise have gone to liquidate the debt and pay a larger 
per-centage in the pound to the debenture holders, is now entirely lost? – It benefits the 
glebe, and it is lost to the depositors. 
The house having been built upon the glebe land? – Yes; between 200l.  and 300l. has 
been expended. 
In other cases where buildings have been erected, you have disposed of them, have you 
not? – In many cases the treasurers did not take the precaution of getting proper leases, 
and the depositors were deprived of the advantage of the buildings; they could not be 
sold. 
Did you ever make an application to the rector at Castletown Delvin, in reference to the 
building? – No, we laid the papers before out lawyer, with a view to taking proceedings 
for the recovery; but he was of opinion that we could take no proceedings against the 
parties, inasmuch as there was no lease obtained for the ground.237  
 
Madden believed that changes in legislation could have rectified a number of 
problems. 
Another problem which arose in the evidence of the Rev. Irwin was that 
landlords established loan funds for the purpose of loaning tenants money to pay their 
rent. It appears that this was a practice that some RLFs were also guilty of. In some 
cases the rent office and the loan fund office were indistinguishable. Coincidently, 
this was also a feature of many contemporary savings banks.238 There was a charge 
brought against the Portadown loan fund in 1847 that ‘it was the rent office of the 
Tanderagee estate, the Duke of Manchester’s estate.’239 This was a serious charge to 
raise and when Rev. Irwin was asked if he had any evidence or if that was just his 
opinion on the matter he stated that: 
  
To say that I am of that opinion from facts within my own knowledge would be saying 
too much; I know the individual who urged the charge, and pursued it an investigation, 
and a very shrewd and clever man he is, and I should be disposed to rely a good deal 
upon results traced out by him; the charge was tried before Mr. Piesse, and it did not 
satisfy me that the loan fund was morally acquitted, though I believe it was technically 
so.240  
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Similar issues arose with the RLFs. F. R. Bertolacci, who was a secretary to the RLF 
and a Treasury official,241 was sent to Ireland to investigate the operations of RLFs 
and he found a similar scenario at play. Bertolacci stated that: 
 
I found a system to exist of this kind: the loans were issued at the rent roll-office; if a 
man could not pay his rent his answer was, “Take a loan;” he would take a loan; that loan 
would at once go the credit of the rent; be would pay interest upon it; and he would 
become saddled, not only with the rent but with an additional debt for interest, and he 
would pay it back by instalments; so that in point of fact the reproductive loan system did 
not operate in many cases to the benefit of the individual for that reason.242 
 
This evidence does not paint the loan funds in good light. In this case it suited 
the landlord to have a loan fund on his land and encourage tenants to use it to pay 
rents as it would ensure that rents were paid and that, provided the tenant could repay 
the loan, profits could be used to finance building on the land under the pretence of 
charitable spending. Perhaps if the tenant defaulted on the loan, it would be easier to 
recover this sum than if a tenant defaulted on rent payments. 
Arguably, the biggest issue in relation to the loan funds was that the loan term 
and repayment schedule were unsuitable to a rural environment and in particular to 
agricultural production. Viscount Clements stated in 1843 that the loan repayment 
schedule was having negative affects on the Irish butter trade.243 Viscount Clements 
claimed to have received a number of petitions. He read out the following letter he 
claimed to have received from a gentleman in Ballyconnell: 
 
The injury occasioned to the butter trade by the loan funds is, that the farmers, to pay up 
their weekly instalments, are obliged to send their butter to market in small quantities of 
two and three pounds to meet their weekly payments, little attention is paid by the 
females in making these small quantities. The markets are glutted with small quantities, 
and a new trade has sprung up, that called ‘packers,’ who buy up small quantities met 
with, and melt all together, colour it with some dye, and put it into tubs, sending it to 
Dublin, Newry, and elsewhere. Butter made in this way keeps good, I understand, a very 
short time, and in a foreign market is despised, lessens the value, and lowers the name of 
Irish butter.244 
 
The reputation of Irish butter was perceived to be undermined by this process. 
This was a serious issue as loan funds were one of the few institutionalised sources of 
credit available in rural Ireland in the early nineteenth century. The repayment 
schedule in loan funds was inherently unsuitable to agricultural production. A 20-
week loan with a weekly repayment schedule is more suitable to an urban 
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environment where the borrower is a wage earner and may repay the loan from his or 
her weekly wage. Crucially, a farmer does not receive weekly wages but instead 
receives his income at different periods during the year. Perhaps the loan funds could 
have been more beneficial if they offered repayment schemes that were more 
accommodating to rural life. The fact that microfinance may be mismatched and 
unsuited to agriculture is not an issue confined to nineteenth century Ireland, but one 
which modern-day microfinance needs to address.245 
Mokyr made a brief reference to the loan funds in a discussion on lending to 
peasants. Mokyr placed the loan funds in the same discussion as meal 
mongers/Gombeen men. This is interesting as the loan fund literature, in particular 
Piesse, declared that the loan funds would help people by saving them from going to 
the meal monger for credit.246 Mokyr cited the following conclusion from the Devon 
Commission when summarising the loan funds: “As loan funds are usually 
constituted, the highest praise which can truth be allowed to them is, that they are less 
ruinous than private usurers.”247 
To summarise, this chapter covered approximately a century of loan fund 
activity in Ireland. In this period loan funds underwent a series of institutional 
transformations. They changed from being solely charitable institutions into hybrid 
institutions with both commercial and charitable concerns. The change in institutional 
structure coincided with changes in the geographic distribution of loan fund activity. 
The earlier societies had been centred in Dublin and in some cases operated in 
surrounding areas in Leinster. The loan funds gradually dispersed in the early 
nineteenth century and by the early 1840s loan funds, including RLFs, were dispersed 
throughout the island. This spread was permitted by benevolent legislation enacted to 
encourage their spread. The loan funds were able to function in credit markets as they 
were able to address lower tier agency problems because of the greater local 
knowledge that the members248 of the society possessed. 
The RLFs ceased operating in 1848, and the only remaining loan funds were 
those registered with the LFB and loan funds registered under different acts of 
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parliament, discussed in chapter 5. The RLFs are interesting in relation to modern 
microfinance, as the capital that these loan funds used was raised outside of Ireland. 
This capital was raised within the United Kingdom but also from regions further 
afield, notably from Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.249 According to Viscount 
Clement, of the £44,177 raised, £29,915 came from these regions.250 There is support 
for this statement, but not the figures, from the report of the LRC which stated that 
money was raised in India and that ‘natives of every rank and degree’ contributed.251 
An historical irony shows that East to West charitable transfers that funded 
microfinance projects predates West to East capital charitable transfers used for a 
similar purpose. But perhaps this reliance on external sources of capital may have 
been responsible for the shortage of monitoring which occurred in the RLFs, and may 
be a contributory factor in their failure. 
By 1860 the loan fund system had been consolidated and was a single system 
operating in rural Ireland, regulated and supervised by the central LFB based in 
Dublin.252 There were evident defects in the LFB loan fund system. The LFB was a 
cumbersome body. It was comprised of 30 unpaid members, the majority of whom 
were apathetic towards the routine activities of the board, and only 3 members were 
required for a quorum. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that attendance at board 
meetings was frequently low.253 It was inadequate for the purpose of regulating the 
loan fund system as it was to be underfinanced and had inadequate powers, powers 
which the LFB had hoped to augment with legislation in the 1850s. Internal and 
external monitoring arrangements in the LFB system, which had proved inadequate, 
were not reformed and hence there was no improvement in the system. The LFB loan 
fund system faced the remaining years of the nineteenth century as an unreformed 
body. This body had shown inadequacies in the early nineteenth century and these 
inadequacies went unchecked for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The 
problem for the LFB loan fund societies in the remaining years of the nineteenth 
century was that they were static institutions operating in a dynamic economic and 
financial environment. The following chapters will analyse how the changing 
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economic and financial environment affected the loan funds, heretofore the dominant 
supplier of microfinance. 
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2 Loan fund activity 1860-1914: debt peonage and regulatory capture 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Loan funds associated with the Loan Fund Board (LFB) were a feature of local 
economies in Ireland from 1860 until the 1890s. This chapter will outline the main 
developments in the LFB system from 1860 until 1914.  
In the pre-famine period loan funds associated with the LFB were the dominant 
suppliers of microcredit to the Irish agricultural sector, and were competitive in 
markets for microsavings. This dominance in microcredit, and competitiveness in 
microsavings, was not continued after the famine. The decline of the LFB system was 
caused by a number of factors both endogenous and exogenous to the LFB system. 
The exogenous factors contributing to the decline of the LFB loan funds included the 
growth in joint stock banking, the establishment of government-backed savings banks, 
and the creation of government lending schemes that provided both short- and long-
term credit. Other factors that influenced the LFB system were the permanent 
establishment of state-administered poor relief, persistent trends in emigration, and 
the establishment of rival microfinance institutions. Many of these factors are 
discussed and elaborated elsewhere in this thesis.   
This chapter will outline trends in loan fund development from 1860 to 1918. 
Firstly, this chapter will explore a number of variables related to LFB loan fund 
activity. The primary focus will be on the number of loan funds, trends in the 
composition of loan fund capital, and the amount and number of loans made by loan 
funds. This chapter will show that the LFB system was in decline but experienced a 
‘bubble’ in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The objective of the chapter is to illustrate 
how this ‘bubble’ influenced developments in the LFB system. When this ‘bubble’ 
burst it precipitated an irreversible decline and caused a loss of confidence in the LFB 
system. 
This chapter will focus on intrinsic factors that contributed to the decline of the 
loan funds. The chapter will argue that institutional stagnation was a contributory 
factor in the decline of loan fund dominance in markets for microfinance. The LFB 
system was regulated by the 1843 loan fund act throughout its subsequent existence.1 
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The lack of any large scale reform of the legislation governing the LFB system meant 
that reforms to individual loan funds did not take place - reforms which arguably 
would have enabled loan funds to become more competitive in the post-famine era. 
This chapter will argue that such institutional stagnation created a niche banking 
institution located in an ever shrinking niche. The chapter will also argue that the 
decline, and paradoxically the continued existence, of loan funds in the post-famine 
period was caused by both regulatory failure and regulatory capture, which in turn 
was a product of the lack of institutional reform. It will be argued that the existence of 
regulatory capture in the LFB system led to a form of debt peonage in Irish society. It 
will also be argued that the lack of reform led loan funds to adopt practices which 
undermined their comparative advantages in information creation. The arguments 
presented in this chapter run contrary to those posited by Hollis and Sweetman who 
believed that the cause of loan fund decline was due to poverty in Ireland being a 
transitory condition.2   
 
2.2.1 Loan funds 1860-1915  
During the period 1860-80 and 1895-1914 the LFB published reports annually which 
included annual accounts of individual loan fund societies. From 1880 to 1894 these 
reports were unpublished. It is unclear why publication of LFB reports resumed in 
1895, but it seems likely that it was a result of political interest in the loan fund 
system from 1896 onwards.3 In fact, the LFB report for the year 1895 that was 
published in 1896 was a ‘copy of the original report’.4  The operations of the LFB 
were transferred to the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (DATI) 
in 1914 by an order of council of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.5 The LFB was 
dissolved and the annual returns of the individual loan funds registered under the loan 
fund acts were subsequently published in the annual reports of the DATI. References 
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were made to loan funds in the DATI and the succeeding Department of Agriculture 
annual reports until 1975.6  
As was stated in the introduction to this section, there is a problem caused by 
missing data in the period 1880 to 1894 owing the fact that LFB reports were not 
published for these years. This has been somewhat overcome by using data published 
in Thom’s Directory as a substitute. Unfortunately, there are limitations to the use of 
the statistics published in Thom’s as they are aggregate county level statistics and only 
give information on the basic elements on loan fund activity such as the number of 
loan funds, the capital, the loan circulation and the number of loans issued.7 The 
statistics from Thom’s Directory lack the depth of information contained in the 
published LFB reports. By using a combination of LFB reports and Thom’s Directory 
statistics it is possible to give an annual overview of loan fund activity from 1860 to 
1914; this will be shown in the following graphs. The statistics for the most part seem 
reliable, but there were accusations raised in both the 1855 and 1897 reports as to the 
authenticity of returns made by a number of societies.8 It must be remembered that 
these statistics were not collected by professional accountants or professional 
statisticians, but by amateurs who in some cases were volunteers. Perhaps an over-
reliance on these statistics will lead to conclusions that are not supported by events.9 
There may also have been an attempt to deceive people as to what the true nature of 
loan fund activities actually were. Caution must be advised against over-reliance on 
them as source material.10  
Another problem with the loan fund statistics is the fact that they are annual 
statistics, and as such they do not give an indication as to the time of year during 
which loans were issued. Given the agricultural bias of loan fund activities, this is a 
                                                 
6The last reference to the loan fund societies in the Republic of Ireland is in the Annual report of the 
Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries 1975, A.1/55, prl 5514, p.126.  
7
 Over the whole existence of the loan funds, these are the only variables which were consistently 
reported. 
8
 The 1897 report questioned the authenticity of the reported returns of all societies. 
9
 A criticism of Hollis and Sweetman is that they were over-reliant on these statistics and as such they 
were uncritical of them and did not question their authenticity. But as Patrick Honohan noted, perhaps 
the loan funds were just better at keeping and publishing statistics due to the existence of the LFB. See 
Patrick Honohan, ‘To what extent has finance been a driver of Ireland’s economic success?’ in 
Quarterly Economic Commentary (Winter, 2006), pp 59-72. 
10
 The importance of reliable statistics was observed by The Economist: ‘The importance of statistics: 
lies, damned lies’ in The Economist (3 March, 2007), p. 13. 
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serious flaw in the evidence on loan fund activity as it clouds the impact of seasonal 
demands for credit.11  
Figure 2.1  
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Note: the LFB ceased to exist from 1915, but loan funds that were registered with it were transferred to 
the DATI. 
Sources: Loan Fund Board reports and Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of loan fund societies that were registered with 
the LFB from 1860 to 1918. It has been constructed in order to give some context to 
the following discourse. Not all of the loan funds registered with the LFB ceased to 
function after the famine, due to the fact that there was no interdependence between 
loan funds. Each fund operated in isolation from each other, and given the number of 
frauds and defalcations that occurred in the famine period this unit independence 
ensured that loan funds could exist independently of others.12 This fact was observed 
by Hollis and Sweetman.13 Such independence was important because it enabled 
funds to continue operating even as other loan funds were being wound up, but 
independence did not equate with immunity to any contagion arising from the 
                                                 
11
 Section 2.2 contains information on seasonal trends from one of the few account books that has been 
found to date. 
12
 This was referred to in chapter 1 section 1.4. 
13
 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microfinance and Famine: The Irish Loan Funds during the 
Great Famine’ in World Development, xxxii, no. 9 (2004), p. 1521. 
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negative effects of loan fund frauds further afield. As can be seen from figure 2.1, the 
number of loan funds did not return to the level of the pre-famine peak of 300.14 By 
1860 there were 110 loan funds in operation throughout the country. Although the 
number of loan funds continued to decline over the entire period 1860-1914, the level 
of loan funds remained consistent from the late 1860s through to the early 1880s. The 
lowest troughs in figure 2.1 in the period 1860 to 1880 came in 1872 and 1880 when 
the number of loan funds fell to 78.  Although the falling number of loan funds in the 
post-famine period might not compare favourably to pre-famine peak, it must be 
placed in the context of demographic changes that would have influenced both supply 
and demand for credit and the restructuring of the Irish economy. Given both factors, 
it is quite likely that such a large number of loan funds were no longer required. Also, 
from analysing figure 2.1 one feature is immediately noticeable: the growth in the 
number of loan funds from 1884 until it reached a new peak in 1895. This peak was 
subsequently followed by a rapid decline in the number of registered loan funds. By 
1912 there were 51 registered loan fund societies, with 27 being in the hands of 
receivers.15 It will be argued that this growth in the number of loan funds from 1880 
to 1895 constituted a ‘bubble’, and this concept of a loan fund ‘bubble’ will be 
elaborated in the following sub-sections.   
The number of loan funds in each province is shown in figure 2.2. As can be 
seen, there was a trend towards loan fund decline in all provinces, but from 1885 there 
was growth in the number of loan funds and this growth came mainly in Ulster. As 
can be seen, Connaught, in many senses the poorest province, had the lowest 
proportion of registered loan funds. Why the poorest province had the lowest 
proportion of loan funds is a question which Hollis and Sweetman did not address. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 As was outlined in chapter 1, the 1843 loan fund act and the famine pruned the loan fund system. 
15
 Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, loan fund 
recommendations, (b) p.117. [Cd. 7375] H.C. 1914, xiii, 1. 
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Figure 2.2 
0
20
40
60
Nu
m
be
r 
of
 
lo
an
 
fu
n
ds
1860 1880 1900 1920
Year
Ulster Leinster
Munster Connaught
1860-1918
Number of loan funds registered with the Loan Fund Board by province
 
Note: the LFB ceased to exist from 1915, but loan funds that were registered with it were transferred to 
the DATI. 
Sources: Loan Fund Board reports and Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
In order to gauge the distribution of loan funds, it is useful to analyse the distribution 
of loan funds per thousand population which is shown figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3  
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Sources: Loan Fund Board reports, Thom’s Directory and Census of Ireland. 
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From figure 2.3 it can be seen that there was a decline in the number of loan funds per 
1,000 population, with the largest decline coming in the period 1841 to 1851, but 
interestingly there was an increase in the number of loan funds per 1000 population in 
1891. Figure 2.4 shows the per capita distribution of loan funds by province. 
Figure 2.4  
Provincial distribution of loan funds per 1000 population
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911
Year
lo
an
 
fu
n
ds
 
pe
r 
10
00
 
po
pu
la
tio
n Ulster
Leinster
Munster
Connaught
 
Sources: Loan Fund Board reports, Thom’s Directory and Census of Ireland. 
 
In figure 2.4 it can also be seen that the number of loan funds per 1,000 
population decreased over the course of the nineteenth century, but with different 
patterns for each province. In 1841 Leinster had the highest number of loan funds per 
1,000 population, but this declined over the period 1851 to 1911. The number of loan 
funds per 1,000 population increased in Ulster, Leinster and Connaught in 1891. 
These increases came as a result of growth in the number of loan funds coupled with 
declines in population.  
The decline in the number of loan funds in the post-famine period until the early 
1880s was acknowledged by the LFB. In 1874 the LFB stated that the decrease in the 
number of loan funds was caused by an: 
…alteration for the better in the circumstances of that portion of industrious agricultural 
poor of Ireland which constituted the borrower class of Loan Funds; but largely it must 
be ascribed to the practice which has been adopted by the Branch Banks throughout the 
country to a large extent issuing loans so low as £10, and even £5, to borrowers of that 
class of small farmers and dealers on a small scale, who could only heretofore get loans 
of such small amounts from Loan Funds.16 
                                                 
16
 Thirty sixth annual report of the commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, p. 7. [C.953], 
H.C. 1874, xv, 231. 
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This assertion was continually made in many of the annual reports of the LFB,17 and 
the allegation dates back to the 1855 committee where R. R. Madden also made a 
similar statement.18 The LFB believed that the joint stock banks branch expansion 
was infringing on the traditional market of the loan fund societies. There is truth to 
this assertion as many of the banks undertook an expansion of their branch networks 
after the famine.19 In fact, if we analyse the early nineteenth century, the loan funds 
may have prospered because there was little effective competition from the joint stock 
banks. There were not many private banks operating in the countryside, and many of 
the joint stock banks formed in the 1820s and 1830s with slow initial branch 
expansion. There is also truth in the fact that the traditional market of the loan funds 
had declined in the post-famine period and, due to legislative restrictions, loan funds 
were unable to compete in mainstream credit markets. The joint stock banks did not 
face legislative restrictions of loan sizes or area restrictions. 
The view that the joint stock banks threatened the loan funds was acknowledged 
by Hollis and Sweetman, but they believed that the loan funds created information 
about lending in rural Ireland and that this was captured by the joint stock banks 
enabling them to enter the market.20 In chapter three we will assess this argument. 
 
2.2.2 Loan fund capital 
Many of the following graphs of loan fund activity are shown in both national and 
provincial aggregate form to give a better understanding of loan fund activity. Firstly, 
figure 2.5 shows the amount of capital that loan funds had at their disposal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The written reports of LFB from 1870 to 1880 were very mundane and followed an established 
template, in some cases not differing at all from the previous year. 
18
 Cited in chapter 1. 
19
 This is shown in chapter 3.  
20
 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘The life-cycle of a microfinance institution: the Irish loan 
funds’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, xlvi (2001), p. 309. 
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Figure 2.5  
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Sources: Annual reports of the loan fund board and Thom’s Directory, and  
Deflator used was the rural weights from Liam Kennedy, ‘The cost of living in Ireland, 1698-1998’ in 
David Dickson and Cormac Ó Gráda (eds.), Refiguring Ireland, essays in honour of L. M. Cullen 
(Dublin, 2003), pp 249 - 276. (Hereafter, Kennedy, 2003). 
 
As can be seen from figure 2.5 there was a decline in the amount of real and nominal 
capital held from 1860 to 1880, but then there was an increase in real and nominal 
capital from 1884 to 1895 when it reached a peak.  The provincial distribution of 
nominal capital, displayed in figure 2.6, illustrates that the loan funds in Ulster held a 
larger share of capital and also that the ‘boom’ in capital came mainly in Ulster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
Figure 2.6  
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Sources: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board and Thom’s Directory. 
 
To account for differences in population, the amount of capital per 1,000 population is 
shown in figure 2.7. The provincial distribution of loan fund capital per 1,000 
population, shown in figure 2.7, indicates that the largest amount of capital relative to 
population was in Ulster. There was a decrease in the amount of capital per 1,000 
population from 1861 to 1881 across all provinces. This is significant as both 
population and capital were decreasing over time. In 1891 there was an increase in the 
amount of capital per person in all provinces. The increase was more pronounced in 
Ulster and Connaught. Thereafter the amount of capital per person decreased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119 
Figure 2.7  
Loan fund capital per 1000 population
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Sources: Loan Fund Board reports, Thom’s Directory and Census of Ireland. 
 
Loan fund capital was comprised of a number of variables including interest paying 
deposits/ debentures, interest-free loans, charitable bequests and retained profits. 
There was a differentiation in the LFB reports between capital and interest-free 
capital, although it did not break ‘free’ capital into its constituent parts. The 
percentage of ‘free capital’21 over total capital is shown in figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8  
Free capital as a percentage of capital in loan funds registered 
with the Loan Fund Board, 1860-80, 1895-1915
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Source: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board, 1860-80, and 1895-1915. 
 
                                                 
21
 Free capital referred to capital on which no interest was paid. From the sources of capital outlined 
above, this would have meant interest-free loans, charitable bequests and retained profits. 
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Figure 2.8 is informative as it tells us that the percentage of free capital was growing 
over time, indicating a fall in the amount of deposits held by LFB loan funds.22 
Unfortunately, the information from 1880 to 1894 is unavailable but what we can see 
is that when the series resumes in 1895 there is a drop in the amount of ‘free capital’. 
This is one of the first indicators as to what was happening during the period 1880 to 
1896 with the loan funds. It appears as though there was an increase in the number of 
depositors/investors. Then from 1896 onwards the percentage of free capital 
continued to grow, which coincided with the decrease in the number of loan funds 
shown in figure 2.1. Details on the number of depositors were also given in the LFB 
reports. In 1880 the number of depositors stood at 825 and this had increased to 2,095 
in 1895.  The number of depositors was not distributed evenly amongst the loan 
funds, as is shown in figure 2.9. 
Figure 2.9  
Percentage distribution of loan funds without depositors, 
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Source: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board, 1860-80, and 1895-1915. 
 
In the period 1860 to 1880 there was an increase in the percentage of loan funds 
without depositors,23 but when the series resumed in 1895 it had fallen to 10 per cent. 
Thereafter it continued to rise. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 If figure 2.8 had shown the percentage of capital at interest (capital – interest free capital), it would 
have shown the opposite: high in the 1860s and decreasing over time. 
23
 It may be the case the same loan funds did not report the number of depositors, in which case the 
percentage would be less.  
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Figure 2.10  
Average deposits/debentures in loan funds, 1860-80, 1895-1914
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Source: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board, 1860-80, and 1895-1915. 
 
Finally, the average deposit in the loan funds is illustrated in figure 2.10. There are 
two variables in figure 2.10. One is the average with the total number of depositors in 
all societies included in the denominator. The second is the average with only the 
societies reporting depositors in the denominator - hence its higher value.24 What 
figure 2.10 suggests is that there was no increase in the average deposit size in the 
loan funds, but that more depositors were investing similar amounts. The average 
deposit size is quite high relative to the agricultural wage statistics that are available - 
roughly two to three times the agricultural wage. This is an indicator that these 
depositors were not low income savers.25 So the question that should be asked is:  
why was there an increase in saving in the loan funds at the end of the nineteenth 
century?  
Tentatively, an explanation can be seen in the trends in Consol yields in the 
nineteenth century and US bond rates. As was stated in chapter 1, the maximum rate 
of interest that loan funds could pay on deposits/debentures under the 1843 act was 
fixed at 5 per cent.26  
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Average all societies = deposits/total number of depositors in all societies (some societies have 0 
values). Average only in societies with depositors = deposits/(number of depositors – societies without 
depositors). 
25
 The POSB and TSB in the same period had lower average savings, which is another indicator of the 
type of investor in the loan funds. 
26
 In comparison, the maximum rate paying in the POSB and TSBs was 2.5 per cent.  
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Figure 2.11  
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Note: The differential has been calculated by subtracting the Consol yield from the maximum 
debenture rate in the loan funds, and from the yield on US bonds. This effectively gives us a 
risk premium value as Consols were considered the safest asset in the nineteenth century. 
Sources: Estimated Consol yield from Jan Tore Klovland, ‘Pitfalls in the estimation of the yield on 
British Consols, 1850-1914’ in The Journal of Economic History, liv, no. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp 
164-187. And table 4.8 in Milton Friedman and Anna J Schwartz, Monetary trends in the 
United States and the UK (Chicago, 1982). 
 
Evidence from parliamentary returns suggests that there was Irish investment in 
government bonds in the post-famine period.27 As Consols would have been the safest 
asset available to investors in the nineteenth century, the Consol yield would indicate 
the price of a safe asset. So the differential between the return of an alternative 
investment and the Consol yield would indicate the risk premium. In the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth-century there was a downward trend in long-term interest 
rates in both the UK and the US. What figure 2.11 then suggests is that there was 
growth in the nominal risk premium associated with investing in loan funds. This 
would account for the increase in the number of investors between 1880 and 1895. 
The growth in the market risk premium alone would not account for the growth in 
investors; there was also a perception that the loan funds were a government 
                                                 
27
 The figure for 1880 of the amount of government stock held by people in Ireland was £32,395,000. 
This figure seems to be exclusive of money held on deposits and cash balances in the joint stock banks, 
which in 1880 was £29,746,000. See Report on statistics of banking in Ireland, and investments in 
government and India stocks Dec 1859-85. [c.4681] H.C. 1886, lxxi.141.  
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guaranteed institution. Hence the higher risk premium would have been perceived as a 
guaranteed premium, with investors believing that in the case of default the 
government would guarantee the investment. But, as will be discussed below, there 
was no government guarantee to investors in loan fund institutions. Another factor 
that may have influenced investors was the income generating techniques used by 
loan funds. Investors may have felt that income generation via fines and loan renewals 
were legitimate means for a loan fund to generate income for dividend, but as will be 
shown below, such income generation means were actually illegal under loan fund 
legislation.28 Once this was realised, and the fear of loss from loan fund investment 
was evident, there was a decrease in the number of depositors. What this suggests is 
that there was inadequate knowledge of the working of the loan fund system amongst 
investors, and this inaccurate information that they possessed may have influenced 
their decision making. 
If we take into consideration the interest payments on alternative financial 
instruments available to these depositors, we can see that they would have been 
excluded from alternative savings bank accounts, TSBs and the POSB, based on 
deposit ceilings which were £50 per annum. Also interest rates were lower in these 
institutions, set at a fixed rate 2.5 per cent.29 Joint stock banks paid lower interest on 
deposits based on the fact that they were short-term investments, with as little as one 
week’s notice required for withdrawals. It was often cited that the joint stock banks 
paid around 1 to 1.5 per cent. Given these alternatives, it is not difficult to see the 
attraction of the loan funds. 
So the two factors - inaccurate information that made loan funds appear less 
risky and higher returns compared to alternative investments - would have made loan 
funds an attractive alternative to investors.   
 
2.2.3 Loan fund circulation and loans 
This section will outline trends in loan fund loan dispersal and the number of loans 
issued.  Firstly, figure 2.12 shows the trend in loan fund circulation, real and nominal, 
from 1860 to 1918. As can be seen, there was a decrease in loan fund circulation30 
                                                 
28
 Loan renewals were actually illegal under the loan fund acts, and this is shown in chapter 1. A court 
decision in 1896 made it illegal to recover loan fund loans that were issued in violation of the 1843 
loan fund act, i.e. renewals. This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
29
 These are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
30
 Circulation was the term used by the LFB to indicate the amount lent. 
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from the period 1860 to 1880, but it then increased from 1885, peaked in 1895 and 
afterwards fell rapidly.  
Figure 2.12  
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Source: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board, Thom’s Directory, and Kennedy, 2003 (rural weights) 
 
The provincial distribution of loan fund circulation in figure 2.13 shows that 
Ulster also had a large proportion of loan circulation, consistent with its larger share 
of loan fund capital. The distribution of loan fund circulation shown in figure 2.10, 
and its decline after 1896, raises questions about the nature of loan funds in Ulster. 
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Figure 2.13  
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Source: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board and Thom’s Directory 
 
Figure 2.14 links the data on circulation and capital to show the ratio of capital 
turnover in the LFB loan funds.31 A word of explanation is needed regarding the 
construction of figure 2.14. As the data for the period 1880 to 1885 are unavailable 
through LFB reports, the data from Thom’s have been used to create the spine of 
figure 2.14, but this spine differs from the average derived from the LFB reports from 
1896 onwards. The reason for this is that after 1896 a number of societies, although 
possessing capital, ceased to issue loans. The Thom’s statistics are aggregates and 
would not have picked up this decrease in activity, whereas the averages from the 
LFB reports have been purged of inactive societies. What figure 2.14 does show us is 
that the loan funds experienced a decrease in capital turnover during the period 1860 
to 1918. The importance of capital turnover in terms of the loan fund business model 
is that the greater the number of times capital was turned around, the more income a 
loan fund would receive. The decrease in capital turnover is an indication of the 
decrease in the demand for loans from loan funds, but also that the loan funds were no 
                                                 
31
 Capital turnover = Amount of loans/capital 
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longer as profitable as they had once been, this being perhaps a reflection of 
competition.   
Figure 2.14  
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Note: This graph has been constructed using STATA. The missing years from 1881 to 1894 were 
automatically estimated linearly for standard deviation and mean working capital turnover. 
Sources: LFB reports and Thom’s Directory. 
 
Figures 2.15 and 2.16 give an indication of the number of loans issued, but it 
must be borne in mind that in the period 1880-95 the data are very questionable, a 
point which was raised in the 1897 report. The main factor that should be considered 
is the high incidence of loan renewals, something which the 1897 report was very 
critical of. Hollis and Sweetman seem to have equated the number of loans with the 
number of borrowers, but this may not be valid. As loan terms were for 20 weeks or 5 
months, and with 52 weeks in a year, this opens the possibility that the number of 
borrowers may have been less than the number of loans issued.32 The issue of 
renewals is very important, and it is not clear whether or not they were included in the 
number of loans issued. Renewals it was said were systemic and a tradition of the loan 
fund system, but a complaint of the 1897 report was that the loan renewals were not 
                                                 
32
 This point is also made in chapter 1.  
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officially recorded.33 A development that occurred in the LFB system in the post-
famine period was the increase in the number of monthly loans. These were loans that 
were repayable in monthly, instead of weekly, instalments. The growth in the number 
of monthly loans34 may account for both the decrease in the number of loans issued, 
and the lower capital turnover, in the post-famine period. 
Figure 2.15  
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Sources: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board and Thom’s Directory 
 
If we look at the provincial distribution of loans issued, shown in figure 2.16, 
again we see that Ulster had the highest distribution of loans issued by loan funds. It 
surpassed all the other provinces and its lending services were more active than in the 
other provinces. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Report of the committee appointed to inquire into the proceedings of charitable loan societies in 
Ireland, established under the Act 6 & 7, vic. Cap 91. , paragraph 61, p. 12. [C.8381], H.C. 1897, xxiii, 
383. (Hereafter Report on  charitable loan societies, 1897). 
34
 These are discussed in greater detail in section 2.3. 
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Figure 2.16  
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Sources: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board and Thom’s Directory 
 
To put figure 2.16 in some demographic context, figure 2.17 shows the provincial 
distribution of loans issued per 1,000 people. 
Figure 2.17  
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Sources: Loan Fund Board reports, Thom’s Directory and Census of Ireland. 
 
Figure 2.17 shows that the number of loans issued per 1,000 population was 
highest in Ulster. It is consistent with the other graphs that show loan fund variables 
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per 1,000 population in that it shows a decadal increase in activity in Ulster and 
Connaught in 1891 compared with the previous census years. The following census 
year, 1901, shows a marked drop in the numbers of loans per 1,000 population in all 
provinces. 
Figure 2.18 shows the percentage change in loans issued by loan funds. Figure 
2.18 shows that the issue of loans continued to decline, and that the sharpest declines 
came during the agricultural depression of the early 1860s, the land war period and 
after 1896. The declines in the depressions of the 1860s and late 1870s show how the 
general economic environment influenced loan fund activity. This it seems is 
consistent with general banking activity. Ollerenshaw cited a letter from one of the 
Ulster banks circulated amongst its bank branches advising them to restrict 
agricultural advances during the depression of the 1860s.35 In a newspaper article 
cited in chapter 1, the Earl of Belmore suggested that borrowers found it difficult to 
find sureties in a recessionary period, this being due to the fact that when a borrower 
defaulted his sureties were called on to repay the debt. The 1896 decline which is 
evident in most graphs shown in this section will be discussed in detail in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Philip Ollerenshaw, ‘Aspects of bank lending in post-famine Ireland’ in Rosalind Mitchinson and 
Peter Roebuck (eds.), Economy and society in Scotland and Ireland 1500-1939 (Edinburgh, 1988), pp 
222 - 232. 
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Figure 2.18  
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Sources: Loan Fund Board reports and Thom’s Directory. 
 
Figure 2.19 shows the average loan size, real and nominal, from loan funds in the 
period 1860-1918. In this period the average loan size remained within the limit of 
£10, but there was a trend towards gradual increases in loan sizes. Although this is 
only an average and fails to represent extreme values, it can be seen that many 
borrowers from the loan funds did not have demands for loans greater than £10. This 
is not to say that people did not want loans greater than £10; it is possible that they 
did. Rather it is to say that those people associated with the loan funds only required 
consistently small loans. In essence the loan fund data is a truncated sample of credit 
demand at the time,36 and as there is no published data on average bank loans during 
the period it is a biased representation of the demand for credit. We do not know what 
the demand for credit may have been, only what the supply of credit from the loan 
funds was.  Previous graphs, figures 2.12 and 2.15, indicated that there was a decrease 
in the amount of loans and the number of loans that were issued. It could be argued 
that many people had finished dealing with the loan funds as the loan funds were 
unable to facilitate demands for increasing amounts of credit. This is questionable as 
                                                 
36
 It is a lower tier truncated sample. We do not have information on what demand may have been like 
for amounts over £10. 
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it depends on whether or not loan fund loans were able to keep pace with agricultural 
input costs. But this may not have been the case, as many farmers had small credit 
needs owing to the low level of input costs.37 What we can say is that the average 
sizes of loans kept increasing as the number of people borrowing from the loan funds 
continued to decrease.  
Figure 2.19  
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Note: The average loan (deflated) is derived from the deflated circulation in figure 2.12.  
Sources: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board and Thom’s Directory, Kennedy, 2003 (rural 
weights).  
 
In this context it is worth asking: how important was the £10 loan ceiling that 
was legislatively imposed on the loan funds? In order to put the average loan sizes 
into some relevant context it would be useful to compare these loan sizes in relation to 
contemporary price and wage levels. The average loan size is compared with the 
prices of young livestock and the levels of agricultural wages in figures 2.20 and 2.22. 
Figure 2.20 shows the price of store cattle and lambs. These prices are used to give an 
indication as to what investment a loan from a loan fund could or could not have been 
used for.38 The data available at hand were limited to what was published in the DATI 
                                                 
37
 I have not found any detailed work on input costs in Irish agriculture during this period. 
38
 This is assuming that loan funds were used for investment and used for agricultural purposes. 
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price series and hence the focus for analysis is limited to cattle and lambs.39 Ideally 
one would like to compare the price of pigs, goats and poultry. From figure 2.20 it 
seems that the price of young store cattle gradually exceeded the average loan size 
from a loan fund. Although data on actual loan usage are not available, the 
information in figure 2.20 suggests that these loans may not have been used to 
purchase store cattle. It may have been likely that a borrower purchased a cow using a 
loan plus the family’s own accumulated savings, and it is also probable that loans 
would have been used to purchase other livestock, namely milch cows, sheep and 
pigs.  
Figure 2.20  
Average loan fund loan size and prices of store sheep and 
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Sources: Annual Loan Fund Board reports, deflator Kennedy ‘The cost of living in Ireland’ 
 A return showing, as far as practicable, for Ireland as a whole, the annual average Prices for each 
year 1881-1909; the annual average Prices for each period comprised from 1881 to 1918 of 5 years, 
10 years, 15 years, 20 years, and 25 years, and for the period of 4 years 1906 to 1909; such prices to 
be compiled from the Returns of Prices of crops, live stock, and other Irish Agricultural products 
heretofore published from time to time by the Irish Land Commission, or the Department of Agriculture 
and Technical Instruction for Ireland, or from other information in the possession of those 
Departments, H.C., (201) 1919, li, 91. (hereafter A return showing the annual average prices for each 
year 1881-1909…) 
 
In order to give us an idea of what the scale of return to investment in livestock 
might have been, figure 2.21 shows the expected return to investment in livestock in 
purely nominal monetary terms - this being the price for older livestock as a 
percentage of the price of young livestock and the likely return which would be the 
                                                 
39
 For the purposes of this study these are the best available price listings. The prices collected by Liam 
Kennedy and Peter Solar relate mainly to agricultural output. There are two tables (table A. 14 and 
table A. 15) giving prices of cattle, but these refer to 3-year-old cattle: See Liam Kennedy and Peter M. 
Solar, Irish agriculture: a price history from the mid-eighteenth century to the eve of the First World 
War (Dublin, 2008).  
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price for livestock in two years’ time as a percentage of the price of livestock today.40 
Admittedly using this crude measure, which does not take account of input costs 
involved in rearing livestock or the risk of livestock dying before being reared, would 
suggest that the highest return would be obtainable from investment in store cattle. 
But, in terms of loan fund loan size, the purchase of store cattle would have been 
beyond the scope of loan fund activities. If the expected gross return of investment 
was to be adjusted for potential input costs it would reduce the rate of return as 
suggested in figure 2.21, and perhaps indicate that the expected return from investing 
in non-cattle livestock would have resulted in negative returns from the perspective of 
a loan fund borrower.41 
Figure 2.21  
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Note: These are gross returns and no allowance has been made for costs. 
The formula used in calculating these returns was: 
For expected returns: the price of a 3 year old store cattle/sheep at time t0 as a percentage return of the 
price of a 1 to 2 year old calf at t0: ((p3t0-p1t0)/p1t0)*100 
For likely returns: The price of a 3 year old store cattle/sheep at time t+2 (t, t+1, t+2 = 3 years from 
time of purchase e.g. if a calf was bought in 1887, the price for 1889 was used), as a percentage return 
of the price of a 1 to 2 year old calf at time t0:  
((p3t+2 – p1t0)/p1t0)*100 
 
Source: A return showing the annual average prices for each year 1881-1909…. 
 
To give the average loans a sense of scale, figure 2.22 plots the average loan 
size against agricultural wage and figure 2.23 gives a ratio of average loan size to 
agricultural wage. To compare the average loan size of loan fund loans, an annual 
                                                 
40
 Expected return is the price of older cattle at time t when the young calf is bought. Likely return is 
the price for cattle at time t+2. 
41
 This return has not taken into account the value of wool that a given sheep could produce. 
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wage series has been constructed using both Bowley’s and Board of Trade wage 
series. The value of such a series can give us a sense of scale to loan fund activity, but 
agricultural wage series are of dubious value in terms of Irish agricultural activity. 
Firstly, the series for agricultural wages used by the Board of Trade do not capture 
additional cash payments that occurred during harvest time, nor do they capture the 
value of benefits in kind such as access to plots of land. This is also a problem 
common with agricultural wage statistics for the rest of the UK, but the Irish statistics 
suffer from additional problems. These limitations were outlined in a Board of Trade 
report on wages in 1913: 
The difficulty, however, is increased in Ireland insomuch as in certain counties especially 
in the West, there are comparatively few farm labourers who are continuously employed 
throughout the year, and it is impossible to select any one predominant class of labourer 
as in the case of ordinary labourers in England.42 
 
Given the shortage of loan funds in the west, and their small contribution to loan 
fund activity, the problem regarding few farm labourers in the west can be discounted. 
The report concluded that there had been a trend towards agricultural wage increases 
over the nineteenth century, and that one of the reasons for the rise was the 
‘increasing scarcity of labour’.43 
The criticism of the Board of Trade statistics also hold for Bowley’s, but the 
available evidence is supported by qualitative statements. For example, Bailey’s 1903 
report on land purchase referred to higher costs of labour.44 Although the wage series 
may not be over-reliable as regards the actual level of wage rates, they do give us a 
sense of the trend in agricultural wage rates. What is not often cited as a cause of the 
increase in agricultural wage rates is the effect of shifts in demand. Undoubtedly the 
supply of labour decreased over time, but it appears that the demand for labour also 
decreased, with family labour units replacing demand for individual labourers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42Report on Changes in Rates of Wages and Hours of Labour in the United Kingdom, for 1913, p. xxix, 
[Cd. 7635] H.C. , 1914-16, lxi, 769. 
43Ibid, p. xxix 
44
 Report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, Legal Assistant Commissioner, of an inquiry into the present condition 
of tenant purchasers under the land purchase acts, p. 19, (92) H.C. 1903, lvii, 333. 
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Figure 2.22  
0
10
20
30
40
£(£
1=
24
0d
)
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
Ag wage(BofT defalted) Ag wage (BofT)
Ag wage (Bow) Ag wage ( Bow deflated)
Average loan Average loan (deflated)
1860-1913
Average annual agricultural wages and average loans from loan funds
 
 
Note: The Ag wage (BofT) is comprised of three different series. Firstly from 1860 to 1874 it is an 
average from 10 farms; from 1874 to 1903 it is an average from 22 farms. These were taken from the 
report of Wilson Fox. An index was created from Wilson Fox’s series and merged with the index from 
the abstract of labour statistics. This is a similar procedure to that undertaken by Boyer, Hatton and 
O’Rourke. Finally the nominal annual wage series was constructed by combining information of the 
indices with the information on weekly wages in Wilson Fox’s series and multiplied by the 
corresponding number of weeks in the calendar year, with the base year being 1900.   
  
Sources:  Average loan fund loans: Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board and Thom’s Directory.  
Ag Bow: Bowley, 1899 
AgBot: Board of trade labour statistics were used. Second report by Mr. Wilson Fox on the wages, 
earnings, and conditions of employment of agricultural labourers in the United Kingdom, with 
Statistical Tables and Charts, p. 137 [cd. 2376], H.C. 1905, xcvii, 335. ; and Seventeenth abstract of 
labour statistics of the United Kingdom, p. 67 [Cd. 7733], H.C. 1914-16, lxi, 295. (Hereafter Board of 
trade, 1905 and 1914) 
Kennedy, 2003 (rural weights) 
George R. Boyer, Timothy J. Hatton, and Kevin O’Rourke, ‘The impact of emigration on real wages in 
Ireland 1850-1914,’ Centre for Economic Policy Research , discussion paper 854 (December 1993). 
(Hereafter Boyer, Hatton, O’Rourke, 1993) 
 
 
From figure 2.22 it can be seen that the average loan fund loan was less than the 
average agricultural wage. In the pre-famine period average loan sizes had kept pace 
with the average agricultural wage, mainly because of sticky wages and downward 
pressure on wages, but this was no longer the case in the post-famine period. 
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Figure 2.23  
Indices of average loan sizes and average wages, 1860-1913
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Sources: Bowley, 1899; Board of Trade, 1905 and 1914; Kennedy, 2003 (rural weights); Boyer, 
Hatton, O’Rourke, 1993. 
 
Figure 2.23 shows indices of wages and loan funds, both with base years in 1900. 
From figure 2.23 it would appear as though the average loan sizes shared a similar 
growth pattern as the average agricultural wages, but the average loan size fell sharply 
after 1896. This seems to suggest that borrowers from loan funds increased borrowing 
with increases in income. Figure 2.24, which is a ratio of average loans to the average 
agricultural wage, illustrates that although the average loan size did increase, the 
increases did not occur at the same rate, or level, as the increase in the agricultural 
wage.  
Figure 2.24  
Ratio of average loan size to average agricultural wage, 1860-1913
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Sources: Bowley, 1899; Board of trade, 1905 and 1914; Kennedy, 2003 (rural weights); Boyer, Hatton, 
O’Rourke, 1993. 
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2.3 Individual loan funds; some random examples 
 
The LFB annual reports are one of the main historical sources for loan fund activity in 
Ireland, but there are some individual isolated sources that are worthy of reference. 
Although they may not be able to influence a general understanding of loan funds, 
they do point to some pitfalls in the over-reliance on the LFB reports and to possible 
limitations of the LFB system.  
One obvious limitation of the annual statistics of the LFB is that they do not 
give us an indication as to whether or not the loans made by loan funds were made at 
regular intervals, or whether there were seasonal demands for loans. Seasonal demand 
for credit is what one would expect from lending institutions operating in an 
agricultural market. For example, one might expect loans to be made in spring time 
for the purchase of seeds or fertilisers to be used in the coming season. It is difficult to 
overcome this problem owing to the scarcity of available source material.  
There are two account books of loan funds available in the National Library of 
Ireland. One is on microfilm from the Knockmourne Loan Fund in Co. Cork45 and the 
other is from the Culduff Loan Fund in Co. Donegal. 46 Unfortunately, of the two, 
only the Knockmourne has been preserved in good condition. The Culduff account is 
a ledger for what seems to be the activity of one month. It gives us information on the 
name and residence of the borrower, but it does not give the surety nor does it state 
what the purpose of borrowing is.  The account book is official LFB stationery, which 
is arranged in 20 weeks to indicate the repayment schedule, and repayments were 
weekly. Although the account book itself is in very poor condition, there are three 
used promissory notes in good condition contained within the account. These are 
shown in plates 2.1 and 2.2. It can be clearly seen on the promissory notes that the 
LFB’s official stamp is present, and there is a clearly visible crown on the stamp 
which signifies a government office. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 ‘Knockmourne loan fund, list of loans, May 1869-May 1871 (original in possession of Mr Frank 
Power, Garry Ann, Conna, Co Louth)’ 1869-1871 (N.L.I , m.f. p3939) (Hereafter ‘Knockmourne loan 
fund..’) 
46
 ‘Culdaff loan society account book,’ 1860 (N.L.I, MS 23063 (bad condition)) 
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Plate 2.1 
 
Source: ‘Culdaff loan society account book,’ 1860 (N.L.I, MS 23063 (bad condition)) 
 
Plate 2.2  
 
Source: ‘Culdaff loan society account book,’ 1860 (N.L.I, MS 23063 (bad condition)) 
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The importance of the LFB stamp is that it gave both borrowers and investors 
(debenture holders and depositors) a sense that the loan funds were somehow 
government institutions. Government security, or perceived security, is a theme which 
arises in the 1890s and 1900s in the loan fund debates.47 Unfortunately, the other 
information from the Culduff account is illegible and does not provide as much 
information as is in the Knockmourne loan fund account. 
 
2.3.1 Knockmourne loan fund 
 
The Knockmourne loan fund account is the most comprehensive loan fund account 
found to date. Using the Knockmourne loan fund account is by no means a definitive 
statement on loan fund activity, as it is only one loan fund out of hundreds, and the 
information is only for a two-year period. The information, although scant, can give 
us a better understanding of the operations and limitations of a loan fund in nineteenth 
century Ireland. 
The Knockmourne loan fund Co. Cork was established in 186048 and continued 
to operate until 1876 when it was wound up.49 It is unclear why the society was 
wound up, but it may have something to do with the fact that Rev. R. D. Campion, 
who had been the society’s treasurer from 1860 to 1875, was replaced by J. W. W. 
Nason in 1876, the year the society was wound up.  
The Knockmourne account shows the weekly loans issued by the loan fund 
from May 1869 to May 1871. The information contained in the account book includes 
the number of loans made, the amount for which the loan was issued, the names and 
occupation of borrowers and sureties, and the residence of borrowers and sureties. 
The benefits of this account are that it gives an indication of who the borrowers of this 
loan fund were and it also gives an indication as to the relationship between the 
borrowers and the sureties. However, the account does not give any information 
regarding loan use. The account is also useful in that the information is given for the 
years 1869 to 1871, which were relatively calm years. So these are not years which 
                                                 
47
 This is discussed in section 2.4. 
48
 Twenty-third annual report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, [2834], H.C., 
1861 xxvii, 601. 
49
 Thirty-ninth annual report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, [c.1704], H.C., 
1877, xxvii, 91. 
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are outliers in terms of the nineteenth century. The frequency of the information in the 
account allows us to get a view of what the demand for loans were like during the 
year. The majority of the surviving evidence on loan fund usage comes in the form of 
annual report, so weekly data of this type are very welcome. 
Firstly, to put these years into context, the following information taken from the 
annual reports of the LFB shows the operation of the Knockmourne loan fund from 
1860 to 1876. 
Figure 2.25  
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Sources: Twenty-third Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, [2834], H.C. 
1861, xxvii,601; [2989], H.C. 1862, xix, 214; [3169], H.C. 1863, xxviii, 553; [3337], H.C. 1864, xxxi, 
315; [3485], H.C. 1865, xxviii, 553; [3644], H.C. 1866, xxiv, 443;  [3838], H.C. xix, 295; [4013], H.C. 
1867-68, xxi, 127; [4143], H.C. 1868-69, xvii, 365; [C.76], H.C. 1870, xvii, 337; [C.325], H.C. 1871, 
xvi, 123; [C.525], H.C. 1872, xviii, 381; [C.753], H.C. 1873, xxi, 269; [C.953], H.C. 1874, xv, 231; 
[C.1186], H.C. 1875, xxi, 89; [C.1468], H.C. 1876, xxi, 1; [C.1704], H.C. 1877, xxvii, 91. 
 
 
Figure 2.25 shows the distribution of capital in the Knockmourne loan fund 
from 1860 to 1876 between interest-free capital and deposits and debentures. As can 
be seen there was a decline in the amount of deposits in the loan fund over the period, 
and there was an increase in the amount of interest-free capital. Interest-free capital 
seems to have come mainly from retained profits that were reused in the loan fund. 
From 1866 the Knockmourne loan fund spent on average £4 a year on charitable 
purposes, with the remainder of its profits being reused the following year. The 
amount of capital used as working capital was consistently high and on average for 
the whole period it was 98.9 per cent of the society’s capital. But the amount of 
money kept in the hands of the treasurer was on average 13 per cent of the capital, so 
in effect there was a 13 per cent reserve. Table 2.1 gives us an indication as to what 
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discount was charged on loans and the interest paid on deposits. Discount and interest 
have been calculated by using the information on discount and fines charged from the 
annual reports and calculating the percentage of charges divided by the total number 
of loans issued. The same procedure was followed for interest on deposits.50 
 
Table 2.1: Capital turnover, rates of interest of loans, and deposits in the 
Knockmourne loan fund, 1869-71 
Year Capital 
turnover 
Discount as 
a % of loans 
Fines as a 
% of loans 
All charges 
as a % of 
loans 
Interest paid 
to 
depositors 
as a % of 
deposits 
1869 4.23 1.67 0.41 2.40 5.00 
1870 4.20 1.67 0.43 2.41 5.00 
1871 4.50 1.67 0.44 2.40 5.85 
 
Sources: Thirty-second Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, 
[C.76], H.C. 1870, xvii, 337; Thirty-third Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board 
of Ireland [C.325], H.C. 1871, xvi, 123; Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan 
Fund Board of Ireland [C.525], H.C. 1872, xviii, 381. 
 
In the LFB annual reports there is a term called ‘gross profit’ which indicates all 
charges on loans, or the total amount of income from lending. As can be seen, the 
calculated rates that borrowers were charged on loans were relatively low and the 
charging of fines was not excessive. The interest paid to depositors was an annual 
rate, and provided a society had a high capital turnover it would have been able to 
meet its liabilities to depositors.51 From the annual reports it is also evident that the 
Knockmourne loan fund only issued loans that were repayable by weekly instalments.  
Finally figure 2.26 shows the average loan sizes in the Knockmourne loan fund from 
1860 to 1876. The number of loans issued from 1860 to 1875 declined by 27 per cent, 
with the highest number of loans being issued in the early 1860s. This trend is in line 
with the LFB system in general as outlined in section 2.2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 There was no information given on discount rates in the account book. But from table 1 it is seen that 
the society used the 4d in the £1 discount, i.e. (4/240)*100 = 1.666667 
51
 Multiply the capital turnover by the rate of discount, and then subtract the rate of interest on deposits.  
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Figure 2.26  
Average loan size in the Knockmourne loan fund, 1860-1876
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Source: Loan Fund Board Reports, various years. 
 
Given this context, the weekly loan and monthly loan distribution of the 
Knockmourne loan fund provide us with some useful information regarding the 
demand for credit. Firstly, we will look at weekly loan issues. 
Figure 2.27 
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Source: ‘Knockmourne loan fund…’ 
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Figure 2.27 shows the amount of loans issued weekly in the Knockmourne loan 
fund.52 As can be seen there was a lot of volatility in the amount of loans issued 
weekly. The average amount issued weekly was £17, with a standard deviation of 
5.02. The outlying values in the period came in July 1869 when the smallest amount, 
£4, was issued and in April 1870 when the highest amount, £32, was issued.  Figure 
2.28 shows the number of loans issued; again there is some volatility in the frequency 
of loans issued, but the volatility decreases towards the end of the period. 
Figure 2.28  
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Source: ‘Knockmourne loan fund…’ 
 
The average weekly loan along with the standard deviation is shown in figure 
2.29. Although the average is very volatile it does show a tendency to stay between £2 
and £4 during the period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 The x-axis is the week number, starting from the first week in May 1869 and finishing in the last 
week of May 1871. 
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Figure 2.29  
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Source: ‘Knockmourne loan fund…’ 
 
Finally from a monthly perspective, figure 2.30 shows the number of loans issued by 
month with an MA(2) process. From the vantage of monthly observations it does 
appear as though there is some seasonality in the distribution of loans from the 
Knockmourne loan fund. But it is also interesting to note that the level of loans is 
fairly constant throughout the year, even in the winter months. This would suggest 
that loans from the Knockmourne loan fund were not solely for agricultural 
investment. Particularly telling is the peak in November 1869 as November was 
traditionally associated with being one of the bi-annual periods for rent payment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
Figure 2.30  
Number of loans issued per month in the Knockmourne loan fund, 
May1869-May1871
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Source: ‘Knockmourne loan fund…’ 
 
In the period May 1869 to May 1871, the Knockmourne loan fund made 705 loans to 
295 borrowers,53 or borrowers equalled 41.84 per cent of the number of loans in the 
period. Of these borrowers 18.87 per cent received only one loan, while the other 
borrowers received multiple loans, with 56 per cent of the borrowers receiving 
between 3 and 5 loans. For example, Edmond Geary, a labourer from Conna, Co. 
Cork, borrowed £2 on four separate occasions: 6 September 1869, 31 January 1870, 
18 July 1870, and 19 December 1870. What is interesting about the pattern of 
borrowing is that each loan came very shortly after the 20-week loan period expired. 
From the Knockmourne account, it appears that Geary was not the only borrower who 
had multiple loans.  
Of the loans made, 78.43 per cent of these borrowers were male, whilst 21.56 
per cent were female. The number of sureties for the same period was 1,408, with 
98.15 per cent of these being male and 1.85 per cent being female.54 The occupations 
that were given for female borrowers varied, but the majority of them were classified 
as widows. The occupational distribution of borrowers and sureties of both genders 
are given in tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
 
                                                 
53
 The methodology used to count the number of borrowers was to sort the borrowers by name and then 
match the name with area and occupation.  
54
 Two loans were made where a borrower only had one surety. 
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Table 2.2: Occupational distribution of the people who borrowed from the 
Knockmourne loan fund, May 1869-May 1871 
Occupation Percentage 
Labourer 49.9 
Widow 12.2 
Farmer 11.6 
Tailor 4.3 
Shoemaker 3.9 
Carpenter 3.4 
Other 14.7 
  
Note: there were 705 borrowers in the sample. The occupations contained within the group ‘other’ are; 
Butcher, Manty maker, Saddler, Mason, fisherman, Inn man, Tinker, Smith, Nailor, Dealer, Cooper, 
Musician, Pensioner, Steward and Spinster. 
Source: ‘Knockmourne loan fund…’ 
 
Table 2.3: Occupational distribution of sureties in the Knockmourne loan fund, 
May 1869-May 1871 
Occupation Percentage 
Labourer 40.6 
Farmer 27.2 
Shoemaker 5.1 
Butcher 3.8 
Saddler 3.1 
Tinker 2.8 
Carpenter 2.6 
Dealer 2.4 
Fisherman 2.1 
Other 10.3 
 
Note: There were 1408 sureties in the sample, (two borrowers were able to borrow with only one 
surety). The occupations contained within the group ‘other’ are; Tailor, Nailor, Dealer, Pensioner, 
Cooper, Widow, Steward, Inn man, Smith, Mason, Gardener and Unknown. 
Source: ‘Knockmourne loan fund…’ 
 
The occupational distributions show that labourers made up the largest proportion of 
borrowers, but that the loan funds were used by a wide variety of people in the region 
of Knockmourne and its surrounding area. The occupational distribution of sureties is 
also interesting as it shows that labourers were also the largest grouping, perhaps a 
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reflection of mutual securitisation whereby a borrower would reciprocate the act of 
surety. Farmers are also more represented in terms of sureties than they were as 
borrowers. This may be an indication that farmers acted as sureties for labourers. 
Given the variety of occupations of borrowers in table 2.2, maybe this is an 
explanation for the lack of obvious seasonality in the data on lending in 
Knockmourne. 
 
2.3.2 Cloone and Kiltegan loan funds 
Two other cases that are of interest to the loan fund narrative are the Cloone loan fund 
in Leitrim,55 and the Kiltegan loan fund in Wicklow. 
The case of the Cloone loan fund is an example of the local politics involved 
when a loan fund was dissolved while still possessing ‘surplus assets’.56 An 
interesting aspect of the Cloone case is that the main protagonist was the infamous 
Earl of Leitrim. The Earl of Leitrim, William Sydney Clements (1806-1878), was a 
cantankerous character in Irish history. Leitrim was a large landowner with estates in 
Donegal, Galway and Leitrim. He served as an M.P. representing Leitrim from 1839, 
after the death of his older brother R. B. Lord Clements, until he retired as an M.P. in 
1847.57 After succeeding his father as Earl of Leitrim he entered the House of Lords 
and was a sitting Lord from 1854 to 1878.58 The Earl of Leitrim was previously cited 
in chapter 1 in relation to his speech admonishing the RLF and loan funds in general 
in Ireland.59 Given that his biographer believed that there was a shift in the politics of 
the earl of Leitrim, from radical in the period 1839 to c. 1847 to an Irish Tory,60 it 
would be interesting to see if there was a similar shift evident in his attitude towards 
loan funds. 
                                                 
55
 Copy of all correspondence between the stipendiary magistrate, the manager of the fund and others, 
and the Irish government, on the subject of the Cloone Loan Fund, H.C. 1863 (502), xxix, 285. 
(Hereafter, Cloone 1863…) 
56
 The correspondence was labelled by R. R. Madden to be on ‘the subject of the disposal of the surplus 
assets of the late Cloone Loan Fund.’: Ibid, p. 1 
57
 A. P. W. Malcomson, Virtues of a wicked earl: the life and legend of William Sydney Clements, 3rd 
Earl of Lietrim (1806-78) (Dublin, 2009), p. 121. 
58
 Ibid, p. 144. 
59
 The earl of Leitrim was cited as Viscount Clements, and the speech cited was made in the House of 
Commons. Malcomson made reference to this speech as evidence of the ‘intellectual power of the 
speaker’:  Ibid, p. 108. 
60
 Ibid, p. 179. 
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The Cloone loan fund was one of the earlier loan funds formed in Ireland, as there is a 
record of it in the 1836 return of loan funds in Ireland.61 The Cloone loan fund society 
was dissolved on 9 July 1861,62 so this would give it a lifespan of approximately 
thirty years. It appears as though the dissolution of the society was in relation to fraud 
perpetrated by the clerk of the society,63 but there was no comment on the case in the 
LFB reports so the details are somewhat vague. In appendices listing societies 
dissolved there was comment on the Cloone loan fund. It was stated that: 
All depositors paid in full, with one exception, that of Mr James Evan, for whose claim 
of £1000 the cheque remains in the hands of Secretary till such time as an indemnity is 
given to Board, the said depositor not being able to produce his debentures. The above-
mentioned depositors has been paid in full since 31 December 1861.64 
  
The fact that one of the depositors in this loan fund held £1,000 is interesting, 
further evidence to suggest that loan fund depositors were not from low income 
groupings.  
If we analyse the LFB reports for a period of ten years prior to the cessation of 
activities in the Cloone loan fund we can get information on the activity of the 
society. Firstly, in terms of the capital, the structure of the LFB reports enables us to 
determine what amount of the capital was from deposits and what amount was free of 
interest. This is useful information because in the event of the society being wound 
up, the ‘free’ capital had no claimant, and if debts to the fund’s creditors (depositors) 
were paid in full then what could be done with the surplus funds was at the discretion 
of the LFB.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 Return from Clerks of the Peace in Ireland of transcripts of Rules and Regulations of Loan Funds, p. 
5 (230) H.C. 1836, xlvii, 539 
62
 Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, p. 14. [2989] 
H.C. 1862, xix, 214. 
63
 R.R. Madden, ‘In re Cloone Loan Fund. Memoranda of Secretary of for Board’s consideration,’ 8 
November 1861 in Cloone 1863…p. 1. 
64
 Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, p. 14. [2989] 
H.C. 1862, xix, 214. 
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Table 2.4: Capital (interest free and deposits) of the Cloone loan fund society, 
Co. Leitrim, 1850-61. 
Year Capital Interest 
free 
capital 
Free 
capital as 
a % of 
capital 
Deposits Number 
of 
deposits 
Average 
deposit 
 £ £ % £ £ £ 
1850 3,223 407 12.63 2,816 38 74.11 
1851 4,196 555 13.23 3,641 40 91.03 
1852 4,578 831 18.15 3,747 57 65.74 
1853 3,004 963 32.06 2,041 26 78.50 
1854 2,697 1,041 38.60 1,656 21 78.86 
1855 3,055 1,188 38.89 1,867 25 74.68 
1856 3,861 1,348 34.91 2,513 25 100.52 
1857 4,227 1,533 36.27 2,694 25 107.76 
1858 4,645 1,699 36.58 2,946 25 117.84 
1859 4,462 1,822 40.83 2,640 20 132.00 
1860 4,467 1,934 43.30 2,533 13 194.85 
1861 4,525 2,022 44.69 2,503 13 192.54 
 
Sources: Thirteenth Annual Report of the Loan Fund Board, App. [1370] H.C. 1851, xxiv, 39; [1509], 
H.C. 1852, xviii, 553; [1638] H.C. 1852-53, xli, 331; [1766], H.C. 1854, xx,197; [1937] H.C. 1854-55, 
xvi, 117; 1856 [2085] H.C. 1856, xix, 165; [2211], H.C. 1857 Session 2, xvii, 49; 1857-58 [2384], H.C. 
1857-58, xiii, 565; [2521] H.C. 1859 Session 2, x, 425; [2625], H.C. 1860, xxxiv, 741; [2834], H.C. 
1861, xxvii, 601; [2989], H.C. 1862, xix, 214. 
  
From table 2.4 we can see that ‘free’ capital made up a significant proportion of the 
Cloone loan fund capital, growing to 44.69 per cent by 1861. In the same period there 
was a decrease in the number of deposits and depositors in the society. Before 
discussing the controversy surrounding the Cloone loan fund it is worth highlighting 
how the Cloone loan fund was able to accumulate such profits, as it is an example of 
how other loan funds operated. 
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Table 2.5: Income and expenses of Cloone loan fund society, 1850-1861 
Year Capital 
turnover 
Discount 
as a % 
of loans 
Fines as 
a % of 
loans 
Salaries 
as % of 
loans 
Interest 
as a % 
of loans 
Interest 
as % 
income a 
All 
costs % 
of total 
income 
b
 
  % % % % % % 
1850 3.45 3.11 0.35 0.54 1.14 31.98 51.40 
1851 3.35 3.12 0.33 0.43 1.19 33.70 49.94 
1852 3.39 3.12 0.38 0.43 1.25 35.05 50.01 
1853 4.84 3.12 0.54 0.52 1.41 37.58 57.17 
1854 3.81 2.92 0.47 0.73 0.85 25.07 52.40 
1855 3.87 2.92 0.41 0.75 0.76 22.86 49.83 
1856 3.62 2.92 0.41 0.64 0.79 23.73 52.67 
1857 3.63 2.92 0.46 0.63 0.84 24.82 50.90 
1858 3.76 2.50 0.43 0.56 0.80 27.29 53.89 
1859 3.76 2.50 0.31 0.58 0.81 28.69 58.92 
1860 3.86 2.50 0.37 0.56 0.77 26.79 60.52 
1861 1.77 2.06 0.46 0.61 0.81 31.53 57.46 
 
Notes: 
a - interest refers to interest paid to depositors and income is the term profit in the LFB reports, which 
is discount plus fines. 
b - All costs indicating total expenses and interest paid on deposits. 
Sources: Thirteenth Annual Report of the Loan Fund Board, App. [1370] H.C. 1851, xxiv, 39; [1509], 
H.C. 1852, xviii, 553; [1638] H.C. 1852-53, xli, 331; [1766], H.C. 1854, xx, 197; [1937] H.C. 1854-55, 
xvi, 117; 1856 [2085] H.C. 1856, xix, 165; [2211], H.C. 1857 Session 2, xvii, 49; 1857-58 [2384], H.C. 
1857-58, xiii, 565; [2521] H.C. 1859 Session 2, x, 425; [2625], H.C. 1860, xxxiv, 741; [2834], H.C. 
1861, xxvii, 601; [2989], H.C. 1862, xix, 214. 
 
Firstly, we can see that the Cloone loan fund had a high capital turnover, indicating 
that a large number of loans were made from the capital of the society. Table 2.5 
shows the income and cost variables of the Cloone loan fund society as a percentage 
of the loans that were made. This is a useful way to illustrate how the income from 
loans was greater than the costs. And in the final column of table 2.5 we can see that 
the total costs of the society were roughly one half of the income, indicating that the 
societies were making a profit. In the case of the Cloone society it is also interesting 
that out of the profits annual sums were expended on charitable causes, whilst the 
remainder of the profit was added to the society’s capital. In the period 1851 to 1860, 
an average of 29.81 per cent of profits was expended on charitable purposes.65  
 
                                                 
65
 This is the mean percentage of charitable expenditure between 1851 and 1860. 
 151 
After the Cloone society was dissolved, it was stated in an LFB report in 1863 that: 
The total amount lodged to Board’s credit, including £21 14s 5d interest allowed by 
Bank to 31st December, 1862, was £4,352 6s 3d. The actual amount available, after 
paying all depositors in full, £2,603, and charges of collection, &c., £239 8s, was £1,500 
18s 3d. Out of above, available assets Board ordered to be applied to the relief of urgent 
distress in the district the same to be administered through the Resident Magistrate, C. 
De Gernon, Esq., the sum of £1,300, which was accordingly lodged in hands of 
government for disposal by Mr. De Gernon, leaving a balance in Bank to Board’s credit 
on the 31st December, 1862, of £209 18s 3d, of which amount £200 up to 31st December, 
1862, was applicable to charitable or useful purposes in Loan Fund district.66  
 
 The main problem in the case of the Cloone loan fund was that it had 
accumulated a large unappropriated reserve. The LFB received numerous petitions 
from local people for the use of the funds, either to reconstruct a loan fund or to use 
the funds for charitable purposes.  The LFB was reluctant to allow a new loan fund to 
be established. In a memorandum, written for the LFB, R. R. Madden outlined the 
position: 
…the circumstances and difficulties above referred to [malpractices and prosecution of 
the clerk of the society] connected with those of the present calamity of the distress 
prevailing in the district, which there is reason to believe will increase, and in the course 
of the ensuing winter, amount to actual wide-spread destitution, make it quite evident the 
old Loan Fund cannot be reconstructed with advantage or with safety to the surplus 
profits of the old charity.67 
 
Another contentious issue related to the fact that the borrowers from the society 
had not all been exclusively from Cloone, but instead were from all over the region. 
The rules of loan funds were supposed to have restricted their activities to certain 
localities. However, it seems from a variety of sources, including the Knockmourne 
loan fund cited above, that this requirement was not always followed. This practice, 
coincidently, undermined the theoretical informational advantages of a loan fund in 
screening and monitoring borrowers. In the case of the Cloone loan fund the practice 
of lending outside the legal district meant that people outside of the district of Cloone, 
by using the loan fund, had contributed to the surplus profits which were in the 
trusteeship of the LFB. There were continued petitions from local interest groups for 
access to these surplus profits for charitable purposes, but the LFB’s legal advice did 
                                                 
66
 Twenty-fifth Annual Report Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, 
p. 14. [3169], H.C. 1863, xxviii, 553. 
67
 R.R. Madden, ‘In re Cloone Loan Fund. Memoranda of Secretary of for Board’s consideration,’ 8 
November 1861 in Cloone 1863…p. 1. 
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not believe that such requests could be acceded to as they came from outside of the 
district of Cloone.68 
The LFB had decided to use the money for charitable relief in Cloone, but in 
this they were challenged by the Earl of Leitrim who claimed that the doling out of 
funds was illegal and that the surplus funds should be invested in stock and that the 
interest from such investment should be in future used for charitable relief. The Earl 
of Leitrim, in a letter to the secretary of the LFB, stated that: 
I now beg that you will submit to the Board my earnest hope that they will not allow the 
large sum of money now staged to be at the disposal of the Board, to be distributed in 
alms during the present season, but that they will take into their consideration the 
propriety of either devoting the money to some useful and charitable local purpose, or 
else that they will direct the money to be invested in the funds, and devote the interest to 
charitable distribution.69 
 
The Earl of Leitrim seems to have taken exception to his request being ignored 
by the LFB,70 as was seen in his subsequent actions.  
The local magistrate, Mr. De Gernon, distributed Indian meal in July 1862 to 
people in the district of Cloone and Mohill in county Leitrim, the Indian meal was 
given on credit and secured by IOUs to be repaid in December of that year.71 It was 
alleged that the Earl of Leitrim encouraged his tenants to default on these loans. The 
Earl of Leitrim justified his actions by saying that charity should be given and not be 
expected to be repaid. In a letter written to the Lord Lieutenant in December 1862, the 
month the loans were due to be repaid, the Earl stated that: 
I am of opinion that the We O U’s should be abandoned forthwith, and that the poor 
should not be required to repay what was given in charity, in my opinion improperly 
given; but if not a bona fide gift, the case becomes one of far greater impropriety.72 
 
But the accusation was raised that the Earl of Leitrim had willingly encouraged 
loan defaults in order to maximise the payment of rent for the season.73 
The earl of Leitrim continued his attack on the LFB in the House of Lords. In 
1863 he raised a motion for: 
                                                 
68
 See for example ‘Letter from Reverend G. Beresford to Secretary of the Loan Fund Board,’ 2 
January 1862, and  ‘Letter from C. De Gernon to Loan Fund Board, 16 January 1862 in Cloone 1863… 
pp 8-9.  
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 ‘Letter from the earl of Leitrim to the Secretary of the Loan Fund Board,’ 24 December 1861, in 
Cloone 1863… p. 7.  
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 Rather from statements made in the House of Lords, cited below, he seems to have taken issue with 
R. R. Madden. 
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 ‘Copy of letter of Mr. De Gernon to Secretary, Loan Fund Board. Original document forwarded to 
Governemnt, wth cheque 200l.’ 8 July 1862, in Cloone 1863…  p. 16. 
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 ‘The Earl of Leitrim to the Lord Lieutenant’ 11 December 1862, in Cloone 1863…  p. 57. 
73
 ‘Letter from C. De Gernon to the Under Secretary [Thomas Larcom]’ 12 January 1863, in Cloone 
1863… p. 285.  
 153 
Her Majesty to appoint a royal commission to inquire into the propriety of the Loan Fund 
Board having ordered that the Cloone Loan Fund should be closed and the funds 
confiscated, and to inquire into the state of those funds, the manner in which they have 
been employed, and how far the same can be appropriated to the benefit of the poor of 
that locality. 74 
Leitrim’s motion and attack on the LFB was questioned by the Earl Granville, 
who argued that there was no ground for complaint, as the LFB did not abuse its 
power. Rather he believed that the fault lay with the earl of Leitrim. The Earl 
Granville was the leader of the Liberal party in the House of Lords, and at the time in 
question was also the lord president of the council in the Whig cabinet.75 The Earl of 
Leitrim’s complaint appeared to be how the surplus funds were used, and the Earl 
Granville outlined how that a local non-denominational committee took responsibility 
for the disbursal of the surplus funds.76 He cited a case where one of the clergymen 
had written to the Earl of Leitrim and that Leitrim’s response was to ‘express a desire 
that the writer would never communicate with him on any subject whatever’.77 
Granville also raised the issue of the Earl of Leitrim encouraging debt defaults, stating 
that ‘he was assured that the noble Earl actually advised some of his tenants not to 
repay the advances made to them’.78 The Earl of Leitrim stated that both accusations 
were incorrect.79 The earl Granville, in reply to Leitrim’s denials, declared that:  
From everybody, except the noble earl, he had received the facts as he had just stated 
them to the House, he must say, that he had never heard a more idle accusation against a 
body so respectable as the Loan Fund Commissioners.80  
After this the Earl of Leitrim retreated from his attack on the LFB, stating that: 
 [He] did not deny that the Loan Commissioners were very respectable in name; but the 
members of that Commission rarely attended to their duties. The Board was a mere farce, 
the whole business being in the hands of one gentleman. As regarded the correspondence 
to which reference had been made, the fact was, that having applied for information at 
the outset, he received a letter stating that his interference was not required. 
Subsequently, when all the funds had been expended, one of the clergymen wrote to him, 
asking for additional contributions, which were to be expended in the very manner of 
which he had all along expressed disapproval. Not unnaturally he returned a refusal. 
Conceiving that there had been an improper use of public money, when applied to for 
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75
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 Ibid, p. 1928. 
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 Ibid. 
79
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advice by several of his neighbours, he advised them to resist payment of sums with 
which they were improperly charged. But he never recommended any man to withhold 
money that was legitimately due.81  
It is difficult to evaluate the nature of Lord Leitrim’s gripe in the Cloone loan 
fund case as he had a track record of harassing public bodies with hostile letters. He 
was also on bad terms with the then under-secretary Thomas Larcom. As the LFB was 
appointed by the Lord Lieutenant or ‘other chief governors of Ireland’,82 this meant 
that the under-secretary to the Lord Lieutenant was in effect responsible for the LFB. 
Evidence of this was given by his biographer: 
Leitrim’s letters were provoking; they were intended to be so; and they certainly 
succeeded in being so in Larcom’s case [letter written in relation to an unfounded charge 
made by [earl of] Leitrim that the Co Leitrim police had been guilty of wilful dereliction 
of duty]. But they were neither foul-mouthed nor ill-mannered.83 
  
The letter referred to in the citation above was a completely unrelated matter, but 
Leitrim seems to have had a track record of writing letters to public bodies and figures 
and then expecting personal and prompt replies.84  
The allegations that the earl of Leitrim encouraged loan defaults out of self-
expedience seem to be supported by some circumstantial evidence. His biographer 
stated that: 
It was not as a turbulent parliamentarian and local magnate, or as an unremitting harrier 
of Dublin Castle and its stipendiary representatives in the localities, that Leitrim achieved 
his greatest notoriety: it was as a landlord.85 
 
His biographer asserted that it was a policy to recover arrears that had 
accumulated on the family estate in 1840s86 and that the estate had accrued debts 
during the famine financing drainage works.87 Malcomson stated that ‘Leitrim’s first 
and main objective was to clear arrears and maximise rental income’.88 All of which 
suggests that perhaps there is truth to the accusations raised against Leitrim. Leitrim 
seems to have personalised the case by placing blame on the secretary of the LFB, to 
whom correspondence was directed. But there may be truth in Leitrim’s belief that the 
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LFB secretary possessed too much power. The ‘bubble’ outlined in section 2.2 
occurred after the retirement of R.R. Madden who had occupied the position of 
secretary to the LFB for thirty years.89 Perhaps the fact that a loan fund ‘bubble’ did 
not take place before 1880 was due to the presence of Madden as secretary.  Therefore 
the bubble after 1880 may then be a reflection of a lack of long-term institutional 
evolution within the LFB as it was effectively personally administered by one 
individual. 
Finally, the reply from the LFB to a request to sanction the establishment of a 
new loan fund in the area of Cloone is interesting regarding the operation of loan 
funds in general. The following letter was written by R. R. Madden in 1862 in 
response to the request to extend interest-free loans beyond the original area of the 
loan fund: 
I am directed by the Board to inform you, in reply to your letter of 27th ult., respecting 
the Fund at your disposal for the relief of the suffering poor of the district included in the 
limits of the late Cloone Loan Fund, namely, the parishes of Cloone and Mohill, that no 
machinery exists for carrying out your suggestion of issuing small loans to poor farmers, 
payable, without interest, in quarterly instalments. It is to be borne in mind that there are 
many expenses and trouble attendant on opening and conducting a loan fund, such as 
stationery, office rent, salaries of two or more officers, &c. If there is no revenue in the 
shape of discount, fines, &c., how are the expenses to be met except by drawing on the 
principal, which in a very short time must be eaten up by such charges? If it is urged that 
disinterest[ed] persons will undertake all the expense and trouble attendant on such 
business, it must be observed it has been invariably found by the Board’s Inspector, that 
in cases even where depositors have large sums at stake, it is next to impossible to get 
them to attend for one or two hours in each month to perform a duty on which the safety 
of their own money depends, and that the important and troublesome duties of loan fund 
business  would be very imperfectly done, in any case, by unpaid and uninterest[ed] 
persons in subordinate positions, and, after a little, not done at all, or done 
disadvantageously with regards to the funds dealt with, and likewise to the character of 
the Loan Fund Institution itself.90 
 
This statement from the LFB suggests that depositors were poor monitors of loan 
funds, and that this was a persistent weakness in the LFB system.  
Another case is the Kiltegan loan fund, which was referred to in the unfinished 
memoirs of Edward O’Toole91 (1860-1943) that were written towards the end of his 
life in the 1940s.92 In his memoir O’Toole referred to the re-organisation of a loan 
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fund in the parish of Kiltegan, Co. Wicklow, in 1904.93 The society had previously 
been in existence, but had died out and a cash balance of £395 was left in the National 
Bank in Baltinglass.94  
The case of the Kiltegan loan funds is interesting as it highlights a sectarian 
element to the loan funds. In his description of the fund, which was first established in 
1841, O’Toole emphasised the Protestant nature of the society. O’Toole stated that: 
The Society was very well managed and as the population of the country at the time was 
at a peak point and consisted principally of small farmers and agricultural labourers, a 
very large business was done and a good profit was made. It is interesting and instructive 
now to examine how most of that profit was disposed of. The debenture holders were all 
Protestants and got 5 per cent on their investments, the two Protestant clerks got £30 in 
salaries and an annual endowment of from £10 to £5 was given yearly to the Protestant 
teachers of the schools at Stratford lodge, Baltinglass, Fortegranite, Kiltegan and Torboy. 
If anything were left it was used to buy blankets for the Catholic paupers of Kiltegan and 
neighbourhood. 
 
The languishing of the old society led to action and the actions ‘made by some 
representatives of the old crowd to have the society re-organised’ led O’Toole and a 
local parish priest, Fr. Delany, to apply to the LFB to have representation in the 
society and access to the idle funds of the loan fund that was to be reorganised in the 
area.95 The argument of Fr. Delany and O’Toole was that ‘the Catholic community 
which provided the vast majority of borrowers should have adequate representation in 
any meetings which were to be held for the re-organisation of the Society.’96 When 
the Society was reorganised Fr. Delany was elected as Chairman and Treasurer, and 
O’Toole was elected as clerk, with O’Toole stating that ‘we are both, thank god, 
carrying out the same duties to the present day, July 1941.’97 
O’Toole also referred to the general lack of awareness about the loan fund 
system. In an incident in the 1920s he recounted how his house was searched by 
British Auxiliaries and upon their finding the loan fund accounts in his possession he 
was suspected of running a Sinn Féin Loan Fund.98 The Kiltegan loan fund received a 
mention in the 1914 report on agricultural credit as being an exemplary model for 
loan funds in the way that ‘all the representative persons in the district were taken into 
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the society – the clergymen, county councillors, and others.’99 But it was an atypical 
loan fund as it was established in the twentieth century. 
 
2.4 The demise of the LFB loan funds, 1896 to 1914 
As was stated in section 2.2 the LFB reports were inconsistently published in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. One period where there is an abundance of 
available source material regarding LFB loan fund activity is between 1896 and 1906. 
During this period the LFB resumed the publication of its annual reports and there 
was also a parliamentary inquiry into the activities of all loan funds associated with 
the LFB.100 There were also references to loan funds in both parliamentary debates 
and local newspapers.  
This sudden appearance of source material needs to be questioned as to why it 
emerged and why such interest in loan funds was not constant throughout the 
nineteenth century. There is a straightforward explanation at hand: in 1896 verdicts in 
cases taken by a number of loan funds against defaulting borrowers went in favour of 
the defendants.101  
The court decisions adjudicated that the loans, for which cases were brought, 
were issued in violation of the 1843 loan fund act,102 and that the borrower was 
exonerated from the repayment of the debt under the loan fund legislation.103 The 
initial verdicts were challenged, but the appeals were dismissed. In the judgement of 
the case of ‘the treasurer of the Enniskillen loan fund society v Green’ it was found 
that as the borrower did not reside within the area which the Enniskillen loan fund had 
given as its area of operations, the loan could not be pursued in the petty session 
courts system. The main issues that arose from the case were: that the sum of money 
being sought was in fact a renewal of a loan issued seventeen years previously, that 
the borrower was residing outside the loan fund’s stated jurisdiction, that the loan 
fund had violated its own rules, and that there had been a change of treasurer since the 
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original loan was made and the new treasurer could not sue for the debt in the name of 
the old.104   
As this was a landmark case in the context of the LFB system it is worth 
elaborating on some of the evidence that was presented. In particular the point 
regarding the society violating its own rules referred to the fact that the borrower and 
sureties were already in debt to the society. In the case the borrower was previously 
indebted to the society, as he was the surety for his sureties. Also his sureties were 
already in debt to the society, as they themselves had outstanding loans. It was stated 
that: 
No money, however, had been advanced to any of the defendants on the 30th January, 
1896, nor for many years previous, this note being the last of a series of renewals of an 
original note given more than seventeen years ago. It had been the custom of this society 
to allow borrowers to renew their loans every three months, the borrowers first paying all 
fines incurred under the previous note, and the interest which would accrue due on the 
new note, in the present case in all amounting to the sum of 9s 4d. The defendant had 
already paid £44 to the society, by way of renewal fines and interest on the original 
note.105 
 
The borrower was also residing 5 miles outside of the district stated to be the 
area where the Enniskillen loan fund society operated. What the courts deemed to be 
at odds with the act was the fact that the loan fund act deemed that loan fund societies 
were to be for the benefit of the industrious poor within a stated area. Provided they 
operated within the area stated there would be no legal doubt surrounding the 
recovery of debt, but if the loan fund operated outside its stated area, then the loan 
fund ceased to abide by the loan fund laws. It is interesting that some of the elements 
in this case were so instrumental in derailing the LFB system as the reverberations 
seem to suggest that the faults highlighted in this case were universal amongst LFB 
loan funds in Ireland. Shortly after the Enniskillen loan fund society v Green, an 
appeal from the Castlederg loan fund society in Tyrone was dismissed. The resulting 
case determined that loan renewals were in fact ‘contrary to the provisions of the loan 
fund act, 1843’.106 
These decisions created panic amongst people involved in loan funds. As was 
alluded to in section 2.2 there had been an increase in the number of loan funds from 
1880 until 1896, and the verdicts, which were upheld, endangered any capital invested 
in loan funds. It meant that loans made via the LFB system could only be recovered if 
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they were made in adherence to the 1843 act and to the rules that the societies had 
lodged with the LFB, and the report published in 1897 showed that the majority of 
loan funds had not adhered to the law. The problem was compounded by the fact that 
loan funds, as they had registered under the 1843 Loan Fund Act, were thereby 
disqualified from suing for promissory notes (i.e. debts)107 under the alternative Petty 
Session Acts.108 This situation was outlined in the fifty-ninth LFB report in 1898: 
The decisions lately given do not appear to involve the invalidity, under the ordinary law, 
of renewed promissory notes given to loan fund societies, working under 6 and 7 Vict. c. 
91. They merely decided that such renewals cannot be sued on under that statute. If, 
however, actions are brought, under the ordinary law, upon renewed promissory notes 
given to Loan Fund Societies, the absence of a stamp (with the Loan Fund Act dispenses 
with) will be practically fatal to the claim.109 (sic.) 
 
Loan funds, by registering under the loan fund acts had taken advantage of the 
tax exemption which did not require the stamping of promissory notes, but by doing 
so they were prevented from suing for debts outside of the loan fund act – suing for 
debt required a stamp on the promissory note. In the opinion of one of the judges in 
the Enniskillen case there was nothing stopping a loan fund from trying to recover a 
debt in court as the judgement did not necessarily invalidate the debt; only the 
judgement meant that the loan fund could not recover debts under the petty sessions 
act.110 As the 1843 loan fund act specially made reference to loan recovery in the 
petty session courts, this meant that loan funds could not adequately and economically 
enforce debts. Although recourse to higher courts could have been possible, this 
would have increased the transaction costs associated with debt recovery. Given the 
low value of loan fund loans it is quite possible that the increased transaction costs 
would have been greater than the size of the loan.   
 
2.4.1 The 1897 report 
In 1896 an inquiry took place into the ‘proceedings of all existing loan societies 
established in Ireland under the authority’ of the LFB.111 The commission of inquiry 
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was given a broad remit and the resulting report was based on inquiries ‘into the 
proceedings of the 104 loan societies’ registered with the LFB at the time.112  
The 1897 report on loan fund activity is an interesting document regarding the 
performance of the loan funds. It is also a useful document in that it is arguably 
devoid of bias. The commission to investigate the loan funds was comprised of two 
independent civil servants and the inspector of the LFB. The inquiry was held in 
public, and as such there were reports in local newspapers. The inquiry was given a 
wide remit and the resulting report was an indictment of the LFB system as it was 
then constituted. It must be borne in mind that the system had not experienced any 
major reform since the 1843 Act, with the only significant change in legislation 
affecting loan funds being one that increased the price of stationery and documents 
purchased from the LFB.113  
The 1897 report into the proceedings of the charitable loan societies in 
Ireland114 was the first such direct enquiry into loan fund activity since the 
establishment of the LFB in 1836. Although there was a committee investigating loan 
fund activity in the 1850s, its main aim was to inquire into the proceedings of the 
funds of the Reproductive Loan Funds (RLFs). Confusion surrounding the 
demarcation between the RLFs and loan funds associated with the LFB led to the 
activities of the LFB being included in the inquiry.115 In contrast, the 1897 inquiry 
was the first, and essentially the sole inquiry, that directly focused on the loan funds 
associated with the LFB. The 1897 report is a survey of what can happen to 
microfinance institutions that are under-regulated and where needy borrowers are 
exploited; in effect what can happen when predatory moneylenders are given rights 
and privileges for exacting repayments.   
A question that was not satisfactorily answered by Hollis and Sweetman was 
how the loan funds continued to operate in the post-famine period. Given that the 
1843 act reduced the rate of discount which loan funds could charge and that the 
interest payable on deposits was also reduced, it would be interesting to see how the 
loan funds were able to compete in the post-famine period under such legislative 
restraints. Were the surviving loan funds able to develop strategies to cope with the 
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reduction in income, or did they have a comparative advantage in information 
creation?  
 From the 1897 report we see a number of ways in which the loan funds 
overcame such legislative restrictions. One of the main strategies was simply to 
ignore the legislative restrictions and to charge a higher rate of discount than what 
was permitted by the 1843 act. It must be noted that this was actually done with the 
consent of the LFB, as it gave misinformed advice to loan societies. As previously 
stated, the 1843 act reduced the rate of discount from 6 pence in the pound to 4 pence 
in the pound.116 But the LFB issued a circular to all societies in 1845 informing them 
that the 1843 act permitted them to issue monthly loans ‘at a rate of discount not 
exceeding 1 ½ d per pound per month, or 7 ½ d in the pound on the sum issued for a 
period of five months.’117  
Given that the 1843 act aimed to reduce the discount from 6d in the pound to 4d 
in the pound, it does not seem to have been its intention to actually raise the rate of 
discount to 7 ½ d in the pound as was advised by the LFB.118 In terms of annualised 
discount rates,119 the 1897 report stated that: 
We are confirmed in this opinion by a consideration of the fact that the rate of discount 
6d in the pound, or £12 8s 3d per cent per annum, was made illegal after 31st March 
1844, by section 29 of the Act of 1843, and that section 27 of that Act restricted the rate 
of discount to a sum not exceeding 4d in the pound for 20 weeks, or £8 5s 6d per cent. A 
rate of discount of 7 ½ d in the pound on a loan repayable by monthly instalments, for a 
period of five months, is £13 11s 7d per cent per annum.120 
 
The 1897 report stated that the LFB had confused the terms interest and 
discount, as the 1843 act had stated that 1 ½ d in the pound per month was chargeable 
as interest, and 4d in the pound per week for 20 weeks was charged as discount. The 
LFB, however, misinterpreted 1 ½ d in the pound per month to be discount, and not 
interest, and thus allowed loan funds to charge higher rates of discount. The 1897 
report also gave an insightful table showing what rates of discount were being 
charged by various societies and it is reproduced in table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6: Rates of discount on monthly loans in 1895  
Rate of discount Discount rate (%) Effective 
annualised 
interest rate (%) 
Number of societies 
7 ½ d in the £ 3.13 1.35 55 
7d in the £ 2.92 1.25 6 
6 d in the £ 2.50 1.07 20 
5d in the £ 2.08 0.89 2 
4 d in the £ 1.67 0.71 4 
 
Note: There are 240d in the £. 
 The annualised interest rate has been calculated by applying the following formula:121 
i=(d/(1-d))*100, and annualised by multiplying i by 5 (number of months in the loan term) and dividing 
by 12 (number of months in the year). 
The monthly interest of 1.5d in the £, was equal to 0.62%, annualised to 0.26% 
 
Source: Report on charitable loan societies, 1897, paragraphs 84-85, p. 15. 
 
The 1897 report stated that there was an increase in the number of societies that 
availed themselves of the permission to charge the higher rate of discount on monthly 
loans, with only twenty loan funds using the ‘legal rate of 4d in the £.’122 The fact that 
loan funds were able to exploit the misinterpretation of the 1843 act meant that, 
contrary to the view held by Hollis and Sweetman, loan funds did not actually 
experience severe interest rate restrictions. Increases in discount may also explain the 
growth in the average loan sizes shown in section 2.2.123  
In the LFB reports from 1860 to 1915 there is a breakdown of the amount of 
loans and the amount of monthly loans, so it is possible to see what percentage of 
loans were issued as monthly loans. This enables us to determine if the number of 
monthly loans increased over time and therefore to see if loan funds issued monthly 
loans to avail of the higher discount rates. The reports stated the amount issued in 
loans and the amount issued in monthly loans, but unfortunately there is no such 
distinction given in the information on the actual number of loans, so it is not possible 
to make a comparison between the average sizes of loans issued monthly and weekly 
loan terms. 
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Table 2.7: Number of loan fund societies issuing monthly loans, and the 
percentage of monthly loans, 1861-1911 
Years Number of 
societies 
Number of 
societies 
where all 
loans were 
monthly a 
Number of 
societies 
where all 
loans were 
weekly a 
Mean 
percentage 
of loans 
issued 
monthly 
(Mean of all 
societies) 
Median 
percentage 
of loans 
issued 
monthly 
(median 
of all 
societies) 
1861 105 11 42 42.58 45.30 
1871 81 8 32 44.80 46.20 
1880 78 10 25 50.46 55.62 
1895 104 52 17 75.02  99.87 
1896 104 55 17 83.16 100 
1897 98 50 17 73.81 100 
1898 82 31 15 67.50 91.27 
1899 75 21 13 65.49 85.16 
1901b 52 15 12 65.03 84.13 
1911c 50 19 7 74.94 95.28 
Percentage 
change 
1880-1895 
33.33 400.00 -32 48.67 79.56 
Percentage 
change 
1895-1899 
-28 -58 -23.52 -12.71 -15.76 
 
Note : 
 a - loans issued weekly and loans issued monthly refer to the frequency of repayment. For monthly 
loans, loans were repaid in monthly instalments and for weekly loans the instalments were weekly. 
b – the number of loan funds have been adjusted to reflect the fact that a number of loan funds are 
inactive. In 1901 there were 96 loan funds in the reports, but only 52 were active. 
c – the number of loan funds have been adjusted to reflect the fact that a number of loan funds were 
inactive. In 1911 there were 80 loan funds in the reports, but only 50 of them were active. 
Sources: Loan Fund Board reports, various years 
 
As is seen in table 2.7 roughly 50 per cent of all loan funds were issuing only monthly 
loans in 1895 and 1896, with a smaller proportion of societies not issuing monthly 
loans. The remaining societies issued a mixture of monthly and weekly loans. Given 
that a large number of societies were issuing monthly loans as shown in table 2.7, 
coupled with the fact that a large number of societies were charging discount over the 
rate legally permitted by the 1843 loan fund act, as shown in table 2.6, it is not 
surprising that the LFB system was decimated at the turn of the century when the law 
was enforced. Although advantageous for a borrower in terms of reducing the 
opportunity cost of weekly repayments, the switch to issuing monthly loans also 
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undermined some of the informational advantages of the loan funds. Weekly 
repayments would have enabled loan funds to monitor borrower performance more 
closely, but monthly loan repayment periods meant that loan funds lost three weeks’ 
monitoring. The 1897 report gives us another perspective of this switch to monthly 
loans which supports the argument that information advantages were eroded. The 
1897 report stated that several loan fund clerks held several clerkships simultaneously 
in various loan funds, particularly in Ulster. The report stated that clerks took 
advantage of monthly loans so that they could perform their plural tasks.124 Figure 
2.31 gives us a breakdown of the provincial distribution of monthly loans and from 
figure 2.31 it can be seen that the highest percentage of monthly loans were issued in 
Connaught and Ulster. 
 
Figure 2.31  
Average percentage of loans issued monthly in loan funds by 
province, 1895-99
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Source: Loan Fund Board reports, various years. 
 
In contrast figure 2.32 shows the provincial distribution of interest-free capital, 
and here it is seen that in 1895 Munster and Leinster had the highest proportion of 
interest-free capital. 
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Figure 2.32  
 Average percentage of capital that loan funds held interest free by 
province, 1895-99
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Source: Loan Fund Board reports, various years. 
 
If we examine figures 2.31 and 2.32 there seems to be an inverse relationship between 
the amount of monthly loans and the percentage of interest free-capital. Or to 
rephrase, that the number of monthly loans was determined by the percentage of 
interest paying capital. 
Theoretically, loan funds ought to have had information advantages over any 
microcredit competitors. They were supposed to have confined areas of operation, 
thus increasing information on potential borrowers, and also a screening process 
which would provide information on borrowers. The loan fund screening process, as 
was outlined by Charles Piesse,125 involved the borrower applying for a loan and 
stating the purpose for which a loan was required. Following the application the 
committee was supposed to meet to discuss whether or not applications for loans 
should be sanctioned. But, from evidence from the 1897 report, this screening process 
does not seem to have been practised by many of the loan funds. The report stated 
that: 
In very few instances indeed have we found that the committees conducted the affairs of 
the societies. Occasionally it occurred that one or two members attended on the office 
day, but no quorum of the committee was formed, and in some cases not even one 
member of the committee attended regularly on the office day, with the result that the 
whole management of the Society was left in the hands of the clerks, and loans were 
issued to borrowers without the necessary approval of the committee on the borrowers’ 
application forms.126 
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This is an indication of management failure of the loan funds, but it is a failure which 
is not unexpected. The loan fund positions were voluntary, and as such there was not 
supposed to be any monetary reward given for time spent on loan fund activities. It 
would be easy to foresee manager apathy creeping in to an activity which was being 
performed monotonously over a number of years.127  
The 1897 report was also critical of the management of loan funds. Managers 
were apathetic towards the day-to-day management of loan funds, although daily does 
not seem to be an appropriate term as loan funds were open weekly, and the 
management of the societies was left to clerks and treasurers. Clerks and treasurers in 
many instances were each other’s surety, and as such there was no check on the 
activities of either. The failure of management, and the power of clerks, meant that 
loan screening processes were undermined and loans were given indiscriminately and 
not based on either the borrower’s ability to repay or on an inquiry into the nature of 
the loan request. 
A new development which also eroded the information advantages that loan 
funds ought to have possessed was the establishment of new loan fund societies 
within the boundaries of existing societies. The overlapping of loan fund boundaries 
meant that borrowers were able to access loans simultaneously from more than one 
society.128 Although arguably beneficial to borrowers who could productively utilise 
multiple loans, the practice undoubtedly increased the risk of lending from a loan 
society’s perspective and placed borrowers in debt. It was stated in the 1897 report 
that: 
The district is usually defined by townlands and parishes within a certain radius from the 
office of the Society. In the majority of cases this radius is five miles, in others it varies 
from six to ten statute miles, but the districts in which the several Societies are authorised 
to operate are not at present separate from one another, their boundaries overlapping so 
frequently that there are only 17 districts in Ireland which do not overlap any other.129   
 
Loan screening was undermined by the fact that there was evidence of cross-
securitisation, whereby borrowers would simultaneously act as a surety for one 
another’s sureties. Although mutually beneficial to borrowers, again it increased the 
risk to loan funds, as guarantors for loans were already indebted to the society and 
there was no diversification of risk. 
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Two features of the LFB system that the 1897 report was critical of were the practice 
of renewals and the excessive use of fines. Both these features suggest that the loan 
fund system was in many instances an institutionalised example of debt peonage. 
Renewals of loans were repeatedly given to borrowers, which in effect meant that 
many borrowers were perpetually in debt. The 1897 report gave an example of the 
renewal system: 
To illustrate the oppressive nature of the renewal system, it is necessary to show how the 
charges for renewals accumulated. In the first place, there is the discount at 7 ½ d or 6 d 
in the pound. The 7 ½d rate is 3s ½ d on a £5 loan for twenty weeks, but as the 
promissory note instead of being allowed to run for twenty weeks was renewed, say, at 
the twelfth week, the cost to the borrower is in such a case 3s 1 ½ d for twelve weeks, or 
13s 7d for a year on £5 which is taken as the usual average amount of a loan. In addition 
the fine generally charged was 3d in the pound at each renewal – say, 1s 1d a year, or 5s 
5d on £5 – making the total 19s a year. So far the charges are direct profit to the Loan 
Fund, but the borrower was also charged 5d for forms and default notices at each 
renewal, making the total 20s 10d on £5, or £20 16s 5d per cent per annum. In very many 
cases the borrower was, in addition, charged 2s for costs of a summons, which would 
much increase the above rate.130 
 
The fifty-ninth report of the LFB stated that renewals were systemic, and in 
many cases had been a persistent practice of the individual loan funds since they were 
established.131  
Fines it seems were used extensively, and were in many cases used as a 
substitute form of income for loan funds. Fines should have been limited to 5 pence in 
the pound and following the failure to repay after two weeks, legal procedures would 
be instigated to recover any outstanding debt. But some societies instigated a policy of 
perpetual fines, making no effort to recover the initial principal. Table 2.8 shows the 
discount, fines and gross income132 of loan funds from 1843 to 1911. These variables 
are also shown as a percentage of loans issued. Fines were a constant feature of the 
LFB system, but the incidence of fines grew over time, peaking in 1895. Fines fell as 
a percentage of income after 1895, with the proportion of income derived from 
discount rising from 1901 onwards. 
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Table 2.8: Discount, fines and gross income in loan funds, 1843 to 1911 
Year Discount Fines Gross 
income 
Discount 
as a % 
of loans 
Fines 
as a % 
of 
loans 
Gross 
profit 
as a % 
of 
loans 
Discount 
as a % 
of gross 
income 
Fines 
as a % 
of 
gross 
income 
 £ £ £ % % % % % 
1843 40,592 12,228 56,215 2.46 0.74 3.41 72.21 21.75 
1851 14,825 3,513 20,755 2.08 0.49 2.91 71.43 16.93 
1861 17,591 5,646 24,948 2.13 0.68 3.02 70.51 22.63 
1871 11,197 3,350 15,659 2.06 0.62 2.89 71.51 21.39 
1880 10,044 4,315 15,397 2.34 1.01 3.59 65.24 28.03 
1895 15,860 7,017 24,260 2.69 1.19 4.12 65.38 28.93 
1901 4,864 2,409 7,625 2.25 1.11 3.52 63.80 31.60 
1911 5,358  6,680 2.75  3.43 80.21  
 
Sources: Loan Fund Board reports 
 
The high incidence of loan renewals and fines makes it hard to defend many loan 
funds from the accusation of debt peonage. Furthermore, in many societies the 
officers of the society were also resident magistrates or clerks of the courts. They 
were also the magistrate in cases where their loan fund was the applicant and they 
themselves had issued the summonses. This would seem to indicate a conflict of 
interest on the part of the magistrates. The 1897 report stated that ‘it seems to us 
objectionable that a Justice of the Peace should act as a Loan Fund Clerk. The two 
offices would appear to be incompatible, and this view has been taken by the [Loan 
Fund] Board in their circulars.’133 The 1897 report was also critical of how 
summonses were issued. Summonses were not issued in the legal manner whereby the 
court would issue the summons to the borrower and his surety, but instead the loan 
fund hired its own summons server and charged the defaulting borrower for the 
summons. It was the conclusion of the 1897 report that the summonses had been 
issued illegally and also that the cost of summonses had been illegally collected from 
borrowers.134 The evidence in the report stated that there was a large number of 
summonses in the north, which coincidently was where the growth in the number of 
                                                 
133
 Report on charitable loan societies, 1897, paragraph 164, p. 24. 
134
 Ibid, paragraph 117, p. 18. 
 169 
loan funds was located.   Of the 55 loan funds registered in Ulster in 1895, there was 
none in Belfast or county Down and only 3 in Londonderry.135 This suggests that 
industrialisation is not an explanatory factor.  
 
2.4.2 The Loan Fund Board: regulatory failure and regulatory capture 
 
Regulatory failure and regulatory capture were two separate but related problems with 
the LFB. In this section it will be argued that regulatory failure was caused by the 
institutional structure of the LFB, which was mainly due to the fact that it lacked 
powers to be an effective regulatory agency. Secondly, it will be argued that due to 
the way in which the LFB was financed it was susceptible to regulatory capture. 
The regulatory powers of the LFB were left unchanged from the acts in the pre-
famine period, and its initial powers proved inadequate quite early in its existence to 
perform its tasks. The LFB had continually pleaded for further legislation in many of 
its post-famine annual reports to rectify the problems with the LFB system, as the 
system in the post-famine period was faced with different conditions to those that 
prevailed when the original legislation was passed. An example of this can be seen in 
the following statement from 1863:  
In preceding reports, the Board have expressed their opinion that some improvement in 
the present machinery of the local management of Loan Funds, and in the existing 
legislative control over the Institution, was required, with a view to the more adequate 
protection of the savings of the industrious poor, and the promotion of the main objects 
of the Institution, and are still of opinion the necessity for such improvement still 
exists.136 
 
The above citation came in 1863, a number of years after the 1855 inquiry into 
loan funds had recommended legislative reform, but no reforms were forthcoming. 
Reform was absent practically for the remainder of the LFB’s existence. Although 
legislation was passed relating to loan funds in the early twentieth century, discussed 
below, it only addressed the legal issues surrounding the recovery of debt. In the 
sixty-ninth report of the LFB for 1906, it was stated that: 
…the recent loan fund legislation hereinbefore mentioned cannot be regarded as 
adequate. The grievance of which they complain is of longstanding. They are supposed 
to control the operations of societies throughout Ireland holding certificates from them 
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under 6 & 7 Vic. C 91, but their statutory powers are quite inadequate to enable them to 
do this, except in a general way.137 
 
The initial acts gave the LFB some statutory powers, but these powers were 
inadequate to regulate loan fund societies. For example, the LFB had drawn up model 
rules for loan fund societies, and the 1897 report drew up new model rules, but the 
LFB did not have the power to compel loan funds to adopt such rules.  
The LFB regularly issued communiqués to loan funds, something which was 
referred to in the 1897 report, but it seems that these were either followed or ignored 
depending on the preferences of the individual loan societies. For example, when the 
LFB authorised a rate of discount above the legal rate this advice was followed. By 
contrast, when it advised societies against issuing renewals, or to reduce the interest 
rate on debentures, these circulars were ignored. A number of concerns were raised 
about the activities of loan funds in the north of Ireland in particular. Swift-MacNeill, 
an Irish nationalist M.P. representing county Donegal,138 raised the issue of the 
number of loan funds operating in licensed premises,139 and asked whether this was a 
factor in the increasing charges of intoxication in Fermanagh. Swift-MacNeill asked:  
... [had] it come under his [Chief Secretary’s] notice that it is notorious to the police and 
local magistrates that loan funds under present working are the occasion of much loss of 
time to borrowers and bailsmen, and an unusual amount of intoxication, resulting in 
prosecutions at petty sessions…140  
 
The Chief Secretary, Gerald Balfour, replied that the LFB was aware of the case 
of a loan fund’s office being held in close proximity to a licensed premise, but that the 
LFB inspector had reported that a different door was used so that borrowers did not 
have to enter the pub.141 When Arthur O’Connor, an Irish Nationalist M.P. 
representing east Donegal,142 asked in June 1896 whether or not the practice of loan 
renewals was legal, the Chief Secretary replied that it was illegal and that the LFB had 
issued a circular in 1893 informing societies of such illegality.143 Arthur O’Connor 
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followed up with a question regarding the overlapping boundaries that the LFB had 
permitted.144 Balfour responded, saying that: 
To guard against simultaneous indebtedness by the same persons to different loan funds 
in the same neighbourhood, the Board, some years ago, issued instructions to managers 
requiring them to have their lists of borrowers and sureties compared three or four times 
yearly.145 
 
What followed Balfour’s answer is worth reproducing, as it gives an indication 
as to what the role of the LFB was within the government.  
Mr Arthur O’Connor inquired how it was the Loan Fund Board had permitted such a 
state of things to arise. 
Mr Gerald Balfour [Chief Secretary for Ireland] said he was making inquiries as to 
whether the instructions had really been carried out.  
Mr Arthur O’Connor asked if it was not the duty of the Loan Fund Board to see that their 
instructions were carried out. 
Mr Gerald Balfour thought that it was.146 
 
Making recommendations was all that the LFB could do, as it did not possess 
powers to enforce any of its recommendations, and the collapse post-1896 was not 
due to any changes in the regulatory atmosphere. 
The LFB’s ultimate sanction as regulator was to gazette147 and order the 
dissolution of loan funds. From 1847 to 1896 the LFB had ordered the dissolution of 
47 loan funds. Of this number 64 per cent of dissolutions came in the period 1847 to 
1860, whereas 36 per cent of the dissolutions were from 1860 to 1896.148 In the same 
period 250 societies voluntarily ceased their operations, ‘in many cases, as shown by 
the Board’s reports, owing to defalcations by officials’.149 Given that the LFB 
annually inspected the loan societies, and 250 societies closed owing in many cases to 
defalcation in the same period, this would suggest that perhaps 47 dissolutions is too 
small a number and not reflective of the scale of suspect practices in the LFB system. 
Evidence given to committee to inquire into Irish industries in 1885 alleged that the 
LFB did not actually do anything, with one of the witnesses advocating that it should 
be converted into a government-run investment bank.150 
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The main problem arose from how the LFB was funded. Unlike contemporary 
government departments, the LFB did not receive a parliamentary grant. Instead the 
LFB received its income from a monopoly it was granted on the sale of documents 
and stationery related to loan fund activity. As was discussed in chapter 1, the issue of 
financing the LFB was not included in the initial loan fund acts that created the LFB, 
and it was only in the 1843 act that reference was made to its finances. In the 1898 
report of the LFB reference was made to the financial arrangements of the LFB: 
The Board next beg to direct attention to the condition of the annual income at their 
disposal for purposes of administration. This income is derived from two sources – (1) 
the sale to loan societies of certain forms requisite for the making of loans; (2) the 
interest of sums accumulated (after meeting current expenditure) in the past from such 
sales, and invested by the Board.151  
 
The arrangements outlined in the 1843 act were that the LFB would receive 1d 
for each promissory note sold to a society. Or to rephrase, that the LFB’s income was 
dependent on loan funds making loans. The LFB was also to receive 2s for every 
debenture form sold, which meant that the LFB’s income was dependent on the 
number of debenture holders. This structure, introduced before the famine, was for a 
regulatory agency to regulate an industry on which it was dependent for its income. 
The LFB was therefore given an incentive to encourage loan funds to lend more, or to 
accept more debenture holders, as the more loans the loan funds made the greater the 
income of the LFB. This was before the LFB system was truncated by the famine. 
The result of the famine era was to reduce the number of loans issued by loan funds, 
and as a by-product reduce the income of the LFB. In its reports from the 1860s to 
1872 the LFB continually highlighted the fact that it was under-funded. But when the 
1843 loan fund act was amended the only significant change was an increase in the 
price of LFB stationery.152 The amendment did not address, or even question, the fact 
that the LFB was dependent on the sector it was regulating for its income. In effect it 
was creating an ideal situation for regulatory capture. 
A model of regulatory capture was outlined by Laffont and Tirole. In their 
model they explained how it was possible for interest groups to capture the regulatory 
apparatus of an industry.153 Laffont and Tirole used a two-tiered agency structure, 
with Congress being the principal, the agent to Congress being the supervisory body 
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in the first tier; the supervisory body is the principal and the regulated firms are agents 
in the second tier. This structure is applicable to the Irish LFB system, with 
Parliament replacing Congress, the supervisory body being the LFB, and the regulated 
firms being the individual loan funds.  
The LFB system differs from this model in that parliament was dismissive of 
the LFB and did not want to fund it.154 Also, in the Laffont and Tirole model, they 
assumed that the supervisory body would receive its income from the principal in the 
first tier; but the opposite was the case under the LFB system with the LFB receiving 
its income from the agents in the second tier. From their model, Laffont and Tirole 
believed that ‘Congress optimally offers the agency a constant income equal to its 
reservation income… [therefore the] agency has no incentive to misreport the 
signal.’155 Laffont and Tirole outlined how collusion could occur in their model, 
stating that ‘collusion occurs when the agency has an incentive to hide information 
from Congress…collusion can arise only if the retention of information benefits the 
firm.’156 Although it is difficult to prove that there was any explicit collusion taking 
place between the LFB and the loan funds, the income of the LFB was structured in a 
way that would give an incentive for implicit collusion. But whether collusion was 
explicit or implicit, the loan funds were hurt by their own actions. The persistence of 
renewals, the excessive use of fines, and the over-charging of discount would not 
have been feasible in the long run. This is in line with Laffont and Tirole who 
observed that an ‘interest group may be hurt by its own power’.157 
One of the problems with the loan funds, as was stated above, was that of 
overlapping boundaries. The LFB had to sanction any new loan fund that wished to 
register under the 1843 act, so it is hard to see how the Board could not have been 
aware that the boundaries of societies were overlapping. But the actions of the LFB in 
allowing overlapping societies to establish falls into the model of regulatory capture. 
Given what we know of how the LFB’s incentives were structured, it is not hard to 
imagine a cash-strapped regulatory agency attempting to encourage the establishment 
of new loan funds. In Thom’s Directory, over a number of years, the following notice 
was printed: 
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There are no Loan Fund Societies in the counties of Armagh, Clare, Down, Dublin, 
Galway, Kerry, Louth, Mayo and Monaghan, but the Loan Fund Board will gladly co-
operate with local gentlemen who desire to have the benefits of the public loan fund 
system extended to their districts.158  
 
This notice was reprinted several times until 1900 when the LFB ceased to 
openly encourage the establishment of new loan funds on the island. In its fifty-eighth 
report, for 1896, the LFB acknowledged the fact that it had failed to establish loan 
funds in the counties where there were no loan fund societies, but it still believed that 
loan funds should be established in those counties.159 When the LFB was lobbying for 
a parliamentary grant in 1912, a witness associated with the LFB gave evidence to a 
committee suggesting that the LFB intended to use any grant to hire a loan fund 
‘organiser’ to establish new loan funds. The LFB’s application for a parliamentary 
grant was rejected on the basis of this proposal, and it subsequently disowned itself 
from having any knowledge of the proposal.160 
Evidence from the 1897 report suggests that the people applying to establish 
new loan funds were individuals from outside the locality of the loan fund, suggesting 
that these were people who would not be expected to establish a loan fund for the sake 
of helping the industrious poor. The 1897 report stated that: 
In many cases the Committee is appointed from a list of non-resident Debenture holders 
who manifest no interest in the efficient working of the Societies or the welfare of the 
poor of the locality, and in these cases no attempt would appear to have been made to 
obtain the co-operation of the clergy and local representative gentlemen as members of 
committees.161  
 
The importance of debenture holders in the loan fund set up was that they were 
supposed to monitor the actions of the loan fund in a way akin to the role of 
depositors in credit co-ops as theoretically outlined by Banerjee, Besley and 
Guinnane.162 But if debenture holders were non-resident, then the monitoring power 
of debenture holders is lost.  
The regulatory capture of the LFB had adverse affects on both depositors and 
borrowers from loan funds. In terms of borrowers, in many cases they were subjected 
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to excessive fines and were perpetually in debt. This in effect enabled debt peonage to 
exist. The existence of regulatory capture it seems may have altered depositor 
incentives.163 The LFB stamp164 and the LFB’s association with Dublin Castle gave a 
misleading signal to savers. Savers, or rather investors, believed that the loan funds 
had a form of government guarantee. The significance of a Dublin Castle address 
should not be underrated as Dublin Castle, the administrative centre of the Irish 
government, represented the state in the eyes of many. The LFB even received a 
mention in R. Barry O’Brien’s, Dublin Castle and the Irish people. O’Brien stated 
that:  
The Board inspects the affairs of a number of local voluntary loan societies who report 
their proceedings periodically to parliament. The Board itself makes an annual report to 
parliament. It is appointed by the Lord Lieutenant, and the members are unpaid.165 
   
But the British government was adamant that the LFB was not a government 
department.166 It seems to have been an anachronistic relic of the pre-famine political 
structure. It must also be noted that the 1897 committee report stated that the loan 
funds did not encourage thrift and made no effort to mobilise microsavings,167 
evidence that is in conflict with the views of Hollis and Sweetman regarding the role 
of loan funds as financial intermediaries in the pre-famine period.168 
 
2.4.3 The political economy of loan fund reform 1896-1914 
 
As was seen in section 2.4.1, in the late 1890s following the legal decision regarding 
the rights of loan funds suing for debt, and the publication of the 1897 committee 
report, the number of loan funds, and activities associated with them, decreased 
dramatically. The period 1896 to 1906 saw an increase in the number of references to 
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the loan fund system in parliament,169 with the product of this legislative interest 
being two acts of parliament intended to reform the loan fund system.170 
In order to have an appreciation of what was happening to the LFB system 
during this time, it is necessary to take the existing political system into account. 
Hollis and Sweetman believed that the LFB system could not obtain legislative 
influence at parliament based on a cost benefit analysis. This is partially true, but it 
does not reflect the fact that attempts were made to introduce legislation to reform the 
existing loan fund acts, nor does it take account of the fact that these efforts were 
either obstructed by Irish nationalist politicians or sacrificed for other Irish legislative 
efforts. The argument outlined by Hollis and Sweetman also does not factor 
contemporary developments within the TSB movement that would have limited the 
scope for reform of the LFB system. 
During the period 1896 to 1906 a number of large-scale legislative efforts were 
introduced specifically for Ireland. In particular during the debates on both the local 
government act in 1898 and the 1903 land act, a loan fund bill was introduced to 
parliament but had to be withdrawn due to time constraints.171 The government had 
prioritised the Irish legislation that could be enacted by the Imperial Parliament. 
Another important point was that of Irish politics, in particular the division between 
Unionist and Nationalist political parties. During the period 1893 to 1905 a 
Conservative-Unionist government was in power that advocated a policy of 
constructive unionism. Examples of this policy were reforms such as local 
government, land reforms, and the establishment of an Irish Department of 
Agriculture. In contrast, the Irish Nationalist (Home Rule) Party’s aim was to 
introduce a form of legislative independence for Ireland. From the evidence in the 
parliamentary debates it seems as though the loan fund cause was taken up by the 
Irish Parliamentary party and used to attack the British parliament. The underlying 
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argument was that if Ireland had legislative independence the problems with the loan 
fund societies would be quickly resolved. The questions in parliament came from 
prominent Irish Nationalists, such as Swift-MacNeill, and John Dillon who was the 
leader of the Nationalist party at the time.172 The Unionist government on the other 
hand wished to dissociate itself from the loan funds and the LFB. So it is therefore 
important to take the political context into consideration when analysing the loan fund 
debates.173 
In the calls for reform of the LFB system, there were two issues that 
parliamentarians deemed important. One was the loss to debenture holders and the 
second was the need to reform the LFB. Yet the legislation dealing with the loan 
funds only addressed the problems associated with losses to debentures owing to the 
fact that promissory notes could not be redeemed. An interesting question was asked 
by Captain Donelan, a home ruler representing east Cork.174 He asked: 
Whether he [the Chief Secretary] is aware that, owing to serious defalcation and frauds 
on the part of the late senior clerk of the Edgeworthstown loan Fund Society, the Loan 
Fund Board in Dublin dissolved that society about a year ago; whether the books of the 
society were regularly inspected by the loan fund inspector, who failed to perceive 
irregularities in the accounts, and expressed no disapproval of the system of 
management; and whether, having regard to the fact that, owing to the dissolution of the 
society and the difficulty of collecting outstanding debts by a receiver who now desires 
to be relieved of his duties, the debenture holders are likely to be heavy losers, any relief 
or compensation will be given to them for the loss of securities through defalcations and 
frauds which the inspector of the Loan Fund Board, a body constituted by statute, and 
whose officers are Government officials, failed from negligence or other cause, to detect 
for a long period of time?175  
 
The important point raised was, given that there was a legally appointed 
inspector and regulator, and given that fraud had resulted in any case, was the 
government liable to compensate any losses resulting from the loan fund system? 
Government responsibility and liability was categorically denied by the Chief 
Secretary who, in 1899, stated that: 
I must point out that neither the officers of the Loan Fund Board nor of the local societies 
working in connection with that board are, in any sense of the word, civil servants of the 
Crown, and that government exercises no control whatever over the proceedings of the 
Board or of the local bodies.176 
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This answer was the one which subsequent Chief Secretaries and government 
representatives used:177  the LFB was not a government department and therefore the 
government was not liable for any losses resulting from fraud or bad management in 
LFB loan funds. This government attitude may be one of the reasons why there was 
no attempt to reform the LFB in either the 1900 or 1906 loan fund acts.178 If the 
government had introduced legislation to reform the LFB, it might have given the 
impression that the LFB was a government department. But there was no clarification 
as to what the LFB was if it was not a government department. It was established by 
statute, located in Dublin castle, its members appointed by the Lord Lieutenant which 
effectively meant that the Chief Secretary appointed them, but the government would 
not acknowledge it as a government department.  
In 1838, when giving evidence to the committee on banking in Ireland, George 
Matthews, secretary of the LFB, was asked, ‘YOU are in the employment of the 
Government?’ (capitals sic). He answered the question in the affirmative by stating ‘I 
am.’179 The following extract from the evidence of George Matthews to the 1838 
banking enquiry supports the view that the LFB was a government body: 
Q: What situation do you hold?  
A: I am Secretary of the Loan Fund Board in Dublin Castle. 
Q: Explain what are the duties of that Board?  
A: The Board was formed in 1836, under an Act of Parliament, to control and regulate 
the accounts of loan fund societies in Ireland.  
Q: By that you mean Charitable loans, by societies which issue small sums on security to 
the poor, receiving back payment by instalments? 
A: By weekly instalments; I do.180 
 
 So, when, if ever, did the LFB stop being a government body? It continued to 
submit annual reports to parliament; the only noticeable difference was its source of 
income, which came from the sale of stationery as opposed to central funding. When 
the LFB was dissolved in 1915 its role was transferred to the Department of 
Agriculture, so too were its clerks, and its secretary was granted a special retiring 
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allowance by the Treasury.181 Such actions would seem to suggest, to an onlooker, 
that the LFB was in fact a government department. 
In parliament attention was drawn to the case of Enniskillen Loan Society v 
Green, where the defendant had paid £44 on a £10 loan.182 This case made it difficult 
for loan funds that had not adhered to the law as outlined in the 1843 act to recover 
loans. The aim of the proposed legislation was to enable loan funds to recover the 
original principal that was lent, namely any sum under £10. Edward McHugh, a 
nationalist in the anti-Parnellite faction representing Armagh,183 asked the Chief 
Secretary for Ireland whether the proposed new legislation would improve the 
management of loan funds, legalise renewals and protect debenture holders.184 James 
Patrick Farrell, a nationalist M.P. representing county Cavan,185 referring to the case 
of the Edgeworthstown loan fund where a treasurer had committed suicide after being 
found defalcating, asked: ‘may those investors who were robbed by the defalcations 
now hope for any redress from the government?’186 
A plausible explanation for the governments refusal to acknowledge the LFB as 
a government department was due to the contemporary problems associated with 
TSBs in England and the danger of setting a parliamentary precedent.187 In 1886 the 
Cardiff TSB collapsed due to internal fraud. 188  The effects of this reverberated 
around the TSB system and from 1887 to 1892 over 100 TSBs closed.189 Legally 
TSBs and loan funds were very similar institutions. Both were managed by trustees 
who appointed clerks for the daily running of the business, and both suffered from 
moral hazard problems as managers were unwilling or unable to monitor the actions 
of clerks. The TSBs ostensibly had government protection for their deposits.190 In 
similar respects the loan funds were perceived to have similar government protection, 
as their accounts were sent annually to the LFB for inspection and an LFB-appointed 
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inspector visited their societies annually. Effectively if the government recognised 
any liability in the case of the loan funds, it would have been equally open to charges 
of liability in the case of the TSBs. Hence this could be the reason why the 
government disassociated itself from the LFB. 
Two acts were passed, in 1900 and 1906, that aimed to steady the decline of the 
LFB system. The main aim of the legislation was to enable loan funds to recover 
debts that were made illegal under court rulings in the 1890s. When the 1900 act191 
was first introduced it was welcomed by the LFB ‘as already bringing satisfactory 
results’.192 But the LFB was disappointed that its powers were not strengthened and 
stated that: 
It is manifest that the lapse of a long series of years without efficient general Loan Fund 
legislation tends to perpetuate abuses which the Board are powerless to check except by 
the radical and unsatisfactory act of withdrawing the Certificate of each offending Loan 
Fund Society.193  
 
The 1900 act quickly ran into difficulties due to the backlog of cases pending. 
This was coupled by a verdict in a petty sessions case that deemed that it was only 
possible to sue under the act for a period of 6 months from the introduction of the 
act.194 The LFB stated that: 
In these circumstances much confusion and imminent risk to the holders of Loan Fund 
Debentures in many districts have been caused by a decision of the King’s Bench 
Division in the case of Atthill v Woods (New Ir Jurist 5 Dec. 1902) to the effect that the 
Charitable Loan Societies (Ireland) Act, 1900, must be construed – as regards limitation 
of time for instituting legal proceedings – by the 10th Section of the Petty Sessions 
(Ireland) Act, and that Summonses purporting to be issued under 63 and 64 Vic., c. 25 
could have been properly issued only within six months immediately following the date 
of that Statute.195 
 
The LFB took it upon itself to appeal the decision in the high court, but the 
appeal failed196 and the LFB system was once again placed in disarray. Not only were 
the activities of loan funds grinding to a halt, but the LFB had wasted a lot of its 
financial resources on the appeal case and was facing bankruptcy.  
Bills were introduced to parliament in 1903 and 1904, but due to parliamentary 
time constraints and political wrangling they had to be withdrawn. One of the 
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stumbling blocks had been attempts by Irish members of parliament to introduce 
amendments to the bill that would have meant the government would guarantee loan 
fund debentures.197 In its report for 1904 the LFB once again pleaded for legislative 
assistance, for both itself and debenture holders, stating that: 
The hardship thus caused to the owners of the money is severe; and a further result is, 
that the lending-power of the Societies concerned is crippled, and in very many instances 
entirely suspended. The Board, therefore, urge that their recommendations for the 
amendment of this Act should be pressed forward as soon as possible. Unfortunately, 
owing to pressure of business in parliament, and to other causes, the Bills that were 
introduced in 1903 and 1904 by the Attorney-General for Ireland, for the amendment of 
the Charitable Loan Societies (Ireland) Act, 1900, had to be withdrawn.198 
 
  
The LFB’s complaints were taken up by Irish Nationalists in parliament. 
Charles Hare Hemphill, a National Liberal M.P. representing Tyrone,199 complained 
about how Irish legislation was treated by parliament, one of his gripes being the 
treatment of loan fund legislation. He stated that: 
But there were other three Bills relating to Ireland, all very important. One of these was 
the Loans Fund Amendment bill. That was a most important measure, affecting the very 
humblest and poorest class of the community. Unquestionably, from the evidence of the 
various officers throughout the Ireland, considerable loss has been sustained by the very 
poorest class in the community. An act was passed by the present government three or 
four years ago for the purpose of removing the evils caused by a previous faulty Act. 
Numbers of poor people in Ireland put their money into debentures in this Loan Fund and 
it turned out that there was no money to pay the interest on these debentures, and the 
whole of their savings had been lost. Then a bill was introduced for the purpose of 
remedying this grievance. And what was the fate of that Bill? It was one of the measures 
which the Prime Minister assured the House was to be dropped – a Bill affecting the 
comfort and prosperity of the class on whom the peace and happiness of Ireland 
depended.200  
 
Timothy Michael Healy, a National Liberal who represented county Louth,201 
was another Irish M.P. who used the loan fund bill to attack the government. He 
stated that: 
The Prime Minister suggested that he would drop the Irish Charitable Loans Bill. He 
admitted there was some opposition to it. But what was the Irish Loans Fund? It was a 
body managed by Dublin Castle, whose inspectors were appointed by Dublin Castle, and 
Dublin Castle invited honest people to invest their money in debentures to be lent out a 
reasonable interest on the faith of the security of British audit and management. The 
result was something like £200,000 or £300,000 had gone, and the British government 
calmly announced that they would not even pass legislation to enable it to be collected. 
This money was largely the money of pensioners, ex-soldiers, politicians, clergymen. He 
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believed that there were a few clergymen on both sides, and year after year this 
government-managed business had failed to meet not only its interest but its principal. 
The total deficit did not amount to more than about £250,000, and yet the government 
not only declined to meet that but refused the machinery of collection. The Prime 
Minister absolutely shone on occasions like this, and it required a very subtle mind to 
appreciate his distinctions.202 
 
The statements of both of the Irish M.P.s are interesting, but given the evidence 
from LFB reports and the 1897 report, seem to be factually incorrect. The loan funds 
were financial intermediaries, but the number of savers in them was minimal, as was 
shown in a previous chapter, and the average saving was quite large relative to 
agricultural labourer wage levels. The description of the debenture holders by Healy, 
as being ex-soldiers, politicians and clergymen, is a novel piece of information, and 
may explain why Irish politicians were so eager to introduce legislation to recover 
debentures.203 
Another Bill was introduced in 1905, but again it was opposed by Irish 
members of Parliament.204 From the debates in the House of Commons it is apparent 
that the issue of compensation to debenture holders was still critical. It was not until 
1906 that a bill was passed which enabled loan funds to recover sums lent.205 
Interestingly, it was a Unionist M.P. who introduced a clause in the 1906 act which 
limited the amount of outstanding debt that a loan fund was able to sue for.206 Given 
that the first case regarding the loan funds was in 1896, the publication of the report 
of abuses in the LFB system was in 1897, and effective legislation was only 
introduced in 1906, it is not therefore surprising that the loan fund system collapsed in 
the manner in which it did.  
The 1906 act failed to address the issue of the LFB.207 The act contained seven 
sections and all of them were in reference to the recovery of promissory notes. 
Essentially the 1900 and 1906 acts were amendments to the 1843 loan fund act to 
remedy the defects in relation to loan recovery. As such neither act made any 
allowance for the financial difficulties of the LFB.  The continued decrease in loan 
fund activity, which the amendments were supposed to remedy, also meant a decrease 
in the income of the LFB, while its expenditure effectively remained constant. In the 
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debates on the LFB loan fund system few references were made to the LFB’s 
finances. One of the few references to the LFB came in 1905 when Swift-MacNeill 
asked if the LFB’s monopoly on the sale of notes would be abolished and replaced 
with a public subsidy. But his suggestion was dismissed.208 The LFB lobbied for an 
annual parliamentary grant of £500 to fund its activities, but its actions came to 
nought. The LFB petitioned the Lord Lieutenant in an attempt to secure some 
funding, but a report into the merits of an annual grant to the LFB adamantly refused 
to sanction the payment.209  
 
2.4.4 The 1914 report; the end of the LFB 
 
The 1914 report on agricultural credit included a subsection devoted to the ‘Loan 
Fund Board system in Ireland.’ It gave an overview of the history of the loan fund 
system, its sources were mainly the previous parliamentary reports related to the LFB 
system, and it gave an overview of the situation that faced the LFB system circa 1912 
when evidence for the report was taken. 
It must be stressed that the 1914 report was not entirely dismissive of the idea of 
lending to small borrowers, as it argued that there was a potential for small loans to 
provide a useful service, citing the example of a woman who bought a cow with a 
loan from a loan fund and who made her repayments with the proceeds of milk 
sales.210 Although praising the usefulness of such loans, the report was critical of loan 
fund loan terms. The report believed that the loan terms were unsuited to agricultural 
needs, especially in comparison to the financial institutions that were within the remit 
of its report. The 1914 report was critical of the loan funds in the way that they 
operated a strict 20-week loan term, with repayments either made weekly or monthly, 
depending on the society in question. The 1914 report concluded that these loan terms 
were unsuitable to agricultural borrowers.211 If a borrower missed an instalment he or 
she would receive a fine. Joanna Ledgerwood, while commentating on modern-day 
microfinance programmes, has stressed the importance of loan terms for both 
borrowers and the microfinance institution: 
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The loan term is one of the most important variables in microfinance. It refers to the 
period of time during which the entire loan must be repaid. The loan term affects the 
repayment schedule, the revenue to the MFI [Microfinance institution], the financing 
costs for the client, and the ultimate suitability of the use of the loan. The closer an 
organisation matches loan terms to its client’s needs, the easier it is to “carry” the loan 
and the more likely the payments will be made on time and in full.212   
 
In comparison to the loan funds, joint stock banks had loan terms of 3 months 
and loans were renewable at 3-month intervals. The loan funds had 20-week loan 
terms, but repayments had to be made weekly or monthly if loans were issued as 
monthly loans. The joint stock bank loan did not have to be repaid until the stated 3-
month period had elapsed. Newly established Raiffeisen co-ops in the 1890s and 
1900s also had flexible loan terms.213 The existence of such favourable loan terms 
from rival institutions would have had demand-side effects on the loan fund system, 
and perhaps may be one of the explanations for the decline in the number of loans 
issued after 1896. The screening of borrowers still seemed to be poor and inquiries 
were seldom made about what the loan was required for.214 There was evidence of a 
loan being granted to a woman so that she could make a deposit in the Post Office 
Savings Bank.215 Although perhaps a reflection of the level of financial illiteracy in 
Ireland, the fact that such a loan was sanctioned by a loan fund shows that the loan 
fund in question had inadequate screening procedures.   
The 1914 report gave an indication as to who the borrowers from the various 
loan fund societies were, something that was not included in previous parliamentary 
reports. Of the borrowers in 1912, 61.45 per cent were farmers, 18.94 per cent were 
labourers, and 2.92 per cent were shopkeepers.216 The high incidence of farmers using 
the loan funds in 1912 is perhaps a reflection of the demographic changes in Irish 
society, with the decrease of the number of labourers.217 The 1914 report indicated 
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that the farmers using the loan funds were small farmers, as larger farmers had greater 
access to borrowing from the joint stock banks. 
The report emphasised the limitations of the LFB loan funds, highlighting the 
effects of the frauds and scandals on the loan funds. The 1914 report stressed the 
importance of the 1897 report on the loan fund system, as it believed that the report 
shocked the public confidence in the LFB system. The report also flagged the 
problems that had arisen due to the legal position of loan funds owing to their 
issuance of loans contrary to the loan fund acts.  The 1914 report found that many of 
the charges of abuses and irregularities that were made against loan funds in the 
previous parliamentary reports, both 1855 and 1897, were still in existence. The 
report was critical of the rules governing the actions of loan funds, as it found that no 
two loan funds had the same rules. The LFB had model rules, but application of these 
rules was optional. The 1914 report highlighted the lack of inspection and supervision 
of societies by their management, which effectively meant that there was little or no 
security for depositors and debenture holders of a society.   
The 1914 report recommended that the LFB be discontinued and that its 
activities be transferred to the DATI. It also recommended that the loan fund loan 
ceiling of £10 be removed and be replaced by a £50 limit, and that the existing loan 
funds be transformed into credit co-operatives. Of these recommendations, only the 
dissolution of the LFB was implemented. The loan fund system languished and 
declined until the last remaining society was wound up in 1975.218 
 
2.5 Evaluating the LFB loan funds as microfinance institutions 
 
Modern microfinance programmes are evaluated on three principles: outreach, 
sustainability and impact. Outreach measures the extent to which the microfinance 
services reach the poorest segment of the population. Sustainability determines 
whether or not the activities of a microfinance institution can be financially self-
sustainable in the long run.  Impact is an assessment of the extent to which the 
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microfinance service improves the material and physical condition of borrowers and 
alleviates poverty.219  
Two notable drawbacks in an attempt to evaluate the three principles in an 
historic case study of Ireland are the lack of information on individual borrowers and 
the lack of micro-level census data before 1901. In an historical context the three 
criteria can be gauged, but of the three impact is the most difficult to evaluate. In 
modern microfinance programmes, impact assessment is very costly to undertake. It 
would involve the collection of data on two groups, using one group as a control, over 
time collecting information on numerous variables to see whether or not a 
microfinance programme worked after controlling for the influence of other variables. 
This is difficult, if not impossible, in an historical context due to data limitations. 
Instead some proxies will have to be used. A proxy variable for outreach is the 
geographic distribution of a microfinance institution, i.e. are they located in the areas 
with the highest clusters of poverty? A proxy for impact would be the ratio of the loan 
sizes to national income per capita, but such a variable for national income does not 
exist for Ireland in the nineteenth century.220 Instead calculations will be based on the 
average annual wage of agricultural labourers.221 Sustainability is easier to gauge 
based on the information that was presented in annual accounts. The focus here will 
be on assessing the outreach of the loan funds. 
A crude measure of outreach would be how active were the loan funds in the 
congested districts, the regions which required government assistance in an attempt to 
implement a ‘big push’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before 
implementing any major work the Congested Districts Board (CDB) commissioned a 
number of reports on the conditions in each of the 84 congested districts. These 
reports were to be used as baselines with which to compare the performance of the 
CDB over time; hence they were referred to as baseline reports.222 The reports were 
undertaken by different inspectors, but they were given a template of questions to 
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adhere to. They were given 32 standardised questions, and the depth of reporting 
varied with each inspector. Questions 22 and 24 were specifically related to credit. 
Question 22 asked whether or not the district had access to a loan fund or a joint stock 
bank, and question 24 inquired about the prevalence of credit within the district. 
Given that these reports took place within the timeframe of 1894 to 1897, they do 
provide some information of loan fund activity prior to the loan fund report of 
1897.223  So, to measure the level of outreach of the LFB loan funds versus the joint 
stock banks in the congested districts we see that only 14.28 per cent of the districts 
had access to a loan fund, whereas 75 per cent of the regions had access to joint stock 
banks. In real numbers 12 districts had access to LFB loan funds, but it must be borne 
in mind that there were not actually 12 LFB loan funds in the districts. Instead 
borrowers were travelling beyond districts to access loan funds. In terms of the 
perceived theoretical information advantages, these practices would have undermined 
any such advantage, which is in line with what has been argued in section 2.3. Some 
of the answers for question 22 written by the inspectors give an indication of the 
attitudes towards the loan funds.  
Mr Gahan in his report on the district of Gartan gave the following account of 
the Letterkenny loan fund:  
There is a loan fund in Letterkenny which extends its operations as far as Templedouglas 
Electoral Division. Mr Porter Boyd of Ballymacool House, is, I believe the Chairman of 
the Fund. The interest charged is 1s 11d on every £5 borrowed, for twenty weeks, and 2d 
for the stamp. The loan must be paid back in 5s weekly instalments. If a week is missed a 
fine of 5d is imposed; if a month a fine of 10d. If not paid back till the end of the twenty 
the interest charged would be within a fraction of five per cent per annum, but as the 
payments are made weekly the actual individual interest charged is almost ten per cent 
per annum. As each 5s in it is lent out again, so that the same 5 s may have borne interest 
at the same rate nineteen different times before the original loan is paid off. In spite of 
this comparatively high rate of interest, the Loan Fund is a great convenience to the 
people, who avail themselves a good deal of it. One of the principal drawbacks is that 
they have to bring in two securities for every loan, with customary “treats,” means an 
additional 5s from the man’s pocket.224 
 
Gahan also reported the operations of the same loan fund in Brocknagh, but his 
report on the loan fund is identical to the above citation.225 Mr Micks was more 
critical of the loan funds in his account of The Rosses, stating that ‘the district is 
fortunate in not having any loan funds within or near its limits.’226 Micks also stated 
that ‘very few small loans are made by the Bank [Northern Banking Company] to the 
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occupiers of land in the neighbourhood.’227 Mr Gahan gave the following account of 
the loan fund in Lough Eask: 
There is a loan fund in Donegal, and one in Pettigo. In the Donegal Fund, 7 ½ d is 
charged on every pound borrowed, and in addition there are 5 ½ d of various charges. A 
£1 loan costs a 1s to borrower; £2 loan, 1s 8d; £3 loan, 2s 3 ½ d,; and so on; £5 (the usual 
amount) costs 3s 7d. The loan has to be repaid in £1 (for £5) instalments every four 
weeks, so the whole amount is repaid in twenty weeks; if instalments not up to date, 1d 
in the pound fine is imposed. The interest to each individual is about 18 per cent; 450 
have already borrowed from that in Donegal.228 
 
This account appears to follow the pattern of increased monthly loans outlined 
in section 2.3. Mr Gahan stated that in Ballyshannon ‘the general opinion seems to be 
that the effect morally of the loan fund is not good.’229 The report by Mr Gahan on 
Grange stated that: 
There is a loan fund at Drumcliff and another in Bundoran. The very general opinion 
seems to be that the loan funds do a great deal of harm in the districts in which they are 
placed, and so far as I could gather about 50 per cent of the farmer in the district have 
borrowed from them. The borrowing is a very costly process, for not only has the 
borrower to pay the interest on the loan, but he must also bring in and pay two securities, 
and if his loan is not paid to date he is fined. The interest charged is very high and it is 
difficult to see where the profits, which must be very great, go to.230  
 
The spatial pattern of loan fund references is consistent with LFB reports, as the 
references are most prevalent in Leitrim and Donegal. The reports are useful - most of 
the reports predate the 1897 report, and seem to corroborate its findings.  
Another feature that is evident from the CDB baseline reports is the prevalence 
of shop credit in the congested regions. Assuming loan funds only made loans for 
productive investments, then such a prevalence of shop credit would not have been an 
important factor. But this assumption may not be entirely accurate, as the evidence 
from Knockmourne suggests patterns of activity not in tune with agricultural 
investment patterns. Also the fact that local shops sold fertilisers on credit231 would 
indicate that there may have been a cross-over between productive and consumption 
credit by shops. So given that the shopkeepers were providing services that the loan 
funds would have provided, i.e. productive credit, coupled with services that loan 
funds also provided, i.e. consumption credit, this may suggest that there was actually 
no need for loan funds in the congested regions. The shops offered more favourable 
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repayment periods and interest payments, as recorded by the CDB inspectors, were 
not excessive. In fact, adjusting for opportunity cost and additional monetary costs, 
from a borrower’s perspective loan fund loans would have been more expensive than 
a loan from a local shopkeeper. Liam Kennedy has shown that there was an increase 
in the number of shopkeepers in the late nineteenth century which would have helped 
to push down the price of credit and explain the low cost of credit reflected in the 
CDB baseline reports.232 The shopkeepers would also have had greater information on 
borrowers than loan funds could have possessed, especially as the LFB loan funds 
were extending beyond their districts, thereby meaning that shopkeepers were more 
effective lenders. Given that the loan funds, although ostensibly financial 
intermediaries, did not mobilise savings, it would seem logical that the shopkeepers 
could perform their role as credit providers.  
Another feature of loan fund distribution which indicates low levels of outreach 
is the absence of LFB loan funds, which claimed to trace their lineage from Dean 
Swift’s Dublin loan fund, in many of the major urban centres particularly Dublin city 
and Belfast city. There it seems the role of LFB loan funds were performed by mutual 
friendly societies.233 But there were also numerous shopkeepers, pawnbrokers and 
moneylenders operating in the urban centres that could have provided the loan fund 
services. The paternalistic LFB loan funds were absent from the centres of Irish 
poverty, both urban and rural, which indicates a failure on their part as providers of 
institutional microfinance. But because they were paternalistic societies they would 
have been constrained by the availability of paternalistic agents. Given that there are 
temporal limits,234 the amount of time that a paternalistic agent devotes to a certain 
charitable activity is dependent on his/her resources and preferences. Since there was 
more than one form of charity vying for paternalistic support, and because 
paternalistic support was limited, it is not surprising that the distribution of loan funds 
was not as prevalent in certain areas. The dearth of loan funds, or a surplus, may 
actually be an indicator of the level of paternalism within a given region or proof of 
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the existence of an alternative. Cynically it could also be argued that elites in urban 
areas had less to gain by offering paternalistic services, as opposed to the rural elites 
who may have used loan funds as vehicles for purposes other than monetary 
distribution. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the LFB system declined during the post-famine period, it experienced 
a ‘bubble’ from 1885 to 1895, and effectively collapsed after 1896. The Irish loan 
funds were ostensibly restricted by legislation from making loans over £10 and from 
charging a rate of discount greater than 4 d in the pound, roughly a 0.70 per cent 
annualised discount rate, but still managed to expand during the bubble period. The 
speculation occurred without consideration for the welfare of borrowers from the loan 
funds. As the abuses were rife, it cannot be assumed that it occurred in the minority of 
loan funds. In fact, it is more accurate to state that the minority of loan funds were 
those that adhered to the original principles designed to assist low income borrowers.    
 
Table 2.9: Inter-decadal percentage change in population and loan fund 
variables, 1841-1911 
Decennial 
period 
Population Population 
(Rural) 
Number 
of loan 
funds 
Capital Circulation Number 
of loans 
1841-51 -19.85 -24.24 -54.10 -49.73 -50.55 -53.55 
1851-61 -11.49 -12.29 -14.63 15.23 16.10 -4.68 
1861-71 -6.67 -9.82 -22.85 -35.11 -34.40 -36.78 
1871-81 -4.37 -6.90 -2.46 -5.18 -24.53 -32.14 
1881-91 -9.08 -12.13 26.58 49.95 25.71 9.99 
1891-1901 -5.22 -11.40 -36 -47.21 -57.94 -51.48 
1901-11 -1.54 -5.16 -20.31 -14.52 -9.86 -18.76 
 
Sources: Loan Fund Board reports, Thom’s Directory, and census of Ireland  
 
Table 2.9 shows the inter-decadal percentage change in population and some 
loan fund variables. As can be seen, both population growth and loan fund variables 
experienced negative changes from 1851 to 1881. Although population continued to 
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decrease, there was an increase in loan fund activity from 1881 to 1891, but this 
increase was not continued into the following decadal period. The importance of 
population change should not be overlooked, as the loan fund zenith in the early 
nineteenth century coincided with Irish population at its peak. The major structural 
changes in Irish demography saw the decline in a portion of the population most 
likely to have actually used the loan funds, these being labourers and cottiers.  As was 
shown in chapter 1, there was a consolidation in land holdings in the post-famine era 
which, assuming that cash flows from farming were sufficient, was something that 
would have reduced demand for credit from the loan funds. Given the continuing 
trends in Irish demography, it is not surprising that the loan funds were an institution 
in decline. What is surprising is that they were able to survive for so long. The bubble 
in the late 1880s and early 1890s is anomalous, as the variables outlined in section 2.2 
have shown.  
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Figure 2.33, which shows the percentage change in loan fund circulation, capital and 
number of loans issued from 1844 to 1918, indicates some of the major events which 
influenced subsequent developments in the LFB system. Of prime importance was the 
famine in the 1840s which truncated the loan fund system. This was followed by the 
recession in the early 1860s and the effect of the land war in the late 1870s and early 
1880s. The second largest event, based on percentage change, was the decline in 
1896. The drop in both capital and circulation in 1896 is second in magnitude only to 
the effects of the famine. The LFB system did not recover from the events of the 
1890s. 
An issue which has not been fully addressed in the current loan fund literature235 
is why the loan funds were most active in Ulster. It has been shown in this chapter 
that Ulster had the largest loan fund representation on the island. So it is necessary to 
explain how this dominance came into place. Or rather, why was it that Ulster, 
possibly the wealthiest province, needed and facilitated the loan fund system, and why 
were these loan funds less prevalent in the areas of the greatest congestion and 
poverty? 
There are two possible explanations for the greater concentration of loan fund 
activity in Ulster, one that explores supply side factors and another that explores 
demand side factors. On the supply side the most likely reason for the prevalence of 
loan funds in Ulster and to a lesser extent Leinster and Munster was due to the nature 
of their constitutions. The loan funds required both capital and people to voluntarily 
run the institutions. The initial capital which the loan funds required was usually 
provided at the behest of local charities but the amounts given were trivial and not 
enough to establish a thriving loan fund. The loan funds required deposits as well as 
bequests in order to adequately operate. But the loan funds also required local 
expertise to run the loan funds on a voluntary basis. This voluntary labour was in 
effect a subsidy, as the labour was expected to be given for free to the cause of the 
loan funds which was the provision of financial services to the poor. Not every locale 
in Ireland had access to both the finances and the personnel to operate loan funds on 
such a large scale. In this regard it could be possible to surmise that due to Ulster’s 
position as the location of the majority of the industry of the island it is possible that 
the inhabitants had greater amounts of surplus capital which they could distribute to 
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the loan funds. And they possibly had a greater array of skilled personnel at their 
disposal than any of the other provinces.  
This assessment is hypothetical as it does not take into account the abuses which 
took place in the system between 1885 and 1895, but it could be argued that the 
assessment that successful loan fund operations required both capital and personnel is 
an accurate one. Clearly the absence of either meant that the loan funds could not be 
administered.  What this leads us to question is why the loan funds were so 
uncommon in the poorest regions. It may be due to the smaller number of land 
owners, i.e. landlords, in the west as compared to elsewhere on the island.236 Given 
that the loan funds required some paternalistic supporters to act as trustees, as 
managers, to donate time, and/or to provide capital, such a dearth of numbers may 
give an indication as to why there were so few loan funds.  
Another explanation stems from the fact that counties in Connaught and 
Munster did have loan funds active there in the 1830s and 1840s under the auspices of 
the Reproductive Loan Funds (RLF). The societies associated with the RLF were all 
wound up in the late 1840s and their capital was placed in the trusteeship of the UK 
Treasury. This would have precluded the replacement of individual loan funds via the 
transferral of capital between trustees as seems to have occurred under the LFB 
system. The lack of intra-trustee transferrals would also have been coupled with how 
the RLFs were wound up. They were accused of being fraudulent and exploitive, 
something that may have precluded their revival.  
The decline of LFB loan funds may have been a reflection of the prevailing 
social attitudes, particularly those of elitist social reformers. The late Victorian period 
is associated with the social reform based on the ideas of Samuel Smiles and people 
of similar ilk. Numerous actions in the late nineteenth century can see traces of 
Smilesian thought, but none more so that the pursuit of thrift. In Smiles’ work on 
thrift, he praised its values, mainly saving and frugal living. But he was also critical of 
debt, and especially loan societies, as is shown in the following passage from Thrift: 
Not many years since, Parliament passed a law facilitating the establishment of small 
Loan Societies, for the purpose of helping small tradesmen and poor people generally to 
raise money in an emergency. The law was at once pounced upon by the numerous race 
of Graballs, as a means of putting money in their purse. They gave the working classes 
facilities for running into debt, and for mortgaging their future industry. A few men, 
desirous of making money, would form themselves into a Loan Club, and offer sums of 
money ostensibly at five per cent. interest, repayable in weekly instalments. The 
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labouring people eagerly availed themselves of the facility for getting into debt. One 
wanted money for “a spree,” another wanted money for a suit of clothes, a third for an 
eight-day clock, and so on; and instead of saving the money beforehand, they preferred 
getting the money from the Club, keeping themselves in difficulties and poverty until the 
debt was paid off. Such a practice is worse than living from hand to mouth: it is living 
upon one’s own vitals. It is easy to understand how the partners in the Loan Club make 
money. Suppose that they advance ten pounds for three months at five per cent. It is 
repayable in weekly instalments at ten shillings a week – the repayments commencing 
the very first week after the advance has been made. But though ten shillings are repaid 
weekly until the debt is wiped off, interest at five per cent is charged upon the whole 
amount until the last instalment is paid off. So that, though the nominal interest is five 
per cent, it goes on increasing until, during the last week, it reaches the enormous rate of 
one hundred per cent! This is what is called, “eating the calf in the cow’s belly.”237 
 
Smiles was also continually critical of both middle and working classes going 
into debt. Debt was frowned upon in Smilesian thought, as is illustrated from the 
following passage from Self-help: 
Every man ought to contrive to live within his means. This practice is of the very essence 
of honesty. For if a man do not manage honestly to live within his own means, he must 
necessarily be living dishonestly upon the means of somebody else. Those who are 
careless about personal expenditure, and consider merely their own gratification, without 
regard for the comfort of others, generally find out the real uses of money when it is too 
late. Though by nature generous, these thriftless persons are often driven in the end to do 
very shabby things. They waste their money as they do their time; draw bills upon the 
future; anticipate their earnings; and are thus under the necessity of dragging after them a 
load of debts and obligations which seriously affect their action as free and independent 
men…Orderly men of moderate means have always something left in their pockets to 
help others; whereas your prodigal and careless fellows who spend all never find an 
opportunity for helping anybody. It is poor economy, however, to be a scrub. 
Narrowmindedness in living and in dealing is generally short-sighted, and leads to 
failure. The penny soul, it is said, never came to two-pence…The proverb says that “an 
empty bag cannot stand upright;” neither can a man who is in debt. It is also difficult for 
a man who is in debt to be truthful; hence it is said that lying rides on debt’s back. The 
debtor has to frame excuses to his creditor for postponing payment of the money he owes 
him; and probably also to contrive falsehoods. It is easy enough for a man who will 
exercise a healthy resolution, to avoid incurring the first obligation; but the facility with 
which that has been incurred often becomes a temptation to a second; and very soon the 
unfortunate borrower becomes so entangled that no late exertion of industry can set him 
free.238 
 
So how does Smilesian thought relate to the Irish loan funds? Given their 
continual decline, it is not implausible that this was caused by a decrease in 
paternalistic patronage of the institutions. Such patronage, i.e. free management and 
expertise, would have been difficult if not impossible to replace. Without it new start-
ups would not have been possible; without it established societies could not have 
continued. We have evidence that few landlords or members of the clergy were 
involved with the loan funds circa 1896. This, coupled with comments cited from the 
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CDB inspectors, suggest that changing social attitudes, although difficult to measure, 
may have some explanatory value.  
On the demand side the ‘Ulster Custom’, whereby tenants received 
compensation for investments, does not seem to be a plausible explanation for the 
regional variation, the reason being that the ‘Ulster Custom’ by definition applied to 
long-term investments, or capital improvements. As loan fund loans were short-term 
investments, there is no intrinsic argument to suggest that the absence of the ‘Ulster 
Custom’ would have hindered the demand for loans elsewhere in the country.  
Furthermore, Donnelly, in his study of nineteenth century Cork, has suggested that the 
distrainment of livestock by landlords was a rarity and only resorted to in extreme 
circumstances and that smallholder farmers did not have disincentives to invest.239 
Across Ireland there was a divide between small and large farming. Roughly 
speaking, in both Connaught and Ulster, farm sizes were on average smaller than 
those in Leinster and Munster. Smaller farm sizes would suggest a greater demand for 
credit from loan fund institutions. In the pre-famine period Connaught was also 
under-represented in terms of LFB loan funds, but these were substituted with loan 
funds from the RLF which used capital imported from a charitable institution in 
London. The poor financial performance of the RLF and its reputation of corruption 
and fraud meant that similar sources of capital in the form of charitable bequests 
would have been less likely in the post-famine period. Therefore, as Connaught had a 
shortage of the supply side factors necessary to establish loan funds, this may suggest 
why there was a shortage of loan funds relative to Ulster. 
In conclusion, the decline of the loan funds was not inevitable, but because of 
the absence of purposeful reform and increased competition their place within the 
Irish financial structure was eroded. The main difficulty that the LFB loan funds faced 
was that they were a niche banking institution and whose specialisation was the one 
most affected by the famine in the 1840s.  Ernesto Schargrodsky and Federico 
Sturzenegger, writing about the Argentine crisis of 2001, observed that: 
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If a bank concentrates in a particular line of business, lower demand or lower 
productivity will make many of its clients insolvent. If a bank concentrates in a particular 
region, any local negative shock will also imply a lower rate of repayment.240 
 
They found that many of the banks which collapsed were too specialised in their 
services and that the ones which survived had greater portfolio diversification. This is 
also the case with the Irish financial structure in the nineteenth century. The joint 
stock banks had greater diversity in their portfolios than had the loan funds and as 
such they were able to continually advance and develop, whereas the loan funds were 
to remain stagnant as their niche was gradually encroached upon by different forms of 
competition. 
The random cases taken from available source material on loan funds seems to 
indicate that they may have been more eventful institutions than represented on the 
pages of the LFB reports and in the overview in section 2.2. Evidence of political 
wrangling and religious discrimination ought to make the subject of loan funds more 
enticing to Irish historians in the future. 
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3 Joint stock banking in Ireland, 1820-1914 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Joint stock banking in Ireland is an example of successful institutional imitation. Irish 
joint stock banks established in the 1820s were modelled on the principles of ‘Scotch 
banking’. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Bank of Ireland, formed in 
1783, was the only joint stock bank operating in Ireland. It operated on a unit banking 
model, banking where a bank’s activities are conducted in one location. The banks 
that were established in the 1820s and 30s operated a branch banking model, which is 
the inverse to unit banking, where a bank opens bank offices in different regions and 
banking business is divided among each branch. By 1914 there were nine joint stock 
banking companies with 860 bank branches,1 including the Bank of Ireland which had 
abandoned its unit banking policy in response to increased competition. The following 
chapter is an account of the historical and structural development of joint stock 
banking in Ireland in the nineteenth century. 
The literature on joint stock banking in Ireland to date has focused on the early 
development of the system,2 developments of individual banks,3 or of banking in 
Ulster.4 Many of these histories were commissioned by the banks themselves.5 There 
has been interest in the joint stock banking failures, namely the Agricultural and 
Commercial Bank of Ireland, the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank, and the Munster Bank.6 
More recent literature has focused on the role of the banks in the Irish economy,7 
capital markets,8 and assessing the significance of unlimited liability on the structural 
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development of joint stock banking.9 This chapter will contribute to the existing 
literature by analysing joint stock banking over the entire nineteenth century, and by 
focusing on the developments of all banking institutions. The chapter will analyse the 
joint stock banks in terms of their impact on the microfinance institutions discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis. The joint stock banks were an important financial institution 
and their structural development is a key to understanding the developments of other 
institutions. The joint stock banks, unlike other financial institutions discussed in this 
thesis, had a wider significance outside of microfinance and as such this will be 
discussed. This work will make a significant contribution to the existing literature by 
mapping the geographic distribution of the banks.   
The focus of this chapter will be on the structural development of the Irish 
banking sector in the nineteenth century and will show how formal constraints 
hindered the development of Irish joint stock banking. The gradual removal of formal 
constraints led to the establishment of a number of banks in the 1820s and 30s. But 
new constraints were imposed on the system in the 1840s which influenced the 
structural development of joint stock banking, and placed sizeable barriers of entry to 
new competition. An important aspect of the early developments of joint stock 
banking is the story of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland (A&C). The 
A&C is important in the context of this thesis as it was the only for-profit 
microfinance institution in the pre-famine period. The A&C was established in 1834 
but was a short-lived venture. The chapter will analyse its history to see if it can shed 
light on the other forms of microfinance in the early nineteenth century. 
The chapter will outline developments in joint stock banking in post-famine 
Ireland. It will be argued in this chapter that the gradual expansion of branch banking 
enabled the joint stock banks to create information regarding borrowers. Information 
was created by the collection of deposits and the collection of information regarding 
the surrounding economic environment. As the Irish banking system was an imitation 
of the Scottish banking system, this chapter will include a comparative study of Irish 
and Scottish banking in the late nineteenth century. The aim of the comparative study 
is to see if Irish banking converged to Scottish banking. 
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This chapter will conclude by assessing joint stock banks as a form of institutional 
imitation and in this context challenge arguments raised by Tim Guinnane in his 
assessment of the institutional imitation of German Raiffeisen banks. Guinnane 
asserted that informal constraints, namely cultural differences, precluded the imitation 
of a financial institution in Ireland. But the existence of an ex-ante institutional 
imitation challenges this view. Also the chapter will assess the role of the Irish banks 
in the economic development of Ireland and whether they could have acted as a 
substitute for private investment as argued by Gerschenkron.10 This Gerschenkron-
esque view was expressed in the latter stages of the nineteenth century and has been 
embraced by Irish economic historians, most notably Joseph Lee.11 
 
3.2.1 The early development and liberalisation of joint stock banking in Ireland 
 
The early developments in Irish joint stock banking began in the eighteenth century. 
Goldsmith observed that: 
Very few financial institutions – be they central banks, commercial banks, savings or 
mortgage banks, investment trusts or insurance companies – go back beyond the early 
nineteenth century, and those that do are of very small size until well into the nineteenth 
century, not only by present standards but in comparison to contemporary values of 
wealth and income.12 
 
This is true for Ireland, with the Bank of Ireland being the only major financial 
institution that predates the nineteenth century. Attempts were made to establish a 
national bank in the 1720s, but these were opposed.13 The Bank of Ireland was 
established by a Royal Charter in 1781-82,14 and began business in 1783. Its initial 
share capital was £600,000. This was to be raised voluntarily from subscribers in 
Ireland or abroad, and it was fully paid-up;15 the share capital was increased by 
successive amendments to its charter. The Bank of Ireland’s charter stated that its 
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objective was to advance the ‘publick credit in this Kingdom and to the extension of 
its trade and commerce if a bank with publick security’.16  
The banking industry in Ireland and Great Britain in the eighteenth century and 
in the UK in the nineteenth century was subject to substantial regulation.17 The 
regulation of the banking industry influenced its structural development. In the 
eighteenth century there were restrictions on banking structure. Ó Gráda noted that: 
Several banking failures in the mid 1750s, however, convinced Parliament that “the 
publick credit of the Kingdom…suffered from Bankers trading as merchants”, and 
amending legislation prohibited merchants engaged in foreign trade from issuing notes. 
Banks were also prohibited from having more than six partners.18  
 
The restriction on banks having more than six partners constrained the 
development of banking in Ireland as it narrowed the capital base of a bank to the 
capital of its partners, and made such banks cautious in regards to credit policy.  The 
Bank of Ireland was the only bank operating in Ireland that was permitted to have 
more than six partners from 1783 until 1820.19 Modelled on the Bank of England, the 
Bank of Ireland, chartered by the Irish parliament in 1783, was given a monopoly on 
joint stock banking in Ireland and given a geographic monopoly on note issuing 
within a 65-mile radius of its headquarters in Dublin. With only one bank operating 
on a joint stock basis it is unsurprising that the Bank of Ireland took advantage of its 
monopoly status and did not pursue overly expansionist policies. This monopoly 
status also influenced the bank’s modus operandi as it did not attempt any branch 
expansion. There is nothing to indicate that the bank’s charter prohibited it from 
operating a branch system. Section two of the Bank of Ireland’s charter stated that the 
funds raised by the bank ‘shall be applied towards any purposes for the beginning or 
better carrying on the business of the said bank and also towards the erecting a proper 
building and convenient accommodations for the same’.20 This suggests that the bank 
could undertake branch expansion if it could justify it in the name of ‘better carrying 
on the business of banking’. According to Hall, the Bank of Ireland ‘consistently 
refused to extend its operations outside Dublin’.21 This was despite the frequent 
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requests from ‘prominent citizens’ in Belfast and Cork for the Bank to open 
branches.22 If we look at the other chartered institutions in the British Isles we can see 
that the Scottish chartered banks chose to operate branch systems, whereas the Bank 
of England purposely chose not to follow a branch banking system.23 
A private bank is financed by the capital of its partners, and shares in the bank 
are not traded publicly. By contrast, a joint stock bank is financed through the sale of 
shares, and these shares are publicly traded.  In the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries there were a number of private note issuing banks operating in Ireland. A 
restriction on gold payments in 1797, an emergency piece of legislation in response to 
the Revolutionary wars, saw the growth in bank note circulation in many parts of 
Ireland. Many of the new notes in circulation did not have any specie backing, and 
economic distress following the end of the Napoleonic wars led to a banking crisis in 
Ireland. The economically induced banking distress in the late 1810s and early 1820s 
saw the end of private banking as the dominant form of banking in Ireland. The 1820s 
was to see the emergence of a new form of banking structure on the island. Figure 3.1 
shows the number of private banks and joint stock banks in Ireland from 1820 to 
1844. As can be seen there was a significant decrease in the number of private banks 
operating in this period. These were essentially displaced by the joint stock banks 
which operated branch networks. 
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Figure 3.1  
Number of private banks and joint stock banks in Ireland, 
1820-1844
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Note: The Bank of Ireland has been included in the number of joint stock banks. 
 
Source: Accounts of the number of private and joint stock banks registered in Ireland in each year from 
1820 to 1844, both inclusive; and of all the joint stock banks existing in Ireland on the 1st day of 
January 1840, distinguishing those banks that issued, and those that did not issue notes, 1844 H.C. 
(232), xxxii, 445. 
 
The early nineteenth century saw the deregulation of the banking sector in Ireland. 
The initial stages of deregulation saw the removal of the restriction on the number of 
eligible partners permitted to establish a bank. The renewal of the Charter of the Bank 
of Ireland in 1821 allowed ‘any number of partners, united or to be united in societies 
or partnerships’ to form note issuing banks ‘at any place in Ireland exceeding the 
Distance of Fifty Miles from Dublin’.24 The act stated that ‘no other privileges’ were 
to be granted until 1838;25 an exception was made for the right to ‘sue or be sued in 
the name of the public officer’ but only if ‘Parliament hereafter think fit to grant such 
a Power’.26 This led to some legal difficulties regarding the right to ‘sue or be sued in 
name of the public officer’,27 as this meant that there was no legal recognition of 
incorporation of joint stock banks. There were also constraints from an earlier act of 
parliament relating to banking.28 The 1756 act prohibited merchants and traders being 
shareholders, and stated a requirement for each shareholder to sign bank notes.29 The 
requirement for signatures on bank notes would have been particularly burdensome 
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for note-issuing joint stock banks. These legal constraints hindered the development 
of new joint stock banks.  
The Relief of Bankers (Ireland) Act 182430 and the Bankers (Ireland) Act 
182531 saw the development of joint stock banking in Ireland. This paved the way for 
the creation of banks with partnerships limited only by the number of shares in the 
banks. The joint stock banks were able to raise capital through the sale of shares, on a 
partially paid up basis, and enabled banks to rely on more diverse sources of capital. 
The 1825 Bankers (Ireland) Act led to the establishment of a number of new joint 
stock banks in Ireland, shown in table 3.1, which were to operate for the remainder of 
the nineteenth century. A particularly interesting feature of the 1825 Act was that it 
allowed capital to be raised from the sale of shares in Britain as well as Ireland.32 This 
enabled banks to raise funds in both Ireland and Britain. Two of the largest joint stock 
banks, the Provincial and the National, actually had their headquarters in London. The 
system of joint stock banking in Ireland was relatively stable, with the A & C bank, 
discussed below, being the only joint stock bank in Ireland to fail during the period 
1824 to 1845.   
 
Table 3.1: Joint stock banks established in Ireland between 1783 and 1840 
Joint Stock Bank Year of 
establishment 
Branches 
in 1826 
Branches 
in 1836 
Bank of Ireland 1783 7 19 
Hibernian Joint Stock Bank 1824 - - 
Northern Banking Company 1824 12 10 
Provincial Bank of Ireland 1825 9 33 
Belfast Banking Company 1827 - 10 
Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland 1834 - 27 
National Bank of Ireland 1835 - 20 
Limerick National Bank of Ireland 1835 - 3 
Royal Bank of Ireland 1836 - - 
Ulster Bank 1836 - - 
The Tipperary joint stock company 1836 - - 
 
Note: The return included the Carrick-on-Suir National Bank of Ireland and the Clonmel National 
Bank of Ireland as joint stock banks. These have been omitted from table 3.1 as they were most likely 
branches of the National Bank of Ireland. 
 
Sources: Banks (Ireland) Accounts, of the number of banks consisting of more than six partners; and, 
of the number of private bankers registered, 1820-1825, 1826, H.C. (228), xxiii, 289; Return of joint 
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stock banks in Ireland, with the dates when established respectively; and of the names of the several 
towns and places where such banks and their branches have been established; with the number of 
partners in each Copartnership, 1836, H.C. (219), xxxvii, 371; Accounts of the number of private and 
joint stock banks registered in Ireland in each year from 1820 to 1844, both inclusive; and of all the 
joint stock banks existing in Ireland on the 1st day of January 1840, distinguishing those banks that 
issued, and those that did not issue notes, 1844 H.C. (232), xxxii, 445. 
 
 
The 1825 Bankers (Ireland) Act eliminated the Bank of Ireland’s monopoly on joint 
stock banking, but it did not eradicate the Bank of Ireland’s geographic monopoly. 
The joint stock banks had to choose between operating in Dublin and note issuing; 
they could not do both.33 Only two joint stock banks chose to operate in Dublin - the 
Royal Bank and the Hibernian Joint Stock Bank. The other banks operated elsewhere.  
The emergence of a number of joint stock banks at a similar time created 
competition in the banking sector. The Provincial bank led the way in many areas. Its 
modus operandi was based on the Scottish banking model. Barrow stated that ‘the 
Provincial’s system was almost identical with that of the Scottish banks’.34 It was the 
pioneer of branch banking in Ireland,35 the introduction of cash credit backed by 
personal security and the payment of interest on deposits.36  Its policies were imitated 
by other joint stock banks.  The increased level of competition also forced the Bank of 
Ireland to abandon unit banking and adopt a branch banking strategy, and the Bank of 
Ireland opened its first branches in 1825.37 In the period 1825 to 1844 the Bank of 
Ireland opened 23 branches.38 It also recorded receiving 28 requests to open branches 
in various towns in Ireland, and of these requests 9 were agreed to by the Bank’s 
directors.39   
The increase in competition did not encourage the Bank of Ireland to implement 
a policy of paying interest on deposits. The Bank of Ireland, which was the largest 
commercial bank, did not give any interest on deposits and it was not until ‘1864 
[that] the system of accepting deposits at interest was put into operation’.40 It is 
possible that the Bank of Ireland did not pay interest on deposits as deposit 
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mobilisation was not part of its initial business model.41 It may have been the case that 
individuals, or businesses, who deposited with the bank of Ireland also borrowed from 
it: this would account for the absence of interest on deposits. But the evidence 
suggests that the majority of Bank of Ireland assets were in fact public securities, and 
not loans,42 so compensating balances43 may not have been occurring to any great 
extent. There was also a general policy amongst all banks of not paying interest on 
current accounts, so perhaps the Bank of Ireland mainly operated current accounts in 
this period.  
The other joint stock banks were more inclined to offer their customers interest 
on their deposits. Barrow observed that ‘the purpose [for interest on deposits] was to 
attract idle money back into the banking system where it would be employed at a 
higher rate of interest to the benefit of all concerned’.44 The newly established joint 
stock banks did not have the same prestige and tradition as the Bank of Ireland 
because they were not chartered banking institutions and as such it was also likely that 
interest on deposits was required as security to attract depositors. Many of the banks 
offered similar interest rates on deposits. Barrow stated that in the early nineteenth 
century the Provincial Bank of Ireland offered 2 per cent in its branches in the south 
of Ireland, and 3 per cent in Ulster. This was due to the fact that the Ulster banks (the 
Belfast bank, the Northern Bank and the Ulster Bank) offered 3 per cent.45 The fact 
that the Provincial bank would raise rates when entering Ulster suggests that there 
was stronger competition in the north. But there is evidence to suggest that there may 
have been tacit collusion in the north,46 and there is evidence that implicit collusion 
did take place in terms of rates. The area where the joint stock banks competed with 
each other was in branches.  As a result of such competition, Ó Gráda noted that: 
 
The total number of bank branches or agencies rose from 14 in 1825 to 54 in 1834 and to 
173 in 1845, and by the latter date nearly all towns with a population of over 5,000, and 
several smaller towns too had their own bank. The banks mopped up money that had 
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previously been hoarded: in 1825-40 the Bank of Ireland received an average of £40,000 
annually in gold guineas, though guineas had scarcely circulated in most of the island 
since the 1790s…There is circumstantial evidence that the Bank of Ireland was over-
cautious in its branch policy in these years. The only Irish towns of 10,000 people or 
more without a bank branch in 1830 – Dundalk, Drogheda, and Carlow – were within the 
Bank’s fifty-mile zone, while a decade later the Bank had opened branches in only three 
towns in the 5,000-10,000 range – Youghal, Tullamore and New Ross. The demand for 
banking services would therefore probably have been less fully met in the absence of 
competition from the other banks. 47 
 
The deregulation of the banking sector between 1821 and 1844 shaped the 
structure of the banking sector in Ireland. Subsequent regulation by the Bank Charter 
Act 1844 and the Bankers Ireland Act 1845 encouraged the spread of branch banking. 
Both acts restricted the note issue of banks in Ireland. The Bank Charter Act, although 
applicable primarily to England and Wales, restricted note issue to banks operating ‘in 
any part of the United Kingdom’ at the time of the passing of the Act.48 Therefore, no 
new banks, or banks that had closed but had not been wound up, were allowed issue 
notes following the act. This immediately affected three joint stock banks in Ireland: 
two that operated in Dublin, the Royal and the Hibernian, as they were the only non-
note issuing joint stock banks, and the Tipperary Bank which was the only bank in 
Ireland that voluntarily gave up its right to issue notes. It was also to affect any banks 
that might form after the passing of the act. The Bankers Ireland Act passed the 
following year removed the Bank of Ireland’s geographic monopoly, but did not 
allow the Royal and the Hibernian to issue notes.49  
The 1844 bank act placed significant restrictions on note issues of the pre-
existing note-issuing banks. The banks were given a limited circulation,50 with the 
limit based on their average note circulation from the previous twelve months.51 
Banks were allowed issue notes above this, but to do so they had to hold an equivalent 
amount of specie to cover the excess issue. Any bank that issued an excessive amount 
of notes, not backed by specie, could be fined the equivalent amount of the excess 
issue.52 The effect of the 1844 bank act was to make excess note issues expensive 
from a bank’s perspective. Note issues in Ireland remained within the limit for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century.53 
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The 1844 act can be seen as a structural break in the development of joint stock 
banking as it shifted the focus of banks: it gave greater importance to deposit 
mobilisation and financial intermediation. In the earlier years of joint stock bank 
development many of the banks had not focused on savings mobilisation. Note 
issuing was no longer the main feature of banking in Ireland and, as Barrow noted, 
‘with the growth of cheque-operated accounts the issue of notes was no longer an 
essential feature of banking’.54  
Branch banking is costly,55 but the cost of branch banking could be partially 
absorbed by the fact that many banks could use their own note issues instead of 
holding money. Gaskin attempted to estimate the profitability of bank notes to 
Scottish banks, stating that: 
…the note issuing activities of the banks may be presumed to add to their earning assets 
and the question at issue is whether or not the income which they derive from these 
assets is outweighed by the costs which the banks incur in operating the issues.56   
 
Gaskin argued that the profits derived from note issues came from the revenue 
of additional assets that could be held instead of holding money (i.e. gold), minus the 
cost of issuing notes. The cost of issuing notes included the cost of printing, the 
amount of cash on call to redeem the notes, licence and stamp duty, and sorting costs 
(costs of clearing notes).57 Under the 1845 act, a licence was required for every 
location that issued notes.58 Notes were subject to stamp duty, but the 1845 stamp 
duty act stated that bank notes could be re-issued ‘from time to time after payment 
thereof, as often as he shall think fit, without being liable to pay any further Duty in 
respect thereof’.59 The 1845 bank act did not state that gold had to be held to cover 
note issues, ‘but its contractual obligation to pay gold for its notes on demand 
remained’.60 It appears as though the banks practised a policy of fractional reserves. 
This can be seen from the amount of gold that the various banks held to cover their 
note issues. For example, the average circulation of the Irish banks in the four weeks 
ending 3 January 1846 was £7,404,366, and the banks held 33.62 per cent of this 
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amount in gold/silver bullion.61 Irish banks were also obliged to pay notes on demand 
at the branch of issue under the 1828 bank notes act,62 and this obligation remained in 
place until 1920.63 It is difficult to estimate the profit derived from note issuing, but it 
may have offset some of the costs of branch banking. This placed non-issuing banks 
at a slight disadvantage.  
There was no immediate expansion of branch banking following the Bank 
Charter Act and the Bankers Ireland Act. This can be attributed to the effects of the 
famine and the more general commercial depression of the late 1840s. Barrow’s 
summation of the development of the Irish banking sector from 1845 until the end of 
the nineteenth century is as follows: 
Looking ahead over the rest of the century, the total of bank deposits fell sharply in 1847, 
then rose, with some fluctuations, over the next thirty years, passing £10 million in 1852, 
£20 million in 1866 and £30 million in 1874. After steadying out for the next twenty 
years it resumed its upward trend in the late nineties and passed the £40 million mark in 
1899. During the same period total circulation varied little, being seldom above the 1845 
level and normally well below it. Even if a large portion of the deposits were short-term 
investments their steady increase in volume must have included a considerable element 
of current money supply. It was here rather than in the issue of notes – restricted by the 
1845 act – that the future development of Irish banking lay.64 
 
The increased competition amongst the banks for available deposits saw the 
joint stock banks offering competitive interest rates on deposits. Even the lofty Bank 
of Ireland was not immune from the effects of competition. The Bank of Ireland asked 
for and was given the statutory right to lend on mortgage security in 1860 and 
introduced interest payments on deposits in 1864. Ollerenshaw observed that: 
With the abolition of free issue in 1845, the importance of deposits as a source of profit 
had increased. For this reason all banks, whether note issuers or not, were keenly aware 
of the need to maximise deposits. It follows that, as branch systems expanded, the 
competition for deposits became fiercer. In general, any bank felt most threatened when a 
rival moved into or near those areas where its own branch deposits were highest.65 
 
 
3.2.2 ‘Scotch banking principles’ 
In the early nineteenth century, Scotland had the most developed banking network in 
the United Kingdom. It was the Scottish model that many Irish banks copied, either 
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intentionally or not.66 The Provincial Bank of Ireland, the pioneer of branch banking 
and deposit accumulation, was based on Scottish banking.67 Notably the Provincial 
bank recruited its managers from Scotland.68 The Ulster banks were also based on ‘the 
Scotch principle’.69  
In the late 1820s there were two separate parliamentary inquiries into the 
circulation of promissory notes in Ireland and Scotland,70 an inquiry from the House 
of Commons and one from the House of Lords, and they provide useful information 
about Scottish and Irish banking at this time.  The aim of both select committees was 
to find evidence if the laws then applied in England regarding promissory notes and 
notes of small denomination should be applied to Scotland and Ireland. In England the 
smallest note was £5, whereas in Scotland and Ireland smaller notes were in 
circulation. There was a fear that in the case of panics, if a bank issued notes of small 
denominations it would be subject to a run; hence the view that if banks issued larger 
notes they would be sturdier. This is a view that can be traced to the work of Adam 
Smith.71  
The evidence from Scotland suggests that it had a stable banking system. There 
were a number of instances in the eighteenth century, such as rebellions in 1715 and 
1745, and the same commercial crises which affected the English banking system in 
1797, 1810 and 1815 where the Scottish system emerged relatively unscathed. These 
events may have caused panic, but in fact they had no adverse effect on the Scottish 
banking system.72 The Lords’ Committee was very complimentary in its comments on 
Scottish banking. It stated that: 
[Scotch banking] exhibited a stability, which the committee believe to be unexampled in 
the history of Banking;  they supported themselves, from 1797 to 1812, without any 
protection from the restriction by which the Bank of England and that of Ireland were 
relieved from cash payments; that there was little demand for gold during the late 
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embarrassments in circulation, and that, in the whole period of their establishment, there 
are not more than two or three instances of bankruptcy.73 
 
The Irish system on the other hand did not get the same vote of approval from 
either committee, and it was recommended that the restriction be placed on Irish notes 
under £5.74 
The benefit of using both reports is that they compared the development of 
banking in Ireland and Scotland, and highlighted the Scottish advances in banking. 
Scottish joint stock banking had a head start of 100 years, and the Irish system was 
severely underdeveloped in comparison. The Bank of Scotland was chartered in 1695 
and was given a monopoly for 21 years, but unlike in Ireland this monopoly was not 
renewed.75 In 1727 the Royal Bank of Scotland was given a charter of incorporation.76 
In 1826, when the report was written, there were three chartered banks,77 the above 
two mentioned and the British Linen Company, and there were 29 other banks in 
business in Scotland.78 One of the principal benefits of a chartered bank is that it 
offered limited liability to the shareholders, whilst the shareholders in non-chartered 
joint stock banks were subject to unlimited liability for any debts beyond their share 
value.79 The majority of the Scottish banks also operated on the principle of branch 
banking, and the Bank of Scotland, the first chartered bank, had 16 branches at the 
time of the report.80 Private joint stock banking was not as prominent in Scotland at 
this time. In 1820 there was only one joint stock bank and by 1845 there were 13.81 
The business of the Scottish banks was summarised by the report of the House 
of Commons select committee. It stated that: 
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Speaking generally, the business of a Scotch Bank consists chiefly in the receipt and 
charge of sums deposited with the Bank, on which an interest is allowed, and in the issue 
of promissory notes upon the discount of bills, and upon advances of money made by the 
Bank upon what is called Cash Credit.82 
 
It is important to define what exactly cash credit was. This is because it will be 
discussed in the following section as the A&C attempted to use Cash Credits. The 
report from the House of Commons select committee stated that: 
A Cash Credit is an undertaking on the part of a Bank to advance to an individual such 
sums of money as he may from time to time require, not exceeding in the whole a certain 
definite amount, the individual to whom the credit is given entering into a bond with 
securities, generally two in number, for the repayment on demand of the sums actually 
advanced, with interest upon each issue from the day on which it is made. Cash credits 
are rarely given for sums below one hundred pounds; they generally range from two to 
five hundred pounds, sometimes reaching one thousand pounds, and occasionally a larger 
sum.
 83
 
 
Essentially a cash credit as defined above is an overdraft on a bank account, or a line 
of credit where terms of borrowing are specified but it is up to the borrower to 
determine when the funds will be used. The system of cash credits was highly valued 
by the witnesses of the committee. The House of Commons select committee’s report 
stated that: 
[the witness were] unwilling to incur the risk of deranging from any cause whatever, a 
system admirably calculated, in their opinion, to economize the use of capital, to excite 
and cherish a spirit of useful enterprise, and even to promote the moral habits of the 
people, by the direct inducements which it holds out to the maintenance of a character for 
industry, integrity, and prudence (sic).84  
 
The House of Lords inquiry into promissory notes followed the Commons 
inquiry and it gave a slightly different account of the Cash Credit system. The Lords’ 
committee showed that the Cash Credits lent small sums of credit and that it also 
made small loans to the middle and industrious classes. The Lords’ committee stated 
that: 
There is also one part of their system, which is stated by all the witnesses (and in the 
opinion of the committee very justly stated) to have had the best effects upon the people 
of Scotland, and particularly upon the middling and poorer classes of society, in 
producing and encouraging habits of frugality and industry. The practice referred to is 
that of Cash Credits. Any person who applies to a bank for a Cash Credit is called upon 
to produce two or more competent securities, who are jointly bound, and after a full 
inquiry into the character of the applicant, the nature of his business, and the sufficiency 
of his securities, he is allowed to open a credit, and to draw upon the bank for the whole 
of this account he pays in such sums as he may not have occasion to use; and interest is 
charged or credited upon the daily balance, as the case may be. From the facility which 
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these Cash Credits give to all the small transactions of the country, and from the 
opportunities which they afford to persons, who being businesses with little or no capital 
but their character, to employ profitably the minutest products of their industry, it cannot 
be doubted that the most important advantages are derived to the whole community.85 
 
The House of Lords’ committee also commented on how the Scottish banks 
accumulated savings, and that they ‘belong chiefly to the labouring and industrious 
classes of the community’.86 
The House of Lords’ committee when reporting on joint stock banking in 
Ireland stated that ‘there is no experience of any such system as that of Cash Credits 
in Scotland’.87 The Lords’ committee was doubtful of the prospects of joint stock 
banking in Ireland, particularly as a number of shocks in the early 1800s meant ‘that 
its Banking establishments are now confined to the chartered Bank of Ireland’.88 The 
Lords’ committee also doubted whether the Scottish system could be transferable to 
Ireland.89  
History has proved the Lords’ committee to be wrong, and the years following 
witnessed a growth in Irish joint stock banking. The spread in branch banking 
coincided with a wider use of Scottish banking, or Cash Credit, by the joint stock 
banks. This can be seen in the evidence of R. R. Madden, secretary of the LFB, given 
to the select committee on loan funds in 1855.90 It seems possible to conclude that, 
given that the Irish joint stock banks had adopted the Scottish banking model, they 
would have eventually emulated the Cash Credit system. This would have had 
implications for any other financial institution which was then operating in the 
financial sector.  
  
3.3 The Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland 
The A&C was established in 1834, suspended payments in 1836 and closed in 1840.91 
It was a controversial attempt to bring banking to the masses in Ireland. Thomas 
Mooney was a baker and flour factor by trade92 before entering the world of banking. 
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He founded the A&C and its successor, the Provident Bank of Ireland. He also 
established an assurance company before emigrating to the US.93 Ó Gráda stated that 
Mooney was considered a ‘poor entrepreneur or, worse, a charlatan by the banking 
establishment’.94 Mooney believed that a National Bank would be of great service to 
Ireland as it would increase investment within the country. Ultimately, Mooney’s 
project failed, but it is worth analysing the A&C Bank. Many earlier banking 
historians have not been complimentary towards Thomas Mooney or the A&C Bank. 
Barrow is the only banking historian who has tried to clear Mooney’s name. Barrow 
has gone so far as to say that: 
It may be an exaggeration to say that if he had succeeded in what he tried to do in the 
1830s there would have been no famine in Ireland in the 1840s, but it is not in my view a 
very great exaggeration.95  
 
The following sections are an account of some key elements of the A&C Bank 
of Ireland. 
 
3.3.1 Origin and principles of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank 
 
The A&C was an institution similar to the loan fund societies, discussed in chapter 1, 
in so far as it aimed to provide credit and savings services to the ‘humbler classes of 
society’. The A&C was an ambitious idea that was an imitation of the banking model 
of the ‘equally ill-starred’96 Northern and Central Bank of England,97 a bank located 
in Manchester that had experienced contemporaneous success in England.  The 
banking model of the Northern and Central Bank of England was of issuing numerous 
shares of small value, and of aggressive branch banking.  
The A&C bank differed from the loan fund societies in its ownership and 
management structures. The A&C bank was a joint stock company and raised capital 
through the sale of shares. The prospectus of the A&C, issued in 1834, outlined how 
shares were to be sold solely in Ireland.98 The share capital of the bank was to be 
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£1,000,000, subscribed in a million shares of £5, with only £1 paid up, unless further 
calls were made.99 The bank subsequently sold shares in England and Scotland, at £25 
per share, paid in instalments of £5, with the intention of raising a further £250,000 in 
capital.100  In comparison with other banking institutions the number of shares and the 
share values differed. For example, the Ulster Banking company opened in 1836 and 
its capital was £1,000,000 in one hundred thousand shares of £10 each, and twenty 
five per cent paid up.101 It appears as though the A&C was under-capitalised. 
Evidence of this can be seen from the fact that an attempt was made to sell shares in 
England, something not in the original prospectus. Also, there was an attempt to 
receive funding from an Assurance company in England, but this was resisted by 
Thomas Mooney because, alleged by The Bankers’ Magazine, he was attempting to 
establish his own insurance company and did not want to invite competition.102 Table 
3.2 shows the number of registered partners in each joint stock bank in 1836. As can 
be seen the A&C had a larger number of registered partners than the other joint stock 
banks. 
 
Table 3.2: Number of registered partners in Irish joint-stock banks, c. 1836 
Joint-Stock bank Number of partners 
Hibernian Joint Stock Bank 225 
Northern Banking Company 208 
Provincial Bank of Ireland 644 
Belfast Banking company 292 
The Agricultural and Commercial Bank 
of Ireland 
2,170 
National Bank of Ireland 250 
Limerick National Bank of Ireland 523 
Ulster Banking company 117 
 
Source: Return of joint stock banks in Ireland, with the dates when established respectively; and of the 
names of the several towns and places where such banks and their branches have been established; 
with the number of partners in each Copartnership, 1836, H.C. (219), xxxvii, 371. 
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The A&C commenced business in 1834. In the announcement of establishment of the 
A&C it was stated that: 
Desirous as we are to commend the banking institutions, now at work in the country, 
still, after due examination, we must aver, that they do not afford the advantages to the 
humbler classes of society, which the agricultural and commercial bank is calculated to 
confer upon so vast and useful a portion of our population.103 
 
The Irish joint stock banking system was still in its infancy and there had not 
been much branch expansion throughout the island. The first branch of the A&C bank 
opened in Nenagh, Co. Tipperary, in 1834, a place which previously had been 
‘overlooked by the Provincial Bank and the Bank of Ireland’.104 This was followed 
quite soon by a branch in Ennis, Co. Clare. Here too there had not previously been 
any joint stock bank presence. It was stated that: 
The enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Ennis on the opening of what they emphatically 
termed their own Bank, was unbounded, it being the first Bank ever established in that 
county. Now, however, there is a second Bank in that town, viz. – the “Provincial Bank,” 
which opened there three months after the agricultural bank, so that the town of Ennis 
and the County Clare generally, will now be much benefited by the presence in the 
capital of the County of two Branch Banks.105 
 
The A&C quickly expanded its branch network, and by 1835 it had 18 
branches.106 It seems to have peaked with 46 branches.107  Barrow shows the highest 
number of branches for the A&C to have been 44 in 1836, with the number declining 
to 20 before the bank was closed in 1840.108 Table 3.1 showed the number of 
branches of the A&C to have been 27 on 13 April 1836,109 and Barrow has a figure of 
44 for October of the same year.110 This suggests a rapid expansion on the part of the 
A&C. Table 3.1 showed that the Provincial bank had 33 branches in 1836, but this 
network had been built up in a piecemeal fashion. Daniel O’Connell’s National Bank 
was the closest competitor of the A&C, discussed below, and it was only in 1850 that 
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it surpassed this number of branches.111 It had taken the National Bank 15 years to 
achieve what the A&C had done in three years. Notably, this rapid branch expansion 
is seen as a contributory factor in the failure of the A&C bank.  
The A&C bank was an interesting financial experiment as it attempted to 
deliver financial services to the ‘industrious classes’. One area of financial service 
that was provided, and which was novel, was the sale of small shares to encourage 
corporate ownership amongst the middle and lower classes. The A&C also had a 
share issue of provident shares. These were distinct from the normal share capital and 
were to be protected in the case of the bank being wound up.112 The provident shares 
were to be made up of £50,000, ‘over and above the paid up capital of one million, 
[and] may be subscribed for in weekly and monthly instalments.’113 The aim of the 
provident shares was to encourage the ownership of shares in the middle and working 
classes.  
The A& C bank, of all the joint stock banks, was the only one that intentionally 
targeted the lower socio-economic groups. It provided savings and loans services, the 
unification of services provided by TSBs and loan funds. As outlined in chapter 1, it 
was not until the 1836 Loan Fund Act that loan funds were legally enabled to provide 
savings services. TSBs, discussed in chapter 4, were savings institutions that legally 
were not able to lend on a commercial basis, lending solely to the government. The 
A&C aimed to combine the roles of both TSB and loan fund in the one institution. 
Evidence of this comes from a published pamphlet entitled The origin and principles 
of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland where it was stated that: 
To the individual who is familiar with the detail of the “Savings Bank” and “Loan Fund” 
as prevailing in some parts of England and Scotland, little may be said to recommend 
this institution. He will see that this bank unites in itself the properties of the “Savings 
Bank” and the “Loan Fund”.114 
 
The rules and regulations115 for the A&C for savings and loans were a 
combination of the rules for TSBs, savings banks discussed in chapter 4, and those 
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practised by loan funds. For savings the A&C bank competitively matched the rate of 
interest given by the TSBs; the rate offered was 3.33 per cent per annum.116 It also 
had similar limits on the amount of interest bearing deposits, but the cut-off point for 
interest payment was higher at £700, and the minimum deposit lower at 1s, and the 
max deposit higher at £100.117 The payment of interest began on a lower minimum 
deposit than in the TSBs, that being 15s.118  Similarly, the A&C accepted deposits 
from charities, to a limit of £300, and deposits of all the funds of Friendly societies.119 
The procedure for saving was intended to be similar with depositors being provided 
with deposit books. But in the case of the A&C, money was not invested with the 
Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt. Instead the money was either 
re-lent, used to buy government securities,120 or used to buy property.121 The lending 
procedures of the A&C were twofold. The A&C, like the other joint stock banks, 
discounted notes and bills. The A&C discounted bills for varying amounts. Table 3.3 
shows the bills discounted by the A&C bank from its establishment until 1835.  
 
Table 3.3: Bills discounted by the A &C bank since its establishment until 1835 
Amount Bills Persons Amount (£) Average (£)* 
From £2 to £10 2,388 1,380 16,376 6.86 
From £10 to 
£30 1,548 945 23,320 
 
15.06 
From £20 to 
£50 2,109 245 23,320 
 
11.06 
From £50 
upwards 969 585 96,369 
 
99.45 
 
* These values have been decimalised.  
 
Source: Anon., The origin and principles of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland (Dublin, 
1835).  
 
The A&C bank also used the same lending scheme that was utilised by the loan funds, 
discussed in chapter 1. This was Scottish Credit, or Cash Credit, where money was 
                                                 
116
 £3 6s 8d per centum per annum, Ibid, p. 3. 
117
 Ibid, p. 15. 
118
 Ibid, p. 3. 
119
 Ibid, p. 4. 
120
 ‘Rules and regulations, &c., were adopted for the guidance and government of the “Provident 
Deposit” and “Provident Loan” of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland’ in  Anon., The 
origin and principles of the Agricultural and Commercial bank of Ireland (Dublin, 1835),  p. 1. 
121
 ‘Prospectus of the National Commercial Bank of Ireland’ in The Freemans Journal (21 June, 1834), 
section 30. 
 218 
lent on personal credit and it was an innovation in Irish joint stock banking. The 
procedures were the same as with the loan funds. Borrowers were required to provide 
two solvent sureties to act as guarantors for the loans, and provide a reference from a 
notable person. The loans were for 20-week periods, repayable in weekly instalments 
of 1s per £1 lent. The interest payable was 6 per cent, and the maximum loan was 
£9.122 
The interest rate cited above appears to be lower than the interest rate that was 
quoted for the loan funds in the same period, this being 12 per cent. It is important to 
outline some differences which indicate that there may have been confusion in what 
interest was actually charged, as each institution seems to have had a different 
understanding of it.  The loan fund rate of interest was calculated from the rate of 
discount of 6d per £1 or 2.5 per cent, whereas the interest rate cited for the A&C bank 
was a 6 per cent discount rate. To illustrate this point we shall use an example that 
was given in The origin and principles of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of 
Ireland.123 The example stated that if a labourer was to borrow £5, then 6 per cent of 
the principal would be discounted, so that the borrower actually received £4 17s 
6d.124&125 If on the other hand a borrower borrowed from a loan fund the discount 
would have been 1s 10d, implying a discount rate of 2.5 per cent, and the borrower 
would receive £4 18s 10d. Both loans would then be required to be repaid in 20 
weeks, in instalments of 3s. This implies that there was a (marginally) higher discount 
rate in the A&C bank. 
The A&C bank was an ambitious institution that attempted to provide financial 
and microfinancial services within the one institution. It was innovative and pre-
empted developments in Irish joint stock banking that came later in the nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century. Lending on ‘Scotch credit’ in Ireland was 
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reported only to have become prevalent in the 1850s,126 and thrift accounts only 
became prevalent in the early 1900s.127 
 
3.3.2 Failure 
The Bankers’ Magazine in 1845 cited four reasons for the recent failure of the A&C.  
These were 1. Incompetency of the directors; 2. The unfitness of the managers; 3. The 
inefficiency of the inspectors; 4. The want of any proper system of bookkeeping.128 
All four reasons were obvious defects. Firstly, the board of directors did not actually 
have any experience in banking or accounting. Secondly, managers were appointed 
based not on experience or qualification, but on share ownership. To be eligible to be 
a manager of a branch of the A&C, one only had to own 300 shares. The manager of 
the first branch in Nenagh was reported to have been a farmer.129 There were also 
incidents where managers increased their salaries and gave themselves unsecured 
loans,130 which was a blatant abuse of their positions. Thirdly, the inefficiency of the 
inspectors is evident in that they did not actually do any inspection. The role of the 
inspector seems to have been more as a messenger, where he travelled to each branch 
and relayed information from the head office and requested the managers to sign the 
deed of settlement.131 Accounts were not audited by the inspector, and thus no 
practical use was derived from this service. Finally, the bookkeeping practices of the 
A&C were deemed to have been highly irregular. The auditor of the A&C was an 
experienced accountant, and the Bankers’ Magazine reported that: 
He had seen a good deal of bookkeeping, both in banks and mercantile houses, and he 
had never seen any but what he could make something of before; but he declared he 
could not make anything of the manner which the books had been kept there.132  
 
These were clear faults in the modus operandi of the A&C. The Bankers’ 
Magazine believed the branch management issue was probably the main defect of the 
A&C. It stated: ‘we think it was this measure which ultimately destroyed the bank, for 
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notwithstanding all its inherent faults of constitution, it was just possible they might 
have been remedied by the appointment of skilful and energetic officers’.133  
Table 3.4 shows the statement of account issued to the annual general meeting 
of shareholders of the A&C, issued just a month before its closure. 
 
Table 3.4: Statement of account of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of 
Ireland submitted to the shareholders on 17 October 1836: 
 
 
£ s d £ s d 
Liabilities   
Paid-up capital 375,029.75  
Notes in circulation 421,596.75  
Deposits and current 
accounts 
366,182.2  
Total liabilities  1,162,808.7 
Assets   
Bills on hand 902,457.1  
Government securities and 
other securities 
20,607.3  
Property in Dublin and at the 
branches valued at 
28,500  
Credit account 93,731.55  
Cash on hand 134,892.25  
Total assets  1,180,188.3 
Surplus assets  17,379.6 
Five per cent on the paid up 
capital for the half yearly 
amounts 
 9,375 
  8,004.6 
Reserve fund at last balance 
sheet was 
 5,741.8 
Add this half-year  2,262.75 
Total to credit of reserve 
fund 
 8,004.6 
 
Note: All figures have been decimalised and rounded to the nearest shilling. 
 
Source: W. T. W., ‘The strange story of an Irish Bank’ in Irish Banking magazine, xiv, (September, 
1932), p. 53. 
 
It appears as though the main problem in the bank’s statement of accounts was 
the illiquidity of its assets, with 76 per cent of its assets being in the form of bills. In 
the event of a run on the bank, it would have been very difficult to liquidate these 
bills. This problem seems to have been brought about by poor management. If we 
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look at the ratio of note issues to capital on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, we 
can see that there was a ratio of 1.12. If we make a comparison with the Bank of 
Ireland, we can see that the Bank of Ireland had a ratio of 1.04,134 something to 
suggest that the A&C had somewhat over-extended its’ note issues.  If we take into 
consideration the position of the Bank of Ireland as the largest note issuer on the 
island,135 then the A&C’s note issues seems more anomalous. In 1836 credit was 
getting tighter as money was flowing to the USA for investment.136 Barrow noted that 
A&C ‘was overly expanding its note issue in a time of financial pressure when other 
banks were actually restricting note issue’.137 In the normal course of events if there 
was a crisis the first thing to be withdrawn from a bank would be deposits, but in the 
event of a run a bank’s notes would also be required to be paid in specie. The 
illiquidity of the A&C’s assets would have made it difficult to meet its commitments 
in the event of a general crisis or in the case of a run. 
The argument that the A&C’s failure was actually caused by a poor modus 
operandi has the support of an open letter, written by a shareholder in the A&C bank 
to the other shareholders. The letter questioned whether Ireland could learn from the 
problems of the A&C bank.  
Or whether in Ireland there is still wanting, that national steadiness of character; which is 
indispensably necessary in the safe and economical working of the banking system, 
without which we cannot expect our establishment to prosper, and guided by which, 
Scotland heretofore has obtained and still retains that high commercial character, 
partaking alike of the sanguine and steady temperaments, but free from those sudden and 
ruinous vicissitudes of public opinion, so incidental to the working of the system in both 
England and Ireland, and so injurious to public credit in both these countries? For my 
own part, I am of the opinion, that there are not wanting in Ireland those requisites, but 
the difficulty seems to be, in getting men who take an interest and consequently a pride 
in encouraging, supporting and managing such establishments; who have the ability, but 
want the inclination; who have the means ample and sufficient, but are devoid of that 
enterprising and industrious character, without which no banking establishment can hope 
ultimately to succeed.138  
 
The letter seems to suggest that there was a belief that the attempt to introduce 
Scottish credit to Ireland on commercial lines, as opposed to loan fund philanthropy, 
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was what caused the failure of the A&C. The problem raised by the letter to the 
shareholders was that there had been a rapid branch expansion without regard to 
branch location.139 The branch location factor was somewhat influenced by 
contemporary legislation which placed restrictions on banking activities within the 
Bank of Ireland’s geographic monopoly.  
A key question remains to be addressed, did the A&C perpetrate an action of 
mass fraud on the Irish people? This view was taken by the Bankers’ Magazine and 
subsequent historians. The Bankers’ Magazine stated that: 
The history of Irish speculations affords abundant instances of misplaced confidence on 
one side, and of blind credulity on another; but, for an example of unmatched impudence 
and incompetency, successfully imposing on the confiding ignorance of a people, we 
may seek in vain for any that can stand a comparison with the “Agricultural and 
Commercial Bank of Ireland”.140 
 
The Bankers’ Magazine believed that Thomas Mooney et al. had attempted to 
deceive the Irish public on a mass scale. There was an accusation that Thomas 
Mooney and John Chambers had misrepresented themselves as gentlemen of great 
wealth and created false confidence in the bank. The accusation arose because John 
Chambers was also the name of a director of the Bank of Ireland and was ‘a 
gentleman whose name was of very great service to the company’.141  It was said that 
Thomas Mooney ‘also was generally mistaken for that of Mr Thomas Mooney, of Pill 
Lane, Dublin, a gentleman of large property, of very high standing in society, and a 
perfect man of business’.142 The Bankers’ Magazine accused Thomas Mooney et al. 
of creating a false impression by not giving their actual address on the prospectus, 
leading people to believe that they were the commonly known men of substance and 
thus giving false confidence to the shareholders and depositors. Thomas Mooney has 
had a rough time from economic historians as a result of this. An article in the Irish 
Banking Magazine claimed that Mooney, who was a baker by trade, was greedy and 
that he ‘viewed with envious eyes the rising prosperity of the Irish Joint Stock 
Banks’.143  
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As much as it would be helpful to use this incident as evidence of problems of 
information asymmetry in nineteenth century Ireland, this treatment does not seem to 
be historically accurate and Barrow has given Thomas Mooney’s name some 
posthumous justice. Firstly, the accusations against Mooney were raised, during a 
Parliamentary inquiry, by individuals who had lost some money in the A&C collapse, 
and claimed that they had been misled by Thomas Mooney. Barrow has shown how 
their evidence was biased, perhaps embittered, and the evidence of three men has 
sullied the name of Thomas Mooney for over a century.144 As for the claim that they 
falsely represented themselves on the prospectus, Barrow showed how their names 
were not even on the Prospectus. In fact the name cited on the prospectus was 
‘Messers. William Bailey, Wallace and Sons, Solicitors, No. 12, North Great 
George’s Street, Dublin’.145 Mooney’s name first appeared on the list of committee 
members in 1834.146 Therefore, Barrow is correct in deeming that Thomas Mooney be 
exonerated of the charge of mass fraud, given the evidence outlined above. 
 
3.3.3 Could the joint stock banks have banked with the ‘poor’ in the pre-famine 
period? 
 
The failure of the A&C bank asks questions whether Ireland was ready for such a 
banking institution or were such institutional structures not ready for the market. Ó 
Gráda stated that: 
Among the new joint stock banks, it was exceptional in that it attempted to extend 
banking to the lower-middle classes, both as investors and customers; perhaps its failure 
indicated, in part at least, that they were not ready for it.147 
 
It was actually this observation that Hollis and Sweetman took exception to. 
They stated that Ó Gráda ‘does not specify in what sense the poor were unprepared, 
so it is difficult to interpret this hypothesis.’148 Hollis and Sweetman’s belief is that 
the existence of the loan funds proves the Irish middle and lower classes were ready 
for banking services; but this misses a key point, i.e. that the proprietors of the A&C 
bank, as well as it users, were intended to be from the middle and lower classes. On 
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the issue, Ó Gráda’s statement may not be entirely accurate. The failure of the A&C 
bank was not necessarily due to whom it targeted but rather its modus operandi and 
poor monitoring arrangements. Ó Gráda was also aware of this.149 Hollis and 
Sweetman attempted to repudiate Ó Gráda’s observations with their research on loan 
funds in Ireland. They cited other examples that showed that the Irish peasantry did 
not appear to be monetised and stated that: ‘the extensive lending activities of loan 
funds shows that a large proportion of the poor were financially active and able to use 
financial intermediation.’150 The ‘poor’ did use financial services, but the authors 
seem to have overlooked the fact that the A&C bank was a more complex institution 
that attempted to turn the poor into shareholders. It offered more that simply credit 
services. It offered savings services, and also offered, and encouraged, share 
ownership among the lower classes. In chapter 1 of this thesis it was shown that the 
loan funds did not provide extensive savings services, nor was ownership encouraged. 
In fact ownership, or rather membership, of a loan fund was confined to those who 
provided the capital of the society.151 The announcement of establishment of the A&C 
stated that: 
Every person who has the prudence to save out of his or her earnings, the trivial sum of 
one shilling, so as to put together the small amount of a single pound, is afforded the 
opportunity, by the benevolent and liberal arrangements of the agricultural and 
commercial bank, to become a proprietor of bank stock, and enjoy the proud feeling 
which the possession of property never fails to produce. (sic.)152 
 
This was not something which loan funds attempted. Coincidently the A&C 
bank also aimed to solicit the support from philanthropic gentry,153 but this support 
was not as forthcoming. Perhaps this may have been to do with the fact that these 
philanthropists were more actively involved in loan fund societies. 
Hollis and Sweetman also hypothesised that serving the poor could have been a 
profitable venture for joint stock banks and their question was ‘why the loan funds 
and not the banks?’154 The following observation was made by Hollis and Sweetman: 
‘it appears that had the banks been able to duplicate the funds’ lending and 
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administration, they would have been able to approximately double their profitability 
by making loans to the poor’.155  
Hollis and Sweetman tested the hypothesis that banks could have provided 
microcredit services to the poor based on the assumption that banks invest in 3 types 
of assets: government bonds, corporate lending and lending to the poor.156 But given 
that the A&C bank tried this, would it not be better to measure their real performance? 
And given that they used A&C activity as an example of adverse selection,157 surely 
this would, a priori, give reason to conclude that the banks could not accommodate 
this market? The A&C was designed to provide banking services to the poor and 
utilised Scottish Credit, but this was something the other banks were not reported as 
doing. It was shown in chapter 1 that the average loan in the loan funds was around £3 
in the 1840s. Also, in evidence to the committee on loan funds in 1855, R. R. Madden 
stated that the joint stock banks did not give loans of less than £10,158 implying that 
Scottish credit, or Cash Credit, was not as prevalent. That the joint stock banks did 
eventually adopt Scottish credit, as they matured and expanded, would imply at the 
earliest stages of development that lending to the poor would not have been 
commercially viable.  
The A&C failed because it underestimated the real cost of running a branch 
network, namely the cost of staff training and central monitoring. The reason why the 
other banks did not expand branch networks as rapidly was because each branch was 
given time to determine whether or not it would be profitable. Evidence that this was 
the practice adopted by banks comes from later in the nineteenth century when it was 
said that it was only possible to see if branch banks would pay off two years after 
being opened.159 Not all branches were profitable, and if a branch or sub-branch was 
loss-making it would be closed.160 Also, given that the A&C failed using this model 
of lending to the lower classes, would this not have sent a signal to the other joint 
stock banks and their shareholders that this model had a high risk attached to it? If we 
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compare the A&C capital-deposit ratio with that of the Bank of Ireland, we can see no 
noticeable difference.161 The A&C’s main problem was its asset illiquidity based on 
the fact that it had concentrated on bill discounting. Government securities made up 
1.75 per cent of the A&C’s asset portfolio, whereas in the Bank of Ireland public 
securities made up 50 per cent of assets.162 Public securities would not have provided 
as much income as lending on bills, but they were more liquid. The Bankers’ 
Magazine, a publication that gave advice and warning to the banking community, 
stated that the failure of the A&C was: 
Attributed to a departure from the established rules which ought to govern the 
proceedings of all joint stock banking companies. We think the result will prove the 
soundness of the Joint Stock Bank principle by negative illustrations…It will be 
sufficient if we lay such a statement of facts before our readers as will enable them to see 
clearly how this result was occasioned by the neglect of sound banking principles, 
irrespective of fraud and dishonesty.163 
 
Hollis and Sweetman did acknowledge the role of the A&C as a provider of 
microfinance services. They stated that:  
It is unclear what the loan recovery rates of a better managed bank might have been. 
Other banks seem to have had little interest in following in the Agricultural Bank’s 
footsteps until, in the 1860s, with a growing network of established branches, banks 
began to make more small loans.164 
 
If the joint stock banks had followed the example of the A&C in the 1830s, as 
Hollis and Sweetman are implying that they should have done in order to maximise 
profits, then perhaps this would have led to a collapse of the banking system. Such 
would hardly have been economically beneficial to the island, or profitable to 
shareholders. Hollis and Sweetman’s argument overlooks the fact that the joint stock 
banks did not fully implement Scottish banking, or the loan fund’s modus operandi, 
until the 1850s. This means that Hollis and Sweetman’s hypothesis underestimated 
the cost of technological advance, namely the opening of bank branches, to the joint 
stock banks, and that if they had done as Hollis and Sweetman infer, there would not 
have been a doubling of profits. 
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The A&C was, unfortunately, no matter how one portrays it, a failure. Perhaps a 
model with better management and asset diversification might have been more 
successful, but such a model would have been costly and undermined the profitability 
argument which Hollis and Sweetman wished to put forward. The high cost of the 
A&C model, namely the large branch network, meant that the A&C needed higher 
returns on its assets, and the way it felt it could do this was by making riskier loans. 
But this policy undermined the liquidity of the bank, and this is why it failed. 
The A&C experienced a run in 1836 and was forced to closed, as was stated 
above. Its main problem was that it was illiquid. It must be stated that it was not 
insolvent; this was shown by the fact that it was eventually able to repay its debts 
from its assets. Two short-lived banks emerged from the ruins of the A&C: the 
Southern Bank of Ireland and the Provident Bank of Ireland.165 The Southern Bank 
was accused of being a ‘swindling bubble’, and does not appear to have taken off. 
Thomas Mooney was involved with the Provident Bank. The Provident Bank used a 
different business model to the A&C in that it was based on larger shares and 
debentures. It was based in Dublin and operated as a private bank. Barrow has 
suggested that it was Mooney’s plan to convert the Provident into a joint stock bank 
once the Bank of Ireland’s monopoly expired,166 but nothing of the sort materialised. 
One of the main problems was that there was no interest in the bank, and there were 
no shares sold.167 
There is one episode regarding the Provident Bank that is of immediate interest 
to this thesis as it involved an altercation between Thomas Mooney and the LFB. The 
Provident Bank was making loans under £10, and there happened to be a loan fund 
registered with the LFB called the Dublin Provident loan society. The LFB received a 
report of a loan fund operating as a joint stock bank and made subsequently inquiries. 
The secretary of the LFB, George Matthews, went to the offices of the Provident 
Bank, 4 College Green, and enquired where to find the Dublin Provident Loan 
Society. He was told by a clerk that “both were the same”.168 George Matthews, in 
evidence to the 1838 banking enquiry, stated that the Provident Bank had used its own 
bank notes to fund other loan societies in the country, including loan funds in Carlow, 
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Athy, Mullingar, Strabane etc.169 It was also alleged that the notes used by the 
Provident also happened to be very similar to the notes of the Provincial Bank and 
were uncovered (i.e. no specie backing).170 Inquiries made by Matthews suggested 
that the Provident Loan Society had copied another loan fund society’s rules and used 
the names of its trustees.171 Upon receiving legal advice, the LFB suspended the 
Provident Loan Society.172  
Barrow has disputed Matthews’ account and stated that Mooney had raised 
funds for the societies by issuing debentures,173 which was legitimate funding 
methodology under loan fund legislation. This episode sheds new light on the 1843 
loan fund act that was discussed in chapter 1, and it suggests that the legislation may 
have been an attempt to discourage loan funds in order to prevent similar Thomas 
Mooney type situations developing in the future. 
 
3.3.4 The political economy of Irish banking in the 1830s  
 
Before leaving the subject of the A&C bank, it is worth highlighting the political 
economy of joint stock banking in the early nineteenth century. The Irish monetary 
system was not immune to political pressures. The prime example of this was Daniel 
O’Connell’s manipulation of the banking system, calling for runs on various banks,174 
prior to his personal involvement in banking. A conflict of interest precluded his 
advocacy of bank runs thereafter. 
In 1834, prior to the opening of the A&C bank, Thomas Mooney wrote a letter 
to Daniel O’Connell to ask for his opinion on the idea of establishing a national bank. 
Daniel O’Connell’s reply, dated 13 June 1834, stated that: 
The more banks in Ireland the better, provided they be founded on sound banking 
principles, and not merely got up by schemers or over-speculative persons. I have no 
doubt that the Irish National Bank will be successful.175 
 
It is worth highlighting that Thomas Mooney’s original idea had been for a 
national bank to be established, using Irish capital, and the name of the national bank 
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was ‘the National Commercial Bank of Ireland’,176 but the name was changed to 
avoid confusion with O’Connell’s bank. The prospectus of the A&C was published 
before an announcement was made of Daniel O’Connell’s intentions appeared on 28 
June, which stated a meeting would be held on 21 July.177  The A&C believed that 
Daniel O’Connell was hostile to their operation as he later became involved in the 
formation of the National Bank of Ireland, a close competitor of the A&C bank.  In a 
letter to P. V. Fitzpatrick, his brother-in-law, dated 8 July 1834, O’Connell gave an 
outline for the National Bank of Ireland. O’Connell wrote: 
…There has also been a bye-battle upon the subject of a new bank. This has been for a 
great while a subject of anxious speculation with me. I have sensibly felt the want of a 
counter check to the rascality of the Bank of Ireland and of the Provincial Bank. You 
know that they play into the hands of the Anti-Irish party. I want a mutual friend at the 
other side….My plan has been, and is, to get one million subscribed in London. Until 
that is done no operations are to take place in Ireland. The million here is to be in aid of 
Irish subscriptions. Whenever a sum large enough to establish a branch bank in any 
locality is subscribed the London managers will double the amount…. of course we will 
require the utmost circumspection and vigilance, and it is of course that if we succeed it 
will be my anxious study that you, your brother and brother-in-law, should participate in 
that success.178 
 
Shortly after indicating his plans for the establishment of his own joint stock 
bank, O’Connell became hostile to the A&C. In a letter dated 22 July 1834, written to 
P. V. Fitzpatrick, he outlined why he objected to the A&C bank. O’Connell stated 
that: 
How can D. countenance the wild scheme of ‘the Agricultural’ Bank, especially in that 
wicked humbug that it can limit individual liability? It would be a gross deception on the 
public even if that were true, because it might throw 3 millions of notes in circulation 
after £25 per cent were paid up, and then, according to their notion, there would be no 
funds for payment of one single note.179 
 
This would seem to justify the criticism in The origins and principles of the 
Agricultural and Commercial bank of Ireland, which believed O’Connell was critical 
of them because he was opening his own bank.180 The Bankers’ Magazine stated that 
‘a race of competition began with the National Bank of Ireland; the issues were 
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unlimited and unchecked; the discounts were profuse; the advances without security, 
extraordinary for their liberality. Then the tide turned! (italics sic)’181 
There was a commercial panic in 1836 and a number of banks experienced runs. 
They all applied to the Bank of Ireland, the de facto central bank, for assistance. 
Initially the Bank of Ireland provided assistance to all joint stock banks in need, but it 
did not continue the support of the A&C,182 whereas the National received continued 
support from the Bank of Ireland. The Bankers’ Magazine stated that ‘when the 
pressure began to be severe, the bank applied to the Bank of Ireland for assistance. 
They asked for advances on the deposit of bills which they held under discount; but 
the Bank of Ireland directors refused to make advances on such security.’183  The 
shareholder of the A&C who wrote the anonymous open letter to the other 
shareholders in the A&C felt aggrieved by this treatment. The writer believed that the 
National Bank received preferential treatment because of the influence of O’Connell. 
The letter alleged that: 
Accommodation [was] denied to 4,000 registered partners of the Agricultural and 
Commercial Bank of Ireland, upon adequate security; but given speedily to one 
individual, whose power was feared but not respected and whose political influence was 
bargained for to obtain the renewal of a chartered monopoly in the banking system.184 
 
The shareholder hoped that the agreement between O’Connell and the Bank was 
mutually beneficial, but from O’Connell’s letters it appears that there was no such 
deal, and if there was such a deal it was not kept on his part. When the Bank of 
Ireland’s Charter was up for renewal in 1838,185 O’Connell opposed it.  Writing about 
the defeat of the Bank of Ireland bill on 16 August 1839, O’Connell stated that: 
There was never a more close Orange confederacy than that at the Bank of Ireland. It was 
impossible to get an honest special jury in political cases in Dublin by reason of the 
undue influence of the Bank directors….this was an attempt to crush Ireland in its 
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monetary system, and to continue a monopoly in the hands of unrelenting enemies of the 
religion and liberties of the people, but the reaction of Irish spirit has in this, as in so 
many other instances, overthrown the enemy.186 
 
What would have happened if Daniel O’Connell had not decided to enter the 
banking market at the same time as the A&C? It would probably have meant less 
direct competition for the A&C, though it would not have improved management 
structures. But ultimately it is a question that is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
 
3.4. Joint stock banks and information improvements, 1860-1914 
 
The joint stock banking system was remarkably robust, with only 2 joint stock banks 
failing in the period 1850 to 1914. The first of these was the Tipperary joint stock 
bank (1836-1856) and its failure was due to the blatant and flamboyant fraud of its 
directors, the Sadliers.187 The fraud perpetrated by the Sadliers involved incidents 
such as fabricating annual accounts to encourage the sale of shares in Britain, and 
insider trading - buying the shares of the bank in order to push up the share price 
despite knowing the bank was in serious debt.188 John Sadlier had a number of 
commercial interests and had accumulated sizeable debts. His biographer, James 
O’Shea, believed that the bulk of his debts were derived from speculating at the stock 
exchange.189 Sadlier’s main line of credit was the Tipperary joint stock bank, and 
when the bank was closed in 1856 it was disclosed that of the bank’s declared assets 
of £443,000, 65 per cent was in the form of John Sadlier’s personal overdraft.190 The 
Tipperary Bank had liabilities of £430,000 at its closure,191 and the news of the 
suicide of John Sadlier led to a run on the bank, and on surrounding banks in 
Munster.192  
The damage to the banking system was localised by the fact that the Tipperary 
Bank did not hold a large market share, and only had nine branches.193 The reason for 
this was that, as was mentioned above, the Tipperary had voluntarily ceded note-
issuing privileges when it was established. It had entered an agreement with the Bank 
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of Ireland whereby the Tipperary Bank used Bank of Ireland notes,194 effectively 
acting as a de facto branch network of the Bank of Ireland. After the passing of the 
1845 bankers (Ireland) act, the Bank of Ireland determined the nature of this 
relationship and restricted the Tipperary Bank from establishing branches further 
afield. As a result the Tipperary’s branches were mainly located in Munster and the 
affects of the fraud were contained. The failure of the Munster Bank in 1884-85 was 
less spectacular.195 It folded mainly as a result of illiquidity as opposed to the 
insolvency of the Tipperary Bank, and was re-formed as the Munster and Leinster 
joint stock bank in 1885. Ó Gráda stated that the failure of the two banks cited above, 
and a commercial crisis in the 1860s, showed how the Irish financial system had 
developed whereby the Bank of Ireland emerged as a lender of last resort.196 In the 
panic that surrounded the events the Bank of Ireland had been a source of liquidity for 
many of the joint stock banks, although arguably it did not do enough for the illiquid 
Munster Bank.197  
In order to appreciate the stability of Irish joint banks, it is worth comparing it 
to the Portuguese experience. According to Jaime Reis, Portuguese banks suffered 
from ‘quite a high mortality between 1860 and 1914 – of the 71 banks created only 23 
still survived on the eve of the First World War’.198 The high failure rate of 
Portuguese banks led to a loss of confidence in such institutions,199 whereas Irish joint 
stock banks did not experience similar difficulties. 
In the period 1860 to 1914, the joint stock banks continued to grow and 
expanded their branch network. This had implications for the LFB loan funds that 
were discussed in chapters 1 and 2, and the decrease in the number of LFB loan fund 
societies in the post-famine period was negatively correlated with the increase in the 
number of joint stock bank branches.  
Hollis and Sweetman outlined an argument whereby information about 
borrowers, which the LFB loan funds created, was captured by the larger joint stock 
                                                 
194
 Ibid, p. 32. 
195
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Moral hazard and quasi-central banking: Should the Munster Bank have been 
saved?’ in David Dickson and Cormac Ó Gráda (eds.), Refiguring Ireland, essays in honour of L. M. 
Cullen ( Dublin, 2003), pp 316-341. 
196
 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: a new economic history 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994), pp 363-364. 
197
 Ibid, p. 364. 
198
 Jaime Reis, ‘Bank structures, Gerschenkron and Portugal (pre-1914)’ in Douglas J. Forsyth and 
Daniel Verdier (eds), The origin of National Financial systems: Alexander Gerschenkron reconsidered 
(London, 2003), p. 202. 
199
 Ibid, p.198. 
 233 
banks, and that this was one of the causes of the decline in the LFB system. They 
suggested that the LFB loan funds ‘may have hastened the development of the banks 
by creating information – first, information about the risk associated with lending to 
the poor, and second information about the credit risk of individuals’.200 But this 
argument is incomplete as it does not take into consideration actions taken by the joint 
stock banks themselves to create information, or the increasing availability of 
information on agricultural production which would have signalled the real level of 
risk associated with agricultural lending.201 
Firstly, there was an expansion in the number of bank branches operating 
throughout the island over the course of the nineteenth century. This is shown in 
figure 3.2 which is an aggregate of all branches opened by the various joint stock 
banks operating in Ireland and figure 3.3 which shows the disaggregated number of 
branches operated by the various banks.  
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Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
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As is shown in figure 3.3 all of the Irish joint-stock banks implemented policies of 
branch banking, mainly as a reaction to competition from the other banking 
institutions, and also in response to restrictions on bank note issues. This growth in 
branch banking, as well as creating information for the banks, provided a more 
accessible service to many in rural Ireland. Branch banks were opened independently 
of any loan fund operation, and therefore would not have had access to information 
that loan funds theoretically created. 
Figure 3.3  
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Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that branch banking was universally 
practised by all banks. This meant that banking facilities were more accessible 
throughout the island. For example, if we look at the instructions that the Bank of 
Ireland issued to branch staff in 1849 we can see that decision-making processes were 
in many respects decentralised. It was stated that an agent could make discounts for a 
‘party known to him’,202 but that no arrears were to be permitted.203 Current accounts 
                                                 
202
 John Chambers(?), ‘Instructions to agents, sub-agents & clerks at Bank of Ireland branches’, Dublin, 
1849,  (N.L.I., p 686), rule xxvii, p. 11. 
203
 Ibid, rule xix, p. 9. 
 235 
could be set up, but it was not permissible to allow perpetual overdrafts.204 Branch 
managers were encouraged to collect deposits. The instructions stated that: 
The agents will bear in mind, that as deposits are one of the great sources of profit to a 
Bank, every reasonable effort is to be made to secure lodgements, the rules of the Bank 
as to identity, &c., being complied with.  Lodgements cannot, however, be received in 
the names of married women or minors, or if received they cannot be drawn out by such 
parties.205  
 
The instructions also stated that staff must ‘exhibit courtesy of manner [to 
customers]…no matter what their position in life may be’.206 
Branch banking was expensive and an estimate of the cost of branch banking 
was given to the 1875 inquiry into banking laws in the UK. The costs of each bank 
seem to have been given on an anonymous basis, and all bar one bank submitted 
information regarding expenses. Given that all banks operated branch networks it 
seems reasonable to assume that table 3.5 is an indication of the expense of a branch 
banking system.  
 
Table 3.5: Expenses of Irish joint stock banks, c. 1875 
 
 Working 
expenses 
Rents paid Interest at 4 
per cent on 
money 
expended on 
buildings 
Total expenses 
 Note-issuing 
 £ £ £ £ 
No. 1 123,495 2,583.3 3,034.15 129,112.45 
No. 2 82,152 2,222 6,690 91,064 
No. 3 36,082 1,455 1,476 39,013 
No. 4 38,639.65 1,820.05 4,627.85 45,087.6 
No. 5 47,964.15 1,048.4 39,939.8 52,952.45 
 Non-issuing 
 £ £ £ £ 
No. 1 20,890 570 1,046 21,460 
No. 2 27,673.65 3,196.9 2,185.45 30,870.55 
No. 3 37,472 2,947.4 1,320 41,739.75 
 
Note: One note-issuing bank did not submit a return; Working expenses excluded rent, interest on 
building account, and other expenses, and omitted interest on capital and reserves 
 
Source: Appendix 17, in  Report from the Select Committee on Banks of Issue; together with the 
proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, and appendix, pp 557-558. (351), H.C. 1875, ix, 1. 
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Branch banking proliferated in the post-famine period and, although costly to operate, 
branch banking enabled banks to diminish information asymmetries and reduce 
adverse selection in agricultural credit markets. Hollis and Sweetman believed that 
asymmetry of information in Ireland in the early nineteenth century was responsible 
for some problems of adverse selection. They cited two examples of asymmetric 
information.207 These are worth discussing. Firstly, they cited a reference Cormac Ó 
Gráda made to a money lender in the early nineteenth century. Ó Gráda stated that: 
In 1819 Waugh lent £20 Irish to Thomas and William Murphy on a promissory note. 
Several years later he noted the whereabouts of the Murphys, with a view to getting his 
money back, but had no luck: “processed the Murphys to the January Hillsborough 
session in 1827. But not being able to procure a witness to prove the handwriting of the 
witness to the execution of their note and at present consider it lost.” 208 
 
Hollis and Sweetman also used an example provided by F. G. Hall of the failure 
of the A&C. Hall’s account was written in 1949 and is an historical account of the 
A&C, but he did not give any reference to any primary sources. Instead he cited 
another historical account written by Evelyn Thomas in 1934. The following citation, 
taken from Hall, is what Hollis and Sweetman used to support their argument 
regarding information asymmetry in nineteenth century Ireland:  
The bank began business with scarcely a forethought or preparation; indeed, its methods 
were a travesty of banking principles. Branches were opened at places where they could 
not possibly pay, and advances were made on the security of bills discounted without any 
investigation being made. These bills represented a considerable proportion of the bank’s 
assets and, after the crash, the total value of bills held was £252,000, of which £114,000 
was past due. A large proportion of these bills were of the local variety, for amounts 
ranging from 30s. to £20, which had been granted chiefly to the poorest class of 
customer. In some cases, even the local managers were unable to identify the drawers of 
the bills.209 
 
If such examples of asymmetric information are accepted then it would be 
plausible that the expansion of the bank branch system in Ireland could overcome 
such information asymmetries. The banks were undoubtedly helped by demographic 
patterns that emerged in the post-famine period, as shown in figure 3.4. The Irish 
population continued to decline in the post-famine period, and the number of bank 
branches per 1,000 people continued to increase over time. Figure 3.4 is a crude 
measure of this change, as it includes the total population and the population between 
the ages of 15 and 65. If the calculation is made using male only variables then the 
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ratio of banks per 1,000 population will increase even more.210  This implies that the 
branch banking policy of the Irish banks enabled them to overcome adverse selection 
problems caused by information asymmetry.  
Figure 3.4  
Bank branches per 1000 population and per 1000 in the labour 
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Note: The ‘labour force’ variable used in this graph is the population aged between 14 and 65. 
Source: Thom’s Directory and Census of Ireland, various years. 
 
Although there were many cases where bank branches were clustered in the 
same rural towns, in general branch banking allowed banks to create and accumulate 
information about the local economy and to implement credit practices with less 
arbitrary discrimination. The banks themselves stated that their target was not the 
towns, but the surrounding areas.211 This is a feature of the joint stock banking sector 
that was not present in the pre-famine period. The joint stock banks also overcame 
information asymmetries by adopting the lending technology of the loan funds. It 
must be stressed that the joint stock banks were not imitating the LFB loan funds, but 
rather they were imitating Scottish banking practices. Loans were given on the 
security of borrower and two guarantors. Evidence from Mr McDonald, a wholesaler 
in Dublin, to the committee on Irish industries in 1885, gave the following description 
of established bank lending practices in the post-famine period: 
That [cash credits] is done in this country in this way, namely, by lending sums on notes 
of hand or guarantees? – Yes; I consider the cash credit system is what I would call a 
mutual guarantee; that is to say, two people will mutually accommodate each other and 
become a mutual security. But there is another principle underlying the system of cash 
credits, and it is this: that the bank attaches as much importance to the character and 
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conduct and industry of the individual borrower as it does to the security that is offered, 
and according as the character is good the security need be the less.212 
 
This account of the lending methodology is supported by evidence from an 
inquiry into the land law in Ireland which stated that banks required two sureties per 
borrower,213 and that loans were made on the security of the tenant and not the 
land.214 These are the same cash credits that were outlined in section 3.2.2 above. 
It is interesting that character should have been referred to as property. It fits in 
with the Smilesian notion of character, or reputation, being an asset. Smiles outlined 
his view in Character in 1871: 
Character is property. It is the noblest of possessions. It is an estate in the general 
goodwill and respect of men; and they who invest in it – though they may not become 
rich in this world’s goods – will find their reward in esteem and reputation fairly and 
honourably won. And it is right that in life good qualities should tell – that industry, 
virtue, and goodness should rank the highest – and that the really best men should be 
foremost.215  
 
The use of ‘cash credits’, personal credit, enabled banks to reduce the cost of 
lending. Every bank loan, regardless of size, required the same labour input in terms 
of screening, monitoring and bureaucracy. Personal credit can partially reduce the 
transaction costs to the bank by outsourcing monitoring to the borrower’s guarantor. 
Personal credit was a technique used to overcome formal constraints due to the 
uncertainty of property rights. It was stated by Hugh Stuart Moore, a solicitor 
practising in Dublin,216 that: 
They [joint stock banks] do not generally lend upon the security of mortgages. Their 
security is rather personal, and has regard to the position of the person to whom they 
lend. I do not know how that may be affected, but there is no doubt they are more 
cautious in lending.217  
 
The growth in branch banking coincided with a growth in savings mobilisation 
in the Irish joint stock banks. Savings are another means to signal information about 
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potential borrowers,218 as the banks would have had access to information about the 
financial assets of a potential borrower. The growth in savings enabled the banks to 
have better information of the conditions of borrowers, and from anecdotal evidence it 
does appear as though farmers had savings in banks from which they borrowed.219 
Horace Plunkett also made a similar assertion in the early twentieth century when 
addressing the A.G.M. of the Institute of Bankers.220  The banks, it seems, did 
encourage saving. Evidence of this comes from the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul’s 
efforts to set up Penny Savings Banks. They attempted to encourage thrift, but wanted 
to place a ceiling on deposits they collected. It was stated that the joint stock banks 
accepted deposits starting from £5, so this was the ceiling that the Saint Vincent de 
Paul placed on accounts in their Penny banks.221 But other evidence suggests that the 
savings habits of farmers may have been as much to do with the financial illiteracy of 
borrowers as with an intentional policy on the part of the banks. William Kirby 
Sullivan, the president of Queens University Cork, in evidence to the Irish industries 
commission in 1885 said that farmers saved in the joint stock banks in order to 
accumulate a dowry for their daughters and that they did not want to touch that nest 
egg at any cost. They preferred to borrow money, at higher interest, than to draw on 
their savings.222 Sullivan believed that the farmers did not understand their cash flow 
requirements and simply placed too much money in savings accounts in the banks and 
left themselves short of cash. 
The amount of deposits held by the joint stock banks is shown in figure 3.5. In 
the period 1860 to 1914, the nominal savings in the Irish joint stock banks increased 
by 297 per cent. Coincidently, the growth rates in nominal savings per bank branch 
decreased by 16 per cent in the same period. 
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Note: Real 1 was obtained using a cost of living index in Geary and Stark (2004), and Real 2 was 
obtained using a cost of living index in Kennedy (2003). 
 
Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the amount of deposits223 held by the joint stock banks from 1840 to 
1914. Although we do not yet have annual time series information regarding the 
actual distribution of deposits in the individual branches and banks, there is some 
information available for individual years.224 Table 3.6 shows the aggregate amount 
of deposits and the average deposits per branch for all of the Irish joint stock banks.  
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Banking in nineteenth century Ireland: The Belfast banks, 1825-1914 (Manchester, 1987), p. 185. 
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Table 3.6 : Bank deposits, bank branches and deposits per branch, (£ million) 
1886 and 1912. 
 Deposits 
and credit 
balances  Branches  
Deposits 
per 
branch  
 1886 1912 1886 1912 1886 1912 
 £ £   £ £ 
Bank of 
Ireland 9.446 16.377 58 99 0.16 0.17 
Belfast 2.27 6.046 54 77 0.04 0.08 
Hibernian 1.234 3.942 47 77 0.03 0.05 
Munster 
and 
Leinster 0.444 5.787  82  0.07 
National 8.764 13.321 110 135 0.08 0.10 
Northern 2.23 5.32 72 100 0.03 0.05 
Provincial 3.71 5.838 59 84 0.06 0.07 
Royal 1.621 1.902 5 11 0.32 0.17 
Ulster 3.583 8.972 60 163 0.06 0.06 
 
Note: The Munster bank was wound up in 1885, but re-formed as the Munster and Leinster. 
Sources: Table 37 in Philip Ollerenshaw,  Banking in nineteenth century Ireland: The Belfast banks, 
1825-1914 (Manchester, 1987), p. 185 and Thom’s Directory.  
 
The information in figure 3.6 can be seen as a rough proxy for the marginal benefit of 
opening an additional bank branch from the perspective of the joint stock banks.225  
Figure 3.6  
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Figure 3.6 would suggest that in the deflationary periods of the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century the number of bank branches was at an optimum level, 
and that the continued opening of branch banks would have meant a decreasing 
marginal return as the benefit of each additional branch in terms of deposits was 
decreasing. Loan funds do not seem to have been able, or perhaps did not want, to 
attract small deposits in a similar fashion to the joint stock banks. This is something 
which may have undermined the performance of loan funds as they would not have 
been able to exploit information that deposit accumulation provides. Joint stock bank 
branches were also able to transmit funds to areas where they could have been better 
utilised. Loan funds on the other hand were isolated units and would not have been 
able to do so. 
Joint stock banks also benefited from better information about the agricultural 
sector than had previously been available. Information on the agricultural structure of 
Ireland was available via parliamentary reports that were published annually, namely 
the agricultural statistics of Ireland that began to be published annually from 1847 
onwards. Information on agricultural prices were widely circulated in national and 
local newspapers.  It is not unreasonable to assert that the banks would have been 
aware of such information. For example, in evidence to the 1875 banking committee 
Edward James Mills, a general manager of the National Bank, when referring to why 
deposits had increased stated that ‘it must be increased prosperity, because under 
every heading, according to the statistics, the wealth of the country has increased’.226  
There was also increasing information available regarding the number of 
agricultural evictions. From figure 3.7 it can be seen that there was a decrease in the 
number of annual evictions in the post-famine period, with an increase in the number 
of evictions occurring in the 1880s, but thereafter decreasing. The number of land 
purchase defaulters is included in the graph from 1906 onwards, as tenants began to 
purchase their land en masse from 1903 onwards, discussed in chapter 7, and 
therefore evictions were no longer a reliable indicator for the risk involved in 
agricultural lending. There are a number of factors that contribute to risk in 
agricultural markets,227 but many of these would be reflected in the rate of eviction as 
                                                 
226
 Report from the Select Committee on Banks of Issue; together with the proceedings of the 
committee, minutes of evidence, and appendix, question 2960, p. 157, (351), H.C. 1875, ix, 1. 
227
 These are human or personal risk, asset risk, production or yield risks, price risk, institutional risk, 
financial risk, see: European Commission Agriculture Directorate-General, ‘Risk management tools for 
EU agriculture with a special focus on insurance’, working document January 2001, pp 12-13. 
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eviction signalled, assuming evictions were not arbitrary, low returns from farming 
activities. From figure 3.7 it is immediately obvious that the scale of evictions in the 
post-famine period does not match the number of evictions that occurred during the 
famine, thus indicating that the post-famine period was a period of lower risk. 
Figure 3.7  
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Notes: This graph has been compiled from a number of sources. The statistics of evictions are taken 
from the compilation of returns made by the Royal Irish Constabulary. From 1880 to 1887 the number 
of evictions are taken from the quarterly returns of the Royal Irish Constabulary. From 1887 the 
number of evictions are taken from tables 1 and 3 from the quarterly returns of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary.  
Tables 1 referred to ‘the Number of evicted tenants and sub-tenants, i.e. of ex-tenants and ex-
sub-tenants, turned out of their holdings under section 7 of the Land Law Act of 1887, and of tenants 
and sub-tenants turned out of their holdings under other processes of law at the suit of the landlord, 
who were not re-admitted as caretakers or otherwise on the day of eviction.’Table 2 refered to ‘Number 
of tenants whose tenancy has been determined (1) under section 7 of the Land Law Act of 1887 (i.e. 
those who, having received an ejectment notice, have been converted into caretakers), and (2) of 
tenants and sub-tenants whose tenancy has been determined under other processes of law at the suit of 
the landlord.’ Table 3 referred to ‘The number of evictions, not at suit of the Landlord, for Debt, 
foreclosure of Mortgage, &c.’ 
The number of evictions is most likely an overstatement, as they do not account for the fact that 
tenants could be reinstated as caretakers any time after their eviction. The statistics recorded only 
include tenants who were reinstated as caretakers on the day of their eviction. 
 
Sources:  Return, by provinces and counties (compiled from returns made to the Inspector General, 
Royal Irish Constabulary), of cases of evictions which have come to the knowledge of the constabulary 
in each of the years from 1849 to 1880, inclusive, H.C. 1881 (185), lxxvii, 725. 
From 1880 onwards the eviction statistics were obtained from parliamentary Return of the number of 
evictions from agricultural holdings which have come to the knowledge of the constabulary.  
Statistics on loan defaults are from the annual reports of the Land Commission. 
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Annual figures of landholdings are available from 1849 onwards,228 and combining 
these with the available statistics on the number of evictions it is possible to create a 
proxy variable of the level of risk associated with lending to the agricultural sector. 
Figure 3.8  
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Note: The percentage ratio is based on this formula: evictions in year T/ landholdings (land occupiers) 
in year T-1. There was no statistics for landholdings for 1848, so the values for 1847 were used instead. 
Land occupation statistics are not recorded until 1860. 
Sources: For evictions, cited above for figure 3.7. For landholdings: Agricultural statistics 1859 to 1914 
and Michael Turner,  After the famine: Irish agriculture, 1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1996). 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the percentage ratio of the number of evictions to the number 
of landholdings and land occupation in Ireland during the period 1847-1914. Firstly, it 
must be highlighted that the ratio of evictions to landholdings is very small during the 
post-famine period. It should also be noted that the number of evictions is most likely 
to be overstated so that the real ratio would be smaller. But assuming there are no data 
problems, the low level of evictions per landholding during the post-famine period, 
excluding the land war period, suggests that the agricultural sector was relatively 
stable and that banks would have had no difficulty making loans to Irish agriculture. 
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If the rate of evictions was high it would have meant that there was a strong likelihood 
that an agricultural borrower would be evicted, and thereby default on a loan. In 
contrast, the low rate of evictions as shown in figure 3.8 indicates that the post-famine 
period was a relatively stable environment for banking.  
The information in figure 3.8 actually fits some details that we know about joint 
stock banking and agricultural lending in Ireland. The joint stock banks did expand 
lending facilities to farmers in the post-famine period,229 but in the agricultural 
recessions of the early 1860s and 1880s the banks retracted the amount of credit 
available to the agricultural sector. The periods of agricultural depression coincided 
with decreases in the amount of deposits,230 so therefore it would have been a risky 
policy to lend in periods when withdrawals exceed deposits. This was due to the 
higher level of risk in these periods. The banks did lend to tenant farmers, and from 
the committee on Irish industries in the mid-1880s one gets the impression that the 
type of tenancy was not what was important to the banks, but what the land was 
capable of producing. Mr. McDonald, a member of a wholesale establishment in 
Dublin, believed that the banks lent to farmers based not on their views on his 
‘character’, but ‘on the security of the farm or of the land, which security is now 
becoming all the less, as proved by the banks having almost as a general rule 
withdrawn their accommodation to the farmer.’231  
The ‘credit crunch’ in the late 1870s and early 1880s came as a result of a crash 
in the prices of agricultural goods.232 This, coupled with an increase in evictions, 
meant that there would have been a higher likelihood of loan default than had 
previously been the case. Therefore, banks retracted the amount of available credit. 
Banks, as private business ventures, had responsibility to both their shareholders and 
to depositors not to unduly put at risk any capital. Deposits it seems were held on two-
week notice, with the standard loan on a bill given for three months. Thus, the banks 
had to exercise caution when disbursing loans. The banks did keep reserve funds, but 
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if we look at the ratio of reserves to deposits we can see that reserves alone would not 
protect the bank in the event of a run on its deposits. 
Figure 3.9  
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Note: cap-dep = Percentage ratio of capital to deposits 
          Paid-up-dep = Percentage ratio of paid up capital to deposits 
          Res-dep= Percentage ratio of reserves to deposits 
Source: Thom’s Directory, various years 
 
Most available primary source material relating to bank activity came during 
periods of unusual distress;233 hence we get a distorted and static picture of banking 
activity. From the commission on Irish industry in the mid-1880s, the commission on 
agricultural credit in 1914, and the commission on banking in 1922 we begin to see a 
more balanced view of the joint stock banks. The commission on banking in 1922 
contained one of the first published statements of accounts of the Irish joint stock 
banks. Although the series only starts late in 1910 and contains information for an 
extremely volatile period in economic history, it does give evidence to dispute claims 
that the banks only invested in government bonds. In figure 3.10 government bonds 
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and treasury bills are shown as a percentage of the total assets of the joint stock banks. 
In the periods of relative tranquillity, 1910-1914 and 1923-25, safe assets do appear to 
comprise a small proportion of the bank’s asset portfolio. Even in the war years 
government bonds and treasury bills do not comprise all of the joint stock bank assets. 
 
Figure 3.10  
Government bonds and treasury bills as a percentage of total 
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Source: Second, third, and fourth interim reports on agricultural credit; business credit; and public 
finance, (Dublin, 1926), R33/2 Banking commission, 1926. 
 
Figure 3.11 is a ratio of the bills of discount, loans and advances to deposits in 
the joint stock banks. Unfortunately, there was no distinction between loans to various 
industries, but the information in both figures 3.10 and 3.11 does suggest that the 
banks did re-lend the majority of deposits that they received. 
Figure 3.11  
Ratio of bills of discount, loans and advances to deposits, 
current and other account, 1910-1925
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Source: Second, third, and fourth interim reports on agricultural credit; business credit; and public 
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When one considers some non-official evidence, such as Joe Ward’s description of 
bank facilities at an agricultural market,234 one gets the impression that joint stock 
banks did expand credit services in the post-famine period. The foregoing argument 
challenges that posited by Hollis and Sweetman, which was cited at the beginning of 
this section. Although banks may have been able to capture loan fund information 
advantages, this assumes that loan funds actually possessed such informational 
advantages. The evidence presented in chapter 2 of this thesis suggests that although 
the loan funds theoretically had the potential to exploit information, their actions 
undermined any information advantages that they might have possessed. Joint stock 
banks on the other hand, through their business model, were able to create 
information, while at the same time developments in communications and economic 
infrastructure also created information on the economy as a whole. 
 
3.5 Scottish and Irish banking in the latter nineteenth century 
 
As was stated in the introduction to this chapter and in section 3.2.2, the Irish joint 
stock banks made a deliberate effort to imitate the Scottish banking system. Given this 
context, it would be interesting to undertake a comparative study of Scottish and Irish 
banking in the latter nineteenth century. There are two existing comparative studies of 
Scottish and Irish banking.235 This section will contribute to this literature by 
exploring the structure of banking in both polities. Scotland and Ireland were 
peripheral economic regions of the UK, and both maintained a separate banking 
structure to that of England. 
As was stated in section 3.2.2 there were three chartered banks in Scotland, but 
monopoly rights were not renewed in their charters. The Bank of Ireland was the only 
chartered bank in Ireland. It maintained some of its monopoly rights after 1821 but 
these were not continued in the period after 1845. The only bank in the UK which had 
its monopoly privileges renewed and strengthened was the Bank of England. This 
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helps explain the central role of the Bank of England within the UK banking structure. 
The Scottish banking system was innovative and Ireland, by imitating this structure, 
strove to replicate such dynamism. Gaskin stated that: 
These innovations in the techniques and organisation of banking were far from being the 
only ones to emerge from Scotland. Scottish bankers originated the overdraft form of 
lending and with it an important type of personal security. They were the first British 
bankers to put emphasis on the wide gathering of deposits. Above all, they pioneered the 
modern system of branch banking. To the observer of one hundred years ago the most 
obvious difference between English and Scottish banking was that of structure: Scotland 
with its fourteen banks and England with four hundred seemed poles apart in banking 
organisation. The structural differences combined with other, connected elements of 
Scottish banking, especially note issuing and the emphasis on deposit gathering, to form 
a system of banking which impressed contemporaries as very different from that of 
England and which, in fact, they designated ‘the Scotch system of banking’.236 
 
The same could be said of Ireland in the post-famine period. The Scottish 
banking structure was highly concentrated, with only a small number of joint stock 
banking institutions, but all of them operated a branch banking network. This was also 
the case in Ireland with nine institutions operating branch networks. Such 
concentration in Scottish and Irish banking took place well before the ‘big five’ 
emerged in England. This is evidence of the fact that Ireland was imitating the 
Scottish system. The Irish structure was also similar to the Scottish in terms of where 
the business and administrative centres were based. In Scotland the administrative 
centre was based in Edinburgh; in Ireland it was Dublin. And in Scotland the main 
business centre was Glasgow; in Ireland it was Belfast. In comparing Scottish and 
Irish banking this section will proceed as follows. Firstly, it will compare Scotland 
and Ireland in terms of branch banking. Secondly, it will look at the structure of 
liabilities, rates and charges and how they were set. Finally, it will compare the asset 
structure of both systems. 
In terms of branch banking it is worth highlighting the fact that there was some 
convergence between Ireland and Scotland in terms of the number of bank branches 
per 1,000 population, as shown in figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12  
Bank branches per 1000 population in Scotland and Ireland,
 1871-1911
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Sources: Population figures were taken from B. R. Mitchell British historical statistics (Cambridge, 
1988); Bank branch figures were taken from table 44 in S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 
1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975); Branch bank figures for Ireland were taken from Thom’s Directory. 
 
Figure 4.12 is somewhat misleading as the population levels and population growth 
were not the same in either country. In Ireland population declined in the period 1861 
to 1911, whereas in Scotland population increased. But both countries witnessed an 
increase in the number of bank branches.  
Branch banking was an important component of banking in both Scotland and 
Ireland; hence it would likely have an influence on the structure of liabilities. In the 
case of Ireland the main banking liabilities were published annually so it is possible to 
make a reasonable comparison between Scotland and Ireland. This will be done by 
looking at notes issued, share capital, reserves and deposits.237 Returns on bank notes 
were required to be published under banking legislation, and returns on deposits were 
published regularly in the later stages of the nineteenth century. The other variables 
used, capital and reserves, and the figures derived from them ought to be treated as 
approximations, as the banking institutions did not synchronise the publication of 
their balance sheets until the 1920s in Ireland238 and the 1960s in Scotland.239 They 
are also annual data and therefore do not reflect seasonality. 
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Firstly, figure 3.13 shows note issues as a percentage of total liabilities; as can be seen 
there is a trend towards convergence towards the distribution of liabilities in Scotland. 
Scotland and Ireland were governed under separate banking legislation to England 
and Wales. After the 1844 Bank charter act both Scottish and Irish banks still had the 
right to issue notes,240 albeit under the proviso that they had existed before 1844 and 
had been issuing notes.241 In England and Wales Bank of England notes were 
recognised as ‘legal tender’ under the 1833 bank act,242 and this was strengthened 
under the 1844 bank act.243 Unsurprisingly, non-issuing banks in Ireland believed that 
Bank of Ireland notes were legal tender;244 this was because they could only issue 
Bank of Ireland notes. On the other hand all banks that operated outside Dublin before 
1844 had the right to issue notes, and therefore they stressed the fact that Bank of 
Ireland notes were not legal tender.245 Notes are an important characteristic in 
understanding the development of branch banking in both Scotland and Ireland. 
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Figure 3.13  
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Note: Bank liabilities for Ireland have been calculated as a sum of notes issued, paid-up capital, 
reserves and deposits. 
Sources: S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975) and Thom’s 
Directory. 
 
As was discussed above, note issues enabled banks to reduce the cost of operating a 
branch network as unissued notes could be used as cash, in effect reducing the cost of 
having a ready supply of money. Notes that were not in circulation were not 
considered to be money, as such, nor did they have to be stamped, and this therefore 
reduced the cost of operating a branch network. Gaskin stated that: 
Even the note issues themselves came to be regarded as deriving their chief importance 
from the fact that they sub-served the collection of deposits. Where an earlier generation 
of bankers had looked on them primarily as a source of funds, after the middle of the 
nineteenth century their prime function in the eyes of the Scottish bankers was to make 
possible a wide spread of branches which in turn produced a more effective ‘draining’ of 
the country of deposits than would otherwise have been possible.246  
 
Contemporary evidence from the 1875 banking committee shows that a similar 
view prevailed in Ireland. Bristow, speaking on behalf of the Ulster banks, stated that: 
The amount of money which may lie dormant at a branch, if it is not issued, if it is in our 
own notes, is not actually costing us money; it is lying in our safe. We can send any 
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amount of notes to a branch, and they will cost us nothing until they are issued by that 
branch.247 
 
Figure 3.14 shows both capital and reserves as a percentage of total bank 
liabilities in Scotland and Ireland. Capital is taken as paid-up capital rather than 
reserve capital. As can be seen there are signs of convergence between Ireland and 
Scotland in terms of the distribution of capital and reserves as a percentage of total 
liabilities. In the case of notes, capital and reserves, the trend is of a decreasing 
importance of all three in the distribution of liabilities.  
Figure 3.14  
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Note: Bank liabilities for Ireland have been calculated as a sum of notes issued, paid-up capital, 
reserves and deposits. 
Sources: S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975) and Thom’s 
Directory. 
 
The declining portion of capital as a percentage of bank liabilities is an 
indication that deposits were to become more important in the structure of banking in 
both Scotland and Ireland. Capital is the money received from the proprietors of the 
banks, whereas deposits come from the public. Figure 3.15 shows the percentage 
share of deposits in total liabilities in both Scotland and Ireland. As can be seen, 
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deposits make up the largest proportion of liabilities in both countries, and the 
distribution of deposits in Ireland converged with levels in Scotland. 
 
Figure 3.15  
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Note: Bank liabilities for Ireland have been calculated as a sum of notes issued, paid up capital, 
reserves and deposits. 
Source: S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975) and Thom’s 
Directory. 
 
Both figures 3.14 and figures 3.15 indicate that the equity capital contributed a lower 
share of the balance sheet structure than deposits, something that indicates that these 
banks had a high gearing ratio.248 Gaskin stated that: 
In the nineteenth century the intensive gathering of deposits was regarded as one of the 
great distinguishing marks of Scottish banking. Before the consolidations of the big joint-
stock banks of deposit in England, the Scottish banks were the outstanding examples of 
institutions that set themselves to attract the unused liquid balances of the public on a 
wide scale.249 
 
Again the same holds true for Ireland with the intentional efforts of the joint 
stock banks to imitate Scotland. Scottish and Irish banks relied heavily on deposit 
mobilisation and in this respect it would be useful to compare Scottish and Irish banks 
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in terms of deposit mobilisation. Firstly, if we compare the deposits in the Irish joint 
stock banks to those in the Scottish joint stock banks we can see that there was a 
gradual convergence in the early twentieth century. This is a useful benchmark for 
Irish joint stock banks, as the Scottish system experienced the same nature of 
competition for deposits as the Irish joint stock banks, mainly from the savings banks, 
although in Scotland the savings banks had a different history to those in the rest of 
the UK. Scottish savings banks held accounts in the joint stock banks,250 whereas in 
England and Ireland savings banks deposited their funds with the Commissioners for 
the Reduction of the National Debt. Figure 3.16 shows that the savings deposits held 
by Irish banks were slowly converging to the amounts held by Scottish banks, but that 
the amounts held by Scottish banks were considerably higher than the amount of 
deposits in Ireland.  
Figure 3.16  
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Source: S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975) and Thom’s 
Directory. 
 
 
Finally, if we compare the number of deposits per bank, shown in figure 3.17, 
we can see that there was some convergence towards the beginning of the period. But 
from the 1880s the number of deposits per bank branches diverged from the trend in 
                                                 
250
 Ibid, p. 61. 
 256 
Scotland. Figure 3.17 is interesting as it suggests that the bank branch network in 
Ireland was not as efficient as the branch network in Scotland. 
Figure 3.17  
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Source: S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975) and Thom’s 
Directory. 
 
If we look at banks in Scotland and Ireland in terms of interest payments and 
charges we can see that they were an integrated part of the Sterling area. Prior to the 
Act of Union in 1800 Ireland had its own pound that was pegged to Sterling,251 but 
after the 1825 currency act Ireland became a fully fledged member of the Sterling 
area.252 All banks conformed to the Bank Rate,253 which is shown in figure 3.18. It is 
also interesting that there were collusive agreements amongst banks in both Scotland 
and Ireland. The Scottish banking system was infamous for its special agreement on 
charges among its banks and the agreement was traced back to 1836.254 The system 
was still in existence as recently as the 1960s. The report of the committee on the 
working of the monetary system in 1958 stated that: 
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In fixing the terms on which they do business the Scottish banks act as a tight cartel, to a 
higher degree even than the English. Rates of interest paid on savings deposits and 
deposit receipts are fixed by agreement (not in invariable relation to Bank Rate): there is 
also agreement that deposits can be cashed on demand but earn interest only if left for a 
minimum of one month. Rates charged on advances are equally rigidly agreed – at two 
levels, the “cash account rate” (secured) and the “unsecured overdraft rate”, the latter 
being ½ per cent above the former. Also the commission charges on the working of 
current accounts – which vary greatly in England, and are neither agreed nor published – 
are in Scotland rigidly agreed at flat rates, which are published. The strength of these 
agreements has meant encouragement of competition by service a factor that has played 
some part in making Scotland one of the relatively “overbanked” countries of the 
world.255 
 
 It is interesting to note that a similar ‘agreement’ existed in Ireland. 
Ollerenshaw highlighted the fact that the Ulster banks had such an agreement.256 But 
evidence from the 1875 banking committee suggests that tacit agreements existed 
amongst all banks in Ireland on a nationwide basis and not just among the Ulster 
banks. For example, Edward James Mills, a manager in the National Bank of Ireland, 
stated that the charges were much the same and reached a ‘level’.257  Mills stated that 
‘there is no verbal understanding; but of course one bank establishes a rate of its own, 
and it comes to the ears of others, and we are obliged, as I say, to find our own 
level’.258 
The rates and charges in Scotland were loosely based on the Bank of England 
rate.259 In the Irish case the Bank of Ireland would adopt the Bank of England rate and 
the other banks would follow suit. Evidence of this comes from the 1875 banking 
committee. Du Bedant, a Bank of Ireland official, explained how the Bank of Ireland 
followed the Bank of England Rate.260 He also stated that the Provincial and the 
National followed the Bank of Ireland rate changes, but that he was not sure if other 
banks followed their rate changes.261 Edward Mills, representative of the National 
Bank, also stated that the National followed the rates set by the Bank of Ireland.262 
And James Thomson Bristow, the representative of the Northern banks, also stated 
                                                 
255
 Report of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, paragraph 159, H.C. 1958-59, 
[Cmnd. 827], xvii, 389.  
256
 Philip Ollerenshaw, Banking in nineteenth century Ireland: the Belfast banks, 1825-1914 
(Manchester, 1987), pp 52, 122-6. 
257
 Report from the Select Committee on Banks of Issue; together with the proceedings of the 
committee, minutes of evidence, and appendix, question 2893, p. 155 (351), H.C. 1875, ix, 1. 
258
 Ibid, question 2972, p. 158. 
259
 Maxwell Gaskin, The Scottish banks: a modern survey (London, 1965), p. 165. 
260
 Report from the Select Committee on Banks of Issue; together with the proceedings of the 
committee, minutes of evidence, and appendix, question 3068, p. 161. (351), H.C. 1875, ix, 1. 
261
 Ibid, question 3069, p. 161.  
262
 Ibid, question 2951-2952, p. 157. 
 258 
that they followed the Bank Rate by following the rate changes of the Bank of 
Ireland.263 
Interest payments on deposits were then set below the Bank Rate, and charges 
for various services were set above the Bank Rate. The variability in the Bank Rate is 
an explanation for the statements that interest on deposits in Ireland was between 1.5 
and 2 per cent. It was stated by a representative of the Bank of Ireland that it paid 5 
per cent on deposits when the Bank rate rose to 10 per cent.264  
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Source: Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A history of interest rates (4th ed. New Jersey, 2005). 
 
The low rate of interest received for deposits in Ireland may also be a sign of the 
level of collusion, rather than competition, within the banking structure. The banks 
competed with each other in terms of service, i.e. opening of branches, rather than 
competing in terms of prices, i.e. rates and charges. This raises the question of over-
banking, an issue that was also continually raised in Scotland.265 It is also evident in 
Ireland. A prize winning essay in 1906 published in the Journal of the Institute of 
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Bankers in Ireland was related to the theme of over-competition amongst the 
banks.266 The essay recommended more collusion between the banks to prevent 
excessive competition and that ‘combination and co-operation should be the 
watchwords of the Irish banker’.267 
Finally, to conclude this section, it would be interesting to compare the asset 
structures of banks in Ireland and Scotland, but it is not possible to do this due to data 
constraints. In the nineteenth century banks were private businesses, and although 
there were requirements to publish certain statistics relating to liabilities, it was not 
until more recent times that there were requirements for more detailed banking 
statistics in the UK.  Given that the distribution of liabilities was similar for Ireland 
and Scotland, it would be a reasonable assumption that this led to a similar 
distribution in asset structure. So if we look at the asset structure in Scotland, shown 
in figure 3.19, we might get an idea of what the asset structure of Irish banks was like. 
 
Figure 3.19  
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Sources: S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: a history, 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975); Branch bank 
figures for Ireland were taken from Thom’s Directory. 
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Figure 3.19 shows the asset structure in Scottish banks and as can be seen advances, 
i.e. loans, made up a significant portion of assets. Investments in figure 3.19 were the 
securities, municipal and colonial, that the banks held and liquid assets were mainly 
short-term treasury bills or Consols. Before 1914, Consols were considered to be 
liquid assets based on the fact that there was a strong demand for them and they could 
be sold easily; it was not until the post-war period that Consols would have been 
classified as investments. 
There is not a similar series available for all banks in Ireland. But we do possess 
a series for the Bank of Ireland from 1886 to 1946, information for all banks in 1886 
and 1912, and the data from the 1926 banking commission that were shown in section 
3.4. Firstly if we look at the information from The Economist banking supplement we 
can look at the asset structure of the various Irish banks. 
 
Table  3.7: Asset structure of Irish banks in 1886 and 1912 
 Year Advances Investments Cash 
  % % % 
Bank of 
Ireland 1886 37.63 53.46 8.91 
 1912 43.57 42.13 14.31 
Belfast 1886 67.13 19.70 13.17 
 1912 61.99 19.33 18.69 
Hibernian 1886 81.26 8.18 10.57 
 1912 69.83 26.39 3.78 
Munster and 
Leinster 1886 41.53 10.56 47.91 
 1912 55.67 25.73 18.60 
National 1886 65.85 14.00 20.14 
 1912 61.38 13.53 25.09 
Northern 1886 74.07 11.87 14.06 
 1912 53.82 30.44 15.74 
Provincial 1886 65.72 18.24 16.04 
 1912 56.68 33.72 9.59 
Royal 1886 60.97 25.93 13.10 
 1912 56.31 36.36 7.33 
Ulster 1886 70.50 18.18 11.32 
 1912 61.11 25.24 13.65 
 
Source: The Economist banking supplement cited in Table 37 in Philip Ollerenshaw,  Banking in 
nineteenth century Ireland: The Belfast banks, 1825-1914 (Manchester, 1987), p. 185. 
 
Looking at table 3.7 we can see that loans make up a significant portion of the 
assets of the Irish joint stock banks. In order to assess the representativeness of using 
the Bank of Ireland asset distribution as a proxy for the Irish banks as whole, if we 
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look at table 3.7 we can see that advances made up a lower proportion of Bank of 
Ireland assets and that investments were higher than in the other banks. Given the 
information we have from table 3.7 and from figure 3.11, it would seem like a 
reasonable assumption to suggest that the asset structure of the Scottish banking 
system could be used as a proxy for what the asset structure of the Irish banking 
system was like in the nineteenth century. This would suggest that the banks did make 
loans, and did not solely invest in government securities as was suggested by some 
contemporaries. A similar asset structure would have implications in terms of the 
microfinance institutions outlined in this thesis, namely the loan funds from chapters 
1 and 2, and the Raiffeisen co-operatives in chapter 6. 
 
Figure 3.20  
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Source: Appendix H in F.G. Hall, The Bank of Ireland 1783-1946 ( Dublin, 1948), pp 400-401. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined the development of the Irish banking structure in the nineteenth 
century. It argued that the liberalisation of the banking sector in the early nineteenth 
century influenced the development of joint stock banking in Ireland, and that the 
constraints placed on the system from the 1840s onwards influenced the path of 
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development of Irish banking. The chapter also showed how Irish banking was 
influenced by Scottish banking, and that the new joint stock banks that were 
established in Ireland were based on the Scottish model of branch banking and 
introduced Scottish banking techniques, namely cash credits. 
The chapter illustrated the history of the A&C bank, the first and only attempt to 
establish a joint stock microfinance company in Ireland. The A&C failed because of 
poor management. The aggressive branch banking strategy coupled with excessive 
bill discounting undermined the capital base of the company and the bank failed 
shortly after its introduction. The history of the A&C bank suggests that the model of 
the loan funds may not have been profitable and that loan funds were able to operate 
based on a number of subsidies, namely free management and tax exemptions, and 
based on the fact that loan funds were independent financial units. Therefore if one 
unit was profitable it would have been able to operate independently of a loss-making 
unit and if a loss-making unit ceased operations it would not affect another unit.  
The chapter illustrated that the growth in branch banking in the latter stages of 
the nineteenth century enabled the Irish joint stock banks to create information and 
collect deposits. The collection of information enabled the Irish joint banks to have a 
better understanding of the creditworthiness of borrowers and also of the general 
economic environment. The chapter showed how Irish banks overcame the 
uncertainty of property rights in Ireland by lending to agriculturists on the basis of 
personal security.  
The chapter made a comparative study between joint stock banking in Scotland 
and Ireland. It showed how Irish banking was an imitation of Scottish banking trends, 
and that there was a trend of convergence between Scotland and Ireland. The chapter 
also used information on the capital and asset structure of Scottish banks to suggest 
that Irish banks were lenders in the Irish economy, and to challenge the contemporary 
view that Irish banks primarily invested in securities.    
In terms of this thesis joint stock banking is important as the banks were the 
largest financial institutions on the island and they operated branch networks. Thus, 
there were most likely to compete with other forms of microfinance discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis. The continued expansion in the second half of the nineteenth 
century coincided with the decrease in the number of loan funds. Joint stock banks 
were not only able to compete in the market for loans, but also in deposit markets. 
The consolidation of the joint stock banks made it difficult for new entrants in the 
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market, and is an important factor in the failure to introduce forms of co-operative 
banking, discussed in chapter 6. The key difference was the professionalism of the 
joint stock banks in their information systems and management structures. The 
microfinance institutions may have had enthusiasts supporting them, but they were 
enthusiastic amateurs. 
The final sections of this conclusion wish to assess assertions made by Tim 
Guinnane regarding the cultural, or informal, constraints, facing financial institutions 
in Ireland. And also, to analyse the role of the Irish banks in the economy in order to 
assess the interpretation of Irish banks made by Joseph Lee. 
Tim Guinnane asserted that one of the reasons why Raiffeisen co-operative 
banks failed in Ireland was due to the fact that ‘norms of Irish society’ made it 
difficult to work a co-operative system.268 Guinnane, using a statement from the 1926 
banking commission, suggested that ‘rural Irish people did not give “full recognition 
of the justice of the debt so incurred,” and thus resisted efforts to force repayment of 
loans’.269 Guinnane’s interpretation has implications for the history of Irish banking. 
If Irish people resisted efforts to repay loans then how did banking work in rural 
Ireland? The truth it seems is that people did repay loans, so much so that the only 
thing in arrears in rural Ireland was rent.270 
So why did the banks not experience arrears and why did joint stock banking 
work where credit co-operation, as outlined by Guinnane, failed? The answer is due to 
the role of reciprocity. The joint stock banks collected deposits, the savings of rural 
Ireland; therefore it was unlikely that people would default on loan obligations given 
that they or their sureties had deposits at risk. Ó Gráda stated that ‘on balance, Irish 
farmers were creditors rather than debtors to the banks’.271 Evidence to the 1875 
banking committee supports this view and suggests that the banks received deposits 
from the agricultural community. For example, James H. Bealton, a general manager 
of the Munster bank, stated that ‘the great bulk of the deposits are in small sums’272 
and that deposits came from small farmers.273 James Thomson Bristow, a director of 
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the Northern Bank who was representing all three Ulster banks,274 also stated that 
deposits came from the agriculturists.275 The fact that the joint stock banks held the 
savings of those borrowing from them suggests this is the reason why it was reported 
to be uncommon for banks to take legal proceedings against defaulting borrowers.276 
The fact that agriculturists made up a significant portion of bank depositors suggests 
that there may have been a greater demand for savings services than for credit in rural 
Ireland. This again suggests that there was not a credit shortage hindering Irish 
development. Rather, there was a shortage of profitable investment opportunities. The 
fact that agriculturists were depositors in the banks would suggest that savings 
withdrawals would also be an indicator of the level of the economic climate from a 
bank’s perspective. If we look at figure 3.21 we can see that the periods of negative 
percentage change in the deposits held by the joint stock banks coincided with the 
periods of agricultural depression in Ireland.  
Figure 3.21  
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Sources: W. Neilson Hancock, Report on deposits and cash balances in joint stock banks in Ireland, 
1840-1869 (Dublin, 1870), and Thom’s Directory. 
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Finally, this chapter will conclude by evaluating the role of the joint stock banks in 
Irish economic development. Classical banking theory has divided banks into three 
types: commercial/retail, investment, and universal. Valdez has described commercial 
banks as ‘banks which are in the classic banking business of accepting deposits and 
making loans’.277 Investment/merchant banks provide longer term finance and 
underwrite securities. The third type of banking institution is the universal bank, a 
bank that combines commercial and investment banking.278 Nineteenth century 
Scottish and Irish banks would be classified as commercial banks. Examples of 
investment banks would be the British mercantile banks or the French Crédit 
Mobilier. Universal banks are primarily associated with the banking structure in 
Germany that emerged in the late nineteenth century, and efforts were made to imitate 
them in various countries. 
 In periods of economic distress it was common for contemporaries to accuse 
the banks of not lending and thus blaming the banks for the state of the country. An 
example of that was a pamphlet written by Cornelius Dennehy in 1883 which 
contained a number of letters he wrote to various Irish newspapers advocating the 
establishment of an Irish industrial bank, essentially an investment bank. 279  Further 
support of this view can be seen in the committee investigating Irish industries. As 
was stated in the introduction, Joseph Lee is an example of an historian who has taken 
the same line of argument. Lee stated that: 
The fact that no investment banks emerged in Ireland partly reflects the conservatism of 
the business community, dominated by the English concept of banking, developed to 
cater for an economy endowed with an adequate supply of business capacity and 
therefore unsuited to Irish requirements.280 
 
Lee’s argument is a reflection of the Gerschenkron hypothesis that suggests that 
banks or government can act as substitutes for private entrepreneurship. It is 
important to address this view as to whether the Gerschenkron hypothesis is 
applicable to Ireland. Gerschenkron’s examples of this were primarily France and 
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Germany in terms of banking and Russia in terms of the state.281 But Gerschenkron’s 
observations regarding banks have been criticised and alternative interpretations have 
been raised.282 For example, Goldsmith emphasised the fact that ‘the conclusions are 
in many cases expressed with hesitation and in no case are they based on intensive 
quantitative study of the role of financial institutions and instruments on the process 
of economic growth’.283 The reason why the German case is often cited as evidence 
for the role of banks in industrial development is based on the rapid growth of 
Germany in the latter nineteenth century. Contemporary opinion, ‘both popular and 
professional’,284 viewed this as being evidence of the fact that the German financial 
structure was superior to the British financial structure. German universal banks were 
perceived285 as being actively involved in many of the industrial ventures. Goldsmith 
questioned the view that German banks were responsible for economic development 
in Germany. He argued that the reason for higher growth rates in Germany in the late 
nineteenth century was because economic development took place later in Germany.  
When Goldsmith compared growth rates for the period of early English 
industrialisation and with an equivalent period in German, he found that growth rates 
were similar.286 More recent scholarship on German economic history in the late 
nineteenth century has also raised significant doubts on the role of universal banks in 
German economic development.287 In fact, Fohlin argues that the joint stock universal 
banks were actually founded after the first wave of industrialisation in German 
states.288 
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Also, if we look at the German financial structure we can see how universal banking 
emerged in Germany. Note-issuing, one of the key areas of bank growth in the early 
nineteenth century in the UK, was monopolised by state-controlled, note-issuing 
banks, and a central bank, the Reichsbank, was established in the 1870s.289 The 
significance of note-issuing is key, as in the UK notes were payable on demand, and 
hence the assets of a bank were required to be fairly liquid in case of an emergency. 
Pierenkemper and Tully summarised the situation as follows: 
The significance of this development lay in the fact that the Reichsbank had to be ready 
to redeem its notes in gold coin on demand and, hence, to concentrate on safe and highly 
liquid business. Other banks, on the other hand, thus excluded from the payments 
business, could and had to turn to more risky business, in particular, to the “mixed 
banking” operations. The growth of the latter among German banks can thus be seen as a 
result of a division of labour between government dominated institutions and profit-
orientated commercial banks. If the latter got into trouble and became temporarily 
illiquid, they could count on the Reichsbank to help them; and this further encouraged 
the growth of “mixed banking”.290 
 
The fact that the commercial banks in the UK, Ireland included, did not engage 
in investment banking was primarily due to how they were structured. Institutionally 
they were not designed to engage in long-term lending as their liabilities were short-
term in nature. Deposits in Irish banks were short term and only required little more 
than a week’s notice to be withdrawn, and if the Irish banks engaged in long-term 
lending it could have resulted in maturity mismatches and loss. Admittedly, the banks 
could have found ways to transform short-term liabilities into long-term assets, but in 
the event of commercial crises it would have been difficult to liquidate long-term 
assets. The Irish banking system had a quasi-central bank in the form of the Bank of 
Ireland, but it was not always a willing lender of last resort. So in liquidity crises 
banks, brought about by a bank’s own actions, it would have been difficult to access 
funds, i.e. the experiences of the A&C and the Munster Bank discussed above. Also, 
if we look at the balance sheet structure of universal banks compared to commercial 
banks across Europe in the nineteenth century, we see that equity made a larger 
contribution to the capital of universal banks than in commercial banks,291 thus 
indicating that commercial banks had a higher gearing ratio compared to universal 
banks. Another significant difference was the fact that German universal banks did 
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not operate large branch networks until the early twentieth century, and were not as 
successful as commercial banks in mobilising deposits.292 It is often said that the 
German banks mobilised deposits for long-term investment, but they only began 
effectively mobilising deposits in the early twentieth century. Fohlin stated that the 
‘deposit business only became significant toward the end of the industrialisation 
period’.293 
The Irish banks were able to lend to industry, as shown by Ollerenshaw, and 
Irish banks were supportive of industry in Ulster. Long-term loans were made 
available by rolling over short-term loans; a similar process occurred in other 
countries that had commercial banks. The fact that the rest of the island did not 
industrialise is not due to the absence of investment banks, but more to do with the 
fact that there was a shortage of profitable investment opportunities. If Germany did 
not have investment banks, chances are it would still have industrialised. And if 
Ireland had profitable investment opportunities similar to Germany, it is probable it 
would have industrialised to a greater extent. The argument that Lee wished to 
propose was that investment banks could have compensated for the apparent lack of 
entrepreneurship in Ireland.294 But this is not the role of investment banks. They may 
complement the role of entrepreneurs but they can not substitute for them. The 
German banks did not create companies, but they did support companies that 
emerged. It should also be stressed that the German banks were conservative in their 
actions as equity holders of companies, and recent research has shown that companies 
that did not have bank equity holdings had higher profitability than companies where 
banks had equity shares.295 
Lee’s argument also runs contrary to the view of path dependence in the 
development of financial structures.296 As was outlined in this chapter, Irish banks 
established in the 1820s were successful imitations of Scottish banking structures. 
Gaskin stated that: 
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As providers of finance the Scottish banks have always regarded themselves essentially 
as short-term lenders, as financing circulating capital, such as stocks or goods 
undergoing process, and not fixed capital in the shape of buildings and durable plant. In 
this they are, of course, in the long-standing tradition of British banking. Indeed they 
helped to form this tradition. They developed originally under the same conditions as 
English banks – conditions of a predominantly agrarian and mercantile economy. There 
grew up a practical emphasis on short-term lending which experience gradually and 
painfully established as the most appropriate type of lending for note-issuing and deposit 
banks. This practice was not altered by the development of branch-banking and the need 
to rely “on the judgement of branch managers [who might] reasonably be expected to 
assess the capacity of a borrower to repay in a short time, though they could have no 
assurance in estimating long-term profitability”. But in the present day this account of 
matters must be immediately qualified by the known fact that in recent decades British 
banks have increasingly provided some finance for medium and long term purposes.297  
 
So by imitating the Scottish model, Irish banks adopted similar lending 
practices. The German model of universal banking came much later in the nineteenth 
century. By the time universal banks were established in Germany commercial 
banking had been well established in Ireland, and survived the tribulations of the 
famine. If we look at the case of Sweden we can also see that it too decided to imitate 
Scottish banking methods in the early nineteenth century,298 before being seduced by 
the attraction of German growth rates inspired by universal banking in the late 
nineteenth century.299 This led to a structural change in the banking system, with 
commercial banks engaging in universal bank activities. The fact that Ireland did not 
invent or adopt universal banking is also a charge that could be raised against the UK 
as a whole, not just Ireland. But recent research suggests that UK commercial banks 
did offer long term credit,300 something which blurs the distinction between the 
British and German systems. Gerschenkron was also aware that industrialisation had 
developed in Britain without recourse to universal banking,301 and the development of 
Ulster is also evidence that investment banking was not a prerequisite for 
industrialisation in Ireland. 
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4 Savings banks and thrift in Ireland, 1817-1914∗ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Thrift is a value commonly associated with the UK in the nineteenth century.1 Central 
to the pursuit and encouragement of thrift in the UK during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were the institutions used to facilitate saving, the savings banks: 
Trustee savings Banks (TSBs), Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) and Penny Savings 
Banks. This chapter will focus on the development of TSBs and the POSB in Ireland.  
Savings banks were not an Irish phenomenon. The original savings banks were 
imported from Scotland in the early nineteenth century, and the POSB was 
established by the UK parliament. The main focus in British historiography has been 
on surveys of developments within the savings bank movement, either taken from the 
perspective of the old savings banks2, referred to as TSBs3 from 1863 onwards,4 or 
from the vantage point of the state savings bank,5 or surveys on the contribution of 
savings banks to the self-help movement.6 The subject of savings banks has been 
overlooked in Irish historiography,7 but Cormac Ó Gráda has recently begun to 
redress this balance.8 In the case of Ireland, although some reference has been made to 
the POSB,9 the attention of economic historians has been directed elsewhere rather 
than on the introduction of these institutions. This chapter engages with Ó Gráda’s 
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work, while exploring the issue of savings banks, including the POSB, in Ireland from 
a broader perspective. 
This chapter will outline the early history of the TSBs in Ireland. TSBs were 
introduced in Ireland in the early 1800s in an attempt to encourage the industrious 
classes to practice thrift by saving. Despite a promising start, the savings bank 
movement experienced a severe downturn in the 1840s in Ireland from which they 
never fully recovered.  The events of the 1840s will be outlined to illustrate how this 
affected the path of development of savings in Ireland. For comparative purposes the 
LFB loan fund system, described in chapter 1, will be used as a benchmark when 
analysing the early history of the TSBs. The existing microfinance literature on early 
nineteenth century Ireland has focused more on the credit side and less on the savings 
side of microfinance.10 This chapter will show how TSBs and loan funds were related, 
and illustrate how they used different financial instruments to tackle ‘poverty’. TSBs 
and LFB loan fund societies and RLFs, which were effectively trustee credit and 
savings banks, experienced similar difficulties in the 1840s and 1850s. These 
difficulties were agency problems relating to the monitoring of staff. There was also 
an element of moral hazard as the state was involved in both institutions and as such 
undermined the role of the trustees in monitoring of staff. From the 1850s onwards 
both institutions were uncompetitive and stagnant in the savings market due to the 
reputational damage caused by these agency problems and the emergence of 
competition for savings from the joint stock banking sector and the POSB. 
 ‘Gladstone’s’ POSB was established in 1861, and introduced to Ireland in 
1862. The creation of the POSB gave the British government a distinct and tangible 
presence in the market for savings deposits. What is interesting about the POSB is 
that it saw the UK adopt a more complete etatist approach to savings banks, when at 
the same time many other European countries continued their liberal approach to 
savings banks.  
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This chapter will analyse the establishment and introduction of the POSB in Ireland. 
These events and their consequences for other agents competing in similar market 
niches have not been given a significant amount of historical attention. This chapter is 
written from an Irish perspective. However, it is not possible to give a complete 
assessment without referring to developments in the POSB system as a whole. The 
POSB was a UK-wide saving institution with centralised decision-making in London. 
The chapter will stress that from its inception in 1861, until the partition of Ireland in 
1921, the POSB was the largest branch banking institution in the UK. As the POSB 
had branches throughout the UK, the sources used in this chapter are for UK-wide 
activity as well as Irish activity. The POSB held a significant amount of savings, and 
was a limited financial institution that only provided savings services to the 
government, and did not offer any reciprocal lending services to individuals. Instead 
the POSB bought government bonds and securities with the deposits it received. The 
POSB was not an insignificant agent in the market for government bonds, Consols or 
‘the funds’ as they were referred to by contemporaries, and by 1914 the POSB held 
approximately 18 percent of the UK national debt.11 
This chapter will analyse the savings banks in terms of their outreach and 
impact capacity as microfinance institutions. It concludes by outlining how the state 
explicitly and implicitly subsidised savings markets in nineteenth century Ireland.   
 
4.2 Smilesian thrift 
Samuel Smiles was a famous contemporary social commentator who championed the 
cause of self-help and thrift. In the mid-nineteenth century Smiles wrote a trilogy of 
books in relation to ‘self-help’.12 In the preface to the third work, Thrift, Smiles stated 
that ‘thrift is the basis of self-help, and the foundation of much that is excellent in 
character’.13  Therefore, thrift can be seen as central to Smilesian thought. Chapter 2 
illustrated how the loan funds ran contrary to this nineteenth century view of thrift. In 
contrast, the savings banks were the embodiment of thrift, so much so that they 
received a distinct chapter in Thrift.14  
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In order to give some contemporary perspective on the importance of savings we shall 
briefly explore Smilesian views on saving. In Self-help and in Thrift Smiles outlined 
his view of a consumption life-cycle. In his view, one should practise ‘self-denial’15 
and consume less early in life in order to save for old age.16 The aim of thrift was to 
save for the future and the essential emphasis was on people not being burdens to 
society and relying on the poor rates.17 Self-respect was an important theme in Self-
help and Thrift, with Smiles’ interpretation of self-respect meaning that a person 
would not embarrass his or her self by placing him or her self, by his or her own 
actions, at the mercy of the poor rate.18 In this respect Smilesian thought is 
reminiscent of the Malthusian view that people should not have families if they could 
not support them by themselves. In fact, Malthus was highly critical of the poor law in 
England,19 and of the prospect of a poor law in Ireland.20 
Once we understand the central views of Smilesian thought we can see the 
remainder of Smiles’ work as an instruction on how to live one’s life and conform to 
his views of a consumption life cycle. An important consideration in Smilesian 
thought is the use and abuse of money, namely income: 
How a man uses money – makes it, saves it, and spends it – is perhaps one of the best 
tests of practical wisdom. Although money ought by no means to be regarded as a chief 
end of man’s life, neither is it a trifling matter, to be held in philosophic contempt, 
representing as it does to so large an extent, the means of physical comfort and social 
well-being.21 
 
Central to this Smilesian view, as was outlined in chapter 2, is the importance of 
not getting into debt22 and a great emphasis on saving. Thus, the key financial 
instruments to help meet this consumption life cycle were savings instruments. The 
main financial institutions which Smiles advocated were friendly societies that offered 
health insurance and were ostensibly life assurance societies, building societies, 
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ostensibly mutual savings and loans societies, and savings banks (TSBs, POSB and 
Penny banks).23  
 
4.3 Trustee Savings Banks and loan fund societies: a comparative study 
The TSB system was first established in Scotland in the 1810s and this innovation 
diffused throughout the UK.24 This section, while stressing developments within the 
TSB system, will make comparisons with the LFB loan funds that were discussed in 
chapter 1. The primary aim of the section is to introduce the TSBs as a microfinance 
institution, but a secondary aim is to illustrate how both institutions, TSBs and loan 
funds, were related as strategies to combat poverty. The aim here is to show that, in 
most cases, these strategies were not integrated with one another, and were in fact 
competitors. The terms used in the comparison of both institutions will be outreach 
and impact, the standard terms used in microfinance literature.  
The motivation for using LFB loan funds for comparative purposes is the fact 
that they offered savings services similar to the TSBs. As was stated in the 
introduction the recent literature on microfinance in Ireland has overrepresented 
microcredit at the expense of microsavings,25 but the evidence will show that savings 
banks were a larger financial institution than the LFB loan funds in terms of savings. 
Therefore, such a comparison will give us a greater understanding of the roles of both 
institutions. It has also been overlooked in the literature that there was a close 
relationship between the two institutions. For example, in a return of the location of 
savings banks in 1852 it was disclosed that 9.62 per cent of the TSBs shared an office 
with a loan fund society, 13.46 per cent of TSBs were run from landlord rent offices, 
and 26.92 per cent were located in municipal offices.26 These are interesting statistics, 
as they show that social elites attempted to encourage both TSBs and loan funds, but 
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also that there was a strong landlord involvement in both. This is to be expected as 
trustees were needed. Many were located in what have here been deemed municipal 
offices; these were local court offices or town halls. 
It is also interesting to highlight the parallel agency problems that occurred in 
these institutions, something which suggests a fault in the management structure of 
both institutions. Also, a key factor influencing the study of TSBs is that they are 
normally located within the historiography of nineteenth century ‘self-help’. By 
comparing the loan funds with the TSBs it can be seen that the loan funds were also a 
‘self-help’ institution.   
 
4.3.1 Savings banks in Ireland, 1818 to 1860 
Before discussing the TSBs in Ireland it is important to stress the inherent source bias 
due to the fact that most sources date to the 1840s and early 1850s. At this time a 
number of frauds were detected in TSBs in Ireland and in England,27 and the 
availability of the historical source material is influenced by these events. 
 The Irish loan fund system, discussed in chapter 1, emerged 
contemporaneously with the savings bank movement, another financial institution that 
was targeted towards the ‘industrious poor’. According to Gosden the belief of those 
advocating savings services was that ‘the classes whose savings the banks were to 
hold could afford to save in normal times against periods of hardship or difficulty 
later on’.28 The first successful savings bank adhering to this belief was established in 
Ruthwell, Scotland, by Henry Duncan in 1810.29 The savings bank was managed 
gratuitously, on a not-for-profit basis, by Duncan. The system was very strict. 
Depositors were screened before they could begin to save and depositors were also 
fined if they did not deposit at least 4 shillings a year.30 Ruthwell is a small village in 
Drumfries in south-west Scotland, close to the English border,31 so it is likely that the 
services were targeted towards rural inhabitants. The Ruthwell model was very labour 
intensive and required a lot of information about depositors. Therefore it is not 
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surprising that a less stringent alternative savings bank model was devised shortly 
afterwards in Edinburgh, in 1814, which paid a uniform rate of interest on all deposits 
and did not fine depositors.32   
The Edinburgh model was very popular and the savings model spread. Within 
three years there were similar savings banks established throughout the United 
Kingdom, 70 in England, 4 in Wales and 4 in Ireland.33 It was not long after this that 
TSBs came to the attention of the British legislature. In the first report of the TSB 
inspection committee in 1893 it was stated that ‘like most of the institutions of our 
country, Trustee Savings Banks are no creation of the law. They made themselves; the 
law has recognised and regulated them’.34 There were 6 savings banks registered in 
Ireland under the first savings bank act in 1817;35 these are shown in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Savings banks in Ireland in 1818 
 
Names of Banks Date of 
establishment 
Sums vested (£) 3.5 per cent stock 
bought* 
Kilkenny City 20 May 1816 800 843.95 
Waterford City 8 August 1817 3,700 3974.3 
Belfast City (Co. 
Antrim) 
6 October 1817 1,800 1879.35 
Cork City 8 December 1817 5,300 5,609.35 
Bangor, Co. Down 10 January 1818 1,000 1050.8 
School Street, 
Dublin City 
19 February 1818 300 322.2 
St. Peter’s Parish, 
Dublin City 
16 February 1818 700 753.1 
  13,600 14,433.2 
 
* rounded to the nearest shilling and decimalised 
 
Source: An account of the several banks for savings, established in Ireland, and registered, under the 
act 57 Geo. III, cap. 105; specifying the date of each establishment, and the amount of the sums vested 
to their credit severally, in government securities, under the provisions of that act., H.C. 1818, (153), 
xvi, 381. 
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TSBs and loan funds were not affiliated to any central body and were individual units 
rather than branches. This is an important distinction as the most successful financial 
institutions, the joint stock banks and the POSB, operated branch systems. Initially, 
TSBs experienced sluggish growth and by 1844 there were 74 individual TSBs in 
operation in Ireland.36 Loan funds, by contrast, experienced rapid growth and by 1844 
there were 259 individual loan funds registered with the LFB.37 This may be more of 
a reflection relating to the difficulty of establishing a savings institution, whereby 
savers have to trust the institution, than establishing a lending institution, where the 
institution has to trust the borrowers. The preamble to the 1817 savings bank act in 
Ireland stated that:  
…certain provident institutions or banks for savings have been and may be established in 
Ireland for the safe custody and increase of small savings belonging to the industrious 
classes of His Majesty's subjects there; and it is expedient to give protection to such 
institutions and the funds thereby established, and to afford encouragement to others to 
form the like Institutions.38  
 
Although TSBs were not created by the legislature, they were continually 
regulated by the law. The key features of the TSBs in terms of interest rates and 
deposit limits are shown in table 4.2. Table 4.2 will be repeatedly referred to in this 
chapter as columns 3, 4 and 5 were also applicable to the POSB.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 John Tidd Pratt, A summary of the savings banks in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland (London, 
1846); 
37
 Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, (365), H.C. 1845, 
xxvi, 233.  
38
 An Act to encourage the Establishment of Banks for Savings in Ireland, (57 Geo. 3), c. cv [11th July 
1817], preamble. 
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Table 4.2: Interest rates and deposit limits in TSBs 1817-1920, and the POSB 
1861-1920. 
 
Year Interest paid 
to TSBs per 
annum(%) 
 
(1) 
Interest paid 
to depositors 
(%) 
 
(2) 
Annual 
deposit 
limit (£) 
 
(3) 
Total 
deposit 
limit (£) 
 
(4) 
Total 
limit of 
account 
(p+i)c (£) 
(5) 
1817 a 4.56  No figure set 50 - - 
1828 b 3.80  3.42 30 150 200 
1844 3.25  3.04  30 150 200 
1863 3.25  3.008  30 150 200 
1880 3  2.75  30 150 200 
1888 2.75  2.5  30 150 200 
1893 2.75 2.5 50 150 200 
1915 2.75 2.5 Removed Removed Removed 
1920 2.875 2.5 No limit No limit No limit 
 
Notes: a – The rate of interest was stated as 3d per cent per diem; the annual rate of 4.56 per cent per 
annum was calculated by multiplying the daily rate by 365, the number of days in the calendar year. 
b – The rate of interest stated in the act was 2.5 pence per cent per diem; the annual rate of 3.80 was 
calculated by multiplying the daily rate by 365, the number of days in the calendar year. The interest 
paid to depositors was 2 pence per cent per diem; the annual rate of 3.04 was calculated by multiplying 
the daily rate by 365, the number of days in the calendar year. 
c – the total limit is the principal plus the interest. After 1863 TSBs were given the privilege to create 
special investment units for the investment of accounts that went over the £200 limit.  
 
Sources:  
Columns 1 and 2  are based on a table from Charles Eason, ‘The trustee savings banks of Great Britain 
and Ireland, from 1817 to 1928’, a paper read before the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of 
Ireland, (Friday 15 November, 1929), p.5. 
Additional information for this table was obtained from the legislation relating to savings banks from 
1817 to 1920: 
An Act to encourage the Establishment of Banks for Savings in Ireland, (57 Geo. 3), c. 105 [11 July 
1817], sections x, xx. 
An Act to encourage the Establishment of Banks for Savings in England , (57 Geo. 3), c. 130 [12 July 
1817]. 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Savings Banks, (9 Geo. 4), c. 92, [28 July 
1828]sections xv, xvi, xxv. 
An Act to amend the Laws relating to Saving Banks, and to the Purchase of Government Annuities 
through the Medium of Savings Banks. (7 & 8 Vict.), c. 83 [9 August 1844], section 2. 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Savings Banks (26 & 27 Vict.), c. 87, [28 July 
1863], sections 21, 23. 
An Act to amend the Savings Banks Acts (43 & 44 Vict.) c. 36, [7 September 1880], section 2. 
An Act to make certain Amendments in the Law consequential on the passing of the National Debt 
(Conversion) Act, 1888, (51 & 52 Vict.), c. 15, [28 June 1888], section 5. 
An Act to amend the Law relating to Savings Banks, (56 & 57 Vict.), c. 69 [21 December 1893], 
section 1. 
War Loan (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1915, (5 & 6 Geo. 5), c. 93. [23 December 1915], section 7 
(1) & (2). 
An Act to amend the Enactments relating to Savings Banks; to extend to National Savings Certificates 
the enactments relating to War Savings Certificates; and to amend the law with respect to the transfer 
of Government stock by Savings Bank authorities, (10 & 11 Geo. 5), c. 12 [20 May 1920], sections 1, 2 
(1). 
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The TSBs and the loan funds ostensibly had the same raison d'être and both were 
prone to mistargeting. They only differed in their modus operandi.  Mistargeting here 
refers to the fact that they were targeted towards the industrious classes, but it was the 
middle classes who took advantage of the services provided.39 As can be seen from 
table 4.2 there was no initial restriction on total deposits in the TSBs but these were 
imposed on the system after 1828 as a result of more affluent socio-economic groups 
taking advantage of the system. Both TSBs and loan funds offered savings services, 
and wished to encourage thrift amongst the ‘industrious classes’. It seems that TSBs 
were intended to be the bankers of the ‘self-help’ movement. For example, friendly 
societies, charities and loan funds were permitted to deposit their funds in a local TSB 
for safe keeping.  Loan funds were permitted to deposit funds in TSBs despite the fact 
that they themselves offered savings services. Both LFB loan funds and TSBs paid 
interest on deposits they received and the maximum interest paid by them was 
determined by the British legislature. The TSBs were paid a fixed rate by the 
Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt (CRND) and in turn 
transferred a lower rate to depositors. The differential between the rates received and 
paid was to pay for the expenses of management. 
The sums deposited with the CRND were used to purchase government-backed 
securities. Technically one cannot say that the TSBs lent to the ‘government’, as 
Porter was at pains to point out to distressed depositors who lost money in St Peter’s 
Parish Savings Bank in Dublin that crashed in 1848.40 The deposits were placed in the 
account of the CRND, or rather ‘they are prohibited from lending to any other persons 
than the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt’.41 Initially the 
government had offered very attractively subsidised interest rates, but these proved to 
be quite expensive to the exchequer and were subsequently reduced. An example of 
the expense of the subsidised interest rates can be seen from the following extract 
from an article in the Bankers Magazine in 1847. The article refers to the problems 
that the savings banks were causing for the government. The deposits were used to 
buy government securities; the problem was that people saved when times were good, 
when the price of securities was high, and had to withdraw when times were bad, or if 
                                                 
39
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Savings banks as an institutional import: the case of nineteenth-century Ireland’ in 
Financial History Review , x (2003), pp 34-35. 
40
 W. H. Porter, Savings banks: their defects – the remedy , part I (Dublin, 1848), p. 4. 
41
 W. Neilson Hancock, ‘Duties of the public with respect to charitable savings banks’ in The 
Transactions and Journal of the Dublin Statistical Society (Read 19th April, 1852, reprinted Dublin, 
1856), p. 5. 
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there was a run, so the CRND had to sell government securities when prices were 
low. Neilson Hancock, professor of political economy in Dublin University, alleged 
that the scheme had been making a loss for 40 years.42 Deposits in TSBs were short-
term demand deposits; in the 1817 savings bank act it was stated that the trustees of 
any savings bank could ‘demand payment at any time’.43 On the other hand, the 
government securities, namely Consols, were long-term assets. This maturity 
mismatch resulted in a loss. In 1847 the Bankers Magazine noted that: 
The state of the money market at the present time, and the recent sales of Savings’ Bank 
stock by the Commissioners to meet the payment of the calls of the depositors, who have 
of late largely withdrawn, and are still withdrawing, to a considerable amount, their 
money for more profitable investment, render any particulars on the subject more than 
usually interesting…Such a deficiency [£4,373,531] although only estimated, as four 
millions of pounds sterling in the value of the Savings’ Bank stock, and also the present 
weekly drain upon some of the larger Savings’ Banks, and the consequent sales of such 
stock, are alone sufficient to justify the devotion, by the chancellor of the exchequer, of 
some attention to the system under which the investment of Savings’ Bank deposits has 
been for some years past carried on, with a view to prevent in future the loss to which the 
country is now exposed by the sales of stock at prices so much lower than those at which 
it was purchased.44 
  
The CRND were supposed to use the money from deposits to purchase 
government securities, but Hancock accused the CRND of using the money to tide 
over budget deficits.  Hancock stated that: 
As the balances of the savings banks were not under any public scrutiny, a lax principle 
seems early to have been introduced, of considering them under the orders of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer; and accordingly successive chancellors, when in a 
difficulty, have resorted to the savings banks balances in the hands of the 
Commissioners, for the purpose of making up temporary deficiencies; in other words, for 
the purpose of making the quarterly and annual statements of the public accounts present 
a fictitious appearance of prosperity.45 
 
The fixed rates offered by the TSBs underwent periodic review by parliament. 
In the period 1817 to 1860, there were three changes in the interest rate payable by 
TSBs. The first act in 1817 set the rate payable by TSBs at 4.5 per cent, but it was 
gradually reduced to 3 per cent in 1844 and by the end of the nineteenth century the 
rate received by depositors was set at 2.5 per cent. In the same period rates offered by 
loan funds were also reduced by parliament, as was shown in chapter 1, but these 
rates were fixed at 5 per cent by the 1843 loan fund act. The reason for the changes in 
                                                 
42
 W. Neilson Hancock, ‘The present state of the savings bank question’ from the Transactions and 
journal of the Dublin Statistical Society (Read 19 February, 1855, reprinted Dublin, 1856), p. 31. 
43
 An Act to encourage the Establishment of Banks for Savings in Ireland, (57 Geo. 3), c. cv [11 July 
1817], section xii. 
44
 Anonymous, ‘Savings banks’, in The Bankers magazine; and Journal of the Money Market, vii 
(June, 1847), p. 165. 
45
 W. Neilson Hancock, ‘The present state of the savings bank question’ from the transactions and 
journal of the Dublin statistical society (Read 19th February, 1855, reprinted Dublin, 1856), p.31. 
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the rate of interest paid by, and to, TSBs was due to the fact that the government was 
the sole borrower from the TSBs. This was the main structural difference between the 
LFB loan funds and TSBs. Loan funds lent money to individual economic agents on a 
quasi-commercial basis. The interest rates, or rather the discount rates, that they lent 
at were lower than those alleged to have been charged by other commercial 
moneylenders and banks.  
The government’s aim in offering subsidised interest rates was to encourage the 
lower classes to deposit their money, but the outcome was that the interest-rate-
sensitive middle classes began using the TSBs. Subsequent legislation began placing 
limits on the amounts that could be saved per person per year, and caps on the total 
deposits on which interest would be paid. There was also a restriction on a person 
having more than one account, not only in an individual TSB, but in all TSBs. This is 
an important legal distinction, and depositors were made aware of this by the printing 
of the rules in their depositor-books. An example of this can be seen in the Cashel and 
Drogheda savings banks.46  
The view that the TSB system was loss-making is supported by some returns 
made by the CRND which show the amount of losses that the public was to absorb in 
the period 1817 to 1849. These are shown in table 4.3 and it suggests that the 
government was subsidising the TSB system in the UK, and in Ireland in particular. 
This may be a key factor in explaining the decline of the TSB system in Ireland, 
which shall be referred to below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 ‘Depositors passbook with the Cashel Savings’ Bank, also the rules of the institution’, Clonmel, 
1846, (N.L.I, I 6551 Clonmel) and ‘Depositor’s passbook with the Drogheda Saving’s Bank, together 
with the rules of management, etc.’, Drogheda, 1844?, (N.L.I., P 2025 [1]). 
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Table 4.3: ‘Amount of loss of interest sustained by the public, on account of the 
savings banks and friendly societies in the united Kingdom’, 1817-1849 
 
 Savings Banks Friendly 
societies 
Savings 
banks + 
friendly 
societies 
 Britain 
Loss 
Britain - 
Profit 
Ireland -
Loss 
UK - Loss  UK - 
Loss 
UK Total 
loss  
 £ £ £ £ £ £ 
1817-
1837 
     1,484,096.95 
1844 62,370.4  39,302.9 101,673.35 10,562.35 112,235.75 
1845  28,396 48,581.2 20,185.2 16,352.2 36,537.4 
1846  36,917.35 54,194.55 17,277.2 18,143.25 35,420.5 
1847  36,947.2 54,611.9 17,664.7 18,888.8 36,553.5 
1848 1,922.55  27,328.25 29,250.8 19,412.15 48,663 
1849 29,954.65  6,902 36,856.7 20,736 57,592.7 
 
Sources: 
An account, showing the difference between the amount paid by the public for interest and charges on 
the sums due to trustees, and the amount received from the sums invested by the commissioners. (411) 
H.C. 1837-38, xxxvi, 497;  A return, showing the amount of loss of interest sustained by the public, on 
account of the savings banks and friendly societies in the United Kingdom in each year, from the year 
ending 20 November 1844 to the year ending 20 November 1849 inclusive; distinguishing the friendly 
societies from savings banks, and the savings banks of Ireland from those of Great Britain., H.C. 1850 
(470), xxxiii, 319. 
 
The structure of the TSBs appeared to give depositors the advantage of a state 
guarantee for their deposits. This, coupled with the security which the trustees 
themselves provided, gave the TSBs an appearance of being a secure, and stable, 
financial institution. Not only were they perceived to be secure, but they also offered 
higher rates of interest for deposits than the prevailing market rates. The nascent joint 
stock banks, discussed in chapter 3, were not offering similar rates for deposits, and if 
they were, they were not coupled with state guarantees. Therefore, the TSBs had two 
advantages over private commercial competition, higher interest rates and security. Ó 
Gráda has called these benefits public and private subsidies.47 The public subsidies 
came in the form of the subsidised interest rates and the government security. The 
private subsidies came from the involvement of trustees, who provided philanthropic 
management services.48 
                                                 
47
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘The early history of Irish savings banks’ in UCD centre for economic research 
working paper series, WP08/04 (February 2008), p. 4. 
48
 Ibid, p. 4. 
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The loan fund societies also had similar advantages. The loan funds offered high rates 
of interest in comparison to the savings banks, and these rates were not subsidised by 
the taxpayer. They were also perceived as being equally secure, although in reality 
they had no security49 before the famine. Loan funds were not unlimited liability 
societies, as the actual liability of the trustees was limited by statute. The loan funds 
were managed on a voluntary basis by notable local trustees and gave local depositors 
confidence in the institution; thus the loan funds availed of a private subsidy similar to 
that of the TSBs. Also, many depositors perceived that the loan fund societies availed 
of some form of government security.50 This conclusion came about due to the fact 
that the forms and stationery that registered LFB loan funds used was supplied by the 
LFB. The LFB happened to have a very misleading address as it was based in Dublin 
Castle, the heart of government administration in Ireland. An example of this can be 
seen in plates 2.1 and 2.2 in chapter 2.  Therefore, both the loan funds and the TSBs 
were seen to have similar benefits before the 1840s and the famine. 
 
4.3.2 Savings in loan funds and TSBs 
The loan funds and TSBs both offered savings services, but it is worthwhile to 
compare the two institutions as vehicles for such services. Did they offer 
microsavings, and if so what was their level of outreach? Evidence will be presented 
in this section that suggests that the level of outreach in terms of savings services in 
the LFB loan funds was not as high as that of the TSBs. Yet, the savings services of 
both institutions were more likely to have been used by higher socio-economic 
groupings than was originally intended, i.e. not the ‘industrious poor’ but the 
‘industrious not-so-poor’. Firstly, figure 4.1 shows the amount of savings deposits (£) 
in Irish TSBs in the period 1837 to 1914. The most noticeable feature in figure 4.1 is 
the sharp fall in savings deposits in the late 1840s; this will be discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 Report from the Select Committee on Loan Fund Societies (Ireland); with the proceedings of the 
committee, and minutes of evidence, question 381, p. 20. H.C. 1854-55 (259), vii, 321. 
50
 Ibid, question 306, p. 16. 
 284 
Figure 4.1  
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Source: Thom's Directory, various years. 
 
Figure 4.1 does not include information for the loan funds simply because the  amount 
of deposits held in the TSBs dwarfed those held by the loan funds.51 This is an 
indication that the TSBs had a greater outreach, simply because of the larger scale of 
their activities. In fact, before the famine, the deposits held by the TSBs were the 
highest of all savings institutions in Ireland, and the TSBs were in direct competition 
with the joint stock banks for deposits.52 In order to compare the TSBs to the loan 
funds, a ratio of loan fund capital53 to TSB deposits has been constructed for the 
period 1841-60 and is shown in figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 For information of loan fund capital (i.e. savings) see chapters 1 and 2. 
52
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘The early history of Irish savings banks’ in UCD centre for economic research 
working paper series, WP08/04 (February 2008), p. 4. 
53
 Capital was the term used by the LFB; it refers to savings, charitable donations and retained profits. 
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Figure 4.2  
Percentage ratio of loan fund capital to TSB savings balances, and loan 
fund depositors to TSB depositors, 1841-1860
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Sources: Annual reports of the commissioners of the loan fund board, and Thom’s Directory, various 
years. 
 
The amount of capital held by loan funds made up roughly about 15 per cent of the 
savings deposits held by the TSBs. The ratio of loan fund capital to TSB deposits 
decreased in the period 1841 to 1860. This is interesting given the crash in the TSBs 
in the late-1840s. The decline was due to the fact that the capital of the loan funds 
substantially decreased after the famine. There are various factors that influenced the 
low ratio levels between the amount of loan fund capital and TSB deposits. One of 
these was that friendly societies and charities were permitted, under the savings bank 
legislation, to deposit their funds in TSBs, but friendly societies did not make up a 
large proportion of savers in Irish TSBs. Furthermore, some of the largest TSBs were 
located in the main cities in Ireland and therefore provided savings services to a larger 
population group. Figure 4.2 also includes a ratio for the number of depositors in the 
loan funds to the number of depositors in the TSBs. As can be seen, the loan fund 
depositors made up a small percentage of TSB depositors. The two ratios together 
suggest that the depositors in the loan funds held larger average amounts of savings 
than those in the TSBs. The most likely explanation for the low ratios is that there was 
a greater demand for secure savings services; perhaps savers may have been worried 
about losses from bad loans. 
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Figure 4.3  
Mean TSB savings balance and loan fund capital, 
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Sources: Annual reports of the commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, and Thom’s Directory, various 
years. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the average deposit in both TSBs and loan fund societies from 1843 
to 1860. Figure 4.3 suggests that the loan funds were not successful in their outreach 
of savings services. The higher average deposit in loan funds in comparison to the 
TSBs is an indicator of who was targeted by the loan funds for their savings and 
investments. Loan funds raised their capital through issuing debentures, and figure 4.3 
suggests that the socio-economic background of the average depositor, or investor, in 
a loan fund would have been higher than that saving with a TSB. TSBs offered 
savings instruments to small to medium sized savers, but as was shown in columns 3, 
4 and 5 in table 4.2 there were ceilings on the amount of deposits per annum, and on 
the total amounts that could be saved. In contrast, the loan funds did not have annual 
ceilings, nor did they have ceilings on the amounts that could be saved. This may 
explain the discrepancy between the two. 
It is possible to compare the two institutions, using the statistical data compiled 
by Tidd Pratt on the TSBs and Henry Porter on the loan funds, and thereby get an 
insight about the real level of average saving. Tidd Pratt, the first Registrar of 
Friendly Societies and the barrister to whom TSBs sent their annual accounts, 
published a book in 1845 on the early history of savings banks.54 Pratt’s book was 
                                                 
54
 John Tidd Pratt, Progress of savings banks, an account of the number of depositors and of the sums 
deposited in savings banks, in Great Britain and Ireland, divided into classes, on the 20th November in 
each of the years 1829to 1844,both inclusive and the increase or decrease in each year (London, 
1845). 
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described as a ‘compendium of the statistics of these institutions’.55 Using these 
statistics allows the reader to get a sense of the activities of the TSBs. But if one tries 
to compare the loan funds and the TSBs by average deposits, it may give a slightly 
misleading account. The same applies if one tries to compare the average deposit size 
of the TSBs in the United Kingdom, as was done by Ó Gráda.56 He stated that the 
average in Ireland in 1844 was £28, £26 in England, £27 in Wales and £14 in 
Scotland.57 Table 4.4 shows average deposit figures in the United Kingdom by 
country and divided by account sizes. 
 
Table 4.4: Average deposit size in UK TSBs c. 1844 
Amounts England Scotland Wales Ireland Total UK 
Standard 
Deviation 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Under 
£20 6.50 4.96 7.99 7.70 6.47 1.38 
Under 
£50 30.92 30.24 30.29 30.55 30.83 0.31 
Under 
£100 68.97 68.92 68.81 67.75 68.85 0.58 
Under 
£150 120.86 121.08 121.23 116.40 120.50 2.33 
Under 
£200 171.18 169.98 168.40 162.77 170.49 3.72 
Above 
£200 235.23 - 257.21 226.64 235.24 15.77 
Total 
Individual 
depositors 28.85 14.04 28.79 29.79 27.90 7.56 
Charitable 
Societies 51.68 45.84 58.84 60.91 52.03 6.90 
Friendly 
Societies 127.24 119.49 145.16 52.34 124.67 40.59 
 
Source:   John Tidd Pratt, Progress of savings banks, an account of the number of depositors and of the 
sums deposited in savings banks, in Great Britain and Ireland, divided into classes, on the 20th 
November in each of the years 1829to 1844, both inclusive and the increase or decrease in each year 
(London, 1845). 
 
                                                 
55
 John Tidd Pratt, ‘The history of Savings Banks in the United Kingdom’ in Journal of the Statistical 
Society of London, vi, no. 1 (April, 1843), p. 73. 
56
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘The early history of Irish savings banks’ in UCD centre for economic research 
working paper series, WP08/04 (February 2008), p. 11. 
57
 Ibid, p. 11. 
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Table 4.4 shows that, in comparison with the other countries, Ireland was not that 
different in respect to the average deposit size in account grouping. Ireland has a 
slightly higher average deposit size in the ‘under £20’ category, but nothing 
drastically above average. Table 4.5 is also derived from Pratt’s statistics, and shows 
the percentage distribution of each class of depositor. 
 
Table 4.5: Percentage distribution of TSB depositors in the UK by account size, 
c. 1844 
 
Account 
size  
England Scotland Wales Ireland Total UK 
 % % % % % 
Under £20 55.41 75.11 50.61 45.53 55.79 
Under £50 24.88 17.56 29.88 36.49 25.52 
Under £100 11.02 4.65 10.69 11.62 10.63 
Under £150 3.85 0.92 3.39 3.31 3.59 
Under £200 2.23 0.29 1.57 1.73 2.04 
Above £200 0.35 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.30 
Individual 
Depositors 
97.74 98.52 96.35 98.80 97.87 
Charitable 
societies 
1.19 0.90 1.10 0.74 1.13 
Friendly 
societies 
1.07 0.58 2.56 0.46 1.01 
 
Source:   John Tidd Pratt, Progress of savings banks, an account of the number of depositors and of the 
sums deposited in savings banks, in Great Britain and Ireland, divided into classes, on the 20th 
November in each of the years 1829to 1844,both inclusive and the increase or decrease in each year 
(London, 1845). 
 
Table 4.5 shows that Ireland, in comparison to the rest of the UK had a lower 
percentage of its accounts under £20, and a higher percentage of accounts in the 
bracket under £50, but above £20. Looking at table 4.5 it appears as though Scotland 
was the outlier with the larger proportion of accounts under £20, and the lower 
proportion of accounts in the other account sizes. This is a reflection of the more 
developed banking structure in Scotland where savings banks were used as feeders for 
the joint stock banks,58 and where higher income groupings had alternative investment 
options. 
Ó Gráda’s study of the Thurles Savings Bank contains information on the size 
of accounts based on the first deposit. Figure 4.4 is a reproduction of this work. It can 
                                                 
58
 Maxwell Gaskin, The Scottish banks: a modern survey (London, 1965), p. 61. 
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clearly be seen that the largest single grouping of new accounts opened were in the 
maximum of £30. Ó Gráda found that 39 per cent of all accounts were actually 
opened in trust. This meant that someone would lodge money in the name of a family 
member, usually a child. Ó Gráda believed that this was a deliberate strategy to 
overcome the annual restrictions that were statutorily imposed. There is evidence to 
suggest that this practice was common, as many depositors in the failed savings banks 
in Kerry had their savings in trust accounts.   
Figure 4.4  
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Source: Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Savings banks, famine, and financial contagion: Ireland in the 1840s and 
1850s’ in Irish Economic and Social History (forthcoming). 
 
It is not possible to directly compare the TSBs’ average deposit size with the 
loan fund deposit as information for both are not available for the exact same year. 
But it is possible to get a sense of the difference by viewing Porter’s statistics which 
were for the year 1840, shown in table 4.6. Unfortunately, Porter’s statistics do not 
give the average deposit size in all loan funds, but they do show the percentage 
distribution of depositors in different account sizes, making it possible to make 
tentative comparisons with Pratt’s statistics. 
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Table 4.6: Percentage of depositors in loan funds, c. 1840 
 £5 and under £5 to £10 £10 to 20 £50 and 
upwards 
 % % % % 
Ulster 21.27 13.85 17.65 47.24 
Leinster 12.96 18.03 18.59 50.42 
Connaught 3.28 16.39 26.23 54.10 
Munster 25.67 22.25 26.16 25.92 
Ireland 18.99 16.72 19.69 44.60 
 
Source: Henry John Porter, ‘A statistical account of loan funds in Ireland, for the year 1840’ in Journal 
of the Statistical Society of London, iv, no. 3 (October, 1841), pp 209-224. 
 
Porter’s statistics show that the loan funds and the savings banks had the same 
percentage of their depositors holding deposits within the classification of under £20. 
When comparing the two institutions, given that there was such a low ratio of loan 
fund capital to TSB deposits, and that it decreased over the time period, it is difficult 
to assess changes in the time period unless the variables are transformed into a metric 
which is more easily comparable. For this reason figure 4.5, which is a graph of the 
percentage change of the deposits in both institutions from 1842 to 1914, has been 
constructed.  
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As can clearly be seen, there is a sharp drop in both loan fund capital and TSB savings 
deposits in the late 1840s. 
 
4.3.3 Exogenous and endogenous shocks 
During the period 1840 to 1860 the TSBs and the loan funds both suffered three 
separate shocks which affected their structural developments in the latter years of the 
nineteenth century. Reference will be made to figure 4.5 when explaining the shocks 
which the TSBs and loan funds experienced during the period 1840 to 1860. 
A shock that affected both was the famine of the late 1840s. Much has been 
written on the famine and its aftermath, and it is not the intention of this chapter to 
comment at length about the famine as the topic has been dealt with by Aidan Hollis 
and Arthur Sweetman in relation to the loan funds and by Cormac Ó Gráda in relation 
to the TSBs.59  The object here is to highlight the affect of the famine on both 
financial institutions, the loan funds and the TSBs.  
Ó Gráda’s synopsis of the cause and duration of the famine is most apt for these 
purposes. Ó Gráda stated that: 
The proximate cause of the Great Irish Famine (1846-52) was the fungus Phytophthora 
infestans (or potato blight), which reached Ireland in the autumn of 1845. The fungus 
destroyed about one third of that year’s crop, and nearly all that of 1846. After a season’s 
remission, it also ruined most of the 1848 harvest.60 
 
The loan funds seem to have been more affected by the famine, with the loan 
fund capital decreasing by 34 per cent in 1847, compared with a 15 per cent decrease 
in the deposits of the TSBs.  The lower percentage decrease in the deposits of the 
TSBs may be accounted for by the location of the institutions, with a number of 
institutions located in urban areas. The higher average deposits in the TSBs led 
Cormac Ó Gráda to believe that the Irish middle classes were using their services and 
he stated that the ‘socio-economic profile’ of these depositors meant that they were 
the people least likely to be adversely affected by the famine.61  
The TSBs were commonly associated as being the savings bank of the 
industrious (urban) poor. The effects of the famine were not immediately realised, and 
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 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microfinance and Famine: The Irish Loan Funds during the 
Great Famine’ in World Development, xxxii, no. 9 (2004), pp 1509-1523; and Cormac Ó Gráda, 
‘Savings banks, famine, and financial contagion: Ireland in the 1840s and 1850s’ in Irish Economic 
and Social History (forthcoming). 
60
 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland’s great famine (Dublin, 2006), p. 7. 
61
 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Savings banks, famine, and financial contagion: Ireland in the 1840s and 1850s’ 
in Irish Economic and Social History (forthcoming). 
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it was even noted that many savings banks actually experienced increases in deposits 
in the initial years of the famine. An editorial in The Times commented on this. It 
stated that: 
Undoubtedly, the thought that would first cross the simple mind, at the mention of the 
savings banks, is that they would exhibit, in due proportion, the drain on the general 
resources. A famished people one expects to be poor. A population of eight millions, of 
whom three or four are on the charity list, and a large portion of the remainder are said to 
be actually dying, or dead, in ditches, cannot have much to lay by. They cannot pay rent. 
They boggle at rates. As for taxes, they have been excused that incumbrance. What can 
they possibly save? A savings bank in such a situation can be little else than a mockery 
of woe…the fact is the Irish savings-banks never were so prosperous…the only remark 
to be made now is that famine has not affected the savings of the people.62 
 
The Times article cited was published on 4 March 1847; therefore the savings 
bank figures cited would have been those for the calendar year ended 1846. There was 
a slight decrease of 2.25 per cent in the amount of savings deposits in TSBs from 
1845 to 1846. Savings continued to decrease in 1847, falling by 15.59 per cent, and in 
1847 they dropped by 44.65 per cent. In the same period savings had increased by 
5.11 per cent between 1845 and 1846 in the joint stock banks; there was a greater 
decrease in 1847 of 23.09 per cent as compared with the TSBs, but savings increased 
by 8.90 per cent between 1847 and 1848.63  
The famine did affect the TSBs, but the observation made by The Times can be 
explained by the mistargeting of the TSBs, as it was not the industrious poor who 
were using their services, but rather in fact it was higher socio-economic groupings. 
There was some decline in the number of depositors in Irish TSBs at the start of the 
famine period, but there was a significant decrease in the number of depositors as 
shown in figure 4.6 after 1848. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6  
                                                 
62
 Editorial ‘The returns of the Irish Savings Banks are, to say the least, a very remarkable fact’ in The 
Times (4 March, 1847), p. 4. 
63
 Percentage figures derived from data on savings banks in Thom’s Directory, and information on joint 
stock bank deposits from W. Neilson Hancock, Report on deposits and cash balances in joint stock 
banks in Ireland, 1840-1869 (Dublin, 1870). 
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Figure 4.7 shows the percentage change in the number of deposit accounts in the Irish 
TSBs over the period 1837 to 1914. As can be seen, the most significant decrease 
came during the famine years, which started in 1846. This seems to suggest that the 
TSBs were affected by the famine. 
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The deposits in the TSBs dropped dramatically in 1848, as can be seen in figure 4.1 
and figure 4.5, and the number of depositors decreased as can be seen in figure 4.6 
and 4.7. This drop was caused by an endogenous shock that came in the form of a 
series of high-profile bank failures, and these were unrelated to the famine. The most 
notable failure, the Cuffe Street savings bank, was caused by fraud and this was first 
detected in the 1820s, but the legal advice, of Tidd Pratt, recommended that the 
savings bank continue.64 
The failure of St. Peter’s Parish Savings Bank in Cuffe Street Dublin, was 
contemporaneous, but unrelated, to two failures in Kerry: the Tralee and Killarney 
savings bank. Confidence in the TSB system seems to have deteriorated as a result. Ó 
Gráda has suggested that the TSB system was affected by contagion caused by fears 
that other TSBs would be equally prone to collapse and insolvency, 65 and this in turn 
led to mass withdrawals.66 The fraud in the TSB system was significant not just in 
Ireland but in the UK as well: as such it will be discussed in greater detail below. 
A third shock that was alluded to by Charles Eason,67 but not by Cormac Ó 
Gráda, was the reduction in maximum interest rate payable to depositors of the TSBs 
in 1844. Eason suggested that this reduction in interest rate may have influenced 
interest-rate-sensitive depositors, again those being middle class depositors. If we 
look at yields of alternative investments for middle class depositors i.e. Consols, we 
can see that Consol yields were above the rate received by depositors as outlined in 
table 4.2.68 Perhaps a more significant effect of the reduction in interest rates was that 
which the CRND paid to the trustees of savings banks. As was shown in table 4.3 the 
Irish TSBs were loss-making; therefore the reduction in this subsidy would have put a 
significant amount of them out of business. 
The loan funds suffered from similar shocks to the TSBs, but in the case of the 
loan funds the interest rate shock was possibly of greater significance. It led to the 
interest rate being offered to depositors falling from 6 per cent per annum to 5 per 
cent per annum. The effects of this reduction in interest may not have been 
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 W. Neilson Hancock, ‘The present state of the savings bank question’ from the transactions and 
journal of the Dublin statistical society (Read 19 February, 1855, reprinted Dublin, 1856), pp 33-34. 
65Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Savings banks, famine, and financial contagion: Ireland in the 1840s and 1850s’. 
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 Report from the Select Committee on Savings Banks (Ireland); together with the proceedings of the 
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Committee on Savings Banks (Ireland). Appointed in the last session, H.C. 1849 (21), xiv, 283. 
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 Charles Eason, ‘The trustee savings banks of Great Britain and Ireland, from 1817 to 1928’, a paper 
read before the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, (Friday 15 November, 1929), p. 16. 
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immediately apparent, but subsequent events may have made 5 per cent seem like an 
unattractive risk premium to depositors and investors. The term risk premium is used 
here rather than the conventional definition of interest being the price of delayed 
consumption, as the loan funds offered financial instruments to investors that were 
inherently riskier than those available from joint stock banks, TSBs and direct 
purchase of Consols. The loan fund system was severely affected by the famine, as 
was shown in chapters 1 and 2. When the dust settled after the famine, the LFB 
believed that the money lost during the famine had not been caused by the famine, but 
by the defalcation of clerks working in the societies. It would be interesting to discern 
if the number of loan funds ceasing to operate coincided with the 1848 crisis in the 
savings banks; this would give us an indication as to whether there were any 
contagion effects caused by the crises in the TSB system. Or, rather, did the frauds in 
one form of financial self-help lead to a loss of confidence in the alternative form of 
financial self-help? 
Figure 4.8  
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Figure 4.8 shows that the largest decrease in loan fund capital came in 1847, but 
the largest percentage decrease in the number of loan fund societies registered with 
the LFB came in 1848. This may be due to the fears of trustees in loan funds about the 
repercussions of the TSB scandal and the effect of legislation on the liability of 
trustees, but it may also be related to the winding up of RLFs, discussed in chapter 1. 
Hollis and Sweetman have shown that there is some evidence of depositors switching 
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from TSBs to the security of a loan fund in Co. Clare in 1848.69 Given that this 
evidence is from 1848, one can assume it had more to do with the 1848 run on the 
savings banks, than as evidence of loan funds performing well during the famine. 
After the famine separate parliamentary enquires were held regarding the 
respective institutions. The savings bank committee found that the laws relating to 
savings banks were inadequate; the managers and trustees of the banks were not 
responsible for its loss unless they gave a written statement stating that they would 
accept liability, and they were only responsible if it could be proven that there was 
wilful neglect on the part of the managers. This led to the reform of the 1844 savings 
bank act in Ireland, and in Ireland alone.70 
The following statement is a summary of the legal position of Trustees in the 
early 1850s: 
The second section of the 11 & 12 Vict. enacted, that after 20 November 1848, any 
Trustee Manager of a Savings Bank in Ireland who had declared, or shall declare in 
writing, deposited with the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, that 
he was willing to be answerable for a specific amount only, being in no case less than 
£100 should not be liable to make good any deficiency which might thereafter arise in 
the funds of the Savings Bank beyond the amount specified in such writing, except in 
respect to moneys actually received by him, and not paid over. The law as to Great 
Britain is therefore that to make Trustees and Managers responsible for general 
deficiencies not arising out of their own individual acts, they must, by writing under their 
hands, make themselves so responsible; while as to Ireland the trustees and Managers 
would appear to be so responsible, but have power to limit that responsibility to a sum in 
no case less than £100.71 
 
The same faults regarding trustees appeared in the loan funds. There was no 
guarantee to depositors in the case of the loss of the deposits through fraud or 
malfeasance unless the trustee or trustees ‘declare[d] his or their willingness to be liable 
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in person or property for the specific sums so guaranteed’.72 The frauds in both 
institutions show a failure of the monitoring structures. The trustees of the TSBs were 
supposed to meet on a quarterly basis to audit the accounts of a society, and they were 
also supposed to send an annual account to the CRND. Both these methods of 
monitoring failed. The most notable failure in terms of the monitoring by the CRND 
is the fact that they were aware of the shortfall in the Cuffe Street savings bank as 
early as the 1830s but decided not to wind-up the bank. Tidd Pratt, in evidence to the 
committee on Irish savings banks in 1849, stated that he visited the Cuffe Street 
savings bank in 1830 but advised them not to close.73 A likely motivation for this was 
that the CRND were afraid that if they ordered the closure of the Cuffe Street savings 
bank this would start a general run on the TSBs.74  
The clerks in the TSBs were supposed to provide security and sureties for their 
position, essentially bonding. But this screening of staff also failed. The limitations of 
this system can be seen from the fact that the clerk in the Cuffe Street savings bank 
was a church minister. In England a clergyman was responsible for the defalcation of 
£24,000 in the Hertford savings bank,75 something which suggests that just because 
someone was a church minister did not necessarily mean the person would be 
trustworthy. There was also irregular, if any, monitoring by trustees. Frauds in loan 
funds had similar origins: trustees were supposed to meet regularly and inspect the 
books and monitor the society to ensure that there were no incidents of fraud. But 
there was no daily contact with the clerk and as such it was possible for fraud to take 
place. External audits took place, with inspectors employed by the LFB. But these 
inspectors were either incompetent or neglected their duty, as was discussed in 
chapter 1. The evidence from both the TSBs and the loan funds suggests that there 
was a moral hazard problem in both systems. This is because in both cases the 
government limited the liability of trustees and ensured that they had no incentive to 
monitor activities on a full-time basis. The government involvement in these 
institutions had also created a perception that it would guarantee deposits in both 
institutions, so again the trustees were given an incentive not to monitor the activities 
of the staff.  
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Finally, there was a belief in the early nineteenth century that the loan funds and TSBs 
should be merged. In evidence to the committee on loan funds in 1854, R. R. Madden, 
the secretary of the LFB, raised the idea of uniting the loan funds and the TSBs into 
an umbrella organisation which would supervise both institutions and provide regular 
inspections.76 His plan was not acted upon even though it would perhaps have been 
beneficial to the TSB system, although given the calibre of loan fund inspectors the 
benefit is questionable. There was a need for external monitoring, and the TSBs did 
create their own external monitoring system, the Trustee Inspection Committee, but 
that was not until 1887.77  
Another writer, P. J. Ryan, also proposed a unification of loan funds and savings 
banks in 1838.78 Ryan’s plan proposed 
That the new institution shall combine the most approved rules of savings’ banks for the 
reception of money, with a system for the circulation of it in loans to humble life, in each 
parish, reserving the profits for local exigencies, according to the usage of most of the 
continental states.79 
 
Ryan proposed that this new institution be run by the Post Office and allow 
local circulation, instead of exporting the money and reducing the Irish money supply. 
Ryan stated that: 
If we can but retain in circulation (the great desideratum of Ireland) the future  savings of 
humble industry, which have been heretofore, a caput mortuum funded abroad in what 
are called Saving’s Banks, sponging up the life’s blood of our country, pauperising the 
majority of the resident inhabitants, and taking the seed out of the ground where it ought 
to increase and multiply; the distribution of such capital, which it were sound policy, but 
common justice to leave amongst use, under parental regulation, even that capital at 
honest interest dispersed through our virtuous, endeavouring, but struggling people, 
would make a garden of the Emerald Isle. (sic)80 
 
These plans to merge the loan funds and the TSBS were based on the 
assumption of continuing the loan fund lending methodology. It also assumed that 
there were investment opportunities within Ireland. One of the main investments 
referenced in the loan fund literature was the purchase of pigs. But in the post-famine 
period there would have been a negative return on this type of investment. This was 
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due to the fact that the main input in pig farming before the famine was potatoes, and 
potato yields were highly volatile and unpredictable in the post-famine period due to 
the continued existence of potato blight. 
 
4.4 TSB fraud 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the number of TSBs in the UK from 1829 to 1922. The number 
gradually increased from 1829 to 1847 when it reached 595. There was a slight 
fluctuation in the number in the late 1840s and early 1850s, but the growth in TSBs 
recovered and reached a peak in 1861, declining thereafter. 
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Source: Oliver H. Horne, A history of savings banks (London, 1947). 
 
Figure 4.10 shows the number of TSBs in Ireland from 1859 to 1914. The Irish 
TSBs continually declined from 1863 onwards until they reached a plateau in the 
early 1900s. 
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Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
There were two separate parliamentary returns that highlighted the number of TSB 
closures. The first return stated that 24 TSBs closed in Ireland between 1844 and 
1852, and the second return stated that 32 TSBs closed in Ireland between 1852 and 
1888.81  
Figure 4.11 shows the growth rates of savings in GB, UK and Irish TSBs. In the 
period covered by the graph there are two phases when the savings held by TSBs 
experienced negative growth, in the late 1840s and the early 1860s. In the 1840s the 
decline in savings held can be explained by the recessionary period, and also more 
significantly there were a number of high-profile frauds in Ireland which were 
followed by runs on the savings banks. They again experienced negative growth in the 
early 1860s due to the transfer of a number of TSB deposits to the POSB, discussed 
below. 
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Figure 4.11  
Growth rates in savings in TSBs in GB, UK, and in Ireland, 
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Sources: Appendix in Oliver H. Horne, A history of savings banks (London, 1947), and Thom’s 
directory, various years. 
 
A number of frauds involving TSBs were uncovered in the 1840s and 1850s, and 
these frauds were believed to have unravelled confidence in the TSBs in general. The 
first frauds to be uncovered occurred in Ireland, one in Dublin and two in Kerry. 
These were not deemed sufficient to merit questioning of the entire TSB system as it 
stood in 1848, and there was not much critical thought of the TSB system being 
undertaken outside of Ireland. The main problem which the frauds revealed was the 
limitation to the state guarantee for depositors, and the limitation of liability of 
trustees. The problem stemmed from the 1844 Savings bank act which stated in 
paragraph vi: 
…No Trustee or Manager of any Savings Bank shall be liable to make good any 
Deficiency which may hereafter arise in the Funds of any Savings Bank, unless such 
Persons shall have respectively declared, by Writing under their Hands and deposited 
with the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, that they are willing so 
to be answerable; and it shall be lawful for each of such Persons, or for such Persons 
collectively, to limit his or their Responsibility to such Sum as shall be specified in any 
such Instrument: Provided always, that the Trustee and Manager of any such Institution 
shall be and is hereby declared to be personally responsible and liable for all Monies 
actually received by him on account of or to and for the Use of such Institution, and not 
paid over or disposed of in the Manner directed by the Rules of the said Institution…82 
 
This reduced the liability of trustees and effectively created a moral hazard 
problem, as now the trustees had no incentive to supervise the clerks as vigilantly as 
previously when there was an element of liability. The 1844 Act also created a legal 
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black hole, as it stated that trustees and managers of savings banks were responsible 
for moneys they ‘actually received’, and the CRND would be ‘answerable’ for money 
they received. The question then arose in the case of the Irish frauds, and later the 
English and Welsh frauds: who was responsible if neither the Trustees nor the CRND 
received the money? The 1844 Act did not say who was responsible for the actions of 
the officers of a savings bank, and it was the officers who invariably committed the 
frauds. In most of the cases money was given to the treasurer of the bank out of office 
hours, and not duly recorded in the bank’s accounts.  
         The response of the UK government to the Irish frauds, and contagion problems 
they created, was to treat the TSB problem in Ireland as separate to the rest of the UK 
and to assume that the problems were systemic in the Irish TSBs, as opposed to a 
problem with the wider TSB structure. An act was passed for Ireland in 1848 which 
increased the liability of Trustees of Irish TSBs.83 Under this act the trustees were to 
be liable for £100, and larger amounts if they expressed their willingness in writing;84 
also the act stipulated that Trustees must appoint an auditor to annually audit the 
accounts of the savings banks.85 These were significant changes, but ones which were 
not extended to the rest of the UK. During the debate on the bill for savings banks, it 
had been intended to apply the changes to the UK as a whole,86 but there was 
resistance from the GB savings banks, and the Act was only passed for Ireland.  
         The perception of the necessity of reforming the savings bank legislation for GB 
changed when a number of frauds similar to the Irish cases occurred in a number of 
TSBs in England and Wales, which again revealed the limitations of the existing 
legislation. In Rochdale there was a deficit of £71,715 owing to depositors caused by 
the machinations of the treasurer George Haworth. But as the CRND had not received 
the money, the government guarantee did not extend to depositors of the Rochdale 
savings bank. A saying that originated in Rochdale after this event was, “We will 
spend our money rather than George Haworth shall have it.”87 Following the 
Rochdale case, a number of other frauds came to light in GB. The extent of these 
frauds showed that the cause of fraud was similar in a number of episodes and showed 
that the TSB system as regulated by parliament was an inadequate institution and 
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needed reform. Various attempts were made to reform the TSBs in the 1850s, but 
these did not amount to much as there was organised opposition to the bills from the 
TSBs in the UK. As was stated above, after 1848 there were different laws regulating 
TSBs in Ireland and Great Britain. The difference in the law is highlighted by table 
4.7. Given the number of TSBs in the UK, shown in figure 4.12, and the number of 
TSBs in Ireland, shown in figure 4.13, table 4.7 shows the effect of the reform of the 
savings bank law in Ireland in comparison to the rest of the UK. 
 
Table 4.7: Number of TSBs in the UK where trustees have made themselves 
responsible to the depositors for deficiencies, c. 1852 
 TSBs 
England 4 
Wales 1 
Scotland 1 
Ireland 46 
 
Source: Return to an address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 26 April 1852;--for, 
"returns from each savings bank in the United Kingdom, of the house or building in which the business 
is transacted; stating, whether the building is the property of the trustees, and if it is used for any other 
and what purpose, or is hired, or gratuitously lent; stating, also, whether the secretary or actuary, or 
any other officer, resides in such house or building, and whether rent is paid by such officer for such 
occupation:" "of the names of each trustee and manager, and the number that have signed any writing, 
making themselves responsible for any deficiency, pursuant to the act 7 & 8 Vict. c. 83, s. 6, and for 
what amount each is so responsible:" "and, of the number of days on which the savings bank was open 
during the year ending the 20th day of November 1851, for the receipt and withdrawal of deposits; and 
the number of days, if any, during the same period, on which the savings bank was opened for that 
purpose without a trustee or manager being present, and by whom the entry of receipt and withdrawal 
of deposits is signed in a depositor's book.", H.C. 1852 (521), xxviii, 757. 
 
         The resistance from the GB TSBs to reform led to the formation of a special 
commission to investigate the issue of savings banks in 1858. The commission was 
comprised of a number of members sympathetic to the interests of savings banks and 
focused on four areas. 88 These were: 
 1. The course of legislation from 1817 to 1857 
 2. The central authority of the National Debt Office, and the practice with    
     respect to investment and payment of balances 
 3. The question of Parliamentary guarantee, and the relations between the 
    Central and local offices 
 4.The mode of providing for future expenditure.89 
 
The commission went on to make recommendations based on their enquiry into 
the four different areas. Their recommendation for the first area of inquiry was that 
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the existing laws be ‘amended and consolidated’.90 The report went into depth dealing 
with the issues relating to the second grievance. The commission objected to the way 
that the National Debt Office had used the funds of the savings banks for investments 
and recommended that the CRND be ‘relieved from the office of investing the monies 
of savings bank’.91 Coincidentally the inquiry unearthed evidence of the use of the 
savings bank funds during the Crimean War through the purchase of Exchequer bills. 
The commission recommended that a new body be set up specifically for the 
investment of savings bank funds, that not all savings bank funds be invested in 
Consols and that at least one third of the funds be invested in higher yielding 
securities.  
The third area of the inquiry did not get as much attention as the second. In fact 
it seems as though the committee was more preoccupied with the second. The 
commission acknowledged that ‘a very general impression prevails throughout the 
country that the government is bound to make good any deficiency whenever a 
savings bank has failed…this impression is not warranted by the laws which regulate 
savings banks.’92 The problem stemmed from earlier legislation which limited the 
liability of trustees, and to some extent it made trustee liability voluntary. This was 
one of the main problems with the TSBs in the 1840s and 1850s. It was not given 
much attention; in fact in the report the space of four paragraphs were given to the 
question. The commission made some recommendations concerning this, namely that 
an external inspector be appointed to audit the accounts of certified TSBs.93 This was 
an important recommendation as up until this point the auditing of savings banks was 
decentralised. The fourth area was related to the second. The committee stated that:  
…the payment of interest and expense of management ought not to be a source of annual 
loss to the State. By investing a portion of the capital in Parliamentary securities, which 
will yield a larger return than three per cent, and by applying to the purpose of a 
management fund the interest of the present unappropriated surplus, and of all dormant 
claims after the expiration of 10 years, your committee think it probable not only that the 
present rate of interest, viz., 3l 5s., can be provided, but all expenses of the Commission 
may be defrayed, and even a balance may be put by yearly towards liquidating the 
deficiency arising from the transactions of former years. (sic.)94 
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Here it can be seen that the recommendations for the fourth area of the inquiry 
overlapped with those of the second. In summary, the 1858 commission of savings 
concluded that a number of reforms in the existing legislation would be adequate to 
solve the problems in the TSB system.  
The recommendations of the 1858 Savings bank commission were not acted 
upon, primarily because there was a change in government before any action could be 
taken. William Gladstone first became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1853 and 
remained in that capacity until 1855 when there was a change in government. The 
commission of inquiry into the savings bank came under a different administration, 
and that government fell before the recommendations could be implemented. 
Gladstone, who returned as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1859, did not act on the 
recommendations of the 1858 committee, and he believed that they did not question 
the management of their banks.95  Under his guidance a bill was introduced to the 
House of Commons which intended to deal with the savings banks issue, but it only 
attempted to widen the scope of investments for savings bank funds.96 Gladstone’s 
savings bank bill was defeated due to opposition from the savings banks.  
 
4.5.1 The Post Office Savings Bank - antecedents 
The establishment of a national savings bank in the UK is believed to have been first 
proposed in 1807 by Samuel Whitbread.97 Whitbread drafted a bill on poor law 
reforms incorporating the establishment of a savings bank for poor labourers, and 
with the institution being attached to the Post Office. Whitbread’s bill also included 
the establishment of an insurance programme for the poor.98 The bill was read twice, 
but not enacted.99 It is worthwhile to analyse the motives which underpinned this 
reform effort, as the inventors of the POSB in the 1860s referred back to it as an 
example.100  
         The main intention of Whitbread’s bill was to reduce the high incidence of the 
poor rates. This was to be done in a twofold fashion, by reforming the levying of the 
poor rate to make it more equitable, and by reforming those who might be prone to 
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make use of poor relief. His policies for dealing with those who were the consumers 
of poor relief were methods which he believed gave greater incentives to productive 
and industrious behaviour.  Whitbread stated that: 
The principles on which I would proceed, to effect this most desirable object, are these: 
to exalt the character of the labouring classes of your community. To give the labourer 
consequence in his own eyes, and in those of his fellows, to make him a fit companion 
for himself, and fit to associate with civilised men. To excite him to acquire property, 
that he may taste its sweets; and to give him inviolable security for that property, when it 
is acquired…101 
 
Whitbread’s plan was influenced by Malthusian economics.102 His savings bank 
scheme was for the establishment of a savings bank to be directed solely at the lower 
classes. Whitbread stated that: 
I would propose the establishment of one great national institution, in the nature of a 
bank, for the use and advantage of the labouring classes alone: that it should be placed in 
the metropolis, and be under the control and management of proper persons.103 
 
To do this he advocated minimum and maximum annual deposit limits, and total 
deposit limits.104 The deposits received would be used to purchase government 
securities.105 The timing of this bill is also important. Whitbread stated in the 
summation of his speech that he hoped by establishing such a bank it would give the 
ordinary people a stake in the country, and thus give them an incentive not to disrupt 
the status quo, or rather to not participate in revolutionary activities: 
Your kingdom safe from the insult of the enemy, because every man knows the worth of 
that which he is called upon to defend. In the provision for the security of the savings of 
the poor I see encouragement to frugality, security to property, and the large mass of 
people connected with the state and indissolubly bound to its preservation.106 
 
From reading the comments following Whitbread’s speech, there does not 
appear to be any ideological opposition. Rather the opposition was to the enormity 
and difficulty in implementing the wide variety of schemes that he was proposing. 
These administrative difficulties were deemed a sizeable obstacle to its 
implementation.107 Not long after Whitbread’s speech an independent savings bank 
movement developed that shared Whitbread’s motives of encouraging working class 
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thrift, and this too may have been a factor in a lack of a desire to introduce a state 
savings bank. 
         It therefore appears that the national savings bank scheme was not instigated at 
this time due to logistical difficulties and because of an emerging private savings bank 
sector. As discussed above, savings banks spread in the early 1810s and were given 
legislative support and encouragement ex post facto. In this environment there was no 
inexorable need to establish a centralised national savings bank institution. 
It must also be noted that Whitbread’s plan was not the only such instance of 
proposals to use the Post Office for the purpose of a savings bank. Horne listed a 
number of individuals who reached similar conclusions, independent of Whitbread.108 
Many were British, but there were also a number of Irish ideas, most notably from 
Nelson Hancock,109 professor of political economy in the University of Dublin. There 
were also references in the loan fund literature to the potential for using the post 
office as a financial institution. The proposal raised by P. B. Ryan, discussed above, 
included the Post Office offering lending services as well.110  
 
4.5.2 The 1861 Post Office Savings Bank Act 
Smiles attributed the idea of the POSB to four men: Whitbread, Roland-Hill, Sikes, 
and Gladstone.111 Whitbread was given credit for the idea of the POSB, Roland-Hill 
for establishing the money order department in the Post Office, Sikes for lobbying for 
a POSB, and Gladstone who ‘having clearly foreseen the immense benefits of Post 
Office Savings Banks, brought in a bill and carried it through Parliament in 1861’.112 
As was stated above, Gladstone attempted to introduce a savings bank bill but his 
efforts were defeated due to opposition from the savings banks. Shortly after this 
defeat, Gladstone received a letter from Charles William Sikes of Huddersfield 
recommending the use of the Post Office as a savings bank. Horne summarised the 
political economy of the savings bank question as follows: 
If the Trustee Savings Banks were determined to oppose him, why should he not use the 
machinery of the post office to run a state savings bank which would encourage thrift in 
places where no savings facilities yet existed, bring more money to the exchequer and, 
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incidentally, either kill or reinvigorate by competition the old savings banks, which had 
proved such a thorn in the flesh of a succession of Chancellors of the Exchequer?113 
 
Sike’s proposal returned to the Whitbread plan of using the Post Office to 
collect savings. 
A bill for the establishment of the POSB was introduced in 1861 under the 
guidance of Gladstone still in the capacity of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Gladstone 
stated that ‘the object which he had in view in dealing with the question was to afford 
facilities for the deposit of savings of small amounts for those who did not possess 
them, or possessed them but imperfectly, under the present system of savings 
banks.’114 Gladstone also stated that: 
One class of depositors, who desired secrecy in their investments, would prefer the new 
institutions’ while another class, who wished to act under the immediate view of their 
local superiors, would prefer the existing savings banks… that it would give to large 
numbers of people in this country facilities for investing their savings which they did not 
now possess .115 
 
The Postmaster General, Lord Stanley of Alderly, stated that the purpose of the 
POSB was: 
To give greater facilities for the investment of the industrious classes, and to give to 
savings banks’ depositors a government guarantee through the medium of the post 
office…The existing savings banks were found to be insufficient in number, inadequate 
in the accommodation they afforded, and insecure as to the repayment of the deposits 
until the money had passed into the hands of the commissioners for the reduction of the 
national debt… it was obvious that when a working man formed a good intention to 
invest his small savings there was a danger lest he should spend his money if there were 
no savings bank in his neighbourhood, or if some few days might elapse before he could 
invest it. Great losses had occurred to the depositors in savings banks since savings banks 
had been established these losses amounted to not less than £290,000.116 
 
Lord Stanley of Alderly believed that the proposed Post Office Savings Bank 
‘will afford the depositors a more complete security, and a much larger amount of 
accommodation than had been contemplated in any previous proposal’.117 Taking the 
comments of both architects of the POSB it would seem that their intention was to 
extend savings services throughout the UK and to offer a service that had greater 
security than before. Gladstone referred to the fact that the savings banks were not 
opened daily, but of the number of savings banks only ‘a small proportion were open 
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for a sufficient number of hours in the week’.118 Gladstone compared the then existing 
600 or so savings banks to the number of money order offices, between 2,000 and 
3,000. Gladstone intended to use this existing infrastructure, saying that it was 
‘machinery ready to hand and admirably adapted for extending the usefulness of the 
savings bank system’.119 Gladstone was of the belief that if the POSB was introduced 
it would result in an increase in savings, ‘as readier means of laying by their small 
savings were afforded them than they now possessed’.120 This view was later support 
by Smiles who believed that: ‘the practice of economy depends very much upon the 
facilities provided for the laying by of small sums of money. Let a convenient savings 
bank be provided, and deposits gradually flow into it.’121 
The bill to establish the POSB caused a lively debate in both houses of 
parliament. The principles of encouraging thrift, and giving adequate protection for 
those who saved, were not opposed. Gladstone believed that opposition to the bill 
boiled down to two camps, those who believed that the POSB would not succeed, and 
those who believed that it would succeed but would become too big.122 To some 
extent this does summarise the ground for opposition, but some of the points made in 
opposition to the creation of the POSB are worthy of reference. Opposition in the 
debates seems to have come mainly from representatives of the existing TSBs, and 
was thereby biased in favour of their self-interest. Sotheron Estcourt perceived that: 
He [Gladstone] proposed to take the power to establish by the machinery of the Bill a 
great national bank with branches all over the country, at any one of which branches it 
would be in the power of any person to deposit any amount of money, and receive in 
return a certificate or piece of paper, duly stamped at the central office, on the production 
of which at any subsequent period he would be entitled to have his money back again.123 
 
As an appeasement to the opposition from TSBs, interest in the POSB was set at 
a rate lower than what was the prevailing rate in the TSBs. In regards to deposit 
account annual and total limits, the POSB was identical to the TSBs.  
There were various other grounds for opposition. Questions were raised about 
the centralisation of funds in London. John Vance, M.P. representing Dublin,124 
objected to the centralisation of deposits in London rather than being centred in the 
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provincial capitals as was the case under the existing money order system.125 But 
Gladstone objected to this, stating that: 
Nothing could be more absurd than to create three centres of investment and three 
centres of management of money; but such would be the effect of the amendment, for 
England, Scotland, and Ireland… whole operation of investment must be central.126 
 
Mr Ayrton raised the argument that the creation of a national bank would ‘act as 
a powerful inducement to the working men to entrust their money to the government 
rather than to their own benefit societies’.127 This argument was overlooked, and it 
was the problem which the Raiffeisen co-operatives, discussed in chapter 6, faced in 
Ireland. Another important argument was that of secrecy. Francis Crossley stated that: 
Working men were often very much afraid to let their masters know that they were 
saving money from a notion that it would lead to a reduction of their wages, and under 
the present system the masters were very often concerned in the management of these 
banks and could know exactly how each man’s account stood. By this new arrangement 
each account would be a secret between the depositor and the postmaster.128 
  
This was significant because the trustees of the old savings banks were usually 
men of local repute, and in Ireland they were normally landlords. The POSB offered 
savers the chance to hide their financial position from trustees, such as their 
employers and landlords, so as to avert pay-cuts or rent increases. Smiles argued that 
secrecy and security were the main advantages of the POSB.129 
The arguments in the House of Lords centred on the use of the funds received 
from the POSB. This was mainly an objection to increasing the power of the 
Chancellor to manipulate the money market as previous Chancellors had been shown 
to have done with the savings bank funds in the evidence given to the 1858 savings 
bank commission.130 There were also issues raised as to what would be done with the 
savings collected by the POSB. Would it be used in the same way that the funds for 
the TSBs had been used? That is, would the CRND be responsible for the investment 
of these funds, which the 1858 commission had recommended be changed. The 
Marquee of Clanricarde stated that ‘it might be right that the government should 
provide the opportunity of investing their money; but it ought to have been stated 
exactly what was proposed to be done to effect this, and how the money deposited 
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was to be invested.’131 Other issues raised in the Lords were to do with the quality of 
the staff in the post office and whether they would be equal to the task.132  
 
4.5.3 POSB – institutional infrastructure 
The post office was in an ideal position to offer banking services as it already had an 
existing infrastructure.  The Economist complained that the existing TSB system was 
inadequate as it did not provide an extensive service:  
They [Savings Banks] are least likely to exist where they are most wanted. If it is 
advisable that the state should receive the money of the poor, it is most advisable, that it 
should do so in places where there are fewer other persons to take care of it – in the 
“uncared for parishes”. Yet it is precisely here that we very rarely find a Savings Bank. 
There are no local trustees to start or administer one.133  
 
In contrast the post office prior to the establishment of the POSB already had a 
vast network of post offices. Perry observed that: 
Clearly the Post Office was well suited to run what became the largest banking system in 
the country. There were over 14,000 branches by the turn of the century. The operation 
did not demand special technical or engineering expertise, as did the telegraphs and the 
telephone. Rather the experience of managing the bookkeeping procedure of the Money 
Order Office served the department well enough. The savings banks also did not demand 
a heavy investment in plant and equipment. As the business grew, more clerks were 
simply hired to tally the figures and verify the accounts. Further, the programme did not 
necessitate the purchase or nationalisation of a private industry. The Trustee Banks were 
allowed to coexist with the competing departmental system. Moreover, the department 
was energetic in explaining the system to the public.134 
 
The Post Office was in a highly suitable situation to operate a national savings 
bank in 1861, primarily due to the fact that since 1839 it had been operating a money 
transfer service throughout the United Kingdom. Prior to 1839, this service had been 
carried out informally, and the profits from the informal service were pocketed by 
employees in the Post Office. An internal reform formalised this service, and 
extended the money transfer system, known as the money order (MO) system, 
throughout the UK. Money orders were a way for people to transfer small sums of 
money. Up until 1860 the limit on such money orders was £5 per transaction; the 
money order system is discussed in greater detail in chapter 8. The purpose for raising 
the MO system in this context is to show how a change in the infrastructure of the 
Post Office had given the Post Office experience of dealing with small sums of money 
on a large scale. To give an idea of the scale of the MO dealings of the Post Office 
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prior to 1861, figure 4.12 shows UK MO activity in the Post Office from 1840 to 
1861. 
Figure 4.12  
UK Money Orders, number and amount: 1840-1861
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Source: Reports of the Postmaster General, various years. 
 
As can be seen in figure 4.12, there was sizeable growth in the number of 
money orders processed by the Post Office between 1840 and 1861. From 1842 to 
1861 there was a 319 per cent increase in the amount that was transferred via the Post 
Office MO service. Table 4.8 shows the number of MO offices operating throughout 
the UK. Each one of these offices had the potential of being transformed into a 
savings bank.  Smiles stated that: 
They [MO office]  held the money until it was drawn, and paid it out on a proper voucher 
being presented. The Post Office was, in fact, a bank for the transmission of money, 
holding it for periods of from twenty-four hours to weeks and months. By enabling it to 
receive more money from more depositors, and by increasing the time of holding it, 
allowing the usual interest, it became to all intents and purposes a National Bank of 
deposit.135  
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Table 4.8: Number of money Order offices open in the UK, 1854-55 to 1860-61  
Year 1854-55 1855-56 1856-57 1857-58 1858-59 1859-60 1860-61 
POMO 1872 1935 2095 2233 2360 2481 2594 
 
Source: Reports of the Postmaster General, various years. 
 
Figure 4.12 and table 4.8 taken together are evidence that the Post Office was in a 
better position to provide a national savings bank in 1861 than it had been in 1807. 
Walter Bagehot’s views on how deposit banks developed were that the prior existence 
of a money transfer service and of note circulation services was important in gaining 
public confidence. Bagehot stated that: 
These [money transfer and note circulation] are all uses other than those of deposit 
banking which banks supplied that afterwards became in our English sense deposit 
banks. By supplying these uses, they gained the credit that afterwards enabled them to 
gain a living as deposit banks. Being trusted for one purpose, they came to be trusted for 
a purpose quite different, ultimately far more important, though at first less keenly 
pressing.136 
 
        This argument can be extended to the Post Office. Perhaps a better statistic 
which stood in favour of the Post Office was the amount of losses due to fraud and 
malfeasance in the MO office. The figure was trivial, £6,000 in the entire period,137 
and was used as justification for the use of the Post Office as a savings bank. In fact, 
between 1841 and 1860 only £5,392 was lost through fraud out of a total of 
£171,916,888 money orders that were sent, or losses of 0.003 per cent.138 The value of 
trustworthiness was not one which could be undervalued at the time, especially in 
light of the TSB troubles of the 1840s and 50s. The government also had experience 
of running a savings bank after the establishment of the military savings bank in 
1842,139 and these military savings banks predated the Crimean War (1853-1856).  
The money invested in TSBs, under the savings bank legislation, was 
guaranteed by the government. But this guarantee was subject to the government 
receiving the money in London; the guarantee did not protect against malfeasance at 
the local office. As The Economist observed: 
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They profess – at least they are understood – to give a government guarantee for all 
money, deposited with them, and yet in practice do not give it. This defect does not arise 
from any legal mistake or confusion. No thing can be clearer than law on this subject, - 
Nothing is better understood among financiers and economists; but nothing is worse 
understood by the class of person who have their money in Savings Banks. The law is 
that the Government is only responsible for whatever sums it actually receives.140 
 
         A new network of government backed savings banks was created in 1861 with 
the passing of the Post Office Savings Bank act.141 The POSB act registered the Post 
Office as a savings bank under the existing savings bank legislation, except with some 
notably differences: namely that there was a 100 per cent state guarantee. The POSB 
accepted a minimum deposit of 1 shilling, with a 1 pence transaction charge. There 
was an annual deposit limit of £30 and a maximum deposit limit of £150. The interest 
which the POSB paid to depositors was 2.5 per cent, ‘but such interest shall not be 
calculated on any amount less than one pound or some multiple thereof, and not 
commence until the first day of the calendar month next following the day of deposit, and 
shall cease on the first day of the calendar month in which such deposit is withdrawn’.142  
The rate paid to depositors in the POSB was below that paid to depositors in TSBs, 
shown in column 2 in table 4.2. The reason for this, according to Gladstone, was to 
avoid ‘all suspicions of unfairness’.143 Ten day’s notice was required for the 
withdrawal of savings.144 The POSB gave complete secrecy, and the names of 
depositors were not to be disclosed except only to the Postmaster General.145 Deposits 
received by the POSB were to be paid-over to the CRND146 and ‘the monies remitted 
to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt under the authority of 
this Act shall be invested in some or in all of the Securities in which the funds of 
savings banks established under the existing Laws may be invested’.147 This appears 
to be an attempt to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the powers of investment of the 
CRND. The new POSB competed directly with the pre-existing TSBs and other 
institutions that provided savings services. But as Perry rightly noted, ‘the one great 
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advantage which the Post Office system possessed over its rivals was its absolute 
security’.148  
 
4.6 Introduction of the POSB in Ireland; impact and implications 
 
TSBs had been a dominant provider of savings services in the early nineteenth 
century in Ireland. The market dominance of the TSBs as the avenue for people to 
save was challenged by the creation of the POSB. The post office had been well 
established across the British Isles and now they provided the service of savings 
banking. In 1861 the Post Office Savings bank was established in the UK. The Times 
believed that: 
The benefit of the new Post-office Savings-banks will be that every poor man in the 
country will have a bank within a mile or two where he will be able to put his money, 
subject to certain regulations. The bank is brought to him, instead of his going miles to 
the Bank. He is thus a vast gainer in vicinity and convenience, and this makes him a 
gainer too, in another important respect. He need not wait weeks with his money in his 
drawer till there is an opportunity of going to the town where the Savings bank is, eight 
or ten miles off. As soon as two or three shillings have been accumulated he can 
immediately take a walk to his Bank and deposit them. One shilling even is accumulation 
enough. “Deposits of one shilling, or of any number of shillings, or of pounds and 
shillings, will be received from any depositor at the Post-Office Savings Banks.”149 
 
 
The POSB facilitated savings and accumulated considerable deposits over the 
course of the nineteenth century. The POSB was also non-discriminatory in that they 
were open ‘to married women, who are allowed to have their own accounts there in 
their names, unless the husbands object in writing’.150 
It must be emphasised that Gladstone & co created the POSB in 1861, not as a 
response to the crisis in the Irish TSBs, but as a response to the English crisis. The 
POSB was a national bank; by national it must be stressed that the nation was the UK, 
and it centralised in London. Therefore, when the POSB was introduced to Ireland it 
was an exogenous innovation and its introduction in Ireland has been overlooked. For 
example, in Ó Gráda’s Ireland: a new economic history the reasons for the 
introduction of the POSB are not outlined. 151  
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Goldsmith has suggested that the historical development of a national financial 
structure is path-dependent.152 The implications of this view is that new forms of 
financial institutions would find it difficult to establish themselves based on the pre-
existence of a financial structure. In terms of Goldsmith’s hypothesis, the events of 
the 1840s in both Ireland and further afield in the UK were the shocks necessary to 
enable the POSB to be established and to alter the path of development in the Irish 
financial structure in the nineteenth century. The crises of the 1840s and 50s led to the 
establishment of the POSB which became the largest branch banking institution in the 
UK.  The crises in both the TSBs and loan funds in the 1840s would probably have 
seen them eliminated from the market through competition from the joint stock banks. 
If this path was not altered it would have seen the emergence of a large joint stock 
banking structure, but this exogenous shock altered the path of development in the 
Irish financial structure.  
         Although not an Irish innovation, the POSB were seen as a welcome addition to 
the savings bank system in the respect that the Irish TSBs were in a fragile state. 
Evidence from Robert Decker, trustee and honorary secretary of the Meath Street 
Savings Bank, to the 1858 Savings Bank Committee stated that the bank had 
experienced two runs in its history.153 One run came about in 1848 which lasted for 6 
months; the reason that Decker gave for this was contagion caused by the failure of 
the Cuffe Street Savings Bank in Dublin. A second run came in 1853 which lasted for 
3 months,154 but for this Decker said that ‘we are unable to give satisfactory reason for 
that run’.155 Decker’s evidence went on to say that the public had become aware of the 
incomplete government security in the TSBs, and the run coincided with the 
discussion of a savings bank bill in parliament which made it evident that the savings 
banks did not possess government security.156 Decker also stated that prior to the 
Cuffe Street Savings Bank crash there was a common belief that the TSBs had 
government security.157 The run was alleviated when the Meath Street bank published 
a letter it had received from the CRND. When Decker was asked if the bank had 
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experienced any other runs he answered in the negative, but said the savings bank had 
been experiencing the ‘general’ trend in Ireland, that being the annual number of 
withdrawals exceeding the number of deposits.158 On the occasion of both runs in 
1848 and 1853, the Meath Street Savings Bank did not uncover any errors in its 
bookkeeping practices that would suggest fraud,159 so the run in 1853, and the 
continued withdrawals thereafter, can be seen as a general loss of confidence in the 
savings bank system in Ireland. The Cork Savings Bank also experienced a run in the 
aftermath of the 1848 frauds, and also in the 1850s as a result of fraud in the 
Tipperary Joint stock bank.160 Ó Gráda’s analysis of the Thurles Savings Bank found 
that it was also affected by contagion.161 This is perhaps an important piece of 
information regarding the declining number of depositors in both TSBs and loan 
funds as people are being made aware of the shortfalls in perceived government 
security in these institutions.  
The 1858 commission on savings banks was essentially an internal enquiry into 
the savings bank system, and at times did not appear to be in touch with the reality of 
the situation. An example of this can be seen in the line of questioning directed 
towards Decker which seems to have been more concerned with proving that the 
TSBs would not contribute to the insolvency of the UK. For example, one of the 
questions was if ‘the risk to the government was nothing?’162 It appears as though the 
priority of the commission was to convince the government that their TSB system 
would not make the state financially insolvent, rather than focusing on the more 
immediate problem of the evaporation of confidence. 
         This is the context in which the POSB was introduced in Ireland in 1862, with 
300 branches opening throughout the country, and by 1864 the number of branches 
had risen to 510.163 To give a sense of scale to this event, table 4.9 compares the 
number of branches of various financial institutions operating in 1862. 
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Table 4.9: Banking institutions and number of branches/units in 1862 
Name of institution Number of branches/units 
POSB 300 
Joint Stock Banks 196 
TSBs 53 
Loan funds 105 
 
Sources: Appendix i, in the Eight report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, [2984], H.C. 
1862, xxvii, 393. and Thom’s Directory, 1862. 
 
As can be seen, the number of POSB branches in 1862 was approximately 6 times the 
number of TSBs, and 3 times the number of loan funds. The joint stock banks appear 
to be the institution with the nearest number of branches. But taken individually, as in 
table 4.10, no individual bank matches the scale of the POSB branch network in 
Ireland. 
 
Table 4.10: Joint stock Bank branches and POSB in 1862 
Institution Number of branches 
POSB 300 
National Bank 52 
Provincial Bank of Ireland 43 
Bank of Ireland 26 
Belfast Banking company 25 
Ulster Bank 25 
Northern Banking company 20 
Union Bank of Ireland 4 
Hibernian Joint stock bank 3 
English & Irish bank 1 
Royal Bank - 
 
Sources: Appendix i, in the Eight report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, [2984], H.C. 
1862, xxvii, 393. and Thom’s Directory, 1862. 
 
Given that the majority of the banks were clustered together in major towns,164 
unsurprising given that they were for-profit firms and were in competition with each 
other, the capacity of the joint stock banking sector to reach the poorer rural areas was 
reduced. The POSB essentially filled a niche in the Irish banking system, with the 300 
branches being distributed throughout the island. All 32 counties had access to a 
POSB in 1862, and this was not the case with the TSBs. 
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Figure 4.13  
Provincial distribution of post office savings banks, 
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Sources: Appendix i, in Eight report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, [2984], H.C. 1862, 
xxvii, 393.  
 
Figure 4.13 shows the provincial distribution of the POSB branches in 1862. As with 
the other financial institutions, the distribution was greatest in Leinster and Ulster. But 
unlike the TSBs, the POSB operated a number of branches in Connaught. Figure 4.14 
shows the provincial distribution of TSBs, in 1844 at the peak of the TSBs, and the 
number of TSBs in 1862. The two years have been chosen to show how the 
distribution of TSBs changed as a result of the crises in the late 1840s, and to make a 
comparison with the introduction of the POSB in 1862. 
Figure 4.14  
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Sources: John Tidd Pratt, A summary of the savings banks in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland 
(London, 1846), and Thom’s Directory 1863. 
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Between 1844 and 1862 there was a reduction in the number of TSBs in all provinces, 
but with Leinster experiencing the largest percentage decrease. Carlow, Donegal, 
Kerry, Leitrim and Longford did not have any TSBs operating within their 
boundaries. The case of Kerry is explained by the defalcation in its two savings banks 
in the 1840s, and the other counties did not have TSBs in 1844. In contrast, the POSB 
opened 5 branches in Carlow, 3 in Donegal, 7 in Kerry, 6 in Leitrim, and 3 in 
Longford. There were POSB branches opened in Killarney and Tralee, the sites of the 
two of the major savings bank frauds in 1848.165  In the debate on the Post Office 
Savings Bank bill in 1861, the M. P. for Kerry,166 Henry Arthur Herbert, was very 
supportive of the bill, especially in view of the failures of savings banks in his 
constituency. He stated that: 
The Right hon. Gentleman [Gladstone], therefore, had adopted a very wise course, as the 
old system apparently could not be mended, to give the people their choice between that 
and a new one. No doubt at the present time savings banks were very well managed, and 
the chance of failure was the exception and not the rule; but so long as loss was possible 
under the present system depositors ought to have a choice between it and a system under 
which loss would not be possible, and he hoped that the experiment would succeed.167 
 
 The greater geographic distribution of the POSB, and its continued growth 
throughout the nineteenth century, meant that for savers the POSB had the capacity to 
reduce the transaction costs of saving, as in travelling expenses, and also the 
opportunity cost of saving, in the form of lost earnings. This would have been done by 
decreasing the average distance that would-be savers would have to travel to make 
deposits.  The increasing growth of the POSB would continually have decreased this 
distance, and the ratio of population to the POSB decreased over time. 
 A number of TSBs closed over time, and their savings were transferred to the 
POSB. One of the most high-profile of these closures in Ireland was in Gorey, Co. 
Wexford. The Trustees of the savings bank decided to transfer money as soon as the 
POSB was established. This and other cases of trustees transferring funds to the 
POSB was noted by the Postmaster General who stated that ‘the trustees of which 
banks having in view the superior facilities and the complete security afforded by the 
Post Office Banks, have determined to close the Banks which they had hitherto 
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maintained at some inconvenience to themselves, for the benefit of their poorer 
neighbours’.168 
Figure 4.15  
Growth in savings in Irish financial institutions 1862-1877
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Source: O’Rourke, 1998 and Loan Fund Board reports. 
 
Figure 4.15 shows the growth rates in savings in the POSB, JS banks, TSBs and 
Loan funds from 1862-1877. Growth rates in the TSBs, JS banks, and loan funds were 
negative in the early 1860s. This negative growth in savings coincided with a 
recessionary period. During the period shown in the graph JS banks and the TSBs 
recovered from the early 1860s and experienced positive growth for the remainder of 
the period, with the TSBs suffering a decrease in the early 1870s. The loan funds 
continually experienced negative growth for most of the period as their capital 
continued to decrease. The POSB from its introduction experienced positive growth 
throughout the period 1862 to 1877. Table 4.11 shows the situation in 1877. 
 
Table 4.11: Savings deposits in financial institutions in Ireland in 1877, real and 
nominal amounts 
Institution Nominal Deposit 
balances(£) 
Real Deposit balances 
(£) 
JS Banks 33,050,000 30,209,507 
TSBs 2,153,000 1,967,960 
POSB 1,124,000 1,027,397 
Loan funds 141,567 129,400 
 
Sources: Thom’s Directory 1877, and Liam Kennedy, ‘The cost of living in Ireland, 1698-1998’ in 
David Dickson and Cormac Ó Gráda (eds.), Refiguring Ireland, essays in honour of L. M. Cullen 
(Dublin, 2003), pp 249-276. 
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The JS banks held the overwhelming majority of savings in the country in the post-
famine period. These were followed by the TSBs and the POSB. The capital169 held 
by loan funds continued to decline and by 1877 it was 32 per cent of the value that it 
had reached in 1845. An important tipping point was the events that took place in 
1877, and this saw a change in the structure of the savings bank system in Ireland. 
The major changes that took place in the Irish savings sector took place between the 
years 1877 and 1882. It was during this period that savings in the POSB experienced 
constant positive growth and by 1884 the POSB had overtaken the old TSBs as the 
largest savings bank and the second largest deposit holding institution on the island. 
The POSB was to maintain this dominant position within the Irish small savings 
market for the remainder of this period of study. 
         The period 1877 to 1882 is synonymous with the ‘Land War’, a period of social 
strife in Ireland. The social problems were caused by bad harvests in the years 1877 
and 1878, coupled with falling grain prices resulting from an increase in international 
competition in grain. The subsequent economic deterioration led to numerous social 
agitations, most notably the creation of the ‘land league’ under the stewardship of 
Michael Davitt and Charles Stewart Parnell. The land legislation in the 1880s can be 
seen as a product of such social agitation, but what has less frequently been referred to 
in Irish historiography is the impact of the ‘Land War’ period on microfinance 
institutions, and the POSB in particular. Meehan observed that:   
The Trustee Savings Banks originated in 1817. By 1836 their number had risen to thirty 
six; but owing to various causes, principally perhaps the institution of the Post Office 
Savings Bank in 1861, there was a subsequent decline, and by the 1920s there were 
eleven in operation, five in the Irish Free State and six in the Six Counties area.170 
 
But Meehan did not explain why or when the TSBs were superseded by the 
POSB. Before discussing the POSB in 1877, it must be noted that by 1877 there were 
660 POSB branches in Ireland. The continued growth of the savings in the POSB in 
Ireland during the depression of the late 1870s was seen as ‘a subject of peculiar 
interest’ by the Postmaster General, Henry Fawcett. 171  
Analysis of the growth rates in savings in Irish banking institutions from 1870 
to 1914 will give an impression of the effect of the depression of the late 1870s.  
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Figure 4.16  
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Source: Appendices in Kevin H. O’Rourke, ‘Monetary data and proxy GDP estimates: Ireland 1840-
1921’ in Irish Economic and Social History, xxv (1998), pp 22 -51 (hereafter O’Rourke, 1998), and 
LFB reports. 
 
Table 4.12 shows the growth rates in various institutions from 1877 to 1885. Both 
figure 4.16 and table 4.12 indicate that the POSB experienced positive growth rate in 
deposits during the entire period in question, and most importantly in the period 1877 
to 1885, the period of the ‘Land War’. 
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Table 4.12: Growth rates in savings in POSB, TSB, JS Banks, and Loan funds, 
1877-1885 
 
Year POSB TSB JS Banks Loan funds 
1877 11.83 -2.70 -3.48 0.99 
1878 5.49 -2.87 -4.59 -3.49 
1879 6.86 -0.91 -3.15 -0.47 
1880 9.81 -1.78 -2.60 -4.70 
1881 10.73 1.76 1.40 1.87 
1882 11.72 -0.87 8.57 -1.39 
1883 6.60 1.80 -4.29 3.39 
1884 8.38 -5.53 -2.28 2.78 
1885 9.62 1.31 -4.10 7.33 
 
Source: O’Rourke, 1998 and Loan Fund Board reports. 
 
Figure 4.19 shows the provincial distribution of the percentage change in savings in 
the POSB, TSBs and loan funds from 1877 to 1882. Figure 4.17 shows that the 
increases in the POSB savings took place in all four provinces. This is including 
Connaught, the region most adversely affected by the economic depression. The TSBs 
suffered their largest decrease in Connaught, and the LFB loan funds experienced 
declines in all four provinces.   
Figure 4.17  
Percentage change in POSB savings, TSB savings, and loan fund 
capital, 1877 to 1882
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Figure 4.18 showed positive percentage change for TSBs in Munster during the 
period 1877 to 1882, and it is an attempt to locate where this increase originated. 
 
 
 325 
Figure 4.18  
Percentage change in savings in Munster TSB's, 1877-1882
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Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
Figure 4.18 shows how the savings in Munster TSBs decreased in a number of 
areas, but shows increases in Bandon, Cork, Roscrea and Waterford. Further local 
research would be required to determine the causes of these increases.  
         The question must be asked what happened in the late 1870s that saw the 
continued positive growth in the POSB, when other banking institutions experienced 
negative growth. Firstly, it must be noted that a fraud was uncovered in the 
Hillsborough Savings Bank in 1875.172 But it seems as though the effects of this fraud 
were isolated, and so it does not explain the growth of the POSB. During the 
depression period there seems to be anecdotal evidence to support a claim that money 
was being transferred from the other institutions into the POSB. The Postmaster 
General Henry Fawcett, noting the growth in the savings held by the POSB, stated 
that: 
…these circumstances show a desire on the part of investors to obtain direct state 
security for their money, which appears to be further manifested by the increased amount 
deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank.173 
 
The implications of such transfers had both short- and long-term effects. In the short-
term it resulted in decreased investment. Evidence of this was uncovered by Sean 
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Lucey,174 who found that farmers in the Firies and Ballyhar region in Kerry, who 
usually invested in their farms, and hired labourers, transferred their money to the 
POSB instead. Similar instances led to an increase in unemployment and numbers 
seeking poor relief.175 The political situation in Ireland at the time seems to have 
influenced decision-making on the part of friendly societies as well. A letter from an 
officer in a friendly society was published in the thirty third report of the Postmaster 
General which stated that: 
“At the present state of political agitation in this country it is not safe to invest any 
monies in any funds or bank whatever, therefore the trustees have desired me to apply to 
the post office savings bank.”176 
 
Figure 4.19  
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Figure 4.19 shows the number of people receiving poor relief and the percentage 
change in the number of people receiving poor relief from 1842 to 1898. The number 
of people receiving poor relief grew by 50 per cent between 1877 and 1882. In light 
of this it is remarkable that the POSB was able to sustain high levels of growth in 
savings held by it.  
         In the long term, the growth of savings in the POSB during the depression of the 
late 1870s and 1880s established a pattern whereby people continued to use the POSB 
based on tradition, habit, and the fact that the POSB was tested and did not fail. This 
meant that the saving deposits in the POSB were set to benefit from the operation of 
the principle of path dependence. This is an important context for which any new 
entrant into the market for savings would need to be aware of, as it would be difficult 
to dislodge such an incumbent. The Raiffeisen co-operatives, established in 1894, 
came only 10 years after the POSB had firmly established their dominance in the 
small savings market.177 
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Deposit limits were increased from £30 per annum to £50 per annum for both the 
POSB and TSBs by the 1893 Savings Bank Act.178 This saw an increase in savings 
directed towards the POSB rather than towards institutions with financial 
intermediary capacity. Figure 4.20 has divided the period 1862 to 1918 into two 
periods to reflect the increase in the annual deposit limit. The effect of the change in 
the deposit limit is also seen in figure 4.16 where it is visible that both the POSB and 
TSBs have spikes in 1893. As a result savings in the POSB were exported to London 
and were invested in government securities. There are possible explanations for this. 
The main explanation stems from the fact that the POSB and TSBs paid higher rates 
on demand deposits than the joint stock banks. Also Irish savers seemed to have a 
preference for security above higher returns, as there were possibilities for higher 
yielding investments in rural Ireland such as savings accounts in Raiffeisen credit co-
operatives, or shares in co-operative creameries. 
 
4.7 Outreach and impact; Post Office Savings Bank and TSBs in Ireland 
This section will analyse the outreach and impact of the POSB in Ireland from 1862 
to 1915. Savings profiles, comparisons with real and nominal wages, penetration 
ratios, annual deposits and withdrawals, and location of savings and depositors, will 
be used as proxy variables for outreach and impact. Savings profiles will give us an 
indication as to who saved in the savings institutions, so that we can see how they 
were used by different socio-economic groups. Real and nominal wage levels are a 
useful barometer with which to compare savings balances, and also to compare annual 
deposits and withdrawals. Analysis of savings banks in Ireland is somewhat hampered 
due to data limitations; for example there is limited evidence of annual deposits and 
withdrawals from savings banks.  To overcome these limitations, where stated, the 
approach taken in this section will be to use UK data as a proxy for the events in 
Ireland. 
Firstly, it would be interesting to know who actually used the TSBs and the 
POSB. The best source of information we have regarding the TSBs comes from the 
1858 inquiry into savings banks.179 Appendix 5 from the savings bank inquiry gave a 
return for 404 savings banks in the UK, as 172 savings banks did not submit returns. 
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It is not exactly clear how many of the Irish savings banks submitted returns, but it is 
possible to deduce how representative the figures in table 4.13 are by comparing the 
returns in table 4.13 with the totals for 1852. The report stated that the returns for 
Ireland were based on 44,690 accounts that had savings of £1,225,572. Comparing 
these figures with 1852 shows that they represent 85.70 per cent of the depositors in 
1852 and the amount is 84.67 per cent of that in 1852.180 Therefore, the figures shown 
in table 4.13 are not unrepresentative of the TSBs in 1852. Table 4.13 shows us that 
the largest grouping of account holders in TSBs in Ireland were classified as 
tradesmen and small farmers - these also held the largest share of deposits. The other 
groupings had high average deposit balances, with the lowest average balance being 
held by dressmakers and labourers. What is interesting about table 4.13 and should be 
taken into consideration when looking at the tables relating to the POSB is the role of 
women as depositors. In only a few classifications are women listed separately, but in 
most cases the classifications are for the male occupation or their wife. This suggests 
that in many cases although women were involved in the financial transaction, they 
were doing so as an agent of a family unit rather than acting on their own behalf.  
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Table 4.13: Percentage distribution of the accounts and amount, and the average 
deposit by depositor grouping, c. 1852 
 
Ireland 
 % 
Number 
% 
Amount 
Average 
amount (£) 
Gentlemen, or persons of independent 
means or their wives 3.01 3.65 33.17 
Professional men and their wives 0.77 1.06 37.41 
Persons engaged in education, male and 
female 1.51 1.49 27.07 
Tradesmen and their assistants, small 
farmers, clerks, mechanics, and artisans 
(not described as journeymen and their 
wives) 39.97 43.68 29.97 
Soldiers, mariners, boatmen, fishermen, 
and their wives 2.87 3.78 36.15 
Policemen, letter carriers, revenue 
officers, pensioners, railway men, and 
their wives 0.62 0.89 39.09 
Labourers, farm servants, journeymen, 
mechanics, and their wives 7.23 4.82 18.27 
Domestic servants, chairwomen, nurses, 
and laundresses 14.77 10.96 20.35 
Dressmakers, milliners, shop-women, 
and female artisans 1.12 0.67 16.55 
Females, described only as married 
women, widows or spinsters 18.19 19.11 28.80 
Minors having accounts in their own 
names, including apprentices 8.32 8.29 27.30 
Trust accounts, principally for minors, 
including all joint accounts 1.03 1.06 28.11 
Miscellaneous, and persons without any 
given descriptions 0.56 0.55 26.77 
All   27.42 
 
Source: Appendix 5, in Report from the Select Committee on Savings Banks; together with the 
proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and index, pp 336-338. (441), H.C. 1857-
58, xvi, 1. 
 
Further information such as table 4.13 on depositor profiles in TSBs are difficult to 
find. One of the few surviving records of a TSB is the Thurles savings bank, but it 
ceased operations in the 1870s.  
The Postmaster General reports often included random samples of the 
depositors in the POSB. Table 4.14 is a table from the eleventh report of the 
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Postmaster General.181 It is the estimated occupation of savers in the POSB based on a 
random sample of 11,000 accounts opened on 31 March 1865. Although the sample 
selection methods are highly questionable, it does give an impression as to who was 
using the POSB at this moment in time. The Postmaster General report did not 
distinguish from where in the UK the sample was taken. Therefore, it would not be 
wise to draw too much inference from table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14: Estimated occupation, number and proportion of savers in the POSB 
circa 31 March 1865 
Occupation Number of depositors Percentage of 
depositors 
Females, male minors, and trustees 285,769 54.50 
Occupation, professional men, and 
their clerks or assistants 
31,353 5.98 
Males engaged in education 5,692 1.09 
Tradesmen and their male assistants, 
farmers, and clerks of all kinds, 
except clerks to professional men, 
and clerks in general offices 
53,756 10.25 
Mechanics and artisans, journeymen 
mechanics, and artisans, domestic 
servants, policemen, labourers, 
pensioners, boatmen, fishermen, and 
merchant seamen 
140,518 26.80 
Persons employed in the revenue 
departments 
2,570 0.49 
Persons in the army or navy 4,682 0.89 
Total 524,340 100 
 
Source: Eleventh report of the Postmaster General on the post office, p. 14. [3558], H.C. 1865, xxvii, 
583. 
 
Another random sample was provided in the twenty-fifth report of the 
Postmaster General.182 The random sample from the twenty-fifth report was based on 
25 small offices in agricultural districts. Table 4.15 would be a better indication of 
conditions in Ireland where the majority of POSB branches were located in rural 
areas. But again the sample selection methods used in the collection of these data was 
not provided in the report. 
 
 
 
                                                 
181
 Eleventh report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 14. [3558], H.C. 1865, xxvii, 583. 
182
 Twenty fifth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 54 [c. 2405], xxi, 197.  
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Table 4.15: Classes who use the Post Office Savings Bank in agricultural 
districts, circa 1879 
Class Distribution of 
depositors 
Average balance (£) 
Female servants 15.74 14 
No occupation 12.10 13 
Artisans 11.69 15 
Minors over seven 11.22 7 
Married women 10.75 21 
Tradesmen 8.11 16 
Clerks 6.38 11 
Labourers 5.48 21 
Unmarried women 3.83 16 
Minors under seven 3.75 5 
Male servants 2.81 22 
Public officials 2.15 40 
Soldiers and sailors 2.13 18 
Professional men 2.10 20 
Milliners 1.77 11 
 
Source: Twenty fifth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 54 [c. 2405], xxi, 197. 
 
Table 4.16, derived from the twenty-sixth report of the Postmaster General,183 shows 
the distribution of 1,550 savers by class in the west of Ireland in 1879. Table 4.16 is 
also a random sample of depositors, and sample selection criteria were not given. Of 
the three tables related to the profile of depositors, it is the only one which solely 
represents depositors in Ireland, albeit confined to the West.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
183Twenty sixth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 48. [c. 2670 ], H.C. 1880, xix, 1. 
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Table 4.16: Distribution of savers in the POSB in the West of Ireland, circa 1879 
Class Percentage of depositors 
No occupation 12.26 
Female servants 11.03 
Married women 10.26 
Constabulary 10.06 
Unmarried women 5.94 
Farmers 5.87 
Tradesmen 5.42 
Minors over seven 5.29 
Labourers 5.23 
Professional men 4.77 
Miscellaneous 4.06 
Artisans  3.35 
Minors under seven 3.23 
Male servants 2.77 
Soldiers and sailors 2.65 
Occupation not given 2.26 
Clerks 1.94 
Public officials 1.74 
Gentlemen 0.90 
Milliners and dressmakers 0.77 
Charitable and provident societies 0.13 
Friendly societies 0.06 
 
Source: Twenty sixth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 48. [c. 2670 ], H.C. 1880, 
xix, 1. 
 
So what can be discerned from tables 4.14 to 4.17? In truth, not a lot. To derive 
conclusions based on these tables alone would lead to spurious claims about the use of 
the POSB. The danger of using these statistics was pointed out in 1884 by an article in 
the Journal of the Statistical Society of London.184 The article was written in response 
to a claim that the number of working class depositors had fallen off, based on the 
statistics in the Postmaster General reports. It was stated in the article that: 
Instead of there being a parliamentary return, there appear to be in existence only certain 
private documents communicated by the postmaster-general in his department to an 
individual gentleman at his request, and somewhat irregularly published, and each 
analysing at different periods 10,000 accounts of depositors in savings banks; but neither 
for the form nor method of procuring the information, nor for the comparison between 
the statements at different times, can the department be held responsible.185 
                                                 
184
 Anonymous, ‘Savings Bank statistics’ in Journal of the Statistical society of London, xlvii, no 4 
(December, 1884), pp 691-694. 
185
 Ibid, p. 692. 
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The article stated that due to the sampling methodology used, no two depositor 
profiles provided in the Postmaster General reports could be used to make 
comparisons between the rise or fall in a particular grouping.186 The article concluded 
that: 
The return being thus totally useless for any purpose of comparison, the public are as free 
as they were before to use the fact of the steady increase of the savings bank deposits as a 
sign of the prosperity of the working and lower middle classes of the country. These 
classes are known to form the bulk of the depositors (a fact so far corroborated by all 
these returns), though there are no means of knowing the exact proportions compared 
with other classes, in which they deposit.187 
 
        Analysis of the average size of deposits in the POSB and the TSB in Ireland and 
the UK shows that the average savings balances in the TSBs were higher than those in 
the POSB, and that the average savings balances were higher in Ireland than in 
counterpart institutions in the UK. The data for the number of depositors in the Irish 
POSB are derived from various years of the reports of the Postmaster General, but the 
series was not consistent. The Postmaster General reports did not consistently give 
data on the number of depositors in the POSB by constituent polities in the UK before 
1886, and data for the year 1895 were not included in the report. Some additional data 
is available from extracts of the number of depositors in Ireland, but these were not 
published continuously during the period. An explanation for the higher savings rates 
in the Irish POSB than in the UK was given in the eighteenth report of the Postmaster 
General. Monsell, the Postmaster General, stated that: 
I am disposed to think that the difference is partly owing to the rate of interest given for 
deposits as small as 10l by the Chartered Banks of Scotland; and by the greater facilities, 
in both England and Scotland, than are as yet to be generally found in Ireland, for 
investing moderate sums of money in various commercial enterprises.188 
 
 
Hancock disagreed with Monsell’s statement and in a letter to the Postmaster 
General stated that Ireland had the same banking system as Scotland.189 However, 
given Hancock’s argument, if Ireland had the same banking system as Scotland why 
were the average balances in the Irish POSB higher than those in Scotland? 
Hancock’s argument does not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, given that Ireland has the 
same banking system as Scotland it highlights the failure of the Irish joint stock banks 
                                                 
186
 Ibid, p. 692. 
187
 Ibid, p. 693. 
188
 Eighteenth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 16 [c. 645] , H.C. 1872, xviii, 
483. 
189
 Twenty-second report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 12. [c. 1575], H.C. 1876, xxi, 
77.  
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to attract deposits as the Scottish joint stock banks had done, or shows that Scottish 
banks were the main savings outlets.  
 Figure 4.21 is a comparison of average balances in the POSB and the TSB in 
the UK and in Ireland, and the annual agricultural wage in the UK and Ireland. The 
use of the annual agricultural wage in this context is to give a sense of scale to the 
annual figures.  
Figure 4.21  
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Sources: (a) Wages – A. L. Bowley (1899), Board of Trade, 1905 and 1914, (B) UK POSB and TSB 
figures- ( Horne, 1947),  (c) Irish TSB – Thom’s Directory  (d) POSB figures – Thom’s Directory , 
Postmaster General Reports and Return relating to Post Office Savings Banks , H.C. 1871 (280),  
xxxvii, 357; H.C. 1878-79 (255), xlii, 547; H.C. 1881, (24) lvii, 335; H.C. 1881, (362), lvii, 383; H.C. 
1882, (347), xxxvii, 361.;H.C. 1884, xlvii, 487; H.C. 1886, (19), xxxviii, 367; H.C. 1886, (149), 
xxxviii, 429; H.C. 1887, (197), xliv, 417; H.C. 1888, (201), lxv, 325; H.C. 1889, (177), xlvii, 351; H.C. 
1890, (246), xli, 407; H.C. 1895, (387), lxi, 371; H.C. 1909, (119), lxxix, 781; H.C. 1913, (272), lvii, 
915; H.C. 1921, (71), xix, 437. 
 
 
Figure 4.22 shows the real and nominal savings in the POSB and the TSB in 
Ireland, and compares them with real and nominal values of the agricultural wage. 
The average deposits held in the POSB are less than those held in the TSBs, and also 
less than the agricultural wage. This is an indication of the outreach of the POSB. Ó 
Gráda stated that ‘the generous deposit rate offered by the post office also attracted 
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many savers from further up the socio-economic ladder’.190 If this is true for the 
POSB, then it would also be true for those saving in the TSBs. Anecdotal evidence of 
the type of people saving in the TSBs can be found in the 1902 report on savings bank 
funds,191 from the evidence of Charles H. Fitt, secretary of the savings bank at 
Limerick. The Limerick savings bank was open two days a week, on a Monday from 
11 to 1, and on Wednesday from 1 to 2:30.192 When Fitt was asked ‘would not more 
frequent opening be more attractive to the people, especially in the evening?’ he 
replied: ‘No, it would not: we have not a manufacturing class of depositors with 
us.’193 Fitt was then asked to describe the class of depositors in the savings bank. He 
stated: 
They were mostly composed of shopkeepers and small farmers: we have a good many of 
those, because we just join the County Clare and have a great many farmers from the 
County Clare side; small farmers that farm six, eight, and ten acres, artisans and 
tradesmen, also several workmen’s societies such as pork, butchers, bakers, coopers, 
sandmen, & c. deposit with us. (sic.)194 
 
When further questioned about the small farmers who saved there, Fitt stated 
that: 
I should say that we have between 200 and 300 small farmers in County Clare the north 
side of County Limerick, and some from the west side of County Limerick; they would 
be all small farmers who deal with us and invest their money with us.195 
                                                 
190
 Cormac  Ó Gráda,  Ireland: a new economic history 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994), p. 239. 
191
 Report from the Select Committee on Savings Banks Funds; with the Proceedings, Evidence, 
Appendix, and Index, H.C. 1902 (282), ix, 1. 
192
 Ibid, questions 2869-2870, p. 134. 
193
 Ibid, question 2872, p. 134. 
194
 Ibid, question 2875, p. 134. 
195
 Ibid, question 2969, p. 138. 
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Figure 4.22 
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Sources: see figure 4.21 and (Kennedy,  2003). 
 
 
 
Fitt gave evidence as to the affect of restrictions in the savings banks, as once the 
£200 ceiling was reached some people preferred to stop depositing in the savings 
bank.196 The attraction of the savings banks was clear, as the local joint stock banks, 
the Bank of Ireland and the Munster & Leinster Bank, were paying 1.5 and 2 per cent 
respectively on deposits,197 whereas the savings banks, both POSB and TSB, were 
paying 2.5 per cent. Fitt also claimed that the rate paid by his savings bank was higher 
than that paid by the POSB.198 This was due to the fact that the POSB did not start 
paying interest on accounts until after a month. Fitt’s claim is corroborated by a 
statement in 1896 by Robert Hanbury, the secretary to the Treasury, in the House of 
Commons.199 
       Table 4.17 shows the trends in penetration of savings banks, including postal 
savings banks. The table is taken from Goldsmith’s Financial structure and 
                                                 
196
 Report from the Select Committee on Savings Banks Funds; with the Proceedings, Evidence, 
Appendix, and Index, questions 2949, p. 137, H.C. 1902 (282), ix, 1. 
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 Ibid, question 2915, p. 135. 
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 Ibid, questions 2903, p. 135. 
199
 Hansard 4, xxxvii (19 March,1896), p. 1341. 
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development of 1969, with some additional information on Ireland included in the 
table. 
Table 4.17: Trends in penetration of savings banks - Number of accounts a as per 
cent of population 
 
 1850 1871/75 1910 1963 
Australia   36 100 
Belgium  2.5 39 94 
Denmark 2.5b 17.4 50 96 
France 1.6 5.6 36 59 
Germany 1.6 8.4 33 56 
Great Britain 40 9.7 30 61 
India   0.5 26 
Ireland c 0.75 1.8 11.3  
Italy 0.3 2.5 22  
Japan   37 198 
Netherlands  2.8 32 81 
New Zealand   44 112 
Norway b 12.6 42 92 
Russia-USSR  0.1 5 24 
Spain   3 43 
Sweden b 13.1 39 160 
Switzerland 2.0 23.3 53  
USA 1.1 4.0 10 12 
 
Notes: a- Includes accounts with Postal Saving organisation 
b- Figures refer to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden together 
c- Information for Ireland not included in Goldsmith’s original table 
 
Sources: Table 8.2, Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial structure and development (Yale, 1969), p. 
348, and information for Ireland has been derived from Thom’s Directory, Postmaster General reports, 
and census of Ireland, various years. 
 
Goldsmith made five observations about the data on savings bank penetration: 
 
First, the penetration of thrift accounts has increased spectacularly during the last 
century…secondly, the penetration of savings accounts in the economy has been 
particularly rapid during the half century preceding World War I…Thirdly, the degree of 
penetration of thrift accounts in the United States is low as compared to developed 
countries…Fourthly, although the number of less developed countries included in table 
8.2 is too low to permit any generalisation, it is suggested – and is corroborated by 
collateral fragmentary information - that the penetration ratio of savings as well as of all 
thrift accounts in these countries is very low… Fifthly, a scatter diagram shows a rough 
correlation between the proportion of population having a savings account and the level 
of real gross national product in 1963…(sic)200 
 
Goldsmith’s observations seem to apply to the case of Ireland. Firstly, the 
penetration of thrift accounts increased after 1850 with the introduction of the POSB 
                                                 
200
 Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial structure and development (Yale, 1969), pp 349-350. 
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to Ireland. Secondly, the rapid growth took place before the First World War. 
Regarding Goldsmith’s fifth point, the penetration of thrift accounts in Ireland is 
relatively low in comparison with other countries. But, it must be noted that Ireland 
also had a developed joint stock banking system that began opening thrift accounts in 
the early twentieth century,201 and these are not included in the tables. The same is 
true of the USA. It is not possible to make a definitive statement regarding the final 
point Goldsmith made, as there are no statistics for Irish real GNP before the 1920s.   
Figures 4.23 to 4.26 are a continuation of this line of thought, by comparing 
Irish and UK penetration rates.202 Figures 4.23 and 4.24 show the number of accounts 
in savings banks, both TSB and POSB, as a percentage of population in Ireland and in 
the UK. Throughout the period the UK has higher penetration rates than Ireland. The 
UK experienced growth in penetration rates that coincided with positive population 
growth. Ireland on the other hand saw its growth in penetration rates coincide with 
continued negative population growth. 
Figure 4.23  
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Sources: Thom’s Directory, Postmaster General reports, and census of Ireland, various years. 
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 Charles Eason, ‘The trustee savings banks of Great Britain and Ireland, from 1817 to 1928’, a paper 
read before the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland (15 November, 1929), p. 11. 
202
 The POSB figures always referred to the UK as a whole, and so too did the figures for the TSB that 
appeared in Horne. 
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Figure 4.24  
Number of accounts in savings banks as a per cent of UK 
population
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Sources: Thom’s Directory, Postmaster General reports, and census of Ireland, various years. 
 
Figures 4.25 and 4.26 show the penetration rates of the savings banks treated as 
separate bodies. The trend of the POSB comprising a greater share of the ratio is 
common to both Ireland and the UK. This seems to suggest that the POSB was 
responsible for the growth in savings bank penetration. Figures 4.26 and 4.27 also 
appear to validate the statement made by Edward John Stanley, Postmaster General, 
that: 
… the Post Office Savings Banks have reached a larger proportion of small depositors 
than the old Savings Banks have been able to attract. This gratifying result is, doubtless, 
attributable to the superior facilities given by the Post Office Banks, and especially to the 
fact that they are open daily and for several hours, and that they are situated almost at the 
door of the depositor.203 
Figure 4.25  
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Sources: Thom’s Directory, Postmaster General reports, and census of Ireland, various years. 
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Figure 4.26  
Number of TSB and POSB accounts as a per cent of UK 
population
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Sources: Thom’s Directory, Postmaster General reports, and census of Ireland, various years. 
 
A limitation of this study is that it uses stock data, in the form of annual balances in 
accounts, rather than the flow, the amount of deposits and withdrawals. Information 
on the annual number of deposits and withdrawals is available for the POSB, but it is 
only for the POSB as a whole and does not make allowances for the constituent parts 
of the UK. Figure 4.27 shows the number of deposits and withdrawals in the POSB 
from 1862 to 1916. 
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Source: Postmaster General reports, various years. 
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Figure 4.28 shows the average amount of deposits and withdrawals.  
 
Figure 4.28  
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Source: Postmaster General reports, various years. 
 
Figure 4.29 shows the average deposits and withdrawals in the POSB as a 
percentage of the UK agricultural wage.  
Figure 4.29  
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The information in figures 4.27 to 4.29 can be used as proxies for Ireland. For 
example, the slope of the lines in figure 4.27 would be what one would expect to see 
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in an Irish scenario. We do, in fact, have some information on the annual amounts 
deposited and withdrawn in the POSB in Ireland, shown in figure 4.30. The slopes do 
look similar to those shown above for the UK as a whole, but unfortunately we do not 
possess disaggregated information for the other variables. 
Figure 4.30  
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Source: Thomas Wrigley Grimshaw, Facts and figures about Ireland (Dublin, 1893). 
 
Figure 4.28 shows that the annual average deposit was smaller than the average 
annual withdrawal, and it would have been the same for Ireland. This is logical, as 
many deposits would be first-time savers, evidenced by the fact that the number of 
depositors grows over time. On the other hand, the size of withdrawals would be 
greater because the people withdrawing would on average have large balances to 
withdraw. Figure 4.29 is assuming that the average deposits and withdrawals in the 
UK were involved in agriculture. This assumption may not appear to be realistic, but 
the aim of figure 4.29 is to give the annual average deposits and withdrawals a 
context. So what would the Irish version of figure 4.29 look like? Given that wages 
were lower in Ireland, and that deposits sizes were probably higher,204 it would be 
safe to say that in Ireland the annual deposits would probably be a higher proportion 
of the agricultural wage. Figure 4.31 is an informal test of whether it is appropriate to 
use the UK flow data as a proxy for Irish flows. Figure 4.31 shows the growth rates of 
savings in GB, the UK and Irish savings deposits in the POSB. Although the 
magnitude is not identical, the trend in both is consistent. This would suggest that 
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 Figures for the average deposit size in 1862 show that in Ireland the average deposit size was £3 19 
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using UK flow data as a proxy for Irish flow would not lead to erroneous conclusions 
about the Irish case. 
Figure 4.31  
-
10
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
ch
a
n
ge
 
(%
)
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Year
UK POSB GB POSB
Irish POSB
1865-1918
Growth rates in savings deposits in the POSB, UK, GB & Ireland
 
 
Sources: Reports of the Postmaster General and O’Rourke, 1998. 
 
The distribution of savings deposits in the POSB is shown in figure 4.32. 
Initially Leinster held the largest share of POSB deposits, but it was overtaken by 
Ulster towards the end of the nineteenth century. Both Munster and Connaught 
increased their share of the distribution of savings deposits in the POSB. 
Figure 4.32  
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Source: Return relating to Post Office Savings Banks , H.C. 1871 (280),  xxxvii, 357; H.C. 1882, (347), 
xxxvii, 361; H.C. 1895, (387), lxi, 371; H.C. 1913, (272), lvii, 915. 
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Given that the savings banks were primarily intended for urban populations it is worth 
looking at the proportion of savings accounts and savings deposits held by Antrim and 
Dublin, the counties where the two largest cities in Ireland are located. Tables 4.18a 
and 4.18b show the percentage distribution of depositors and savings deposits in 
Belfast and Dublin for the POSB and TSBs. As can be seen, the two larges cities 
made up a significant proportion of the depositors and made up a large portion of the 
savings deposits in the POSB. Surprisingly, this pattern is not reflected in the statistics 
for the TSBs, with Dublin having a lower proportion of the savings deposits and 
Belfast having a larger proportion. The most likely explanation for this is the fact that 
there was a cultural bias against TSBs in Dublin due to the frauds in the 1840s.  
 
Table 4.18a: Percentage of POSB depositors and savings deposits from Dublin 
and Antrim, 1870-1912 
 Dublin Antrim 
Year 
Depositors 
Savings 
deposits Depositors 
Savings 
deposits 
 % % % % 
1870 24.04 18.84 13.96 12.28 
1881 27.27 21.33 14.61 12.93 
1894 25.36 17.61 15.56 14.76 
1907 24.34 14.97 16.09 14.95 
1912 23.94 14.56 15.97 14.28 
Source: Return relating to Post Office Savings Banks , H.C. 1871 (280),  xxxvii, 357; H.C. 1882, (347), 
xxxvii, 361; H.C. 1895, (387), lxi, 371; H.C. 1913, (272), lvii, 915. 
 
Table 4.18b: Percentage of TSB depositors and savings deposits from Dublin and 
Belfast, 1870-1912 
 Dublin Belfast 
Year 
Depositors 
Savings 
deposits Depositors 
Savings 
deposits 
 % % % % 
1870 21.41 14.78 9.32 7.94 
1881 19.22 12.17 11.81 10.55 
1894 20.03 12.44 20.71 17.20 
1907 15.69 9.57 37.21 31.39 
1912 15.12 8.88 39.26 34.13 
Source: Thom’s Directory, various years 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century the TSBs deposits were confined to urban 
areas. By comparison the majority of the POSB deposits were derived from rural 
Ireland. 
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4.8. Inherent limitations of the British Savings Banks and the subsidisation of 
savings  
 
The raison d'être of the British savings bank movement, and the thrift movement 
espoused by Samuel Smiles,205 had been to encourage working class and low income 
members of society to save more of their income and thus to be self-reliant in times of 
distress. This philosophy does not seem to have been self-criticised, even by the 
historians of the movement. As was shown in the earlier sections of this chapter the 
TSBs were loss-making enterprises, and so too was the POSB. It seems that self-help 
did not necessarily mean self-sustainability.  
Classical economists were aware of the limitation of the savings bank 
institutions. John Stuart Mill was sympathetic to the aims of the savings banks, but he 
had some philosophical objections to the use of the savings banks to purchase Consols 
and suggested that the government establish a national savings and loan bank.206 
Another critic of the savings banks, including the POSB, was William Samuel Jevons. 
Jevons wrote in the Money and the mechanism of exchange that: 
The post office savings bank system as established by Mr. Gladstone is an admirable 
institution; it has been very successful, and has done great service in increasing 
providence. But it is troublesome and costly in working, and leaves no profit to the state. 
Already the Scotch banks serve almost in the capacity of savings banks by receiving 
small fixed deposits; and it is well worthy of consideration whether, by the assistance of 
the Cheque Bank, almost all the English banks might not be converted savings banks, to 
the advantage of every one.207  
 
The Cheque bank that Jevons refers to is the use of cheques to make payments 
which Jevons thought could be applied to a savings bank system to make it affordable 
for joint stock banks to compete with the POSB. Another article written by Jevons208 
in 1875 referred to the POSB, and was written in the context of a bill that intended to 
increase the annual limit from £30 to £100, and the total limit from £150 to £250. 
Jevons, like Mill, acknowledged the fact that the savings banks had been intended to 
be ‘eleemosynary institutions’, but he was critical of the fact that the government was 
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receiving demand deposits and investing them in long term-securities, with the risk of 
substantial losses to the state.209 
In the early nineteenth century, most criticism of the savings bank movement 
came mainly from the viewpoint that the government should not be subsidising the 
thrift movement by offering overly generous interest rates. This continued to be a 
theme throughout the nineteenth century. The rate of interest which the government 
paid to the TSBs was fixed, and that received by depositors was also fixed, whereas 
the price of Consols fluctuated daily. Figure 4.33 shows Consol yield from 1800 to 
1921, an estimated Consol yield for the period 1850 to 1914, and the interest rates of 
TSBs and the POSB. Klovland stated that: 
For many decades before World War I the price of Consols was the single most 
important asset price in the world economy. Since then, the yield on Consols, calculated 
by dividing the coupon rate by the market price, has been the obvious benchmark rate of 
interest used in comparisons of the rate of return on capital assets.210  
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 (b) Consol yield (non-corrected): calculated from tables in Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A history 
of interest rates (4th ed. New Jersey, 2005). (c) Interest paid to trustees: see table 4.2 
 
 
The importance of the information in figure 4.33 is that it shows the various interest 
rates at the time. The POSB rate was fixed; so too were the rates payable to TSBs but 
they were periodically revised, as was shown in table 4.2. 
Figure 4.33 shows the long-run trend in UK Consol yields and the maximum 
rates paid to TSBs. Figure 4.33 indicates the significant problematic areas and 
supports the statements made by Hancock in section 4.3. As the Consol yield was 
continuously below the maximum rate paid to TSB trustees in the early nineteenth 
century, the government was forced to make up the difference. The reductions in the 
interest rates paid to trustees underestimated the downward trend in Consol yields 
during this period, and thus the government was making a loss on the TSB system, i.e. 
subsidising savings. If we look closely at figure 4.33 we can see that the rate paid to 
the TSBs was greater than the rate paid to depositors in the TSBs in the early 
nineteenth century. This indicates that the TSBs themselves were making profits; but 
as the rates paid to the TSBs were greater than the yields on Consols these profits 
were being subsidised by the state, as indicated in figure 4.33. 
If we analyse the TSB and POSB interest rates in terms of differentials between 
Consol yield and the maximum rates paid to TSBs and to depositors in TSBs and the 
POSB, shown in figure 4.34, we can see that in the early years of the nineteenth 
century the differential between Consol yield and rates paid to TSBs was negative, but 
that the Consol yield was higher than the rate paid to depositors. This would suggest 
that TSB deposits would have been attractive investments at the start of the nineteenth 
century, but that from the mid-nineteenth century Consols provided a higher return to 
investors. The key issue here is the accessibility of Consols to low-income investors. 
They essentially were inaccessible until a scheme was launched for the purchase of 
Consols through the POSB in the 1880s.211 Also geography could have played a role 
in increasing transaction costs associated with purchasing Consols and hence made 
TSB deposits a more attractive investment. 
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Figure 4.34  
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CYE= Klovland’s estimated Consol yield 
Sources: See figure 4.33. 
 
The key to the question of savings banks funds was how they were used. Consols 
were the main securities that the CRND purchased, with deposits received from both 
savings bank institutions (TSBs and POSB). The problem with Consols was that the 
price, and thereby the yield, fluctuated with market conditions. Consols had a coupon 
rate of 3 per cent for most of the nineteenth century, but in 1888 Goschen, the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, attempted to consolidate the UK National debt.212 
Goschen’s consolidation involved the gradual conversion of UK Consols from 3 per 
cent to 2.5 per cent Consols. The problem from the perspective of the savings banks 
was that the national debt consolidation, coupled with increased demand for Consols 
coincidently caused by the expansion of annual limits in the savings bank accounts, 
pushed down the yield on Consols. Figure 4.33 shows two representations of the 
Consol yield during this period. One is a crude version which makes no allowance for 
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the change in the Consol coupon rate;213 the other is an estimated version taken from 
Klovland. Both yield rates show that the decrease in yield would have led to losses to 
the government from the savings bank business. Klovland’s estimate is a more 
accurate depiction of Consol yields and shows the seriousness of the situation. The 
decrease in Consol yields meant that for a stretch of five years, from 1895 to 1900, 
given that the Consol yield rate was less that the POSB deposit rate, the POSB was a 
loss-making institution. As Walter Bagehot pointed out, ‘if you hold millions of other 
people’s money at interest, arithmetic teaches you that you will be ruined if you make 
nothing of it, even if the interest you pay is not high’.214 
These loss making years did cause some contemporary anxiety, if gauged by the 
questions asked in the House of Commons. For example, in 1896 there was concern 
that the rate of interest paid to the POSB and TSB would be reduced. G. C. T. Bartley, 
founder of the National Penny Bank Limited,215 questioned Michael Hicks Beach, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, about the issue, but received no indication of the action 
that would be taken. Hicks-Beach simply stated that the issue was being addressed by 
an internal committee in the department and the action would await the committee’s 
report.216 The Chancellor’s reassurances did not assuage G. C. T. Bartley. A week 
after his question regarding whether or not the Government intended reducing the rate 
of interest payable to the POSB and TSB, he called for a commission of some 
description on the issue. Bartley stated that: 
…considering the great importance of the subject of the financial position of the country 
to the Post Office Savings Banks and the Trustee Savings Banks, owing to the very great 
rise in the price of Consols, the government will accept the Motion put down for a 
Committee of this house to investigate the subject.217 
 
J. G. Weir was concerned that the government would reduce interest on deposits 
and asked: ‘whether in view of the fact that the Post Office Savings Bank was 
established for the encouragement of thrift among the masses, he [secretary of the 
treasury] will give the house some assurance that the rate of interest shall not be 
reduced, at all events, so far as accounts showing a balance of less than one hundred 
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pounds are concerned?’218  But the graver concern seems to have been over the 
potential for indebtedness of the UK government. Mr B. L. Cohen asked the 
Chancellor what measures would be taken to ‘provide for depreciation in the value of 
securities held on account of the post office savings bank.’219 
 It was this context that led to some alternative evaluations of the question of 
savings banks, in particular by Henry W. Wolff. His writing on credit co-operatives, 
and more importantly an article on savings banks, shows an awareness of the 
problem.220 Wolff tried to use the savings bank deficits to make the case for an 
alternative in the form of co-operative people’s banks. It is worth noting Wolff’s 
views, as he is an important character in terms of co-operative banking in Ireland and 
his work is discussed in chapter 6.  
The problem regarding losses made by the TSB and POSB accounts due to the 
fluctuation in yield prices was only of short duration. The trend from 1900 was of 
increasing Consol yields. This was caused by an increase in government debt 
following the Boer War (1899-1902) and more so after the First World War.221 After 
this short period, 1895-1900, the question of the use of savings bank funds was not an 
immediate concern.  
It is useful to highlight that not all contemporary thought was oblivious to the 
problem created by one-dimensional financial institutions that only offered savings 
services. The funds were lent to the government and not to depositors or individuals. 
For example, during the debate of the 1887 Post Office Savings Bank and 
Government Annuities Bill,222 when there was some discussion on increasing the 
annual deposit limit from £30 to £50.223 The most poignant response to the increased 
limit clause came from Lubbock who said that the joint stock banks had no interest in 
the matter; in this view he stated, ‘I speak for myself, and I believe, for other 
bankers’.224 Lubbock had no objection to the lower classes saving per se, but he found 
two faults with the existing system. Firstly, he foresaw the difficulties that the 
government would cause, and face, if it increased the limits from £30 to £50. In 1887 
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the POSB in the UK already held a sizeable number of deposits. His second point was 
that: 
The Trustee Savings Bank and the Post Office Savings Bank only do one part of the 
banker’s business. Banking business consists of different parts. One is to collect funds 
paid into the bank, and the other – an equally important duty – is to lend money out to 
customers on favourable terms. But the result of these banks is to drain enormous sums 
from different localities in the counties, and to bring them up to London to be invested in 
Government securities.225 
 
Lubbock recognised that there could be implications of encouraging the growth 
of such institutions. He pointed out that the existence of the POSB could crowd out a 
nascent intermediary institution by the fact that it almost controlled the savings 
element of banking. He stated: 
I maintain that savings banks have not been an unmixed benefit to this country. One 
effect has been to discourage the creation of workmen’s banks, and local banks, which 
would otherwise have been established. In Germany no fewer than 900 workmen’s banks 
have been established, and hold large sums of money. They have proved a great 
convenience and extremely useful to the community. Some years ago it was in 
contemplation to establish banks of this kind in this county; but it was found to be 
practically impossible, on account of the fact that the government did so very much of 
the banking business.226 
 
These views, raised by Lubbock in 1887, were not considered in 1896 when the 
savings bank system began experiencing some difficulties.  In 1896 Mr Heinniker 
Heaton asked if the POSB would introduce a cheque system to facilitate payments 
from POSB accounts, and Mr. J. G. Weir asked if there would be a money order 
system attached to accounts to facilitate payments from POSB accounts. The response 
from Mr Hanbury, representing the Post Office, was: 
…the Postmaster General is not prepared to introduce any such machinery as is 
suggested for facilitating the withdrawal of deposits from the Post Office Savings Bank. 
It must be remembered that the Post Office Savings Bank was established in order to 
encourage thrift, and the Government has no intention of converting it into a banking 
institution.227  
 
4.9 Conclusion  
This chapter outlined the main developments in the Irish savings banks. From the 
outset the chapter placed an emphasis on Smilesian self-help and thrift. The relevance 
of Smilesian thought in an Irish context can be seen in role of the Congested Districts 
Board (CDB), which aimed to inoculate a culture of self-help, paradoxically through 
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the medium of state-aid, in the west of Ireland.228 In writing a history of the 
achievements of the CDB Micks, an inspector and Secretary of the CDB, placed 
emphasis on the increased deposits in the POSB as an indicator of the success of the 
CDB.229  
The chapter showed that the TSBs were a dominant competitor in savings 
markets before the famine, but they declined thereafter due primarily to endogenous 
shocks. The continued weakness in the Irish TSB system and contemporary 
difficulties in the UK led to the establishment of the POSB in 1861. The POSB went 
on to become the dominant institution of ‘thrift’ in Ireland. Table 4.19 summarises the 
changes in the savings bank system by showing the percentage change in variables of 
both TSBs and the POSB in decadal intervals from 1861 to 1911. 
 
Table 4.19: Inter-decadal percentage change in the units/branches, savings 
deposits and depositors in TSBs and the POSB, 1861-1911 
 TSBs POSB 
Decennial 
period 
Units  
 
 
(1) 
Savings 
Deposits  
 
(2) 
Number 
of 
depositors 
(3) 
Branches 
 
 
(4) 
Savings 
deposits 
 
(5) 
Number 
of 
depositors 
(6) 
 % % % % % % 
1861-
1871 -25.45 3.18 -10.17 72.33 843.04 421.37 
1871-
1881 -24.39 -6.39 -15.34 14.51 131.28 153.66 
1881-
1891 -38.71 -4.32 -7.72 20.95 130.18 118.41 
1891-
1901 -31.58 19.86 3.89 0.00 112.76 88.54 
1901-
1911 -7.69 8.83 10.67 40.92 47.89 11.02 
 
Note: The POSB was established in 1862, so the first rows in columns 4, 5 and 6 are percentage 
changes from 1862 to 1871. Also note that there was no information for the number of depositors in 
1871, so 1870 was used for the calculations in rows 1 and 2 for column 6.  
Sources: Thom’s Directory, and Postmaster General reports, various years. 
 
                                                 
228
 Thirteenth annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, p. 104, H.C. 1905, [Cd. 
2275], lxii, 229. 
229
 William L. Micks, An account of the constitution, administration and dissolution of the Congested 
Districts Board for Ireland from 1891 to 1923 (Dublin, 1925), p. 211. 
 354 
In order to gauge the relative importance of the TSBs and the POSB as savings 
institutions, it would be worthwhile to compare it to the joint stock banks, and the 
savings deposits that they held.  
Figure 4.35  
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Source: O’Rourke, 1998. 
 
Figure 4.35 shows how the ratios of the savings banks to the deposits held by 
the joint stock banks were not insignificant amounts, and the information presented in 
this chapter is reflected in figure 4.35. Before the famine period the TSBs held a 
significant share of the deposit market in Ireland, but following the discovery of 
frauds in 1848 the TSB share of deposits fell dramatically and continued to decline. 
The POSB from its establishment in 1862 continued to grow relative to the joint stock 
bank deposits. The savings banks combined grew to a ratio of 28 per cent of the 
deposits held by the joint stock banks in 1905.  
The 1914 report on agricultural credit in Ireland acknowledged the role of the 
savings banks. Stating that ‘although the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks 
cannot be considered as credit institutions in the strictest sense of the term, they have 
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in several respects an important relation to the subject of rural credit in Ireland’.230 
The report believed that ‘the large sums on deposit in the country Post Offices prove 
that there are ample funds in these localities for the purposes of agricultural credit if 
the confidence of the small depositor could be attracted’.231 The differentiation 
between the POSB and the TSBs is trivial in this issue, as both institutions collected 
savings that were used by the state to purchase Consols. The 1914 report noticed this, 
and stated that ‘a grave economic injury is done to Ireland by the transfer of 
£15,000,000 of the savings of her population to England for investment in 
government securities’.232 That being said they offered no alternative to this, or a way 
to re-direct the flow of savings, only to establish co-operative societies and hope for 
the best. The report recommended that: 
The most immediately feasible and generally satisfactory method, in our opinion, of 
turning to account reproductively a part of the large amount now on deposit in Irish Post 
Office Savings Banks, especially in rural districts, is the organisation of a sound scheme 
of co-operative credit on the lines proposed in our Report. This would lead, we believe, 
to a gradual and beneficial transfer of a portion of the funds of the Post Office Savings 
Banks to Credit Societies, and would after a time furnish the latter with sufficient capital 
(when taken in conjunction with Bank overdrafts) to meet all the reasonable current 
borrowing requirements of the medium and small agricultural classes.233 
 
This policy did not address the fact that the POSB had a competitive advantage 
in the form of complete government security for any losses, something which no other 
financial institution, including the co-operative credit societies, had unless the 
government offered a state guarantee for deposits. Another problem with the savings 
banks, both POSB and TSB, was that they helped breed a culture of financial secrecy, 
one which would not have been conducive to a successful co-operative banking 
programme. For example, Mr Charles Fitt in his evidence to the 1902 savings bank 
fund committee stated that ‘our depositors are a curious class; they do not like the 
idea of people knowing what they have in the bank’.234  
Evidence from the work of Ledgerwood suggests that there is a demand for both 
savings and loan products from microfinance institutions,235 and it is possible that 
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different economic conditions determine the demand for both. The demand for 
savings and loan products was also evident in Ireland in the nineteenth century, with 
different people having different needs. The joint stock banks that were discussed in 
chapter 3 offered both services to people, and the largest microfinance institutions in 
nineteenth century Ireland catered to those who had a demand for savings products. 
From the statements of the committee on agricultural credit we can get the impression 
that contemporaries believed that there was a shortage of credit in Ireland. 
Admittedly, using a committee on agricultural credit introduces an element of bias 
into this analysis, but perhaps the committee misinterpreted the savings banks. 
Perhaps the real demand in Ireland was for savings services. It is ironic that while 
there were complaints of capital shortages in rural Ireland, at the same time many 
small Irish farmers had their savings in institutions whose infrastructure ensured that 
this capital would not be re-invested in the Irish economy. Perhaps the bias in the 
source material that suggests ‘credit’ shortages is more a reflection of people 
believing that they would have been able to get access to cheap government loans or 
grants if they exaggerated their inaccessibility to credit. The counterfactual to this 
statement is that if there was no demand for savings, we would not see any growth in 
the POSB savings deposits, or in the savings deposits held by the joint stock banks. 
Many modern-day microfinance institutions have had problems similar to the 
POSB and TSB in nineteenth century Ireland in that they were one-dimensional 
financial institutions and concentrate on one type of financial service. But the focus of 
modern institutions was on credit rather than savings services, and many have 
attempted to transform themselves into financial institutions to also offer savings 
services.236 Ledgerwood and White stated that the reasons for transforming a 
microfinance institution are that it would enable the microfinance institution:  
To offer additional products and services (particularly savings) to their clients and to gain 
access to capital (both debt and equity), and in so doing, expand their outreach…In 
addition, savings services represent a critical component of any household’s financial 
management strategy. In fact, it is often argued that providing access to savings services 
is a much more valuable service to poor people (including those not able to access credit 
either because of lack of debt capacity or poor product offerings by the MFI) than credit. 
The path out of poverty lies in building assets, not accumulating debt. In addition, other 
services – specialised housing loans, money transfers, and microinsurance – are greatly 
valued by clients and may only be possible through licensed financial intermediaries.’237 
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The case could be argued that in Ireland the savings institutions were too one-
dimensional and could have supplied a better service if they had provided loans as 
well as savings services. Contemporary savings banks in Europe and America 
developed differently, and in some cases were lending institutions. For example, 
savings banks in Denmark, Germany and Sweden all had a capacity to make loans to 
individuals,238 but this does not take into consideration the late development of joint 
stock banking in these countries. In contrast, Ireland had an established joint stock 
banking sector dating from the 1820s. The existence of state-administered savings 
banks in Ireland suggests that there may have been some market distortions in Ireland. 
Lending to individuals is riskier than lending to the government, but a practical 
policy could have been arranged whereby screening and monitoring would take place, 
and a significant amount of savings should have been made available for small loans 
within the Irish economy. Given that it was government policy to provide small loan 
facilities in Ireland towards the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century,239 perhaps such a facility could have been provided more cost effectively 
within the one institution.  
This chapter has shown that the savings banks, TSB and POSB, were loss 
making institutions. Therefore, this indicates that savings were subsidised in Ireland. 
In fact, the interest rates offered by the savings banks were greater than the prevailing 
market rates. As was outlined in chapter 3, the interest rates set by the joint stock 
banks followed the rates set by the Bank of England. These were competitive market 
rates, and were usually lower than the 2.5 per cent that the savings banks were paying 
for deposits. The lower rates paid by the banks was also due to the fact that savings 
were short-term demand deposits, and the low rate is a reflection of the short-term 
nature of the investment; if the savings deposits were held for longer terms the banks 
could have offered higher rates. Savings were also held as demand deposits in the 
savings banks, but the state paid a fixed rate on these deposits. A highly significant 
feature of the savings banks was also the fact that they had a semblance of a 
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government guarantee. The perception that the TSBs were safe was lost after the 
frauds in the 1840s, but the POSB offered a 100 per cent guarantee and this is 
something which explains its growth in the 1870s and 80s. Therefore, the savings 
banks, most notably the POSB, had competitive advantages over the joint stock banks 
in terms of both security and higher interest rates. The savings banks had constraints 
on savings, such as the annual and total restrictions, but these were not binding. An 
obvious way for someone to overcome the annual restrictions was to deposit money in 
a family name. The research of Cormac Ó Gráda suggests that this was a common 
practice. 
Could other financial institutions have profitably entered the savings market if 
there was no government-supported savings banks? Most likely not, as the savings 
banks attracted savers by paying high interest rates and by providing guaranteed 
security. Also, the fact that the POSB had the largest branch network on the island 
should not be discounted. In addition, the Post Office had the advantage of economies 
of scope and was able to cross-subsidise some of its other loss making services. As 
branch banking was costly, and the income from lending would not have generated 
the required risk-adjusted returns, the joint stock banks would not have been able to 
profitably enter the market.  
The increase in the annual limits of the savings banks is also a significant factor 
in explaining the growth of the savings banks deposits relative to the joint stock banks 
at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The joint 
stock banks seem to be irritated by the increase in the savings bank limits. For 
example, the chairman of the National Bank, Mr. Slattery, stated in a speech in 1900 
that ‘the advantages of state banking are placed within the reach of a class for which 
they were never originally intended’.240 In modern financial theory it has been found 
that people will accept negative interest rates in order to get access to secure financial 
services (i.e. pay to save),241 but the market in nineteenth century Ireland was 
distorted by legislatively encouraged and imposed institutional imports from Great 
Britain. The joint stock banks argued that this rate was ‘far beyond the local value of 
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money’,242 and wished that the rate of interest of the POSB and TSBs be reduced.243 
Thrifty savers in nineteenth century Ireland were given 2.5 per cent interest, secured 
by a one hundred per cent state guarantee, something a competitive market could not 
have matched. 
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‘The Banking operations of the Post-Office’ in Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Ireland, ii, no. 4 
(October, 1900), (Dublin, 1900), p. 233. 
243
 For example see: Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Ireland, ii, no. 3 (July, 1900), (Dublin, 
1900), pp 165-166. 
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5 Urban experiences of nineteenth century microfinance 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Nineteenth century Ireland witnessed a growth in the proportion of the population 
classified as urban; in 1841 the urban population constituted 14.86 per cent of the 
total population, but by 1911 it had increased to 34.69 per cent.1 Therefore, it would 
be an inexcusable oversight, given the growth in urban population, to ignore some 
urban experiences in relation to microfinance institutions. The urban segment of Irish 
society is often overlooked in historical studies because of the heuristic bias of Irish 
historical source material, in particular parliamentary inquiries, which mainly focused 
on rural activity.  
The microfinance institutions heretofore discussed in this thesis were 
predominantly rural institutions. The LFB loan funds discussed in chapters 1 and 2 
had a few urban loan funds, but these comprised a small proportion of the total 
number of loan funds. For example, of the 268 loan funds registered with the LFB in 
1841 only one was found in Belfast and Dublin city respectively, and two in Cork 
city.2 The RLFs were also located in rural areas in Connaught and Munster. The 
savings banks discussed in chapter 4 also had a strong rural presence. The TSBs, 
although predominantly an urban institution in the latter nineteenth century, were 
found in rural locations, and the POSB was also active in rural areas.  
The aim of this chapter is not to give a detailed account of urban experiences of 
microfinance; rather to illustrate the fact that there was a strong element of 
institutional imitation occurring in nineteenth century Ireland. The institutional 
imitations were undertaken at the behest of social elites, with social, as opposed to 
economic, goals being their raison d’être. The urban experiences also show us that 
indigenous innovation was possible, but that the structures of these institutions did not 
encourage permanence. The urban experiences highlighted in this chapter are relevant 
in that they shed light on the microfinance institutions discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis.  
                                                 
1
 The term urban has been used here. The census definition of urban was any town with a population 
over 1,500 people at a census date, the remainder of the population being considered rural: Report of 
Commission on Emigration and other population problems, 1948-1954 (Department of social welfare , 
Dublin , 1954), R. 84 (Pr. 2541), majority report, p 7. 
2
 Fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, [392], H.C. 1842, 
xxiv, 247. 
 2 
This chapter will give a brief introduction to three distinct microfinance institutions 
that operated in urban environments in the nineteenth century.  These were Monts-de-
Piété, Penny Banks (PB) and Friendly Society (FS) loan funds. Each case is separate 
but provides us with useful information that helps understand the history of other 
institutions discussed in this thesis.  
Firstly, this chapter will give an outline of pawnbroking in Ireland. 
Pawnbroking is an understudied nineteenth century experience receiving little if any 
scholarly attention. A book has recently been written by Jim Fitzpatrick,3 but the field 
is still ripe for further study. This chapter will contribute to the literature by focusing 
on attempts to imitate Continental pawnbroking institutions, Monts-de-Piété, in 
Ireland. The case of the Monts-de-Piété is an example of an unsuccessful institutional 
import, but it is interesting on two accounts. Firstly, it gives us an understanding of 
the pawnbroking sector in Ireland. Secondly, the Monts-de-Piété provide us with an 
example of an attempt to imitate Continental microfinance institutions. The Monts-de-
Piété experience illustrates limitations to institutional imitation and this bears 
comparison to the credit co-operative experience discussed in chapter 6. The Monts-
de-Piété are also interesting in terms of this thesis as many of the printed pamphlets 
advocating loan funds did not distinguish between loan funds and Monts-de-Piété. So 
the comparative success of loan funds vis-à-vis Monts-de-Piété may give us a greater 
understanding of nineteenth century microcredit. 
The chapter will then introduce PBs, another microfinance institution whose 
experience is under-represented in Irish historiography. The section on PBs will 
initially introduce the existing literature on PBs in Great Britain, and then show how 
the Irish experience conformed to this. The section on PBs will illustrate the efforts of 
the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul (SVP) to establish PBs. The case of the SVP PBs 
is interesting on two accounts: firstly, it shows how the SVP attempted to imitate 
savings institutions that were prevalent in Britain and secondly, it illustrates the 
effects of social memory on microfinance institutions. The evidence from the SVP 
PBs suggests that the failures of the TSBs in Dublin in the 1840s, discussed in chapter 
4, had a long-lasting effect, and this is useful information that may indicate a broader 
psychological impact of microfinance failure.  
                                                 
3
 Jim Fitzpatrick, Three brass balls: the story of the Irish pawnshop (Cork, 2001). 
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The chapter will also introduce Friendly Society (FS) loan funds into the 
historiography on loan funds in Ireland.4 The FS loan funds were registered with the 
Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland and operated under a different body of 
legislation to the LFB loan funds that were discussed in chapters one and two. These 
FS loan funds were institutions that operated outside the autonomy of the LFB as a 
regulator. As a result, they were not legally required to submit themselves to the 
inspection of the LFB nor to purchase stationery from the LFB; therefore they do not 
appear in the LFB annual reports.  The FS loan funds were mutual financial 
intermediaries that were concentrated in urban centres, mainly Dublin, as opposed to 
the rural constitution of the paternalistic LFB loan funds. The FS loan funds are 
interesting in terms of this thesis because they are an example of mutual financial 
institutions and indigenous microfinance innovations. They are important in terms of 
an experiment to imitate German mutual rural banks in the late 1890s, discussed in 
chapter 6, and they provide a useful parallel to the existing knowledge of rural LFB 
loan funds. 
 
 
5.2.1 Pawnbroking and Monts-de-Piété in Ireland5 
 
In the 1830s attempts were made to imitate-French style Mont-de-Piété pawnbroking 
institutions. Before discussing these institutions it is necessary to first outline the 
nature of pawnbroking in nineteenth century Ireland. Pawnbrokers have traditionally 
been referred to as a ‘poor man’s bank’.6 Pawnbrokers gave short-term loans that 
were secured by pledges; in other words collateralised loans. The traditional practice 
was to make loans of up to 80 per cent of the value of durable goods, namely plate 
and jewellery, and a lower percentage, in the region of 66 per cent or less, for non-
durable goods such as clothes. The borrowers would then be issued with a document 
and if the loan, with interest, was repaid within a set period of time the pledged item 
would be redeemed. If not, the pledged item would be forfeited to the pawnbroker 
who would then proceed to auction it in order to recoup losses from the loan.  
                                                 
4
 These were loan funds not referenced by Hollis and Sweetman. 
5
 In this section Mont-de-Piété refers to the singular, and Monts-de-Piété refers to the plural. 
6
 Jim Fitzpatrick, Three brass balls: the story of the Irish pawnshop (Cork, 2001), p. 4; and Margaret 
Atwood, Payback: debt and the shadow side of wealth (London, 2008), p. 55. 
 4 
In Ireland the laws regulating pawnbroking were enacted in the late eighteenth 
century,7 and these, for the most part, remained unchanged until they were reformed 
in the mid-twentieth century.8 The lack of reform is surprising given the high level of 
legislative interest in the early nineteenth century.9 Pawnbroking in Ireland was 
always regulated under separate legislation to the pawnbroking establishments in 
Great Britain, perhaps as a result of initial legislation being passed under the Irish 
parliament. Following parliamentary enquiries in the late nineteenth century 
pawnbroking laws were reformed in Great Britain, but the act did ‘not extend to 
Ireland’.10  
As was stated in the introduction, pawnbroking in Ireland has received little 
scholarly attention. The main secondary reference is the work of Jim Fitzpatrick.11 
Fitzpatrick is a journalist and his work is mainly a romanticised, Orwellian-style,12 
vision of pawnbroking with little analysis undertaken. Pawnbroking also receives 
brief references in social history works, for example in the social history work of 
Catriona Clear. But Clear’s work does not make much contribution to the literature, as 
she mainly cites that there were 856 pawnbrokers in 1861, 1,013 in 1891 and 828 in 
1911, and makes the statement that ‘pawning meant that those with the least money 
paid over and over again for their meagre goods’.13 Cormac Ó Gráda has looked at the 
role of pawnbrokers during the famine years to see if allegations that pawnbrokers 
profited from the famine bore any truth. He analysed the lending habits of 
pawnbrokers during the famine and found that there was a decrease in loans made.14 
Ó Gráda, from looking at individual accounts and analysing pawnbroker loans, stated 
that neither ‘support[ed] the claim that the famine was a golden opportunity for 
pawnbrokers’.15 The scarcity of scholarly work relating to pawnbrokers is an indicator 
to suggest that there is a lacuna to be addressed in the literature. 
                                                 
7
 Pawnbrokers Act, 1786 (26 Geo. 3) c. 43 [I]; Pawnbrokers Act, 1788 (28 Geo. 3) c. 49 [I]. 
8
 Pawnbrokers Act 1964, 31/1964 [Éire]. 
9
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index. H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
10
 Pawnbrokers Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict.), c. 93, section 2. 
11
 Jim Fitzpatrick, Three brass balls: the story of the Irish pawnshop (Cork, 2001). 
12
 George Orwell’s romantic depiction of pawnbroking can be seen in George Orwell, Down and out in 
Paris and London (London, 1933). 
13
 Catriona Clear, Social change and everyday life in Ireland, 1850-1922 (Manchester, 2007), pp 31-32. 
14
 Cormac Ó Gráda, Black’47 and beyond: the great Irish famine (New Jersey, 1999), p. 154. 
15
 Ibid, p, 154. 
 5 
The main sources for nineteenth century pawnbroking in Ireland come from a number 
of parliamentary enquiries. There was an inquiry in 1838.16 This was followed by a 
report written by W. Neilson Hancock,17 and then there was a general UK 
parliamentary inquiry in 1871.18 From these inquiries we can get an understanding of 
the basic modus operandi and regulation of pawnbroking in Ireland.    
Pawnbroking was a regulated industry with would-be pawnbrokers having to 
purchase a licence and provide two sureties, bondsmen. This was supposed to be a 
check on the pawnbrokers to ensure that only people of ‘honest repute’ obtained 
licences.19 Under legislation the maximum loan from a pawnbroker was set at £10.20 
In terms of this thesis the amount is significant, as it suggests where the ceiling on 
loan fund loans discussed in chapter 1 originated from. But in the case of the 
pawnbrokers there were ways to evade the law, and thus loans could be for amounts 
greater than £10.21 The terms of a loan from a pawnbroker were short in nature, with 
longer terms obtainable for more valuable pledges. Three months was the usual term 
for non-durable goods. This is rational as non-durable goods would depreciate in 
value the longer they are kept in storage. The Irish term structure differed to the rest 
of the UK. Hancock stated in his 1868 report that: 
In Great Britain no pledge can be sold before twelve months have elapsed. In Ireland 
pledges on which loans not exceeding 20s have been made may be sold in six months, 
those on which loans over 20s and not exceeding 40s have been made may be sold in 
nine months, and those on which sums over 40s have been lent may be sold in twelve 
months.22  
 
The interest that pawnbrokers were able to charge on loans was determined by 
legislation. The 1838 pawnbroking report stated that the object of the law had been: 
To enable the pawnbroker to make a specified and limited charge for the duplicate [lost 
document of the pledged item], and to demand a certain maximum scale of interest when 
the goods are released, in lieu of all other charges for warehousing, risk of loss, &c., 
                                                 
16
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
17
 Report of the commissioner appointed to inquire into the laws of pawnbroking in Ireland, H.C. 1867-
68, [3985], xxxii, 345. 
18
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbrokers; together with the proceedings of the committee, 
minutes of evidence, and appendix, H.C. 1870, (377), viii, 391; Report from the Select Committee on 
Pawnbrokers; with the proceedings of the committee, H.C. 1871, (419), xi, 377; Report from the Select 
Committee on Pawnbrokers Bill; together with the proceedings of the committee and minutes of 
evidence, H.C. 1872,(288), xii,1. 
19
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, p. xii, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
20
 Ibid, p. xv. 
21
 Ibid, p. xv. 
22
 Report of the commissioner appointed to inquire into the laws of pawnbroking in Ireland, paragraph 
12, p. 27, H.C. 1867-68, [3985], xxxii, 345. 
 6 
which rate of interest varies according to the sum lent, and which is proportionally higher 
on small than on large sums. (sic.)23 
 
Pawnbroking was in many respects dependent on a secondary market in order 
for the value of forfeited pledges to be redeemed. In Ireland forfeited goods were sold 
at public auctions.24 The law stated that the owners of the pledges were to be given 
notice of the auctions but Hancock believed that this practice was unnecessary as 
defaulting borrowers rarely attended the auctions.25 The main buyers at the auctions 
were reported to have been dealers in second-hand goods.26 This is an important piece 
of information, because it shows that the pawnbrokers were constrained in what they 
could do with the pledges. If they wanted to insure against loss they would only have 
made loans on pledges that had some market, in this case auction, value. Fitzpatrick 
observed: ‘Pawnbrokers, if they wished to remain in business, relied on people 
pawning and redeeming. That was the nature of the business.’27  
Pawnbrokers have often been associated with crime as they were the main 
institution where the proceeds of criminal activity could be laundered. This was a 
constant complaint. Under the 1788 pawnbroking act pawnbrokers who were found 
guilty of dealing in stolen goods would ‘immediately be deprived of his or her licence 
to carry on the said business, and be disqualified from ever acting in or exercising the 
trade or business of a pawn-broker.’28 The police only had the right to search a 
pawnbroking premise if they acquired a search warrant,29 and they continually 
demanded greater rights to search pawnbroking premises.30  It should also be noted 
that pawnbrokers were subject to an annual levy of £100 and this was paid directly to 
the police force; Ireland was the only country in the UK where this was practiced.31 
The pawnbrokers who were registered in Ireland were private bodies, but, under the 
eighteenth century legislation, all pawnbrokers were required to submit monthly 
returns to the Marshal of Dublin, who in turn was required to submit an annual 
                                                 
23
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, p, iv, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
24
 Ibid, paragraph 13, p. 30. 
25
 Ibid, paragraph 13, p. 30. 
26
 Ibid, paragraph 13, pp 29-30. 
27
 Jim Fitzpatrick, Three brass balls: the story of the Irish pawnshop (Cork, 2001), p. 86. 
28
 Pawnbrokers Act, 1788 (28 Geo. 3) c. 49 [I], section 5. 
29Report of the commissioner appointed to inquire into the laws of pawnbroking in Ireland, paragraph 
5, p. 10, H.C. 1867-68, [3985], xxxii, 345.  
30
 See letter from Commissioners of Dublin Metropolitan Police in Report of the commissioner 
appointed to inquire into the laws of pawnbroking in Ireland, p. 97, H.C. 1867-68, [3985], xxxii, 345. 
31
 Report of the commissioner appointed to inquire into the laws of pawnbroking in Ireland, paragraph 
9, p. 16, H.C. 1867-68, [3985], xxxii, 345. 
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abstract to parliament. From these returns we can get an understanding of what the 
pawnbroking sector was like in the early nineteenth century. Unfortunately, these 
returns do not seem to have taken place on a regular basis, but from isolated returns 
we can get a sense of the number of pawnbrokers operating in Ireland and the scale of 
their activities. The available data is shown in table 5.1. It must be noted though that 
the returns from 1832 to 1837 were obtained from an appendix in the report on 
pawnbroking in Ireland. The data from the early years seem to be under-reported 
based on the fact that there was a newly appointed Marshal of Dublin. It is not until 
1837 that we get a somewhat more detailed and accurate picture of the pawnbroking 
sector. John Judkin Butler, the Marshal of Dublin and register of pawnbrokers, stated 
that: 
I certify the foregoing is a correct and perfect list (acquired by personally visiting almost 
every town in Ireland within the last twelve months)32 of those pawnbrokers who have 
lodged certificates of their having perfected the necessary securities as required by the 
statute, and that it contains a true account of the returns received by me for this (my 
sixth) year from the pawnbrokers of Ireland.33  
 
Table 5.1: Pawnbroking returns, 1832-1844 
 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1844 
Pawnbrokers 39 131 84 225 250 445 467 
Incomplete 
returns 18 18 17 4 2 66 20 
Tickets        
Aggregate 303,701 3,269,975 2,761,743 6,522,403 6,308,045 9,846,788 11,810,007 
Mean 11,681 28,189 38,898 29,118 25,682 25,845 26,421 
Standard 
deviation 8,291 29,059 35,049 29,896 26,995 25,842 25,590 
Sums lent £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Aggregate 56,300 476,024 392,135 882,856 847,127 1,191,327 1,601,978 
Mean 1655.87 3,748.22 4,901.68 3,976.83 3,392.96 3,143.34 3,583.84 
Standard 
deviation 14,00.88 4,375.11 6,035.34 4,916.63 4,403.54 3,637.69 4,130.43 
Mean loan 
size £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Mean 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Standard 
deviation 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.06 
 
                                                 
32
 The towns where each pawnbroker is listed in the report, but it is unclear if these were all the towns 
that were personally visited; Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together 
with the minutes of evidence, appendix and index, p. 163, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
33
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, p. 163, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
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Sources: Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of 
evidence, appendix and index, pp 147-163 H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173; and Return from the marshal 
of the city of Dublin of the pawnbrokers of Ireland, for the year ending 31 December 1844, H.C. 1845, 
(141), xlv, 329. 
 
Given the incomplete nature of the returns on pawnbroking, it is perhaps best to focus 
on the mean and standard deviation values rather than on aggregate values. The main 
statistics to focus on from table 5.1 are the mean and standard deviation of loan sizes. 
As can be seen these were quite small in size, around 2 shillings. This is important 
when taking the Monts-de-Piété into consideration. But these are also useful values 
for comparing with the LFB loan funds that were discussed in chapter 1. As a good 
proportion of pawnbroking institutions were located in small towns in Ireland, what 
table 5.1 suggests is that the people who used pawnbroking institutions in the early 
nineteenth century did not have many tangible assets. Therefore, if we compare loan 
sizes from the loan funds in chapter 1, we can see that the average loan from an LFB 
loan fund would have been almost 20 times the size of a loan from a pawnbroker. 
This is quite a high figure and indicates the potential impact that a loan fund, if 
properly administered, could have had. 
Another piece of information that is available from the pawnbroking statistics is 
the date of registration of each pawnbroking institution. If we look at the year of 
registration from the pawnbroker returns from 1832-37 and 1844 we can get an idea 
of what the life cycle of a pawnbroker was. In all the returns the year of registration 
was highest for years closest to the date of the return. 
Figure 5.1  
Number of pawnbrokers by year of registration from annual 
returns 1832-37 and 1844
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Source: see table 5.1. 
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If we look at the year of registration of pawnbrokers in 1837 and 1844 we see that 
there was a low survival rate of pawnbrokers that were included in the returns for 
1837. Yet in 1844 there was still a large number of pawnbrokers, something which 
suggests a high turnover of pawnbrokers. The reason for this is most likely due to the 
fact that individuals were required to register as pawnbrokers, and figure 5.1 is 
picking up some information on the lifecycle of individual pawnbrokers. Therefore, 
we should expect to see more new pawnbrokers registered closer to the date of the 
return. There were barriers to entry into the pawnbroking market, namely an adequate 
capital base to both purchase a licence and to make loans. But what figure 5.1 
suggests is that the pawnbroking field was fairly competitive. This is an important 
point, as the Monts-de-Piété were introduced on the assumption that there was a lack 
of competition in the pawnbroking sector.   
 
5.2.2 Mont-de-Piété in Ireland 
Monts-de-Piété were a type of pawnbroking institution that were found in Continental 
Europe. The main examples of these institutions were found in France, both the 
Netherlands and Belgium,34 and the Italian states.35 The key distinction between the 
Mont-de-Piété variant of pawnbroking and those in the UK was the fact that Monts-
de-Piété were public institutions whereas pawnbrokers in the UK were privately run 
enterprises. In the cases where Monts-de-Piété were most successful in the nineteenth 
century, this seems to be due to the fact that they had monopoly status.36 A 
parliamentary report, in 1894, on foreign pawnbroking institutions stated that French 
Monts-de-Piété were: 
Created in most instances by the local authorities and intended to supply the place of 
private pawnbrokers, and to prevent the abuses and extortion to which the poorer classes 
are subjected when necessity obliges them to borrow on personal belongings.37 
 
It was also stated that in France private pawnbroking was illegal, although there were 
reports of illicit pawnshops.38  
                                                 
34
 Monts-de-Piété were found in both prior to the separation of the Netherlands in 1831. 
35
 Reports from H. M. Representative abroad on system of pawnbroking in foreign countries, [c. 7559], 
H.C. 1894, xc, 381. 
36
 Ibid, p. 47. 
37
 Ibid, p. 47. 
38
 Ibid, p. 47. This statement is also supported by modern scholarship on the Paris Mont-de-Piété; 
Cheryl L. Danieri, Credit where credit is due: the Mont-de-Piété of Paris, 1777-1851 (New York, 
1991). 
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A Mont-de-Piété is a charitable pawnshop where people who pawn goods are charged 
a rate of interest lower than the prevailing market rate, and where the associated loan 
terms are also more lenient. Essentially they were designed to combat ‘usury’. The 
Mont-de-Piété system is intended to assist borrowers by giving them access to cheap 
money, cheaper than if they used a normal pawnbroker. An additional feature of the 
Mont-de-Piété system was that profits derived from it were to be applied to charitable 
purposes, such as building and maintaining hospitals. The Irish Monts-de-Piété were 
related to the LFB loan funds discussed in chapter 1 and they were also subject to the 
same loan fund laws as applied to loan funds, including the restriction of loans to a 
maximum of £10.39  
Matthew Barrington (1788-1861), a lawyer and philanthropist,40 established a 
Mont-de-Piété in Limerick in 1837 and was the first person to establish a 
pawnbrokers’ along Mont-de-Piété lines in Ireland. Barrington drew inspiration for 
his Mont-de-Piété from similar institutions in contemporary Europe. In his pamphlets 
on the subject he cited their historical developments in Italy and their spread to the 
Netherlands. He was keen to state that the Monts-de-Piété had received papal 
approval.41 It is quite probable that this was to avoid any Catholic charges of usury. 
The contemporaneous LFB loan funds, discussed in chapter 1, were accused of being 
usurious in the classical sense whereby the charging of interest was deemed sinful.42 
Barrington stated that the Mont-de-Piété model had been given official status by the 
Code of Napoleon in 1804.43   
Barrington’s account of the historical origins of Monts-de-Piété is fairly 
accurate, but his statements regarding the French experience do not hold up when it is 
compared to a recent history of the Parisian Mont-de-Piété.44 It is important to outline 
some of the early developments of the Parisian Mont-de-Piété as this was the 
institution Barrington et al. attempted to imitate.  
                                                 
39
 Loan Societies (Ireland) Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4), c. 55, section 13. 
40
 Helen Andrews, ‘Sir Matthew Barrington (1788-1861)’ in James McGuire and James Quinn (eds), 
Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009), pp 310-311. 
41
 M. Barrington, An address to the inhabitants of Limerick on the opening of the Mont de Piété, or 
charitable pawn office, for the support of Barrington’s hospital, in that city (Dublin, 1836), p. 8. 
42
 For example see: William M’Cormick, P.P., Loan funding indefensible (Nobber, 1841). 
43
 M. Barrington, An address to the inhabitants of Limerick on the opening of the Mont de Piété, or 
charitable pawn office, for the support of Barrington’s hospital, in that city (Dublin, 1836), pp 11-12. 
44
 Cheryl L. Danieri, Credit where credit is due: the Mont-de-Piété of Paris, 1777-1851 (New York, 
1991). 
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The Parisian Mont-de-Piété was first established in 1777 under a royal decree in an 
effort to combat usury and under this decree it was given a monopoly status in the 
field of pawnbroking.45 The Mont-de-Piété was not intended solely for the poor, and 
Danieri stated that ‘the Mont-de-Piété expected to received objects from a wide range 
of clients, from the very rich to the very poor’.46 Following the French Revolution, in 
1789, the Mont-de-Piété was distrusted as an institution of the Ancien Régime47 and in 
an attempt to promote laissez-faire economic policies it lost its monopoly status in 
1793.48 Following the removal of barriers to entry the Mont-de-Piété faced 
competition from private lending houses.49 Political interference in the affairs of the 
institution restricted its lending activity to small amounts in order to assist the poor 
and occasionally allowed pawns to be freely redeemed.50 The Mont-de-Piété was also 
affected by the inflationary effects of the period; it issued loans in specie but was 
obliged to accept repayment in nominal fiat currency.51 The net effect of competition 
and political interference saw the Mont-de-Piété close in 1796.52 It was re-opened the 
following year, but struggled to compete with the private institutions.53 It was forced 
to implement a maximum loan policy, and this excluded it from making more 
remunerative loans.54  
Political concern over the level of interest rates saw an increased support for the 
Mont-de-Piété and it was recognised as a public institution under the 1804 act referred 
to by Barrington above. But he seems to have overlooked the fact that an additional 
law passed in 1805 ‘ordered the closing of currently existing’ private pawnbrokers, 
hence giving the Monts-de-Piété monopoly status.55 The Mont-de-Piété experienced a 
significant growth in business after 1804, and Danieri stated that: 
The situation at the Mont-de-Piété had never been better. In Year XIII operations 
increased unprecedentedly, especially in the last months of the year. Much of this was 
the result of the closure of private pawnbrokers, which, by the terms of the decree that 
ordered their closure, could deposit their pawns at the Mont-de-Piété. The closure of 
private pawnshops led to such a recrudescence in business that annual operations nearly 
doubled between Year XIII and 1806.56 
                                                 
45
 Ibid, p. 42. 
46
 Ibid, p. 46. 
47
 Ibid, p. 63 and 65. 
48
 Ibid, p. 65. 
49
 Ibid, pp73-74. 
50
 Ibid, pp 60-61. 
51
 Ibid, p.71. 
52
 Ibid, p. 72. 
53
 Ibid, p. 74 and 76. 
54
 Ibid, p.74 
55
 Ibid, p. 85. 
56
 Ibid, p. 87. 
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Monopoly status is an important consideration in analysing the success of these 
institutions. The Dutch Banken van Leening institutions that were referred to in 
chapter 1 were similar in structure to the French Monts-de-Piété and also had 
monopoly status.  
Barrington opened the Limerick Mont-de-Piété on 13 March 1837.57 His 
scheme had some influential supporters, as can be seen from the list of debenture 
holders shown in table 5.2. An interesting supporter, in terms of this thesis, is John 
Abel Smith who was one of the founders of the RLF discussed in chapter 1. 
 
Table 5.2: List of debenture holders in Barrington’s Mont-de-Piété, Limerick 
city c. 1835 
The Marquis of Lansdowne William Roche, Esq., M.P. 
The Earl of Clare Joseph D. Jackson, Esq., M.P. 
The Earl of Limerick Samuel Gurney, Esq. Lombard-Street, 
London 
The Lord Bishop of Limerick John Wright, Esq., Banker, London 
The Rt. Rev. Dr. Ryan, R. C. Bishop of 
Limerick 
William S. O’Brien, Esq., M.P. 
The Rt. Hon. T. S. Rice, Chancellor of 
Exchequer 
J. Drummond, Esq. Under Secretary 
The Lord Mayor of London, W. T. 
Copeland, M.P. 
Colonel Burgoyne 
Sir Aubrey De Vere, Bart J. J. Bagot, Esq. 
Daniel O’Connell, Esq. M.P. David Roche, Esq., M.P. 
Colonel A. Perceval, M.P. Lady De Vere 
The Very Rev. P. McNamara, R. C. Dean 
of Limerick 
Mrs. Fry 
John Abel Smith, Esq., M.P  
 
Source: Barrington, M., An address to the inhabitants of Limerick on the opening of the Mont de Piété, 
or charitable pawn office, for the support of Barrington’s hospital, in that city (Dublin, 1836), p. 28. 
 
In a petition to the UK parliament c. 1838 Barrington stated that he was 
‘determined on making a trial’ of the Mont-de-Piété system in the city of Limerick, 
and that ‘success has been most complete’.58 Barrington’s example was replicated in a 
number of other locations throughout the island, mainly in urban centres. The number 
of Monts-de-Piété peaked in 1841 when there were 8 in operation.59  
                                                 
57
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, question 531, p. 34, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
58
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, p. 228, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173. 
59
 Eight Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, H.C. 1846, (218), 
xxii, 385. 
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There is some useful information available regarding the Limerick Mont-de-Piété 
thanks primarily to Matthew Barrington. He was responsible for petitioning 
parliament to make an inquiry into pawnbroking in Ireland, something which was 
acknowledged in the report of the inquiry: 
It has been principally owing to Mr. Matthew Barrington, of Limerick, that the subject of 
pawnbroking has attracted the attention which is at present directed towards it in 
Ireland.60 
 
As a result of Barrington’s lobbying for an inquiry he and a number of people 
directly associated with the Limerick Mont-de-Piété were given an opportunity to 
give evidence to the 1837 pawnbroking inquiry. The evidence provided by these 
individuals is useful in understanding how the Limerick Mont-de-Piété operated. The 
evidence is also important as people were in contact with Barrington regarding 
establishing other Monts-de-Piété.61 
Barrington stated that there were two reasons for setting up a Mont-de-Piété in 
Ireland: firstly, because he believed that the pawnbroking laws were ‘either evaded or 
totally inoperative’ and secondly, as a means to raise money for his hospital.62 The 
second reason may be more influential, and evidence of this can be seen from the title 
of Barrington’s pamphlet An address to the inhabitants of Limerick on the opening of 
the Mont de Piété, or charitable pawn office, for the support of Barrington’s hospital, 
in that city.63 Barrington’s hospital in Limerick was founded in 1830 and opened in 
1831 by Joseph Barrington, with his ‘sons Matthew, Daniel, Croker and Samuel’.64 
Coincidently, the Mont-de-Piété was located within the grounds of the hospital.65 So 
perhaps Barrington saw in a Mont-de-Piété a way to raise funds to support the 
hospital.  
Archibald Douglas, an inspector and secretary of the Limerick Mont-de-Piété, 
stated that it was the policy of the management to hire an experienced pawnbroker to 
be the manager of the Mont-de-Piété.66 This experienced pawnbroker was John 
William Hobbs Haynes who also gave evidence at the enquiry, and he stated that 
                                                 
60
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, p. iv, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173.  
61
 Ibid, questions764-765, p. 50. 
62
 Ibid, questions 656 and 660, pp 41-42. 
63
 M. Barrington, An address to the inhabitants of Limerick on the opening of the Mont de Piété, or 
charitable pawn office, for the support of Barrington’s hospital, in that city (Dublin, 1836). 
64
 Maurice Lenihan, Limerick; its history and antiquities (Dublin, 1866), p. 478. 
65
 Report from the Select Committee on Pawnbroking in Ireland; together with the minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index, question 490, p. 31, H.C. 1837-38, (677), xvii, 173.  
66
 Ibid, question 505, pp 32-33. 
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Barrington recruited him to be conductor of the Limerick Mont-de-Piété.67 This is an 
interesting piece of evidence in itself as it shows that the Limerick Mont-de-Piété was 
not lacking in skilled management. Haynes’s father-in-law also happened to be a 
pawnbroker, but one who made loans on ‘high quality goods’, where they were higher 
profits.68  
Haynes stated that the policy of the Limerick Mont-de-Piété was to lend ‘small 
amounts’, and that they deliberately targeted poorer borrowers.69 The policy was to 
lend 33 per cent of the value of soft goods, and 80 per cent of the value of hard 
goods.70 This was in line with standard pawnbroking practice. The establishment 
seems to have been well staffed; there were 12 clerks employed in the Mont-de-
Piété,71 something to indicate that there was a heavy workload, but also high costs. 
Archibald Douglas, an inspector and secretary of the Limerick Mont-de-Piété, gave 
evidence of how the Mont-de-Piété was capitalised. Unlike private pawnbrokers, the 
Mont-de-Piété was able to issue debentures to raise its capital. These debentures were 
guaranteed by the assets of the institution and paid 6 per cent.72 Therefore, the Mont-
de-Piété, unlike the private pawnbrokers, was a financial intermediary. The board of 
the Mont-de-Piété was made up of the debenture holders, namely the figures listed in 
table 5.2. A problem with this management structure was the fact that many of these 
debenture holders were non-residents of Limerick city. 
Barrington thought the Mont-de-Piété system was more suitable to poorer 
borrowers than the loan fund system, discussed in chapter 1, that was being 
established contemporaneously. He believed that people who could not get security 
for loans ‘had no other resource but the pawn office, unless they steal or commit a 
crime’.73 When asked if he thought the Mont-de-Piété system was better for a person 
who ‘may have an urgent necessity for money’ than a borrower awaiting the 
formalities of a loan fund enquiry, Barrington replied: 
Yes; and it is of great advantage to labourers in purchasing provisions in the morning, 
and taking advantage of the early market, and re-paying the loan in the evening when 
they get their wages, and not dealing with the hucksters.74 
 
                                                 
67
 Ibid,, questions 156-158, p. 19. 
68
 Ibid, question 241, p. 15. 
69
 Ibid, questions 238 and 243, pp 14-15. 
70
 Ibid, questions 406 and 408, p. 24. 
71
 Ibid, question 370, p. 22. 
72
 Ibid, question 476, p. 30. 
73
 Ibid, question 705, p. 46. 
74
 Ibid, question 706, p. 46. 
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The only problem with a Mont-de-Piété is that it assumes that a borrower has assets to 
pledge. The low average loan sizes from pawnbroking institutions in table 5.1 
suggests that this may not be the case. From the evidence to the committee we also 
get some evidence of who was using the Mont-de-Piété, but this evidence must be 
approached cautiously as Barrington et al. were lobbying for Monts-de-Piété to be 
established on a nationwide basis. Haynes stated it was ‘huxters in Limerick’ who 
used the Mont-de-Piété. These were small urban traders who sold small quantities of 
goods in the city. They pledged their bed linen and the money they received from 
dealing they used to repay the loan and redeem their pledge.75 Barrington stated that 
most articles were only pledged for one day and then redeemed, something which 
suggests they were used by poor people.76 Given the evidence on the number of loans 
from private pawnbrokers in table 5.1, it may have also been the case that loans were 
redeemed frequently in private pawnbroking operations as well.  
 
5.2.3 The failure of Monts-de-Piété in Ireland  
Within less than twenty years after the introduction of Monts-de-Piété in Ireland all 
such imitations failed,77 something to suggest that Barrington spoke too soon when he 
said that the imitation had been a complete success. The aim of this section is to 
determine why the Monts-de-Piété failed.  
One obvious starting point would be the effect of the famine. Was the famine 
responsible for the failure? Were the institutions unable to firmly establish themselves 
because of a large exogenous shock? Monts-de-Piété were first registered under the 
1836 loan fund legislation,78 and as such they were required to register with the LFB 
and submit annual returns. Unfortunately, the LFB did not make any distinction 
between loan funds and Monts-de-Piété in its individual returns in its initial reports, 
but from 1841 onwards the LFB gave a summary of the operations of the Monts-de-
Piété. 
Figure 5.2 shows the circulation79 in Monts-de-Piété from 1841 to 1853 and 
what is surprising here is that the circulation was decreasing before the famine. 
                                                 
75
 Ibid, questions 250-251, pp 15-16. 
76
 Ibid, question 714, p. 47. 
77
 The last recorded Mont-de-Piété in LFB reports was 1853; Eighteenth Annual Report of the 
Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, [2085], H.C. 1856,xix,165. 
78
 Loan Societies (Ireland) Act,  1836, (6 & 7 Will. 4), c. 55, paragraph 21. 
79
 Circulation is the term used by the LFB, it refers to the amount of loans in pounds made by the 
Monts-de-Piété. 
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Unfortunately, there is not much information for the period before 1841 so it is 
difficult to see what the level of Mont-de-Piété activity was like before this period. 
But it is interesting how the decline in Mont-de-Piété circulation preceded the famine. 
As was noted above, Ó Gráda found a decline in pawnbroker loans during the famine, 
but as the loan circulation in Monts-de-Piété decreased before the famine it may be 
safe to conjecture that it was not the famine that caused their decline. Piesse noted in 
1841 that: 
Monts de Piété have been established at Limerick, Newcastle, Cork, Belfast, Dungannon, 
Tanderagee, and Portadown, but no one place have they repaid the expense of outfit. The 
establishment at Limerick is still supported by the munificence of a private individual, 
without whose assistance it must have long since fallen to the ground.80 
 
Piesse’s statement is an indication that these operations, not just in Limerick, were 
receiving private subsidisation from their patrons.  
 
Figure 5.2 
Monts-de-Piété circulation, 
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the number of pledges made in Monts-de-Piété between 1841 
and 1853. Again figure 5.3 shows that the number of pledges decreased before the 
famine. So again this would indicate that the decline in the Monts-de-Piété was 
independent of the famine and its consequences. 
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 Charles Piesse, Sketch of the loan fund system in Ireland and instructions for the formation of a new 
society; with the loan fund acts (Dublin, 1841), pp 44-45. 
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Figure 5.3  
Number of pledges in Monts-de-Piété, 
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 Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Coincidently, when the LFB separated the loan funds and Monts-de-Piété and 
classified their activities separately, the Monts-de-Piété were spending very little of 
their surplus profits on charity. Perhaps this is an indication that they overestimated 
the profitability of the pawn market. 
Figure 5.4  
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Source: Annual reports of the Commissioners of the Loan Fund Board, various years. 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the expenditure on charity by Monts-de-Piété between 1841 
and 1853. In Paris the profits of the Mont-de-Piété were used to support the Hôpital 
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General and other municipal welfare works.81 But as can be seen the expenditure was 
not great in Ireland and did not match the high expectations of Barrington and 
Connery. Both believed that the profits would be able to finance public hospitals and 
public dispensaries. But such irregular spending would not be evidence that this was 
possible. 
Figure 5.5 shows the average loan obtained from Monts-de-Piété during the 
period 1841-1853. It is evident from this graph that the average loan size was very 
small. This perhaps gives a better indication of the business undertaken by the Monts-
de-Piété. They were urban based and receiving goods on pledge that were of little 
value. The low average loan size would indicate that the people who were using the 
services of the Monts-de-Piété were very poor, if using Bowley’s agricultural wage 
index as a barometer. The wages in the early 1840s were £6 per annum. The Monts-
de-Piété had a deliberate policy of charging less interest on small loans than private 
pawnbrokers and also to exempt borrowers from the cost of tickets. So it is highly 
likely that they received a high number of small borrowers as a result. 
Figure 5.5  
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If we take into consideration the average loan sizes from the private pawnbrokers that 
were shown in table 5.1 we can see that the Monts-de-Piété had a similar average loan 
size. If we assume that £0.14 was the average loan size from a private pawnbroker, 
then it may be the case that the Monts-de-Piété gave loans greater than the average 
issued by private pawnbrokers. But the key difference is that they were receiving less 
income per loan that the private pawnbrokers. This was due to the policy of charging 
less interest on loans, and also because Monts-de-Piété specifically targeted poorer 
borrowers. 
The Mont-de-Piété system failed to establish itself in Ireland. There is one key 
reason that can adequately explain this failure: the Monts-de-Piété were not public 
institutions as they had been elsewhere. This had two major implications for the 
success of an imitation of the Mont-de-Piété system. Firstly, they did not have 
monopoly status in Ireland and there was already an existing private pawnbroking 
market on the island. This point was also raised by Hancock who noted that the 
Monts-de-Piété had to face competition in Ireland,82 and Hancock subsequently 
repeated this statement in his report on pawnbroking in 1867.83 Secondly, they did not 
have a state guarantee on their debentures. 
An interesting fact regarding the Monts-de-Piété is that the imitators had spent 
time in France to study the Mont-de-Piété system. In evidence to the 1838 
pawnbroking committee it was stated that the Limerick Mont-de-Piété was actually 
‘entirely’ modelled on the Paris Mont-de-Piété.84 Archibald Douglas stated that the 
Limerick Mont-de-Piété ‘adhered to it [French system] very closely, altering it only in 
such parts as we conceived were not suited to the locality in which we were to 
operate’.85 From the evidence we can observe two key differences between the French 
Mont-de-Piété system and the Irish imitation. The most noticeable is the fact that the 
French Monts-de-Piété had a monopoly status. When Haynes was asked how many 
pawnbroking institutions there were in Paris he stated that there was ‘only one, there 
are not any private pawnbrokers in Paris’.86 The line of questioning of the committee 
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does not seem to have grasped the fact that the Paris Mont-de-Piété had monopoly 
status, but instead seemed to focus on whether one institution was ‘competent to the 
business of an immense city’.87 The question that should have been asked was: can a 
Mont-de-Piété survive without monopoly status? The evidence from Ireland suggests 
that the answer would be negative. The experience of the Parisian Mont-de-Piété 
during the early years of the French Revolution, discussed above, suggests likewise.  
Another key point about the evidence of Haynes is that it does not convey a 
knowledge of the existence of a group of agencies called commissionaires, private 
intermediaries used by the Mont-de-Piété. They intermediated between borrowers and 
the Mont-de-Piété, they operated in areas in close proximity to borrowers (i.e. better 
ex post monitoring capabilities), had longer opening hours, and were funded by 
commissions on loans and redemptions. The commissionaires play a key role in 
understanding the functioning of the Mont-de-Piété in Paris at this time. Between 
1831 and 1839 they actually ‘pawned nearly 90 per cent of items at the Mont-de-
Piété, and redeemed at least 50 percent’.88 The role of the commissionaires remained 
intact until they were eventually superseded by the opening of branches by the Mont-
de-Piété in 1841 and were abolished in 1887.89 So what does this tell us about the 
Irish ‘research trip’ to Paris? Mainly that it was flawed and that it did not take account 
of how exactly the institution worked. How was it that they could not have taken 
account of the fact that the Mont-de-Piété actually operated a large network of 
agencies? The commissionaires would have been the equivalent of a private 
pawnbrokers in Ireland, but with the notable difference that they were actually de 
facto branches of the Mont-de-Piété. 
Henry John Porter was also an advocate of the Mont-de-Piété system and seems 
to have played a role in establishing one in Portadown.90 In 1842 he wrote an article 
on the topic of Monts-de-Piété. The article was an account of his visits to a number of 
those institutions.91 But Porter also seems to have overlooked the importance of the 
                                                 
87
 Ibid, question 467, p. 30. 
88
 Cheryl L. Danieri, Credit where credit is due: the Mont-de-Piété of Paris, 1777-1851 (New York, 
1991), pp 196-197. 
89
 Ibid, pp 204-205. 
90
 Report of the directors of the Portadown Mont de Piete and loan fund to the Central Board in 
Dublin; shewing the formation, progress, and winding up of the Portadown loan fund society 
(Portadown, 1855), p. 3. 
91
 Henry John Porter, ‘On the Monts de Piete of Rome, Genoa, Turin, and Paris, and other 
pawnbroking establishments on the continent’ in Journal of the Statistical Society of London, iv, no 4 ( 
January, 1842), pp 348-357. 
 21 
monopoly status of these institutions, and the fact that they were publicly supported. 
He noted that a Mont-de-Piété in Tuscany was funded by public taxation,92 but he did 
not comprehend that such an institution was not replicable in Ireland.  Barrington was 
asked if he thought the Monts-de-Piété would ‘be useful in competition with the 
ordinary pawnbrokers’. Barrington answered: ‘Yes; I think they will be useful in 
competition with them, and be the means of raising funds for charitable institutions.’93 
Another key difference between Ireland and France was the fact that the bonds 
issued by the French Mont-de-Piété were guaranteed by the French government,94 
essentially they were publicly tradable municipal bonds. It would have been possible 
for the Monts-de-Piété to raise more capital based on this fact alone. Evidence of this 
comes from the fact that the Limerick Mont-de-Piété had to pay a higher interest rate 
on bonds than similar institutions in France. The Limerick debentures had to pay a 
higher risk premium, this despite the guarantees provided by Barrington.  
Another important reason for the failure of the Monts-de-Piété, and which is in 
fact a consequence of the first reason cited, is that it seems Barrington overestimated 
the revenues from pawnbroking, and in turn underestimated the costs of running a 
pawnbroking institution. An aspect of pawnbroking, constant over time,95 is that it is 
not only the ‘poor man’s bank’. All socio-economic groups pawn goods when they 
are in financial difficulty and need money immediately; all that is required to obtain 
money is tangible security. Pawnbrokers receive greater interest payments on more 
valuable pledges, and if a pledge is forfeited, for the pawnbrokers, it is the more 
valuable goods when sold at auction that make money and make the business 
profitable. If a pawnbroker does not receive valuable goods on pledge it is difficult to 
run a business on commercial lines.  
There were two difficulties that the Irish Monts-de-Piété faced. The first was the 
fact that they deliberately targeted the poor, and did not target their services towards 
groups that may have provided greater revenue. Secondly, Barrington’s crusade to 
clean up pawn broking made it difficult for the Monts-de-Piété to engage in the legal 
evasions necessary to pawn higher value goods. Another difficulty faced by the 
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Monts-de-Piété was, as they were very transparent, they may have discouraged people 
from higher socio-economic backgrounds using their services. If people from higher 
socio-economic backgrounds had financial difficulties, but wished to keep these 
private, using a Mont-de-Piété might not have been the best way to go about it. This 
point was raised by Charles Piesse when he noted that: 
 
The most valuable class of pledges, such as plate, watches, jewellery, &c., rarely find 
their way to a Mont de Piété, the owners preferring to pay a higher rate of interest to the 
private pawn rather than have their names appear in the books of a Public Institution. 
Now there is just as much trouble and expense incurred in receiving and releasing an 
article valued at 6d. as there would be in the receipt and release of one valued at £60. It is 
the business done in valuable pledges which constitutes one of the chief gains in private 
pawning, and whist this practice is sanctioned by the Legislature, the most profitable 
class of business will never be done at the Mont de Piété.96 
 
The importance of these higher value pledges is that they can cross-subsidise 
the smaller loans, the loans which the Mont-de-Piété wished to make.  If we look at 
the Paris experience we can see that such cross-subsidisation did take place. Danieri 
stated that: 
Access to the loan facilities of the Paris municipal pawnshop was open – articles ranged 
from clothing and bed linens of doubtful commercial value to jewellery and furniture –
the Mont-de-Piété never merely served the needs of the destitute poor or even the artisan 
and shopkeeper in temporary difficulties, but other groups as well.97 
 
The importance of cross-subsidisation can also be seen in the distribution of 
loans made, where low value pawns, between 3 and 10 francs, made up almost 60 per 
cent of the items pawned, but they corresponded to 20 per cent of the total amount 
loaned. Higher value pawns were a lower proportion of total pawns, but a high 
contributor to the total amount lent. Danieri stated that these figures were 
‘representative of the first half of the nineteenth century’.98 In fact, the Mont-de-Piété 
actually implemented a minimum loan policy whereby no item valued less than 3 
francs could be pawned.99 It must be noted that the Paris experience of cross-
subsidisation is also a reflection of its monopoly status. When the Parisian Mont-de-
Piété lost its monopoly status in the 1790s and, for political reasons, was forced to 
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engage in low value pawning it too was a loss-making institution. This suggests that 
such ideologically driven influences do not take account of market forces. 
High costs, coupled with high levels of competition, essentially pushed the 
Monts-de-Piété out of business in Ireland. Barrington believed that his Mont-de-Piété 
was profitable;100 evidence from Archibald Douglas suggests that the Mont-de-Piété 
was sustaining losses as early as 1838.101 In fact Barrington himself stated that the 
low rate of interest on loans was ‘not sufficient to remunerate the labour required in 
passing it through the books’.102 
The Barrington-inspired Monts-de-Piété gives an example of how not to 
undertake institution imitation, and similar parallels may be drawn between this 
attempt at institutional imitation and the adoption of Raiffeisenism, discussed in 
chapter 6, in the latter years of the century. Perhaps it should have been taken into 
consideration that just because an institution has high-ranking support, such as those 
listed in table 5.2, and works well on the Continent, does not automatically translate 
to success in Ireland. A more detailed study of the existing market and a comparative 
study between Ireland and France would have shown the benefits of a monopoly. 
Given the high number of pawnbrokers in Ireland who each had to pay for a licence, it 
is highly unlikely that Barrington would have been able to force them from the 
market.  
 
5.3 Penny banks and the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul 
PBs were institutions aimed to encourage the savings of very small amounts of 
money, amounts smaller than possible to save in the existing financial institutions. 
PBs emerged in England in the late 1840s and early 1850s.103 They were an 
ideologically inspired attempt to fill the perceived gap in the market, as the existing 
savings banks did not accept savings for amounts lower than 1 shilling.104 The most 
successful exponent of the PB movement in the UK was the Yorkshire Penny Savings 
Bank.105 It operated a branch network and expanded its deposit base. PBs, unlike 
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TSBs and the POSB discussed in chapter 4, did not lend their money to the CRND. 
PBs instead, given that they had registered as companies, could invest in whatever 
assets they chose.106 This accounts for the success of the Yorkshire Penny Savings 
bank as it held higher yielding British and Indian Railway securities.107 But, in 
general, most PBs were not as successful as the Yorkshire Penny Savings Bank, 
owing mainly to the fact of the widespread growth of the POSB, and also TSBs 
catered for savings requirements. The existence of PBs, established by trustees, does 
show that social leaders felt that such services were required. In Self-help Smiles 
outlined the importance of saving small sums of money: 
Simple industry and thrift will go far towards making any person of ordinary working 
faculty comparatively independent of his means. Even a working man may be so, 
provided he will carefully husband his resources, and watch the little outlets of useless 
expenditure. A penny is a very small matter, yet the comfort of thousands of families 
depends upon the proper spending and saving of pennies.108  
 
Smiles viewed PBs as an instrument to teach thrift and advocate their use in 
schools,109 stating that: 
The extent to which Penny banks have been used by the very poorest classes, wherever 
started, affords a striking illustration how much may be done by merely providing 
increased opportunities for the practice of thrift.110 
 
In Smilesian thought every penny should be saved, so therefore this 12 penny 
barrier had to be overcome. The initial PBs in England were established with the 
support of the POSB,111 with the PB holding an account in the POSB. The POSB 
further subsidised PB efforts by providing free stationery.112 The Postmaster General 
reports also stated that there was an Irish Penny Bank association formed.113 These 
reports show that the PBs were used as a way to teach the habits of thrift,114 therefore 
the existence of PBs in Ireland shows a convergence to British trends. 
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The SVP was first established in France in 1833 by Frederick Ozanam,115 as a 
charitable society, inspired by Catholic thought, designed to assist the poor. The SVP 
diffused abroad and societies were established in various countries shortly after the 
initial French society.116 The first Irish society was established in Dublin in 1844.117 
Máire Ní Chearbhaill states that: 
The primary purpose of the Society was firmly established from the beginning: the 
sanctification of its members through charitable works. The visitation of a family was 
seen as a means to an end, literally the opening of a door to a relationship that could offer 
moderate material assistance, lasting friendship and mutual spiritual benefit for both 
parties.118  
 
The rules of the SVP declared that the ‘primary’ form of charitable work should 
be the visitation of the poor by members of the society,119 but also the SVP 
‘encouraged conferences to undertake additional “special works” ’.120 A list of special 
works undertaken by the SVP in 1881 is shown in table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: ‘Special works’ of the SVP in 1892 
Name of work Place 
Male Orphanage, Glasnevin Dublin 
Penny Savings' Bank, Corn Market Dublin 
Penny Savings' Bank, North Parish Cork 
Penny Savings' Bank, South Parish Cork 
Night School, South Parish Cork 
Night School, North Parish Cork 
St. Vincent de Paul Home for boys, and Night Refuge Belfast 
 
Source: Bulletin of the Society of St. Vincent De Paul, xxxvii (Dublin, 1892), p. 247. 
 
 
The PBs were adopted by the SVP as a ‘special work’ to combat poverty. It is 
interesting to note that the SVP did not advocate lending money as a policy to combat 
poverty. It was stated in the 1867 SVP Bulletin that: 
As to loans of money to the poor, the Council General lays down that ‘these may produce 
good results, but they ought only to be the exception. You are aware that, in general, we 
very much prefer relief in kind to relief in money. Still loans of money have been 
habitual in many places, and with some good results; but, we repeat, they ought to be the 
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exception, made to meet special cases, and ought not to become a general practice. In 
every case, any system of loans which would render a brother visitor responsible for the 
reimbursement of the Conference seems to us quite defective and censurable.’(italics 
sic)121 
 
The view that charity should not be in the form of loans was re-affirmed in the 1886 
SVP Bulletin when members were reminded that ‘relief in kind is the rule’.122 
 
5.3.2 Saint Vincent de Paul Penny Savings Banks 
As can be seen from table 5.3 above, PBs were part of the SVP portfolio of ‘special 
works’. In this section we shall focus on the efforts of the SVP to establish PBs. The 
sources for this section are primarily derived from the annual reports of the SVP 
which gave information on a number of PBs that were associated with it from the 
1860s until the 1920s. The SVP PBs are interesting on a number of levels. Firstly, 
they give us information on prevailing social attitudes towards financial institutions. 
They are particularly interesting as they were active in Dublin, the location of one of 
the main savings bank crashes in the 1840s, discussed in chapter 4. The efforts of the 
SVP also support the view that Smilesian thought was pervasive in the nineteenth 
century. This is evident from the fact that the SVP wish to encourage thrift, but also in 
that they did not like to assist the poor through lending (i.e. encourage debt). 
The SVP PBs were not endogenous innovations; they were in fact based on the 
English model of PBs that was discussed above. It was stated in the SVP Bulletin that 
‘the rules had been carefully prepared from the best rules of Penny Banks in England 
and Ireland’.123 It also seems that the main motivation for the SVP to establish PBs 
was to combat rival ‘Proselytisers’ who had established similar institutions in Dublin. 
It was stated that: 
The Penny Bank, which has its place of business at 5, Cornmarket, was founded very 
much with the view of counteracting the efforts of proselytisers, who had set up a bank in 
the Coombe, and were using it as an engine for perverting the poor from their faith. The 
Society’s bank has been very valuable in effecting the object above stated, and we trust 
also that one result of its establishment may be to infuse habits of thrift into our poor.124 
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This action seems to be consistent with the early history of the SVP, as Ní Chearbhaill 
stated that the ‘foe’ for members of the SVP were evangelical groups.125 
Initially there were very few PBs established by SVP conferences. The SVP 
seem to have been very cautious and fearful of the effects of a failed financial 
institution and the implication of such failure on the wider work of the SVP. In the 
discussion on PBs at the 1865 AGM some members explained their unease at large 
amounts of money being taken by the PBs. One member advocated prudent 
management, ‘lest by any failure of mismanagement the interests or character of the 
society should be compromised’.126 It was stated in the 1867 SVP Bulletin that ‘while 
the work of the Penny Banks was most important, it was so full of peril to the Society, 
that it ought not to be engaged in without necessity.’127 
Ni Chearbhill stated that depositors had confidence in the SVP PBs and cited a 
member of the SVP involved with the PBs who stated that:  
It was impossible to persuade depositors to transfer their accounts to a joint stock bank or 
to the post office savings bank, although the latter was eminently suitable for the 
purpose. Many private banks had crashed during the century, but evidently the poor had 
great confidence in the Society’s banks.128 
 
Given that the SVP had two PBs in Dublin in the mid-nineteenth century and 
that the majority of SVP penny banks in the early twentieth century were found in 
Dublin, it would be reasonable to assume that the private bank crashes refer to the 
Cuffe Street savings bank, discussed in chapter 4. However, it may also be a reference 
to the Tipperary Bank that crashed in 1856 due to the fraudulent practices of John 
Sadlier or even the Munster bank which suffered liquidity problems and was forced to 
close in 1884-85. Either way, the citation suggests that the failure of a savings 
institution had implications in terms of the long-term trust and confidence of 
depositors, and it suggests that the memory, not just of individual depositors, but 
‘social memory’ existed. If this is the case, then the failures of the TSBs and the loan 
funds would have been remembered and may explain a distrust of depositors.  
The SVP seem to have viewed the PBs as a mechanism to encourage Smilesian 
‘self-help’. In this mode of thinking poverty could be relieved by the poor themselves 
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if they had a secure way of saving money. For example, the following citation is taken 
from the 1868 SVP Bulletin; the idea seems to suggest that by providing savings 
services the SVP can help the poor help themselves: 
Instead of one [PB], there will be several of them. I need now say how much better it is 
to keep the poor from vice, and poverty which follows it, than to relieve them in the 
poverty which too often is the result of evil habits. Even though poverty is the offspring 
of vice, it ought to be relieved; but those poor who are anxious to keep themselves from 
sin, intemperance, poverty, and distress, they, we will admit, are the best deserving of 
our deepest sympathy and most anxious support. These are the class of people who 
deposit their money in the Penny Banks – people who are anxious not to be a burthen to 
anyone so long as God gives them strength to work; and I would agree with the brother 
who spoke on the subject, that there can be nothing more extensive in its good, more 
lasting in its beneficial effects, than the work of the Penny Banks.129 
 
 
There is also a pragmatic element to the SVP advocating PBs, namely that if 
people saved with them it would both save the resources of the SVP and provide a 
better means to monitor the poverty level of its depositors.130 The 1899 SVP Bulletin 
praised the PBs for fostering ‘feelings of hope and self-denial’ amongst depositors.131 
The SVP also thought that thrift had to be taught,132 something which conforms to the 
Smilesian view of thrift discussed above. 
In the nineteenth century there were very few PBs, with two in Cork and one in 
Dublin. Towards the end of the nineteenth century one opened in Belfast and another 
in Kingstown, Co. Dublin. But it was not until the early twentieth century that the 
number of SVP PBs proliferated. The increase in popularity of the PBs with the SVP 
came as they were seen as a complementary instrument to the SVP policies to 
promote temperance and their anti-treating league.133 This is an interesting fact, 
because treating is what was commonly associated with the personal lending 
methodology used by the loan funds and joint stock banks discussed in chapters 1, 2 
and 3. The SVP defined treating as ‘giving or receiving a treat of intoxicating drink in 
a place where drink is sold’.134 The SVP believed that the money saved in the PB 
could be a disincentive to intemperance. Their policy of weekly notices to withdraw 
were cited as being, unintentionally, an effective check on people who wanted to 
drink, as instead of being able to spend money immediately they would be forced to 
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wait a week.135 It was also claimed that depositors referred to the amounts they had 
saved as equivalent to x amount of ‘pints’.136 This is further evidence that the SVP 
were conforming to Smilesian thought. Smiles was an advocate of temperance and 
abstinence from alcohol which can be seen in his writing.137 In Thrift he advocated 
temperance as a way to save money.138 
 The SVP encouraged the spread of new PBs in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries because they had received support from the POSB. The most 
notable example of this came with the Belfast PB that was ‘worked in connection with 
the post office’ and received the personal help of the Belfast Postmaster.139 From 
1884, although not advocating that every SVP conference establish a PB, it was 
recommend that if one was to be established it should be set up in conjunction with 
the POSB.140  Also, as part of the agreement between the SVP and the POSB, once an 
account reached £5 it would be transferred from the SVP PB to the POSB.141  
The proliferation of PBs and their increased popularity highlighted the 
underlying structural problems of the PB model. They were very costly to operate. 
The sums deposited were small, but were labour intensive as they required attention to 
detail. The returns on investments made with the funds could not have been very high, 
as the amounts were small and they were demand deposits. They were subsidised 
through the efforts of the SVP members, but it became evident that ‘their 
administration [was] unwieldly and time-consuming’.142 They were unprofitable and 
as a result they were gradually phased out in the 1920s, with all PBs closed by 
1931.143    
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5.4 A primer on microcredit and Friendly Societies in Ireland144 
The loan funds associated with the LFB were not the only loan funds that existed in 
Ireland. As referred to in chapter 1, RLFs also existed in the pre-famine period. But 
these loan funds were dissolved in the late 1840s, and their residue capital was later 
used to finance the fishery loans of the CDB.145 There was also another alternative 
form of loan funds that existed in Ireland since the 1830s. This alternative strand of 
loan fund has been overlooked by Hollis and Sweetman, and also in the wider Irish 
historiography.146 This is mainly due to the heuristic bias of Irish historical source 
material, in particular parliamentary inquiries, which mainly focused on rural activity.  
Firstly, it is necessary to outline how such societies were legally recognised. 
Friendly societies were given legislative encouragement and support from the late 
eighteenth century, and as friendly societies continuously evolved the friendly society 
legislation had to be continually reformed. Friendly societies were associations that 
provided mutual services to their members. The archetypal friendly society can be 
broadly defined as either a health insurance or life assurance society for lower socio-
economic groups. The activities performed by societies within the scope of what were 
legally deemed friendly societies evolved over time. By the late nineteenth century, it 
was regarded that there were five distinct types of friendly society, namely friendly 
societies themselves, cattle insurance societies, benevolent societies, working men’s 
clubs and specially authorised societies.147 Cattle insurance societies provided life 
insurance for livestock;148 these were notably absent from Ireland. Benevolent 
societies were societies established ‘for any benevolent or charitable purpose’,149 
essentially charities. Working men’s clubs were defined to be ‘for the purpose of 
social intercourse, mutual helpfulness, mental and moral improvement, and rational 
recreation’.150 There was also a number of societies that qualified as specially 
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authorised societies, one of which was societies ‘to create funds by monthly or other 
subscriptions to be lent out to or invested for the members of a society or for their 
benefit’.151 The approximate number of all such societies in the UK and Ireland in 
1893 is shown in table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Approximate number of friendly societies in the UK, January 1893 
 England and Wales Scotland Ireland 
Friendly Societies 
and their branches 
26,865 779 373 
Cattle insurance 
societies 
59 0 0 
Benevolent 
societies 
70 6 1 
Workmen’s clubs 281 1 2 
Specially 
authorised societies 
216 0 14 
Total under 
friendly societies 
acts 
27,491 786 390 
Benefit building 
societies 
650 150 1 
Building societies 2559 68 67 
Industrial and 
provident societies 
(co-ops) 
1433 336 41 
Loan societies 298 0 0 
Trade unions 493 43 54 
TSB’s 331 53 27 
Railway savings 
banks 
10 2 0 
Total 33,265 1,438 580 
 
Note: The source material on which the original summary tables were based, cited below, were the 
annual returns of friendly societies. But the friendly societies were poor at making returns, and 
although reporting had improved by the end of the nineteenth century, exact numbers are still 
unreliable. 
Source: The guide book of the friendly societies registry office 1893 (London, 1893), p. 78. 
 
There was separate loan society legislation for England and Wales and it was 
exclusively for England and Wales.152 Therefore, the term loan societies in table 5.4 
refer only to certified loan societies in England and Wales, whereas in Ireland FS loan 
funds were registered under the specially authorised societies section of the friendly 
society legislation. Also, it must be borne in mind that under Friendly Society 
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legislation, friendly societies that provided insurance and assurance services were 
given legal privileges to encourage their activities, while at the same time the 
legislature left them to their own devices in order to encourage ‘self help’. One of the 
privileges that friendly societies possessed was the ability to either lend directly to 
members, or to establish a separate loan fund for members. As can be seen in table 5.4 
it appears as if there were no FS loan societies in Ireland. It is therefore 
understandable that the existence of such loan funds was overlooked by Hollis and 
Sweetman, because they were grouped with Friendly Societies in the Friendly Society 
returns and because the existing historiography on friendly societies in Ireland is 
scant. Another form of friendly society that provided lending services was the benefit 
building society.153  Building societies in England and Wales are the subject of 
research on microfinance as the working classes utilised this service,154 but in terms of 
nineteenth century Ireland building societies seem to have been predominantly middle 
class institutions. 
In terms of this thesis on microfinance in Ireland, FS loans are an interesting 
addition to the current literature which has essentially overlooked them. The first 
issue to address is where they were located. Were they rural, urban or both? From the 
available evidence the friendly societies that were in Ireland seem to have primarily 
been urban institutions. Evidence of this comes from the Assistant-Registrar of 
Friendly Societies in Ireland R. F. Littledale. When asked if he believed there were 
many small village societies in Ireland, he replied that there were ‘very few’.155 He 
was then asked if ‘it is not the habit in this country, as in England, to establish small 
village clubs?’ Littledale replied: ‘It is not; there is not the class in this country which 
may be called the better lower class, amongst whom those societies, I think, flourish 
most in England.’156 
It would be safe to generalise and say that the friendly societies were an urban 
phenomenon in Ireland and it is the same with the FS loan funds, with the majority of 
them being in Dublin city.157 From the reports of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in 
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Ireland it seems that distinct friendly society loan funds first became registered under 
the 1834 act.158 One problem with determining the number of loan funds registered 
under the Friendly Societies Acts is the low level of returns made by such societies.159 
Buckley argued that the low level of returns by Friendly Societies in Ireland was due 
to the fact that friendly societies were reluctant to register as they did not want 
government interference.160 He further argued that there was no pressing need for 
these societies to register under the friendly societies acts as the existing common law 
structures adequately provided for their needs.161 This actually gives more weight to 
the argument that we need to be more critical of LFB loan funds and their reports, as 
the low level of returns of mutual loan fund societies makes the paternalistic LFB loan 
funds seem anomalous. The situation circa 1857 is shown in the following passage 
from a report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland: 
The registrar has been at pains to induce the various societies established throughout 
Ireland to forward the returns required by the 45th section of the 18 & 19 Vict. cap. 63. In 
the majority of cases the neglecting to furnish these returns had become habitual. In some 
it did not appear that such returns had ever been furnished, and as there had been no 
formal registry book of Friendly Societies heretofore kept, the registrar had no means of 
ascertaining what societies were in default, and no penalty being attached to neglect in 
furnishing such returns, it is impossible to enforce their punctual transmission.162 
 
In 1857 the Registrar tried advertising in the main newspapers of Dublin, Cork, 
Belfast and Limerick for societies to submit annual accounts and as a result 327 
friendly societies submitted annual returns. The majority of the friendly societies that 
submitted returns, 222, were sickness and mortality societies, but 71 of the societies 
that submitted returns were recorded as being loan societies.163 Unfortunately the 
registrar did not deem the friendly societies that were not sickness and mortality 
societies of interest and as such ‘called for no particular comment’.164   
From the report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland in 1868 we can 
get a sense of the number of FS loan funds. In the report, the Registrar had stated that 
he aimed to circulate forms similar to those that had been issued in England by Tidd 
Pratt the Registrar of Friendly Societies in England in order to get more accurate 
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information on the activities of friendly societies in Ireland. But both the response rate 
and the completion of returns in Ireland were poor and it is unclear what the true 
friendly society population size was. Table 5.5 summarises the available statistics for 
the years 1868, 1869, 1871 and 1872. The level of detail in each return varied but the 
variance decreased in the time period shown. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Loan funds in Ireland registered under the friendly societies Acts, 
1868, 1869, 1871 and 1872 
 1868 1869 1871 1872 
Number of 
societies included 
in the report 
38 37 36 34 
Members  1,518 2,964 3,191 2,568 
Capital  £38,717 £45,406 £55,927 £48,958 
Amount lent  £82,222 £101,166 £135,065 £116,464 
Dividends paid to 
members 
£3,479 £5,333 £5570 £4,844 
Average capital 
turnover  
2.22 2.29 2.38 2.64 
Average rate of 
dividends  
9.35 % 9.92% 10.34% 11.81% 
Average capital 
per member  
£13.70 £19.47 £19 £17.23 
Average dividend 
per member  
£1.13 £2.01 £1.67 £1.60 
 
Note: Not all societies made complete returns, so the averages are not derived from all the societies 
listed in the first row. 
 
Sources: Further appendix to the report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland, for the year 
ending 31 December 1868, H.C. 1870 (11) (11-I) lxi, 411, 421; Report of the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies in Ireland, for the year ending 31 December 1869, H.C. 1870 (471) lxi, 425; Report of the 
Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland, for the year ending 31 December 1871, H.C. 1872 (350) liv, 
269; Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland, for the year ending 31 December 1872, 
H.C. 1873 (369) lxi, 291. 
 
In 1871 there was a general enquiry into friendly societies in the UK and 
Ireland, with evidence being heard at Belfast, Dublin and Cork. From the evidence we 
can get a better understanding of how loan societies operated. But this commission of 
enquiry is a mixed blessing to historians of friendly society activity in Ireland, as one 
of its recommendations was the dissolution of the office of the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies in Ireland. From 1876 onwards the reports on Scottish and Irish friendly 
societies were subsidiary to the reports on the more prevalent activities of English and 
Welsh friendly societies. 
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One difficulty with measuring the activities of FS loan funds is the fact that it was 
possible for any society registered as a friendly society to have a separate loan fund. 
Evidence was given of such a friendly society with a loan fund at the 1871 
commission on friendly societies. For example, John O’Connor was secretary of two 
separate, but related, societies in Dublin, the Pius 9th Loan Society and Pius 9th Burial 
society.165 The rules of the society allowed a member to borrow £1 in the event of the 
death of a relative or friend, with the loan to be repaid in weekly instalments of 6d and 
any outstanding balance to be deducted from the end-of-year dividend.166 This activity 
shows that there was a crossover between the societies. Another example was the 
Cork Mechanic Provident society. The secretary and treasurer of the society stated 
that the purpose of the society was to create a ‘sick fund’ and a ‘burial fund’. They 
also stated that the society made loans to its members, and that ‘many of the members 
wish to avail themselves of that’.167 These examples of crossovers in the activities of 
the friendly society purposes suggests that the friendly societies may have provided 
lending services to members, and also suggests that focusing on FS loan societies may 
not give us the complete picture of the microcredit activities of friendly societies.  
What we do know about these societies allows us to understand how they 
functioned. The FS loan societies were financial mutuals, and to borrow or save with 
them required the person to become a member. Under friendly society legislation the 
minimum number of members was seven and no maximum number was stated. All 
members had to purchase shares in the society, with the face value of each share being 
determined by each individual society. Aspiring members had to purchase a minimum 
of one share, payable weekly, and also to purchase a copy of the society’s rules. 
Membership was not guaranteed, as an applicant was screened before entering. It 
seems to have been the case that in some instances aspiring members had to receive 
the recommendation of an existing member. The 1872 committee on friendly societies 
gives us an indication of the type of members involved in loan societies. The evidence 
of Robert McCormack gave details as to who the members in his loan society were. 
He said that they were artisans and mechanics, and ‘as a rule they are a very 
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respectable class’.168 The Cork Mechanic Provident Society said its members were 
mainly mechanics but included tradesmen of every description.169 Such evidence 
would suggest that membership is screened to exclude members who are either 
unskilled or unemployed and as such minimise potential loss to the society. 
Loan limits were set under legislation at £50, with no set limit to the rate of 
interest or on term limits as was the case with the LFB loan funds. Societies were 
given the discretion to determine the level of interest that borrowers were to be 
charged. From the evidence of the committee investigating friendly societies, and 
from surviving loan fund rule books, it seems to be the case that interest charges were 
flexible and varied depending on the borrowers’ preference for repayment.170 
Instalments were repaid weekly; the rate of interest varied inversely with the 
percentage of the loan repaid.  
As borrowers were members, they were required to use their share value and 
additional capital as a security for loans, and also to provide sureties. What this meant 
was that if individual borrowers defaulted, they would lose any capital saved, plus 
their sureties would have to recoup any losses. This would have provided an incentive 
for more cautious behaviour from the borrower as they stood to materially lose from 
any negligent actions. This coupled with surety monitoring would have also improved 
the performance of the loan fund. The distribution of profits would furthermore have 
created an additional incentive effect. The annual profits of a society were divided to 
shareholders on a pro rata basis. As all members were shareholders, this would have 
provided an incentive for group monitoring.  
These societies would have been able to overcome information asymmetries and 
provide loans to urban borrowers whom banks would have been inadequately able to 
screen due to problems associated with information asymmetries. The major cities in 
Ireland, unlike the rural areas, experienced population growth in the post-famine 
period and this is shown in table 5.6. As such the information arguments regarding 
banks outlined in chapter 3 would not be equally applicable. But it may be more likely 
that such FS loan funds created information about borrowers for banks to capture. 
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Some anecdotal evidence from the 1884 inquiry into Irish industries suggests that, in 
general, urban tradesmen found it harder to access credit from joint-stock banks.171 
 
Table 5.6: Inter-decadal percentage change in population in Dublin city and 
Belfast 
 Dublin city Belfast 
 Males Females Total Males Female Total 
1821-31 10.78 17.34 14.31 41.32 44.37 42.95 
1831-41 14.28 13.76 13.99 32.94 31.57 32.20 
1841-51 13.91 8.66 11.02 25.53 21.91 23.59 
1851-61 -0.75 -1.91 -1.38 36.31 42.66 39.67 
1861-71 -2.25 -4.26 -3.33 42.93 43.85 43.43 
1871-81 3.62 -0.70 1.33 18.83 19.75 19.33 
1881-91 -1.92 -1.77 -1.84 25.22 21.11 22.98 
1891-01 19.48 17.84 18.63 36.09 36.72 36.43 
1901-11 5.18 4.59 4.87 12.16 9.66 10.82 
 
Source: census of Ireland, taken from W. E. Vaughan and A. J. Fitzpatrick, Irish historical statistics: 
population 1821-1871 (Dublin, 1978). 
 
The existence of urban mutual loan funds does raise some interesting questions 
for future research. Interestingly the mutual FS loan funds operated on similar 
principles to the LFB loan funds in that loans were to be repaid by weekly instalments 
and loans were issued at a discount.172 As the FS loan funds were located in urban 
areas, it is more likely that members had access to weekly streams of income, and as 
such the lending mechanism would have been more suitable to the FS loan funds than 
to the rural LFB loan funds. The FS loan funds also experienced moral hazard 
problems with their officers which was similar to the LFB loan funds, but these moral 
hazard problems were not exacerbated by government interference.  
The FS loan funds are also interesting in terms of the chronology of this thesis, 
as from 1895 attempts were made to introduce mutual loan funds in rural Ireland. The 
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introduction of the co-operative Raiffeisen societies to Ireland also saw them 
registered under the friendly society legislation, and the introduction of Raiffeisen co-
operative societies was also an important development in the decline of the LFB loan 
funds. These were introduced in 1895 and received notable public support. For 
example Bailey’s 1903 report on land purchase recommended the widespread 
introduction of Raiffeisen credit co-operatives.173 One of the witnesses before the 
1908 report on congestion in Ireland was involved in a loan fund, and he openly 
praised the Raiffeisen system as being superior to the loan fund system.174 And the 
1914 report on agricultural credit was overtly in favour of a system of credit co-
operation, as can by seen by its recommendations. The outcome of Raiffeisen banks 
despite such espousal and support did not have the desired effects, as will be 
discussed in chapter 6. In the context of the discussion on FS loan funds, it is worth 
questioning whether the efforts to establish Raiffeisen banks were undermined by the 
pre-existence of paternalistic microfinance institutions and did they hinder the 
emergence of mutual loan funds? The urban experience provides evidence that mutual 
lending societies could have emerged, and evidence from England and Germany 
regarding rural mutual savings and loan societies would suggest likewise.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced three institutions that have been under-represented in the 
existing literature in both Irish social history and microfinance institutions in 
nineteenth century Ireland. All three were distinct, but had a common theme, namely 
they were all urban based. Two of the three were institutional imitations and failed; 
the third was an innovation but it failed to find permanence.  
Private pawnbroking and Monts-de-Piété models of pawnbroking provide 
additional information of interest to this thesis. The information on average loan sizes 
in pawnbrokers gives us an additional benchmark with which to assess the average 
loan sizes of other financial institutions. As was stated in the introduction, and again 
in section 5.2.1, pawnbroking is an understudied topic in Irish economic and social 
history. Perhaps more analytical scholarship in this area will yield interesting results 
                                                 
173
 Report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, Legal Assistant Commissioner, of an inquiry into the present condition 
of tenant purchasers under the land purchase acts (92) H.C. 1903, lvii, 333. 
174
 Fifth Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation of the 
Acts dealing with Congestion in Ireland; Evidence, and documents, questions 23802-23812, p. 74. [Cd. 
3630], H.C. 1907, xxxvi, 261. 
 39 
and provide significant insights into urban conditions in nineteenth century Ireland.  
Pawnbroking was a noticeable practice in nineteenth century Ireland, and 
pawnbrokers were found in most major towns on the island, as can be seen in table 
5.7.  
 
Table 5.7: Distribution of loans made by pawnbrokers, 1858-1871 
Year Dublin Cork Belfast Limerick Waterford 
Other 
Towns 
 % % % % % % 
1858 33.76 9.59 8.56 4.13 2.16 41.81 
1859 34.37 8.96 8.46 4.04 2.29 41.88 
1860 32.37 9.29 8.78 4.11 2.13 43.32 
1861 32.30 9.17 9.02 4.27 2.21 43.03 
1862 33.27 9.77 9.30 4.05 2.45 41.16 
1863 35.87 9.02 9.40 3.99 2.38 39.34 
1864 32.98 9.08 10.20 4.54 2.62 40.58 
1865 25.68 8.99 10.59 4.12 2.88 47.74 
1866 30.45 9.12 9.69 3.65 3.21 43.89 
1867 31.50 8.89 7.34 3.81 3.36 45.10 
1868 28.72 10.79 9.81 3.66 3.38 43.63 
1869 30.82 11.85 9.46 2.87 3.04 41.97 
1870 39.10 11.69 7.61 3.91 2.36 35.33 
1871 33.14 7.61 9.93 2.20 2.75 44.38 
 
Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
If we look at the average loan sizes shown in table 5.8, we can see that there 
was slight regional variation, something which might deserve further study. The sizes 
of loans clearly illustrate the low level of income and are a reflection of the prevailing 
living conditions of the urban poor. 
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Table 5. 8: Average loan sizes in pawnbrokers by city, 1858-1971 
Year Dublin Cork Belfast Limerick Waterford 
Other 
Towns 
Total 
Ireland 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
1858 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.14 
1859 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 
1860 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 
1861 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.14 
1862 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 
1863 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 
1864 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.14 
1865 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.15 
1866 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.14 
1867 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.14 
1868 0.23 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.15 
1869 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 
1870 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
1871 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
 
Source: Thom’s Directory, various years. 
 
The Monts-de-Piété are an interesting source of information and they were 
contemporaneously related to the LFB loan funds discussed in chapter 1. Given that 
many of the advocates of the loan fund system suggested the adoption of Monts-de-
Piété type institutions, this should make us question why loan funds were adopted en 
masse and not Monts-de-Piété. Both loan funds and Mont-de-Piété are addressed in 
the 1836, 1838, and 1843 loan fund acts,175 and many of the Mont-de-Piété were 
actually attached to loan fund societies. In 1841 of the 8 Mont-de-Piété registered 
with the LFB, 6 of these were linked to loan fund societies. These were in Belfast, 
Cork, Dungannon, Lismore, Portadown and Tandragee.176  The Dungannon Mont-de-
Piété was actually ‘under the control of the loan fund committee, who profess to 
regard them as one institution’.177 
So what was the difference between the Monts-de-Piété and the LFB loan 
funds? One notable difference between the two institutions is the security they 
required for loans. The Monts-de-Piété required tangible security, whereas the loan 
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funds were reliant on personal security. The difference in security suggests that the 
loan funds may have been riskier to operate, but also less costly. The Mont-de-Piété 
would have faced two significant costs in their lending methodology; one was storage 
and the second was selling unredeemed pledges. The fact is that the Monts-de-Piété 
would have been reliant on a secondary market, the public auctioning system of the 
pawnbrokers, and such infrastructure was costly to run. In Hancock’s report of the 
pawnbroking sector he stated there were a number of ancillary costs associated with 
the auctioneering system, such as sending notices for auctions to the individual 
pledgers whose items were to be auctioned.178 In Great Britain this was not required, 
and general advertisements were made instead.179 Also, the low value items would not 
have realised much at auction and may even have resulted in loss if the cost of the 
auction is taken into account. Section 54 of 1843 loan fund act stipulated that Mont-
de-Piété ‘shall be deemed loan societies within the meaning of this Act’.180 Therefore 
they would have received the benefit of an exemption from auction duty181 and stamp 
duty.182 A significant legal constraint to establishing and operating Monts-de-Piété 
was that they, as pawnbrokers, were still subject to the old pawnbroking laws. The 
1836 and 1838 loan fund acts did nothing to address this problem, and it was not until 
1842 that some clarification of the position of the Mont-de-Piété vis-à-vis private 
pawnbroking institutions was established.183 The 1842 charitable pawnbroking act 
recognised Mont-de-Piété as a special form of pawnbrokers, but pawnbrokers 
nonetheless, and they were still required to adhere to a number of features of the old 
pawnbroking acts. So while the Monts-de-Piété did receive subsidisation (public and 
private), these were insufficient to make the Mont-de-Piété system profitable. 
The LFB loan fund system was able to utilise peer pressure in the form of loan 
guarantors to ensure loans were repaid, and additionally it had access to relatively 
cheaper debt recovery procedures. Pawnbrokers are also subject to ex post moral 
hazard as they do not know if a borrower would repay a loan and redeem a pawn. The 
goal of pawnbrokers is not to accumulate pledges, but to have them redeemed as 
promptly as possible to reduce the cost of storage. Borrowers from pawnbrokers may 
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not actually value the good or may not own it; therefore there was a likelihood of loan 
default. 
 The Monts-de-Piété introduced in the 1830s are an example of a failed 
institutional imitation. The decision to imitate the Mont-de-Piété system was 
ideologically motivated and did not take the existing market structure, in Ireland or in 
France, accurately into consideration. There was a complete failure on the part of the 
Mont-de-Piété propagators to explain and understand the French context. For 
example, in Barrington’s pamphlet he suggested that the Mont-de-Piété could be 
utilised instead of a poor law system, but in France the Mont-de-Piété was a 
complementary tool in poor relief policy. It had been established in 1777 as an 
ancillary to the pre-existing poor relief system, and was able to feed profits into the 
poor relief system by virtue of the fact that it had a monopoly of the pawning market. 
This was never possible in Ireland. Firstly, monopoly status would have needed to be 
acquired, and secondly the loan fund legislation under which Mont-de-Piété were 
registered restricted loans to a £10 ceiling.184 This would have limited the scope of 
activity of Monts-de-Piété and hindered the possibility of cross-subsidising loans. 
Taking pre-existing market conditions into consideration is an important factor when 
undertaking institutional imitation and it is something that has been stressed in recent 
microfinance literature.185 The Mont-de-Piété experience should be borne in mind 
when we discuss Raiffeisen co-operatives in chapter 6, as history seems to repeat 
itself whereby socially motivated reformers undertake the imitation of foreign 
financial institutions without giving much thought to the prevailing economic 
conditions that underpinned those institutions. 
This chapter introduced PBs in an Irish context and outlined the connection of 
the PBs to the work of the SVP. One of the interesting points to be noted from the 
SVP PB story is their support for the view that Smilesian thought was prevalent in 
nineteenth century Ireland. The SVP PBs although established in Dublin with 
traditional sectarian motivation, became associated with the pursuance and 
encouragement of thrift and were used as complementary institutions to the SVP 
temperance campaigns. The SVP promoted PBs in the belief that the existing 
financial structure did not adequately service urban groups who could only save small 
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amounts of money. They believed that by providing such a service they would remove 
the temptation of people to spend, and would also obtain information about the 
depositors (i.e. recipients of charitable relief) in these banks, the belief being that such 
information would enable the SVP to know who was in need of relief, or who had 
sufficient means to support themselves. But this information was costly, as seen by 
the large workload it involved and the SVP was forced to terminate the project. The 
PBs were one of the many Victorian institutions designed to encourage thrift, but they 
were designed without the thought of the cost of thrift. Such institutions were costly 
to undertake and the returns were low. In a free market such institutions would not 
have survived without the subsidisation of their promoters, who in many cases were 
ideologically driven.  
The issue of social memory that arose from the SVP story is useful and 
informative. It suggests that negative events had long-lasting impacts on the social 
psyche. In this it conforms to some more recent economic research such as that 
undertaken by Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel who suggest that adverse 
financial experiences affect investor behaviour.186 This is in common with Galbraith’s 
belief in the importance of memory as a regulator. Galbraith stated that ‘as a 
protection against financial illusion or insanity, memory is far better than law’.187 So 
if we assume that similar memory effects were in existence in Ireland it may explain 
the distrust of both the LFB loan funds, discussed in chapters 1 and 2, and the TSBs, 
discussed in chapter 4, in terms of their failures as savings institutions, and something 
which had implications for their long-term developments.   
This chapter also introduced friendly society loan fund societies. These were 
mutual savings and loan societies located in urban centres. The existence of such 
societies is an interesting complement to the loan funds discussed in chapters 1 and 2 
of this thesis. Further research in this area would be welcome. These societies were 
usually short lived, and it seems that they conformed to the friendly society tradition 
of short-term dissolving societies. For example, friendly societies in Britain annually 
distributed their profits between members, and they could also vote to disband the 
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society and distribute the capital amongst members.188 There is evidence from the 
work of Buckley on Irish friendly societies to suggest that similar practices occurred 
in Ireland. He found that there were many societies that operated as units that divided 
their funds, especially at Christmas.189 Buckley also noticed that the effect of dividing 
was more common in friendly societies that operated as units rather than ones that 
were branches of larger and better organised institutions.190  
This is a key distinction between the constitution of LFB loan funds and FS loan 
funds. If an LFB loan fund wished to dissolve it had to give the LFB three months 
notice, then it had to give the users of the service 10 days notice. The excess capital 
was not distributed amongst members, as in the FS loan funds, as the LFB loan funds 
were not mutual societies. Instead the 1843 loan fund act declared that in: 
…every such case [where a loan fund dissolves] all and every the capital stock, funds, 
and securities, and property whatsoever, of or belonging to such society or the trustees 
thereof, shall vest in the secretary of the said Loan Fund Board for the time being, and be 
disposed of, under the direction of the said Board, in like manner as herein-after provided 
with respect to a society that shall be found to have violated their rules or the provisions 
of this Act.191 
 
 Here we can clearly see a different incentive structure for members of FS loan 
funds and LFB loan funds. If an FS loan fund dissolved, its members divided surplus 
capital amongst them or a pro rota basis, whereas a LFB loan fund had no such rights 
and funds were put in the trusteeship of the LFB. Given the evidence from Great 
Britain and other friendly societies in Ireland, there is a strong likelihood that 
dissolving societies and dividing profits would have been an attractive proposition. 
What we have with the FS loan funds is a number of isolated units, so it is not beyond 
the realms of possibility that many dissolved when members felt there was no need 
for them or when members wanted to divide the accumulated reserves. There are 
records of new FS loan funds forming even in the early years of the twentieth 
century,192 so perhaps there is a wider story to be told. The experiences of both the 
LFB loan funds and the FS loan funds are important for when we discuss the mutually 
based philosophy of Raiffeisen co-operative banking in chapter 6. 
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6 Imitating the continent: Raiffeisenism in Ireland, 1894-1922 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The co-operative movement, which involved the formal combination of individual 
economic agents in the pursuance of mutual economic goals, emerged as a form of 
economic activity in the nineteenth century. Numerous demand side and supply side 
institutions were formed that adhered to principles of co-operation. Co-operative 
agricultural societies, primarily in Continental Europe, were among the most 
successful adherents to this organisational structure. Success and benefits attributed to 
the co-operative models of agricultural production encouraged the imitation of these 
models in different regions and in different sectors of the economy.1  
Ireland was an example of such imitation. Towards the latter stages of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century various agricultural co-operatives 
were formed throughout Ireland.2 The first efforts of co-operation attempted to imitate 
the Danish model of co-operative creameries.3 Also, village banks applying the 
template of cooperative banking established by Friedrich Raiffeisen in the German 
town of Neuwied were founded. These Raiffeisen banks were successfully introduced 
in a variety of different countries, not just in Europe but in other parts of the world. 
The imitations of credit co-operation were able to replicate the successful growth that 
they had shown in Germany. Remnants of the cooperative banks are still to be found 
in continental Europe and in the United States. However, in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom there has been a very poor tradition of cooperative banking and these banks 
did not gain much of a foothold.4 
In 1943 the Rev Cornelius Lucey (1902-1982), a notable clerical figure who 
became Bishop of Cork and was a lecturer in University College Dublin, wrote that: 
 
So far no serious effort has been made to introduce Schulze-Delitzsch or Raiffeisen co-
operatives either here or in Great Britain…There is every reason why we in Ireland 
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should think seriously of inaugurating a co-operative credit movement on Raiffeisen or 
similar lines.5  
 
In fact, when the number of registered Raiffeisen societies peaked in 1908, there 
were 268 Raiffeisen societies affiliated with a central co-operative body called the 
Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS) and the overwhelming majority of 
these were registered as Friendly Societies.6 The fact that by 1943 there was little or 
no trace of these societies, as shown by the above citation, is an indication of the 
brevity of their existence. The main argument of Lucey’s article was for the adoption 
of Credit Unions, a variant of Raiffeisen co-operatives,7 in Ireland. When Credit 
Unions were adopted in the 1960s they had greater success than the Raiffeisen 
societies of the early 1900s, and the Republic of Ireland has one of the highest credit 
union penetration rates in the world.8   
Raiffeisen societies were superseded within the IAOS co-operative portfolio 
only by the creamery co-operatives,9 yet research and writing on the origins of co-
operation in Ireland has mostly focused on the creamery co-operatives as they were 
the most successful adherents of co-operation. Concentration solely on successful 
economic ventures is the economic history equivalent of winner’s history. Other co-
operative movements emerged but they did not have the longevity or the sustained 
success of the creamery co-operatives. Yet this should not disqualify them from study. 
Much can be learned from failure as can be learned from success. The credit co-
operatives made up a sizeable proportion of the co-operatives that were registered 
with the IAOS during the period 1894-1915. The strength of the credit co-operative 
movement did not stand the test of time, and as such it has been overlooked or simply 
ignored by many historians. Numerous contemporary accounts of co-operative 
development in Ireland focused on the movement as a whole rather than on individual 
aspects. In this regard it can be seen how the credit co-operatives occupied a role of 
considerable importance. Many contemporary commentators were optimistic and 
                                                 
5
 Lucey, C, ‘Co-operative credit societies’ in The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, lxii (July to December 
1943), pp 78-79 and 79-80. 
6
 Report of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society for the year ending 1909 (hereafter IAOS 
Annual report 19XX). 
7
 The co-operative literature maintains that there is a link between Credit Unionism and Raiffeisenism. 
For example see Georges Lasserre (translated by Anne Lamming), Co-operative enterprises 
(Manchester, 1959), p. 71. 
8
 Patrick Honohan, ‘To what extent has finance been a driver of Ireland’s economic success?’ in 
Quarterly Economic Commentary (Winter, 2006), p. 63. 
9
 This can be seen in figure 6.3. 
 47 
enthusiastic about credit co-operation in Ireland.10 Horace Plunkett advocated the 
spread of credit co-operation and was enthused with the preliminary results that he 
saw. Plunkett noted that: 
The exact purpose of these organisations is to create credit as a means of introducing 
capital into the agricultural industry. They perform the apparent miracle of giving 
solvency to a community composed almost entirely of insolvent individuals.11 
 
Plunkett was confident that the credit co-operatives would continue their expansion. 
He stated that: 
As the credit of these associations develops they will become the depository for the 
savings of the community, to the great advantage of both lender and borrower.12 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the introduction and adoption of Raiffeisenism in 
Ireland from 1894 to 1922, written from the perspective of supply-side innovation 
diffusion and institutional economics.13 This chapter will focus on the role of the 
central agency that propagated the idea of co-operation in Ireland and argue that the 
initial propagation strategy used by this central agency to encourage co-operative 
creameries undermined subsequent propagation efforts to establish distinctive co-
operatives along Raiffeisen lines. The chapter will analyse why the IAOS perceived 
that Raiffeisen banks were needed in Ireland and the propagation strategy that it used. 
It will look at the information available to the IAOS and how information diffused to 
potential adopters. It will argue that the propagation strategy used by the IAOS to 
encourage the formation of Raiffeisen societies was both flawed and contradictory. 
The chapter will outline the institutional structure of Raiffeisen societies in 
Ireland and argue that the structure adopted was not conducive to sustainable 
adoption. It will outline and analyse the legal context that was faced by the 
propagating agency when introducing Raiffeisenism. It will argue that formal legal 
constraints were more of an impediment to the development of Raiffeisenism than the 
informal constraints, as has been argued by Tim Guinnane.14  It will be argued that 
these formal constraints led to the formation of institutions that were not conducive to 
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long-term sustainability. It will also be argued that if the propagators were 
ideologically flexible they could have made an alternative choice based on a theory of 
second best and that a form of Raiffeisenism could have been successfully introduced. 
The chapter will conclude by comparing the strain of Raiffeisenism introduced 
in the period 1894-1920 with a subsequent strain introduced in the 1920s, and the 
credit union movement of the 1960s. The arguments developed within this chapter 
will be used to explain why credit unionism experienced a more successful adoption 
in the Republic of Ireland. 
 
6.2.1 Co-operation – context and origins 
 
Co-operation, as defined by the International Co-operation Alliance, ‘is an 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise.’15 
The co-operative literature traces the origins of the co-operative movement to 
the writing and activities of Robert Owen in the early nineteenth century.16 Robert 
Owen implemented his theory in New Lanark in an early attempt at labour co-
operation.17 His influence was felt in Ireland when a co-operative society was 
attempted in Ralahine, Co. Clare.  The venture ended ignominiously, the landowner 
lost his estate in a bet and the workers were evicted from the estate, but it provided 
Ireland with a precedent of co-operation.18 
The first successful co-operative venture was implemented in Rochdale in the 
north of England in the mid-nineteenth century. This template of co-operation was 
based on the consumer co-operation and it focused on providing consumers with 
relatively cheap goods and ensuring the quality of goods bought for its members. The 
Rochdale system of consumer co-operation operated along eight principles. An 
outline of these principles was given by Johnston Birchall: 
The first was democratic control; members gained only one vote each, regardless of the 
size of their shareholding. The second was open membership; anyone could join, for a 
small down payment. The third was a fixed and limited interest on capital; they needed to 
secure investment, but gave it just as much reward as was necessary to secure it and no 
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more. The fourth was distribution of the surplus as dividend on purchases, the famous 
dividend principle. The fifth was cash trading, the sixth a commitment to providing only 
pure and unadulterated goods, something which to a consumer owned society should 
come easily. The seventh was a commitment to education, the eight to political and 
religious neutrality.19 
 
Co-operation can be viewed through the lens of agency theory. For example, the 
emergence of consumer co-operatives in the nineteenth century can be seen as a 
response to problems due to information asymmetry. The Rochdale model of 
consumer co-operation was a response in part to the sale of impure and adulterated 
goods, with one of the principles of the Rochdale store being the sale of ‘only pure 
and unadulterated goods.’20   Akerlof showed that in cases where information is not 
perfectly distributed amongst all participants in an economic game there exists a 
temptation to exploit such imperfect information by certain agents with greater access 
to information. Akerlof stated that: 
There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the quality of 
prospective purchases. In this case there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality 
merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose 
statistic is affected rather than to the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a 
reduction in the average quality of goods and also the size of the market. It should also 
be perceived that in these markets social and private returns differ, and therefore, in some 
cases, governmental intervention may increase the welfare of all parties. Or private 
institutions may arise to take advantage of the potential increases in welfare which can 
accrue to all parties. By nature, however, these institutions are nonatomistic, and 
therefore concentrations of power – with ill consequences of their own can develop - can 
develop.21 
 
In this sense consumer co-operatives can be seen as a reaction to the sale of 
adulterated goods and as a result the movement received widespread support and grew 
in size throughout the nineteenth century. The British model of consumer co-
operation was quite successful and was to be the dominant form of co-operation in 
England, Wales and Scotland. The main thrust of the consumer co-operative 
movement was to provide goods for working class Britons and thus it was primarily 
an urban movement. Ireland did not develop the consumer driven model that gained 
popularity in England in the nineteenth century. The socio-economic structure in 
Ireland militated against a similar permeating influence in Ireland, given that Ireland 
was a more rural-based society in comparison to Britain. It was not until the early 
twentieth century that successful attempts were made in Co. Donegal to imitate the 
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British consumer co-operative model. Using co-operative statistics from 1893 we can 
see that there were 41 co-operative societies registered in Ireland, 1433 co-operative 
societies in England and Wales, and 366 in Scotland. The number of co-operative 
societies in Britain mainly refers to consumer societies, whereas the numbers for 
Ireland also include other forms of co-operation discussed below. By making 
comparisons per 1000 population we can see that Ireland had the lowest level of co-
operatives societies at 0.008 compared with 0.083 in Scotland and 0.049 in England 
and Wales.22  
In the late nineteenth century templates of co-operation geared towards 
agricultural production were developed in Continental Europe. These forms of co-
operation were to have ramifications for Irish economic interests as they were geared 
primarily towards agricultural production in countries that competed in traditional 
Irish export markets. This template of co-operation, in contrast to the urban consumer-
driven one, was primarily a supply side movement. The countries which inspired 
imitation in Ireland were Denmark, for its organisation of dairy co-operatives, and 
Germany, for its organisation of credit co-operatives.   
Eric Hobsbawm traced the origins of the agricultural co-operative movement to 
the effects of the ‘Great Depression’, the depression of ‘prices, interest and profits’ in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century.23 Hobsbawm believed that the decreasing 
agricultural prices created incentives for the introduction of innovative methods in 
agricultural production. The same was not the case for Britain as it had ceased to 
specialise in agricultural production.  Hobsbawm believed that Britain by avoiding 
competing in grain markets and instead switching its focus to other agricultural 
products less affected by competition was evading the problem. Hobsbawm noted 
that: 
This sorry record contrasts with the fortunes of other European countries equally hit by 
the depression of the 1870s and 1880s, but which discovered ways of meeting its 
challenge other than that of evasion. Denmark, which began to supply the breakfast 
tables of Britain with bacon and eggs towards the end of the nineteenth century, is the 
obvious example. The strength of these lively and modern minded farming communities 
lay not in any major technological transformations of production, but rather in 
revolutions of processing, storage, marketing and credit, and especially in the spread of 
cooperation for these purposes. Under the pressure of crisis such cooperative methods 
developed fast everywhere – except in Britain.24 
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This analysis seems to adequately explain the emergence of co-operation in Denmark 
and various other countries as the first dairy co-operative was established in Hjedding 
in West Jutland in 1882 and quickly spread to other areas in Denmark. 25  Danish 
agriculture, prior to the establishment of dairy co-operatives, had been a net exporter 
of wheat and grain. Their main export market was Britain, where it had been 
profitable to export grain when the Corn Laws, import tariffs, were repealed in 1846. 
But increased competition from new world granaries in the latter nineteenth century 
decreased prices in the market for wheat and grain and gave an incentive to specialise 
in other forms of agricultural production.  
Another factor which influenced the development of dairy co-operation in 
Denmark was the mechanisation of the dairying process which made it an 
economically viable prospect.  The centrifugal separator for extracting cream from 
milk was invented by Cark de Laval in Sweden 1878,26 just four years before the first 
co-operative creamery was established. Rather than individual agricultural agencies 
operating in isolation, co-operation encouraged the combination of economic agents 
to reduce individual costs and improve production techniques. Co-operation was 
effective as it enabled individual farmers to realise economies of scale. 
Ireland, as a small open economy, with a large rural population dependent on 
agricultural production, was not immune from international competition. The 
competition came first from the new world and the exploitation of the new granaries, 
and secondly from other European countries adopting more efficient co-operative 
methods of production, marketing, distribution and credit services. The new methods 
of agricultural production were encroaching on traditional Irish export markets.  The 
price decline in the 1870s and 1880s which proved a spur for co-operation in some 
European countries did not have the same affect in others. Hobsbawm noticed that: 
The decades of depression were not a good time in which to be a farmer in any country 
involved in the world market. The reaction of agriculturalists, depending on the wealth 
and political structure of their countries, ranged from electoral agitation to rebellion, not 
to mention death by famine, as in Russia in 1891-92. Populism, which swept the USA in 
the 1890s, had its heart in the wheatlands of Kansas and Nebraska. There were peasant 
revolts, or agitations treated as such, between 1879 and 1894 in Ireland, Spain, Sicily and 
Rumania. Countries which did not have to worry about a peasantry because they no 
longer had one, like Britain, could let their farming atrophy: here two-thirds of the wheat 
acreage disappeared between 1875 and 1895. Some countries, like Denmark, deliberately 
modernised their agriculture, switching to profitable animal products. Other 
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governments, such as the German, but especially the French and American, chose tariffs, 
which kept up prices.27 
 
Hobsbawm also stated that the ‘two most common non-governmental responses 
were mass emigration and co-operation’.28 The late 1870s and early 1880s saw social 
agitation in rural Ireland, starting initially in Connaught and then spreading to other 
parts of the island. The ‘land war’ as it is commonly known in Irish historiography 
resulted in the implementation of numerous land acts.29 These land acts were to 
transfer land ownership from landlords to their farming tenants. The combination of 
interest groups in rural Ireland was a form of co-operation, but it was not producer co-
operation. A possible reason for Ireland diverging from European trends could be due 
to the fact that land liberalisation took place much earlier in Continental Europe. For 
example land reform, ‘Baurenbefreiung (peasant emancipation)’, took place in the 
early nineteenth century in ‘Prussia and elsewhere’ in Germany.30 It was these 
smallholders in Germany that participated en mass in the Raiffeisen co-operative 
movement in the late nineteenth century.31 Land reform also took place much earlier 
in Denmark.32 The non-governmental response in Ireland to the price decreases was 
not confined to co-operative agitation for land reform. Emigration was also used as a 
response to the deteriorating economic conditions and there was an increase in the 
rate of emigration per 1,000 population in the late 1870s, as shown in figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 
Emigration from Ireland per 1000 population, 1871-1891
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Source: W. E. Vaughan and A. J. Fitzpatrick, Irish historical statistics: population, 1821-1971 (Dublin, 
1978), pp 261-263. 
 
Attempts to introduce European models of co-operation followed the ‘land war’. The 
first attempts to introduce co-operation came not from the farming community 
themselves, but rather from a group of co-operative enthusiasts.  
Hobsbawm’s account of the origin of co-operation in Europe sits well with the 
formation of Danish co-operatives, but the development of credit co-operatives in the 
German states predated the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1870s and 1880s. There were 
three distinct strands of credit co-operatives formed in the nineteenth century: 
Schulze-Delitzsch, Raiffeisen and Haas. Each strand had a distinct take on the 
formation of credit co-operatives. Schulze-Delitzsch was the first to establish his 
system of co-operative banking and was subsequently followed by Raiffeisen and 
Haas.  
For the benefit of further discussion later in this chapter it is necessary to give a 
brief account of both Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen as both banking types were 
designed based on their personal beliefs, and these forms of banking were to be 
introduced into numerous other countries miles removed from their initial German 
context. Margaret Digby gave the following biographical account of both characters: 
 
Friedrich Raiffeisen (1818–1888) was Burgomaster of a group of Rhineland villages. He 
had a varied career as a soldier, railway contractor (he built the railway along the right 
bank of the Rhine) and wine merchant; he was a Catholic with a sincere belief in the 
Christian virtues. He was concerned for the welfare of the people under his care. There 
were lean years of semi starvation and he tried various charitable expedients. He saw that 
they brought no lasting relief and that people sank back into their old shiftlessness and 
dependence on the merchant usurer…About the same time as Raiffeisen was beginning 
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his work among the Rhineland peasants, another German, Schulze-Delitzsch (1808-
1883), a judge and member of the Prussian Parliament, had been appointed Chairman in 
1848 of a Commission of enquiry into the condition of labourers and of the independent 
artisans and tradesmen who were and still are more important in the German economy 
than in that of England. As evidence accumulated before the commission, Schulze-
Delitzsch, like Raiffeisen, became convinced that debt was the root of most of the 
poverty and insecurity among the people whom he was trying to serve. Quite 
independently, he arrived at the idea of the co-operative credit society. His societies were 
on somewhat different lines to those of Raiffeisen. (sic.) 33 
 
 
Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen established versions of co-operative banking 
contemporaneously.34 The first Raiffeisen loan fund was established in 184735 and the 
Schulze-Delitzsch credit co-operative was formed in 1850.36 Both types of credit co-
operative offered credit and savings services to members but differed in the means 
through which they offered their services. The Haas system of credit co-operatives 
was similar to that of Raiffeisen’s and all three were to experience sustained growth 
for most of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century until this growth 
was hindered by hostility from the national socialist regime in Germany. The 
fundamental difference between Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch was that Schulze-
Delitzsch required members to purchase shares, and hence they possessed share 
capital. Members, as shareholders, received dividends payments in the Schulze-
Delitzsch co-operatives, something which was not done in Raiffeisen co-operatives.   
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Table 6.1: Strands of credit co-operatives in Germany by unions, 1918 
Union Societies 
Members in 
1000 
Turnover in 
Million Marks 
Shares in 
Million Marks 
 
General Union 
of German 
Cooperatives 
[Schulze-
Delitzsch] 948 565 37,745 24,611 
 
Imperial Union 
of German 
Rural 
Cooperatives 
[Hass] 12,480 1,100 15,965 41 
 
General Union 
of Raiffeisen 
Cooperatives 
[Raiffeisen] 5,121 471 443 5 
 
Sum [including 
others] 19,738 2,525 71,794 393 
 
 Source: Michael Prinz, ‘German rural cooperatives, Friederich–Wilhelm Raiffeisen and the 
organisation of trust’, Universitaet Bielefeld, paper delivered to the 13th International Economic 
History Association Conference, Buenos Aires, 2002, p. 6. 
 
 
Of the three forms of credit co-operation in Germany, Raiffeisen and Haas groups 
were the ones which were primarily geared towards rural communities. Schulze-
Delitzsch banks were mainly urban operations, although there were some rurally 
based members. All three offered short term un-secured loans, with none providing 
loans on long-term mortgage. Loans were usually guaranteed by collateral substitutes 
such as sureties, the personal security of the borrower, and membership was a 
criterion for a borrower.  
M. L. Darling, a joint-registrar of co-operative societies in Punjab, gave the 
following outline of the Raiffeisen system in 1922: 
 
Everyone who knows anything at all of agricultural co-operation is familiar with the 
main features of the system, namely, unlimited liability, an area restricted to a village or 
two, small shares, limited dividends or no dividends at all, indivisible reserve, loans to 
members only, low rates of interest and honorary management controlled by the general 
assembly of members, each of whom has one vote and no more. In detail one country or 
province may vary from another, but the ground principles are everywhere the same, and 
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wherever they are found and however they appear to be derived, their ultimate origin is 
Germany and their sponsor Raiffeisen.37 
 
The operations of Raiffeisen banking structures can be explained by application 
of agency theory. The structure of the Raiffeisen bank, membership and limited area, 
can provide additional information which can overcome principal agent problems, 
such as monitoring, screening, ex ante and ex post moral hazard, and adverse 
selection.  
Another German system of co-operative lending existed which extended loans 
on long term mortgages. This was the Landschaften system of co-operative mortgage 
credit whereby money was raised by the sale of land bonds and repaid by sinking 
fund. The origins of the Landschaften system date from the eighteenth century and 
were initially established to lend money on mortgage to land owners in Prussia.38 A 
variant of this was introduced to Ireland in the 1920s by the Irish Free State 
Government.39 
 
6.2.2 Raiffeisenism and financial structure  
Raiffeisen banks did not exist in a financial vacuum when they were introduced in 
Ireland. This section will use the information heretofore presented in this thesis to 
given an outline of the nature and level of competition that Raiffeisen banks faced on 
the eve of their introduction and throughout their existence. It is also important to 
outline the financial structure in Germany, because Ireland and Germany were not 
homogenous and developed along different paths. The co-operative propagators 
believed that they could replicate co-operative banking by simply establishing them in 
Ireland, but they did not take into consideration the niche that these banks occupied in 
the German banking structure. If we look at the German financial structure we can see 
that it was much different to that which existed in Ireland. Deeg has shown that there 
was a tripartite division of the German banking sector between private, public and 
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mutual banks.40 As was referred to in chapter 3, joint stock banking in nineteenth 
century Germany is associated with the model of universal banking.41 There are rival 
schools of thought that have aspired to explain the development of universal banking 
in countries. One school of thought follows the Gerschenkron argument that universal 
banks, banks which mix short- and long-term lending, were created in response to 
demand for their services.42 In other words, there was a demand for long-term capital 
investment and this capital was not generated within the existing economic structures. 
The Gerschenkron focus on the development of universal banking is therefore on the 
asset side of the balance sheet. A rival perspective is associated with Daniel Verdier;43 
it is a political economy perspective which argues that universal banking is in 
response to deposit market segmentation and the existence of a lender of last resort. 
Essentially the Verdier approach has been to focus on the structure of bank liabilities. 
But as Verdier noted (not until the end of his article), the truth would probably lie 
somewhere between the asset-side and liability-side approaches.44  
By 1894, the time when Raiffeisenism was introduced in Ireland, both countries 
were at different stages of economic and social development. Two noticeable 
contrasts were the existence of universal joint stock banks in Germany, referred to in 
chapter 3, and co-operative banking institutions, discussed here. More importantly, 
there was a pre-existing savings market in Ireland and it was structured in a 
significantly different fashion, reflecting the different financial structure, to that in 
Germany. The most significant aspect of this fact was that the Raiffeisen propagators 
did not take this into consideration when establishing Raiffeisen banks in Ireland, nor 
did they appreciate the role of the Raiffeisen banks in the German financial structure. 
It was argued in chapters 3 and 4 that historical developments in national 
financial structures are path-dependent.45 If this is the case it would be difficult for 
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new entrants to establish themselves in the market. So before we analyse Raiffeisen 
banks in Ireland we must firstly analyse the Irish financial structure. As was discussed 
in chapter 3, there were a number of joint stock banking companies operating in 
Ireland, shown in table 6.2. Following financial liberalisation in the 1820s a number 
of joint stock banks were formed, but financial regulation in the 1840s, which 
restricted the note-issuing capacity of the joint stock banks, encouraged the spread of 
branch banking in Ireland.46 The Irish banking sector was remarkably robust, with 
only 3 joint stock banks failing in the period 1840 to 1914. Two failures were the 
result of illiquidity. The Munster and Leinster bank, the youngest bank in table 6.2, 
was formed from the remains of the illiquid Munster bank.47 The other bank, the 
A&C, was based on a flawed business model that aimed to establish joint stock 
microfinance. The third bank, the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank (1836-1854), failed due 
to fraud, but the impact of its failure was contained. There was concentration in the 
number of individual banks, but each branch operated a branch policy. 
 
Table 6.2: Joint stock banks operating in 1900 
Bank Year of establishment 
Bank of Ireland 1783 
Belfast Banking company 1827 
Hibernian Joint Stock Bank 1824 
Munster and Leinster 1885 
National Bank 1835 
Northern Banking Company 1824 
Provincial Bank 1825 
Royal Bank 1836 
Ulster Bank 1836 
 
Source: Thom’s Directory 1900.  
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By 1894 the joint stock banks had consolidated their position and, all banking 
companies combined, held the largest market share of savings deposits in Ireland.48 
The expansion of branch banking also led to the creation of information on borrowers 
and enabled the banks to overcome moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
associated with lending. The joint stock banks utilised a system of collateral 
substitutes whereby potential borrowers provided two guarantors for a loan, and loan 
terms were for 3-month periods. The banks were said to have made loans for sums as 
low as £5 and received deposits from as low as £5.49 Evidence from the 1898 money 
lending enquiry stated that in 1896 the joint stock banks ‘advanced no less than 
345,138 loans, from 1l. upwards, to peasant occupiers in Ireland, at a rate of interest 
averaging 5 per cent to 7 per cent only’.50 The joint stock banks were successful 
lenders, but more importantly they were successful at mobilising deposits. 
It must be stressed that those advocating the propagation of Raiffeisenism in 
Ireland initially did not give much weight to savings mobilisation, as their aim was to 
establish a credit movement.51 Therefore, they were going to forego a cheap source of 
information on their borrowers,52 but it should also be borne in mind that there was a 
pre-existing savings bank sector in Ireland, discussed in chapter 4. Savings banks 
were sizeable financial institutions in Ireland and came in two forms, Trustee Savings 
Banks (TSBs) and Post Office Savings Banks (POSB). TSBs were introduced in the 
1810s and were an imitation of Scottish savings banks.53 The key features of the 
British savings bank system that remained constant over the nineteenth century were 
fixed interest payments on deposits, deposit ceilings, and savings were invested in 
government bonds. In 1844 Tidd Pratt, the Registrar of Friendly Societies, reported 
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that there were 73 savings banks in Ireland.54  Following an endogenous shock in the 
late 1840s55 and competition from government-backed savings institutions the number 
of TSBs subsequently declined and in 1894 there were 15 active TSBs. There was an 
unequal distribution of savings among these TSBs, with 6 of them holding 69 per cent 
of all TSB savings.56  
The TSBs in 1894 were, however, dwarfed by the POSB which was introduced 
in Ireland in 1862. The POSB was the single largest branch banking institution 
operating in Ireland in 1894, and the number of branches continued to grow. The 
POSB had constantly experienced positive growth in savings, especially during the 
recessionary period of 1877-82. It was during that period that the amount of savings 
deposits held by the POSB first caught up with those held by the TSBs. The POSB 
went on to become the largest savings bank in Ireland. It was argued in chapter 4 that 
the frauds in TSBs in the 1840s encouraged the growth of the POSB. The fact that 
savers shifted to the POSB in the 1877-82 period is significant as this created an 
element of path dependence in savings patterns.  
The significance of the savings banks (both TSB and POSB) grew in the 1890s 
as the annual deposit ceiling was raised from £30 to £50. The significance of this 
increase in the deposit ceiling is that it was greater than the average annual wages as 
reported by government bodies, and as such available to people from higher up the 
socio-economic ladder. However, the savings bank system was flawed as the fixed 
rate of 2.5 per cent paid on deposits exceeded the yield on Consols, which were the 
main assets of both institutions, in the late 1890s. This meant that these institutions, 
TSBs and the POSB, were loss making and that the state was forced to pick up the 
loss; essentially this meant that savings were subsidised.  
The British savings bank system also differed from other countries in that the 
institutions did not engage in commercial lending. The UK savings bank system was 
constrained from making commercial loans. This point was made by the 
contemporary economist and co-operative bank advocate, Henry Wolff.57  Tim 
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Guinnane and Ingrid Henriksen have argued that the reason why Raiffeisen banks 
were unimportant in Denmark was because of a pre-existing network of savings banks 
that performed the financial services, savings and loans, associated with Raiffeisen 
banks.58 This argument is somewhat applicable to Ireland as there was an established 
network of savings banks, but the key distinction was that they did not make loans. 
Perhaps this is why the propagators of Raiffeisenism did not include thrift in their 
message. It is also important to emphasise the fact there was no national public 
savings bank institution in Germany. Information was published regarding a POSB 
system in Germany and further applications for information were sent to the British 
Postmaster General from Germany.59 A bill was introduced in the Reichstag,60 but it 
was not made law.61 The fact that Germany had not imitated the UK in establishing a 
POSB led the Postmaster General to make the following observation: 
The adoption of Postal Savings Banks in Russia leaves Germany, I believe, alone among 
the Great Powers of Europe, without such a system. This is the more singular in view of 
the efforts which are being made in that country to ameliorate the condition of the wage-
earning classes.62  
 
The absence of an institution similar to the British POSB is shown in Toni 
Pierenkemper and Richard Tully’s study of the nineteenth century Germany 
economy.63 What can be seen is that there were pre-established alternative conduits 
for savings in Germany, with credit co-operatives being one such alternative. Given 
that the British POSB originated contemporaneously to credit co-operatives in 
Germany, what might be an interesting question is why a POSB system did not 
develop in Germany. A plausible argument is that the lack of a national savings bank 
has something to do with the late formation of the German state in the nineteenth 
century and the pre-existence of a strong savings bank sector. 
There was also a tradition of financial mutuals in Ireland similar to Raiffeisen 
co-operative banks, avant la lettre. These came in two varieties, the first of which, 
and the ones that have received scholarly attention, being loan fund societies 
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registered with the LFB.64 Membership of LFB loan fund societies was confined to 
persons investing funds for the purpose of lending to the ‘industrious poor’.65 But the 
society could borrow from non-members, and it made loans to non-members. Ó Gráda 
has likened the LFB loan funds to credit unions,66 but this analogy is inaccurate as 
membership is a prerequisite for both saving and borrowing in a credit union. The 
LFB loan funds were providers of small loans with a legally imposed loan ceiling of 
£10 and a loan term of 5 months (20 weeks). These loans were guaranteed by two 
sureties, similar to the methodology used by the joint stock banks. The other loan 
funds that existed were friendly society loan funds. These were first established in the 
1830s. Friendly society loan funds came in two forms; they were either friendly 
societies that gave loans to members or singular loan fund societies.67 Membership 
was a legal criterion for both borrowing and lending in loan funds registered under 
Friendly Society legislation. Friendly society loan funds also had a legally imposed 
loan ceiling of £50, but loan terms and interest rates, on both loans and deposits, were 
flexible. 
 The loan funds most prevalent in rural Ireland were the LFB loan funds, so as 
such there was no tradition of mutual societies along Raiffeisen lines. Vaughan has 
argued that there was no formal co-operative tradition, of any description, in rural 
Ireland, and that the religious background of most tenants, hierarchical religions, did 
not ‘inculcate those arts of management that are necessary for voluntary 
organisations’.68 Vaughan argued that there were elements of informal co-operation 
such as ‘swapping, either of horses, machinery, or time’, but they were based on 
‘neighbourliness’ as opposed to formal arrangements.69 In terms of financial mutuals, 
it was argued that the use of sureties was a form of mutualisation.70 Evidence of cross-
securitisation, whereby borrowers would simultaneously act as a surety for one 
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another’s sureties, supports this view.71 However, this form of mutuality is not the 
same as members of a society being mutually involved in the lending process as in a 
Raiffeisen society.  
The friendly society loan funds were located in urban centres. When Raiffeisen 
societies were established in rural Ireland, discussed below, they were essentially 
friendly society loan funds but with powers to borrow from non-members. A key 
consideration in the Raiffeisen story is the bubble experienced by LFB loan funds 
from 1880 to 1895 and its subsequent collapse in 1896 following a number of legal 
verdicts which made it difficult to enforce loan repayments if loans were not issued in 
conformity with the loan fund acts.72 This created a catch-22:  LFB loan funds could 
not recover debts issued in contravention to the LFB acts but could sue under 
alternative acts.  In order to sue for debts under alternative legislation a stamp was 
required, but this stamp was exempted under the LFB acts. It was not until 1906 that 
adequate legislation was introduced that resolved this impasse.  
When the Raiffeisen societies were established the institutions that came closest 
to resembling them were the LFB loan funds, and these were experiencing a major 
crisis. George Russell (Æ), an organiser of Raiffeisen societies for the IAOS, stated in 
1912 that the LFB loan fund societies, along with moneylenders and traders, were the 
interest groups most opposed to the establishment of Raiffeisen societies in Ireland.73 
George Russell’s account is somewhat dubious as in 1894 there were very few loan 
funds in the west of Ireland, and it was mainly in the west of Ireland that Raiffeisen 
banks were being established. An interesting point regarding G. Russell’s account of 
the competition between Raiffeisen societies and LFB loan funds is the fact that the 
loan funds had already lost a significant portion of their market share to the joint stock 
banks, and they had little or no share of the savings markets. G. Russell is therefore 
implying that the Raiffeisen banks were competing with the weakest elements of the 
market and they failed to match them. The key issue is not the LFB loan funds, but 
the role of the joint stock banks in Ireland.  
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Figure 6.2 
Financial institutions in Ireland per 1000 population, 
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Note: The POSB was established in 1862, the number of branches in 1862 was used in the calculation 
for 1861. The values for Raiffeisen societies are those stated by the IAOS. 
Sources: Thom’s Directory 1861-1911. POSB statistics for 1862 are taken from Eighth Report of the 
Postmaster General on the Post Office [2984] H.C. 1862, xxvii, 393. 
Raiffeisen statistics are taken from IAOS annual report 1902 and 1912. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the number of financial institutions per 1,000 population. As can be 
seen the largest institution was the POSB followed by the joint stock banks. The high 
values for the POSB and joint stock banks can be seen as a reflection of the large 
number of branches operated by each institution. It should be noted that many towns 
had more than one joint stock bank branch, but each POSB branch was found in a 
unique location. Looking at figure 6.2, one can see that before Raiffeisen banks were 
established there were two strong financial institutions active in Ireland. The joint 
stock banks were active financial intermediaries, whereas the POSB only offered 
savings products. Given that this information was available to contemporaries, one 
would expect that an economically rational agency attempting to introduce a new 
financial institution would have studied the market to pinpoint where the new 
institution could compete. From the information outlined in this section it would 
appear as though the POSB could be targeted as it did not offer lending services, and 
also the LFB loan funds were in disarray.  
An important consideration, given that the IAOS wished to introduce a lending 
institution, would be the extent of informal competition. The most notable sources of 
informal credit would have been from local shopkeepers, and from pawnbrokers. 
Kennedy has shown that there was an increase in the number of rural traders towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and he has argued that this increase in traders 
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decreased the cost of credit.74 Kennedy’s arguments are supported by the CDB 
baseline reports. Kennedy has also argued that the credit terms available from 
shopkeepers were less rigid than those available from the formal joint stock banks and 
that this was an explanatory reason why the farming population had a preference for 
shopkeeper credit.75 Kennedy’s analysis shows that the relationship between traders 
and those who obtained credit from them was more complex than the propagators of 
Raiffeisen societies understood. 
In order to compare Irish and German banking structures it is useful to use the 
Verdier approach of analysing financial structures. The Verdier hypothesis is that 
state involvement influences the development of financial systems, and that the 
degree (i.e. centralised versus localised) of state involvement in an economy 
influences the competition in savings markets and can create a lender of last resort. 
Verdier’s findings were that ‘universal banking was most likely to emerge in states 
that were neither so centralised that local banks were displaced by centre banks, nor 
so decentralised that there was no central bank’.76 If we just focus on Germany we see 
that there was a lag in the establishment of municipal savings banks in German states 
compared to the UK, but that the motivation to establish savings banks, i.e. to 
encourage thrift etc discussed in chapter 4, was the same in both cases. Deeg stated 
that between 1840 and 1860 there were 800 savings banks formed,77 whereas a similar 
magnitude of savings banks had been established in the UK in the period 1820 to 
1840; see chapter 4. The main difference between the German and UK savings banks 
was that in German states savings banks were local municipal savings banks that did 
not transfer funds to a central body as was done in the UK. The German savings 
banks did not experience a crisis of confidence, such as what happened in the UK in 
the period 1848-1863, and as a result there was no demand to establish a stronger 
national savings bank. The German savings banks initially did not lend to individuals 
but ‘beginning in the 1840s personal credits to local merchants, craft workers, and 
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farmers became a central part of their lending activities.’78 The co-operative banks 
emerged later and they competed for savings and made loans to individuals in urban 
and rural settings. Another factor which distinguished German from the Scottish and 
Irish forms of joint stock banking, but not the English, was the monopoly of note-
issuing by a central bank. This happened relatively early in the life cycle of German 
joint stock banks, so as a result they did not have to keep as liquid an asset structure 
as Scottish or Irish banks. It also forced them to focus on other business models, 
hence a reason why universal banking was adopted. If we look at the distribution of 
deposit market share in Germany and the UK by banking sector in 1913, we can see 
that in the UK the commercial banking sector held a substantial share of that market 
at 80 per cent, whereas, in Germany the commercial banks held 28 per cent of the 
market; a much larger and more significant share of the market in Germany was held 
by savings banks, mutual credit societies and mortgage banks.79  
The strength of the other sectors, the non-profit and the mutual, in nineteenth 
century Germany influenced developments in the joint stock banking sector and as a 
result the German joint stock banks differed significantly from their UK counterparts 
in that they were not deposit mobilisers.80 Another area where this difference is 
noticeable is the gearing ratio of German joint stock banks. For example, in 1914 we 
can see that they had a lower gearing ratio (i.e. more equity capital) and a lower 
liquidity ratio (i.e. less liquid assets) in comparison to UK joint stock banks.81 The 
reason for this was that the German banking model was more reliant on equity capital, 
whereas UK banks (including Ireland) were based on a deposit mobilising model. UK 
banks operated large branch networks to collect deposits. In Germany joint stock 
banks did not begin branch banking until late in the nineteenth century.82 For 
example, Deeg stated that in 1900 Deutsche Bank had 6 branches and this number had 
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increased to 173 by 1926.83 But the efforts of German joint stock banks at branch 
banking were unsuccessful.84 This lack of success was not because they did not want 
to practise branch banking but because there was strong competition in the market for 
savings.  
Similar segmentation existed in credit markets as the different sectors targeted 
different groups. The German joint stock banks focused on industrial investment, for 
which they have been praised,85 but as a result they neglected other sectors of the 
economy and these sectors were forced to look elsewhere for banking 
accommodation; hence savings banks and co-operative banks were more competitive 
in Germany. The German joint stock banks focused on industrial loans from an early 
stage of their development, and it is this factor which explains the large market share 
of the other sectors. Lending in the German structure was also segmented, with the 
universal banks focusing on lending to industry, and co-operative banks lending to 
small urban and rural enterprises. From what we have discussed heretofore in this 
thesis, a similar segmentation did not exist in Ireland. It was shown in chapter 3 that 
joint stock banks held a large amount of deposits, and in chapter 4 that the joint stock 
banks held a large share of the deposit market vis-à-vis the savings banks. This 
suggests that, based on the Irish banking structure, Raiffeisen banks would find 
greater competition for savings deposits in Ireland than they had done in their early 
history in Germany. 
What Irish contemporaries saw when they looked at Raiffeisen banks in 
Germany was just one aspect of the German banking and co-operative structures. The 
IAOS thought it was possible to replicate the German model by implementing a 
superficial imitation of the German institution. But what they saw was only part of a 
complex banking structure that had developed due to state intervention in the German 
banking sector. Also, the German Raiffeisen banks were heavily integrated with other 
forms of co-operation. Deeg has likened the developments in German co-operative 
banking to a form of co-operative universal banking,86 with individual co-operatives 
banks linked to regional banks, who in turn were linked to national bodies. The co-
operative banks were also involved with other forms of co-operative enterprise. The 
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Irish contemporaries who examined the Raiffeisen societies undertook limited 
analysis. The narrow focus of their investigations left them with a perception of how 
Raiffeisenism worked, rather than a detailed knowledge. It proved to be a costly 
mistake. 
 
6.3.1 The IAOS and the propagation of co-operation in Ireland 
 
In the late nineteenth century attempts were made by a small group of co-operation 
idealists to introduce co-operative agricultural methods in Ireland. The first attempts 
at co-operation were aimed at establishing co-operative creameries along lines similar 
to what was practised in contemporary Denmark, this was a conscious effort to imitate 
the Danish co-operative system. This is a key element to the Raiffeisen story in 
Ireland because in Denmark there was not a strong tradition of co-operative 
banking.87 It is also a key issue in understanding the diffusion of co-operative 
creameries in Ireland. Kevin O’Rourke, in a recent article, has suggested that property 
rights and politics may be important variables in understanding the distribution of co-
operative creameries in Ireland.88 But O’Rourke’s paper does not allow for the fact 
that the demand for innovation was actually determined by a centrally controlled 
body, the IAOS. This was a key argument in the thesis of Proinnsias Breathnach.89 So 
in order to fully understand the imitation of co-operation in Ireland, we must also 
understand the IAOS. 
Tim Guinnane has looked at both Ireland and Denmark in terms of their non-
adoption of co-operative banks. But he did not specifically draw the links between 
Ireland and Denmark. Ireland specifically imitated Danish co-operation and this 
imitation did not come with a tradition of co-operative banking. This is a key 
sequential factor in co-operative development as it essentially placed the co-operative 
creamery rather than the co-operative bank at the heart of the Irish co-operative 
movement. In Germany the Raiffeisen co-operatives were associated with a number 
of agricultural societies. The Raiffeisen philosophy was to establish a bank first and 
then other constituent societies such as agricultural production societies, or 
creameries.  
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The problem with introducing Raiffeisen societies in Ireland was firstly, they were not 
the fulcrum of the co-operative movement, and secondly, they found it difficult to 
access savings. Coincidently the co-operative creameries initially had difficulties with 
the joint stock banks as they were reluctant to make loans secured by unorthodox joint 
liability of members,90 something which a co-operative banking society would not 
have had a problem recognising. This was also noted by H de F Montgomery who 
went on a ‘research trip’91 on behalf of the Department of Agriculture and Technical 
Instruction (DATI) to Germany in 1903. In an article on co-operation in Germany he 
stated that: 
In many respects the Raiffeisen Organisation offers, probably, the best model for the 
organisation of agricultural co-operative societies; but the difficulty of adopting it as a 
pattern for Irish agricultural co-operative organisation arises from the circumstance that it 
is specially framed for the benefit of savings and loan societies doing supply business 
and that productive societies (dairy societies &c.) were an afterthought in this 
organisation. They did not fit into it, and had to be provided for by subsidiary 
arrangements. In Ireland the dairy societies came first, the supply associations next, and 
the credit societies last. (italics sic)92 
 
Another key difficulty with the Raiffeisen societies, which is due to the Irish 
financial structure discussed above, was that they had a weak deposit base whereas in 
Germany these institutions had a wide deposit mobilisation, even encouraging 
children to save.93 This type of deposit mobilisation occurred in Britain and Ireland, 
but it was the POSB that actively encouraged children to save, supporting school 
savings banks.94 
One reason for this was that Horace Plunkett, a pivotal figure in the initial co-
operative movement, had given preference to the creameries, à la Denmark.  Plunkett 
outlined the motivation for the prioritisation of creameries: 
Though the economic conditions of the Irish farmer clearly indicated a need for the 
application of co-operative effort to all branches of his industry, it was necessary at the 
beginning to embrace a more limited aim. It happened at the time we commenced our 
Irish work that one branch of farming, the dairy industry, presented features admirably 
adapted to our methods….New machinery, costly but highly efficient, had enabled the 
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factory product, notably that of Denmark and Sweden, to compete successfully with the 
home-made article, both in quality and cost of production.95 
 
The initial efforts to establish dairy co-operatives involved Horace Plunkett and 
R.A. Anderson, another key figure in the Irish co-operative movement and Secretary 
of the IAOS, attempting to encourage dairy farmers to establish co-operative 
creameries. Their initial focus was primarily on an area in the south-west of Ireland 
known as the Golden Vale where there was an established tradition of dairy farming. 
Horace Plunkett claimed to have held over 50 meetings before the first co-operative 
creamery was established in 1889.96 Following the first example, many other 
creameries were established. Initially Plunkett had solicited help from the Co-
operative Union, the federated body that represented British consumer co-operatives, 
for his ‘missionary work’.97 Having realised that consumer co-operation, co-
operatives, looking to minimise the price paid by consumers, had an antinomic 
relationship to producer co-operatives, co-operatives looking to maximise the price 
received by producers, Plunkett and company decided to establish their own central 
co-operative organisation, the IAOS, in 1894. It is worth stressing that the apex 
institution representing Irish co-operatives at a national level was not established on a 
federated basis, as in other countries. In most discussion on the development of 
central institutions in the co-operative literature the emphasis is on individual co-
operatives combining on a ‘higher level’.98 In Ireland the order was reversed with a 
central organisation creating local co-operatives, or a top-down development of co-
operation as opposed to a bottom-up approach. The role of the IAOS was outlined by 
Horace Plunkett as follows: 
In the first instance it was to consist of philanthropic persons, but its constitution 
provided for the inclusion in its membership of the societies which had already been 
created and those which it would itself create as time went on.99 
 
As can be seen in the context of co-operation the propagating agency was itself 
an innovation. Giving evidence to the money lending inquiry Plunkett said that the 
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role of the IAOS was to ‘persuade’ people to adopt co-operation.100 Paul-Dubois, a 
contemporary French observer gave a description of the role of the IAOS in 1904: 
 
An intelligent propaganda on the part of Sir Horace Plunkett and the Irish Agricultural 
Organisation Society, soon began to gain support for the new ideas, in spite of all 
obstacles and objections. The society is of an original and novel type, and has for its aim 
to ameliorate the condition of the agricultural population of Ireland by instruction in the 
principles and methods of co-operation. Of itself it has created nothing; it merely 
organises, advises and controls. It sends out organisers, who undertake campaigns in one 
district after another, and endeavour to establish co-operative associations by explaining 
their aims, advantages and methods to the peasants. The parent Society watches over its 
offshoots, initiates them into the best methods of procedure, superintends their 
operations, and audits their accounts. Through its agents and instructors it trains the co-
operators in good business habits, and teaches how to keep accounts and to apply co-
operative rules. In a word, it undertakes their economic education. In 1894, when the 
society commenced its labours, there were 33 Co-operative Associations in Ireland, at 
present (1904) there are 778 of various kinds, with 85,000 members, representing a 
population of over 400,000 persons, or about one-seventh of the total population of 
Ireland. 101 
 
Without the efforts of Horace Plunkett or the IAOS it is unlikely that co-
operative forms of agricultural production would have developed. Private creameries 
using mechanical machinery had been established in Munster before the development 
of co-operatives,102 so it is likely that this would have been the line of development 
had the co-operative propagators not influenced the market. Breathnach observed that: 
 
Whereas in Denmark, co-operative formation was largely a spontaneous development 
from within the farming population, in Ireland there was little evidence of any such 
tendency. Indeed, were it not for the proselytising efforts of a small band of co-operative 
enthusiasts, drawn for the most part from outside the farming community, it may be that 
the co-operative sector would never have established a substantial foothold in the dairy 
industry.103 
 
The important point in regards to the Raiffeisen societies is that the integration 
of co-operative enterprises was not encouraged in the way it had been in Germany. 
This meant that the Raiffeisen banks were losing out on two cheap and integral 
sources of information about their members: deposits and income flows from farming 
enterprises. Information on income flows from farming enterprises are very 
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significant as they can overcome the danger of ex post moral hazard whereby a 
borrower is untruthful about the outcome of an investment. This meant that the 
Raiffeisen societies, as designed and encouraged by the IAOS, were also losing 
advantages of economies of scope. 
 
6.3.2 Raiffeisenism – origins in Ireland  
The first Raiffesien society was formed in Doneraile, Co. Cork, and was registered as 
a specially registered friendly society in 1894.104 It was established by the IAOS at the 
‘personal initiative’ of Horace Plunkett,105 and the subsequent establishment of 
Raiffeisen societies was at the behest of the IAOS. Therefore, in order to understand 
why Raiffeisen societies were introduced we must first try and understand why the 
IAOS felt they were needed. The Raiffeisen societies, like the co-operative 
creameries, did not emerge spontaneously. This can be interpreted to suggest one of 
two things: that there was a market failure or that the market was working. 
The best source of information on why the IAOS felt Raiffeisen societies were 
needed comes from the Parliamentary inquiry into money lending in the UK. The 
inquiry began in 1897, but the committee did not produce a report in its first year, and 
its work was carried over into 1898. On 31 March 1898, three IAOS delegates and a 
secretary of one of the earliest Raiffeisen societies founded in Ireland gave evidence 
to the committee of inquiry. The IAOS delegates were Horace Plunkett and two bank 
organisers, George Russell and P. J. Hannon. The evidence of all three men is very 
similar and there is little deviation in content. This is most likely because they had 
briefed each other on the day. They outlined five sources of credit in rural Ireland and 
the complaints that they had against them. The sources of credit were joint stock 
banks, trust auctions, LFB loan fund societies, shopkeepers and money lenders.106 
Their complaints against the joint stock banks were essentially that there were 
high ancillary costs of credit. They believed that the joint stock banks were not 
prevalent in the west and that as such there were high transaction costs associated 
with borrowing from them. They also believed the cost of treating, that is the cost of 
transport, food and whiskey for a borrower and his sureties, also increased the cost of 
                                                 
104Reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies for the year ending 31st December 1894, Part 
A., p. 85, H.C. 1895, (110) (110-I) (110-II), xci, 1, 247, 453. 
105
 Henry W. Wolff, People’s banks: a record of social and economic success (2nd edition, London, 
1896), p. 390. 
106
 Report from the Select Committee on Money Lending , pp 99-120. 
 73 
a loan from a borrower’s perspective. The trust auction system was newly established 
in Ireland and was confined to Co. Donegal in the North West of Ireland. It involved 
the collusion of a buyer and seller in an auction with the aim being to get an advance 
from the auctioneer. The example given was of a buyer who would bring a cow to an 
auction, his neighbour would bid up the price for the cow, the buyer would then give 
the auctioneer a bill of sale and the auctioneer would discount this bill of sale for the 
seller. The actual sale was fraudulent, but the seller of the cow would have received a 
loan. George Russell, the only one of the three IAOS delegates who had direct 
knowledge of the system,107 disliked it as the sale was ‘a sham’ and because the 
borrower was paying two charges: the initial auctioneer’s fee and the discount of the 
bill.108 The IAOS delegates believed that although the interest charged by LFB loan 
funds was relatively low, the loan terms were unsuited to the needs of agriculturalists. 
Usurious money lending was believed to be uncommon in Ireland, but shopkeeper 
credit was extensive. Both activities seem to have come under the heading 
‘gombeenism’. The IAOS delegates believed that the introduction of Raiffeisen 
societies was the remedy to the five ‘evils’ they had outlined.109 
Before further discussing the IAOS views on why Raiffeisenism was needed, it 
is worth highlighting the level of ignorance of the IAOS delegates in relation to joint 
stock banking in Ireland. Given that they were advocating the establishment of a new 
form of banking, would they not have made inquiries about the existing banking 
system of the island? This they did not do. All their information was based on second-
hand accounts of banking practice. Horace Plunkett was asked, ‘Have you paid much 
attention to the subject of banking in Ireland?’ His response was, ‘No; I cannot say 
that I have paid much attention to it.’110 George Russell was shown a map indicating 
the spatial distribution of joint stock banks in Ireland, and the areas where there were 
no banks were areas with sparse population distributions. It actually transpired that a 
joint stock bank branch had been active in Belmullet, a location of a Raiffeisen 
society, but that it closed due to a lack of business.111 It was put to Plunkett that these 
Raiffeisen societies would have to locate in areas not served by joint stock banks 
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because the joint stock banks were adequately serving the market. 112 The later actions 
of the IAOS also suggest that they did not see the joint stock banks as a problem. The 
IAOS made it their business to declare that the Raiffeisen societies were not in 
competition with the joint stock banks. George Russell described the Raiffeisen 
societies as auxiliaries of the joint stock banks in his evidence to the 1912 committee 
on agricultural credit.113  
The trust auction system that was outlined by G. Russell was not prevalent 
across Ireland, and seems to have been confined to Donegal. ‘Gombeenism’, by the 
acknowledgement of the IAOS delegates, was also declining. It seems that it was the 
joint stock banks that were responsible for the disappearance of the Gombeen man.114 
As usurious money lending was acknowledged to be a rarity, the main gripe of the 
IAOS delegates was with shopkeeper credit, the policy of long and short pricing by 
shopkeepers. This was the difference between the prices of goods bought on credit, 
versus the price bought with cash.  
This view that gombeenism was the problem was repeated at different 
occasions. The views of Horace Plunkett can be seen in the discussion that followed a 
paper on ‘agricultural credit banks’ at the Royal Statistical Society. Plunkett believed 
that ‘cheap credit’ was necessary for the relief of small farmers. He said the aim in 
introducing Raiffeisen banks was to ‘reach those who had no credit with the ordinary 
banking institutions’ and to curb the extortionate interest rates charged by Gombeen 
men.115  
George Russell gave a memorandum to the 1914 committee on agricultural 
credit in Ireland, outlining his views on Raiffeisenism. G. Russell stated that ‘the 
country was, at the time the IAOS began its work, overrun by private 
moneylenders.’116 In his book Co-operation and Nationalism G. Russell outlined the 
various rural moneylenders whose actions he objected to. Interestingly he did not 
have any complaint against the joint stock banks. The only issue he had with them 
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was that their loan terms were inconvenient for agriculturalists. His main grievance 
was directed towards rural traders, whom he deemed ‘gombeen men’:  
There remains now the one universal credit-giver – the rural trader. I find it difficult to 
write calmly of the abuses of the credit system which once prevailed all over Ireland, and 
which still prevail in many districts, but especially in the west. Nothing is easier for the 
farmer than to run into debt at one of these country shops. He is invited to help himself to 
everything the shop contains up to certain well-defined limits. He may be allowed a year 
or a year and a half to be behindhand with his payments. The aim is to let him sink into 
debt, not so deeply as to imperil the security the trader has, but deeply enough to make it 
difficult or impossible for the customer to quickly extricate himself. In fact the idea is to 
have tied customers – men who must buy where they already owe money, who are not in 
a position to quarrel with prices or quality of the goods supplied. When the trader has 
double functions as middleman, not only supplying requirements but accepting produce, 
the system is one of the most effective means of fleecing the farmer at both ends of his 
business which could be devised.117  
 
This attack on rural traders is consistent with the work of T. A. Finlay, another 
key figure in the co-operative movement and vice-president of the IAOS. In an article 
written in 1894 Finlay made the following statement: 
The gombeen man, Hebrew or Celtic, is, frankly and undisguisedly, a usurer; he charges 
his 60 per cent, or his 200, or 2000 per cent., candidly and unequivocally; with a little 
knowledge of arithmetic the borrower can ascertain exactly how he is dealt. But there is 
another usurer who plies his business much more insidiously, and whose operations are 
certainly not less fatal to the unhappy agricultural debtors – I mean the shopkeeper 
turned usurer.118  
 
The only problem is that the definitions of gombeenism were quite broad 
comprising of money lending, loan sharks, and also consumer credit in shops. In the 
evidence of P.J. Hannon he outlined the practices of a money lender whom he called a 
Gombeen man. He was told that did not constitute gombeenism, that what he 
described was ‘only usurious money lending’, but Hannon stated ‘I do not quite 
understand the distinction.’119  This difficulty of defining what constitutes a 
‘Gombeen man’ is not something confined to contemporaries.120 
It is difficult to discern with accuracy the level of gombeenism, if in fact it did 
exist, in rural Ireland. One source that has been used by Irish historians is the baseline 
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reports of the Congested District Board (CDB). From these reports one can see that 
although shop credit was widespread, the effective interest rates were not extortionate. 
Liam Kennedy has shown that there was an increase in the number of shopkeepers in 
rural Ireland and that this probably caused a decrease in the cost of credit.121  
From the perspective of G. Russell and T. A. Finlay, it can be taken that the 
Raiffeisen banks were to be used as an instrument to tackle gombeenism in the form 
of high interest money lending and shop debts. Plunkett, G. Russell, and Finlay offer 
consistent reasons for establishing Raiffeisen banks, namely to curb gombeenism, 
particularly in the retail sector. Given what we know about joint stock banking in 
Ireland, and given that the IAOS propagators wished to tackle ‘gombeenism’ or 
‘shopkeeper credit’,122 surely some form of co-operative stores and wholesale 
federations would have been a better instrument to address shop credit?  
 
6.3.3 Information on Raiffeisenism 
A key consideration in understanding the establishment of Raiffeisen societies in 
Ireland is how information on their structure was obtained by the IAOS and 
subsequently diffused to the adopters of Raiffeisenism. Henry Wolff, an authority on 
co-operative credit and considered by contemporaries to be the leading expert on 
credit co-operatives in the English-speaking world, believed that co-operative banks 
could be established in Ireland.123 And, by all accounts, Henry Wolff played a key 
role in instigating Raiffeisenism in Ireland.124 Wolff acknowledged the fact that he 
had been invited to Ireland by Horace Plunkett to advise the IAOS on the subject of 
credit co-operation,125 and he stated that the IAOS ‘is now actively turning that 
explanation to account’.126 Given the key role played by Wolff in the establishment of 
co-operative banks along Raiffeisen lines in Ireland, it would be interesting to see 
what he knew about the subject.  
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The key features of the Raiffeisen system that Wolff believed were the main causes of 
success were the area restrictions, unlimited liability and selective restriction of 
members.127 The area restrictions were emphasised because it meant that a society 
could maximise the use of local information.128 Wolff stated that ‘the object is not, to 
secure a large roll of members, but rigidly to exclude everyone who is not really 
eligible’.129 Another key feature which he dwelled on was the creation of an 
indivisible reserve fund, going so far as to say that the ‘reserve is the backbone of the 
society’.130 Wolff also outlined other key features of the system such as the role of a 
committee within each bank together with a council of supervision as internal 
monitoring mechanisms to minimise the possibility of loss. He believed that the 
external auditing arrangements were an important monitoring arrangement.131 Wolff 
emphasised that the object of the society was not to make borrowing easy, but in fact 
to make it difficult.132 Loans were to be screened by members, with personal 
borrowing and collateral substitutes used to secure loans; these substitutes were 
sureties. Loans were to be repaid in regular instalments, with punctuality being 
insisted upon. Wolff believed that the encouragement of thrift was an important 
consideration. The thrift side of the movement led to the establishment of a federated 
Central Bank in 1874,133 this being an institution that acted as a clearing house 
between societies with surplus deposits and societies with excess demand. Wolff also 
highlighted federated co-operative wholesale supply societies that were linked with 
the Raiffeisen system.134 
From Wolff’s account Raiffeisen established his first credit co-operative in 
1847, but there was initially slow growth in the system, the second Raiffeisen co-
operative not being established until 1854, the third in 1862 and it was not until 1880 
that they began to ‘perceptibly multiply’.135 Coincidentally, a British parliamentary 
inquiry in 1895 stated that ‘the first purchase on joint account was made in 1880 by 
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the Central Department at Neuwied’.136 It is also interesting that Wolff’s chronology 
of the growth in Raiffeisen societies is consistent with that of a recent historical 
account,137 and his outline of the Raiffeisen structure is consistent with that outlined 
by Tim Guinnane. So, given that the IAOS had adequate information about the 
structure of a Raiffeisen society it is worth exploring how it transferred this 
information to the societies that it established. 
The IAOS employed organisers to personally propagate the message of credit 
co-operation. Initially the work of the bank organisers was concentrated within the 
area of the CDB, as the CDB had agreed to subsidise the organisation programme.138 
In evidence to the committee on agricultural credit G. Russell gave evidence of how 
he went about raising awareness of Raiffeisen societies: 
If I started a society the parish priest or the doctor would give me a letter of introduction 
to someone in the next parish, or perhaps at the meeting people would come in from 
three or four parishes and discuss the matter afterwards in their own district, and ask me 
to come out. After the first half dozen societies had been established, I found no 
difficulty at all. I could have gone from one district to another organising societies, but 
the first half dozen were a difficult proposition.139  
 
Deliberate attempts were made to diffuse the information to the people in the 
West of Ireland in their vernacular language. The IAOS used an Irish-speaking 
organiser to visit the communities and also had ‘the Agricultural Banks explained in a 
Gaelic leaflet’.140 Members of the first society in Doneraile, Co. Cork, gave talks on 
the benefits of co-operative credit societies. For example, the secretary of the bank 
addressed a meeting at Steamstown, Co. Westmeath, in 1896 shortly after the 
Doneraile society was established.141 The IAOS also did all the work in regard to 
getting societies on their feet. The IAOS would get the society registered, and 
provided the necessary stationery.142 The IAOS organised the printing of rule books 
that were required under legislation: one copy was required to be registered with the 
Registrar of Friendly Societies and the others to be provided to members. The rules 
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used were a standardised set of rules written by the IAOS but the local people decided 
the area of operation and the rates of interest on loans and deposits. There are a 
number of rule books still existing in a number a files relating to individual Raiffeisen 
co-operatives and in the files of the Registrar of Friendly Societies.143 
The rules and regulations for credit co-operatives were written by the IAOS and 
distributed to Raiffeisen societies when they registered with the IAOS. The rules 
stated what the objects of the societies were to be. They were firstly to ‘create funds 
[that were] to be lent out to, or invested for, its members, or for their benefit,’ and 
secondly ‘loans to members shall only be made on condition that the purpose for 
which the money is borrowed is such that there is sufficient prospect of the loan 
repaying itself by the production, business or economy which it will enable the 
borrower to effect.’144 As can be seen, the aim of credit co-operatives was primarily 
that of providing credit services to its members. But the second objective made clear 
that the goal was not merely lending for the sake of lending, but rather lending for 
specific purposes that would render a benefit to the member. It is important to note 
that although the rules are made for credit societies, these societies, as originally 
designed by Raiffeisen, offered both savings and lending services. Even though the 
Irish model was an imitation of the Raiffeisen model, it did not give equal stress to 
savings as it did to lending. 
There were also a number of concessional loans from government bodies. These 
are discussed below, and an important question to ask is how the individual societies 
were informed of these concessional loans. The answer it seems is that the IAOS told 
them. Evidence of this comes from a number of sources. Firstly at a parliamentary 
enquiry in 1912 it was asked who applied for the loans, was it the IAOS or the 
societies themselves? The answer was that the societies themselves applied for the 
loans,145 but that the IAOS were involved in the process. T.P. Gill, a senior figure in 
the DATI, said that: 
I should mention that in those days the department was working in co-operation with the 
IAOS and that any applications from the Banks were first sent to the IAOS to be reported 
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on. It was on the report of the IAOS, and on its Bank organisers’ recommendations, that 
the loans were made by the Department.146  
 
Gill’s statement was supported by T.W. Russell, the president of the DATI, and 
Gill’s statement is also supported by archival evidence as there are letters from the 
Secretary of the IAOS, R.A. Anderson, to the various bank organisers asking them to 
write up a letter of recommendation so that a bank could receive a loan. Take for 
example the case of the Kiltimagh Credit Society, Co. Cavan.147 The IAOS organiser, 
J. Moore, was responsible for setting the society up, saying that ‘having again 
explained the advantage of and method of formation – it was unanimously decided to 
apply for registration’.148  J. Moore then wrote the following memorandum regarding 
the Kiltimagh Credit Society, Co. Cavan, recommending that they be given a loan 
from the DATI: 
As this is a very poor district I would strongly recommend they should obtain a loan of 
£100 from the Department of Agriculture, and have got the form of application filled up 
accordingly. As arranged in previous correspondence, I trust the sub-committee will 
strongly support this recommendation.149 
 
The impression that the IAOS supported and encouraged the formation of 
societies based on the availability of concessional loans is supported by a recollection 
of Patrick Gallagher, or Paddy ‘The Cope’ Gallagher, a popular figure in the Irish co-
operative movement. Gallagher is more commonly associated with a co-operative 
store that he established in Templecrone, Co. Donegal, but prior to that he was 
involved in a co-operative bank. According to Gallagher there was an announcement 
that a gentleman from Dublin would be visiting the parish for the purpose of 
establishing a co-operative bank. The gentleman in question was Æ (George 
Russell),150 so this is in line with the statement from Æ cited above. The following is 
Gallagher’s version of events: 
He [Æ] got up on the rising ground and commenced talking to the people and telling 
farmers the benefit they would gain by having a Co-operative Agricultural Bank. If they 
decided to start one the Congested Districts Board would give them fifty pounds to begin 
with. He appealed to the audience to subscribe. He said the more they subscribed the 
more the Congested Board would give. The Parish Priest said he would give five pounds, 
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and three or four merchants said they would give five pounds each. I said I would give 
five pounds.151  
 
According to Gallagher, Æ also told the people that it was up to the IAOS 
whether or not a bank would be registered.152 Given that Æ encouraged Gallagher to 
tell his story, we can take it that this account is accurate. What is also interesting, and 
in line with what was discussed above, Gallagher said that the reason he left the 
agricultural bank was because he wanted it to purchase wholesale goods for its 
members. Gallagher had experience of consumer co-operatives in his time in Scotland 
and wanted to introduce a similar variety in Ireland. However, his fellow committee 
members did not agree with his stance, saying that trading was against the rules of the 
society.153 This prevention of Raiffeisen societies trading is discussed below. 
Gallagher chose to set up a co-operative store rather than keep the agricultural bank, 
believing it to be more beneficial. When he did this the committee members of the 
agricultural bank threatened to withdraw their money from the bank if Gallagher did 
not cease co-operative trading.154 So this again begs the question: why were 
Raiffeisen societies established and not co-operative stores? 
 
6.4.1 Raiffeisenism in Ireland 
 
As was discussed above, the IAOS was responsible for establishing co-operative 
societies in Ireland. In fact, it was stated that it was not until 1912 that the first co-
operative was set up at the initiative of farmers, whereas ‘in former years the initiative 
had to be taken in all cases by our organisers’.155 Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of 
co-operative societies registered with the IAOS, and as can be seen the Raiffeisen 
societies were not insignificant during the period 1898 to 1915.  
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Figure 6.3  
Percentage distribution of co-operative societies registered with the IAOS, 
1895-1922
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Source: IAOS annual reports 1899-1922 
 
The data on individual Raiffeisen co-operative societies in Ireland have mainly been 
obtained from the annual reports of the IAOS, but additional information was 
obtained from archival sources. Annual accounts of the various Raiffeisen societies 
were printed in the IAOS annual reports. Data have been obtained and analysed for 
the years 1899 to 1920. Firstly, it must be stressed that the IAOS continually included 
inactive societies in their annual list of Raiffeisen societies. Therefore, it was 
necessary to filter the active from the inactive societies as a large number of zero 
values will distort any findings.  
For the purposes of this study, inactive societies have been defined as either 
those that did not submit annual accounts, or those that submitted incomplete 
accounts. The IAOS when publishing information about their societies always 
stressed the large number of registered societies, regardless of activity. The IAOS 
maintained that the societies which did not submit accounts were active,156 until 1916 
when a number of inactive societies were struck off their register.157 Given that the 
IAOS was supposed to audit the accounts of each Raiffeisen society,158 the large 
number of incomplete returns suggests that these societies may not have been active, a 
view supported by the IAOS itself.159 The Registrar of Friendly Societies also 
reported that a large number of the Raiffeisen societies did not submit returns.  
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Figure 6.4 
Raiffeisen societies registered with the IAOS (total and filtered), 
1899-1920
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Source: IAOS annual reports, 1899-1920. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the number of Raiffeisen societies, both the IAOS figures and the 
number filtered for activity. As can be seen, the number of societies recorded by the 
IAOS was greater than the number of inactive societies. For the remainder of this 
chapter, unless stated otherwise, the graphs depict activity of the active Raiffeisen 
societies, as in general the IAOS did not have information for the inactive societies.  
 
6.4.2 Institution  
 
In order to assess the role of the Raiffeisen co-operatives in providing financial 
services it is conducive to look at the institutional structure of the societies. Primarily 
the societies were local concerns established and operating within a specific area and 
‘the area from which membership was drawn was usually restricted to the confines of 
a parish, or a three-mile radius from the place of meeting’.160 The entire operation was 
localised:  the membership, the staffing, lending, and saving. As decision making was 
autonomous, there was no reliance on any central authority whenever a loan request 
or deposit was to be lodged or withdrawn. In the view of Joanna Ledgerwood: 
Most successful MFIs [microfinance institutions] have fairly decentralised operational 
structures. Due to the relatively homogenous nature of microfinance loans (small loan 
sizes, common delivery method), loan approvals can usually be relegated to the credit 
officers (or the borrower group, if applicable) with final decisions on larger loan amounts 
made by the credit manager, usually at the branch level. Decentralised loan approval 
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processes reduce operating costs, decrease waiting time for clients, and enhance the 
accountability of the credit officers.161 
 
While the system of decentralisation and unit independence enabled the credit 
co-operatives to function independently, many influential decisions that affected the 
operation of Raiffeisen societies were made at a national level. This is discussed 
below.  
The level of decentralisation can be seen by the fact that there was no 
interaction with other Raiffeisen societies in the country. They existed in isolation and 
despite numerous commentators advocating the creation of central banks, efforts to 
federate the credit co-operatives never bore fruit. It must also be noted that such 
federation was illegal, discussed below, but the fact that there was no drive towards 
federation ensured that there was no pressure brought on the government to reform 
the legislation. 
Given that the Raiffeisen societies when established did not have many assets, it 
was not unusual that their place of business would have been somewhere central in 
the locality. The report on agricultural credit noted that ‘in most cases credit societies 
in Ireland cannot afford to provide even the small rent of a suitable room for the 
transaction of their business. A very usual meeting place for the Committee [of the 
Raiffeisen co-operative] appears to be the national School; this has some advantages, 
including that of being as a rule, fairly central for the parish.’162 This choice of 
business location had some practical benefits such as centrality, and therefore its 
accessibility for members; it also would have reduced the costs of running the society. 
Yet the report further described the conditions in many of the national schools where 
documents relating to the business of the society were not given a proper place of 
storage and simple left unattended in the classroom. 
Game theoretic analysis of banking suggests that a permanent edifice can send 
confidence-bolstering signals to borrowers and savers involved with a banking 
institution.163 In a game of two periods 0 and 1, if players see that a bank has a 
permanent residence it might instil more confidence, for effectively the reason that the 
bank will not fold overnight. This creates an incentive for borrowers to repay and for 
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savers to keep their savings with a bank. But this view was not shared by Henry 
Wolff. He thought that for co-operative banking to work a member ‘must have his 
own bank, as he must have his own shop, homely and plain, it may be, but of familiar 
appearance, familiar to him in its usages, encouraging him to do business’.164 In 
Henry Wolff’s view the creation of a grandiose permanent edifice could distract and 
intimidate potential members, be counter-productive in its aim and possibly reduce 
outreach. It should also be taken into consideration the fact that the Raiffeisen 
societies in general did not attempt to mobilise deposits, therefore undermining the 
need for a permanent edifice. 
Membership, and hence mutuality, is a key feature which distinguished the 
Raiffeisen societies from other forms of microfinance in nineteenth century Ireland. 
Membership was decided when a society was initially formed and subsequent 
applications for membership were possible provided that the person was deemed to be 
of ‘good character’165 and resided in the area of the co-operative. If applicants were 
refused membership they had the right to appeal to the A.G.M. of the society. 
Membership was conditional on the behaviour of the borrower; it was possible to 
expel members believed to have acted against the ethos of the co-operative. It was 
also possible for members to resign from the co-operative provided they gave written 
notice to the secretary. In order for individuals to borrow from a Raiffeisen society 
they needed to be members. Membership was initially a condition for saving but this 
requirement was removed after the passing of the Societies Borrowing Powers Act in 
1898.166 Membership also brought with it the liability for the debts of the credit co-
operative. 
The IAOS recorded information on the number of members in each Raiffeisen 
society. If a society was inactive the IAOS still recorded membership statistics for 
inactive societies. The membership statistics have been filtered to distinguish between 
the inactive and the active societies. In the initial years of the Raiffeisen societies 
there was no major discrepancy between the IAOS stated membership and the filtered 
membership, as shown in figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5  
Filtered membership of Raiffeisen societies as a percentage of IAOS 
stated membership, 1899-1920
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Source: IAOS Annual reports, 1899-1920. 
From 1910 to 1920 there is an increasing discrepancy between the recorded 
membership as stated by the IAOS and the filtered membership figures used here. The 
unlikelihood of an inactive society to resume activity indicates that the membership of 
Raiffeisen societies was in fact overstated by the IAOS, and this fact has implications 
for the analysis of the mean membership size of Raiffeisen societies. Figure 6.6 shows 
the time trend in mean membership of Raiffeisen societies in Ireland. What can be 
seen is that there was an increase in the mean membership over time. Given the 
decline in the number of Raiffeisen societies, this suggests that the societies with the 
longest staying power were societies that had larger membership over time, but the 
standard deviation between societies was also quite high.  
Figure 6.6  
Mean membership of Raiffeisen societies 
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Source: IAOS annual reports, 1899-1920 
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Co-operatives, as designed, are democratic in nature; thus membership gave 
individuals control over the organisation of a co-operative and enabled them to decide 
the policy that would be implemented. Although decision making was intended to be 
democratic, in a body comprised of a large number of members it would have been 
cumbersome to make every decision in a democratic fashion. Therefore, the decision 
making was delegated to a committee. The members of a committee were decided by 
vote at the annual meeting of the members of the credit co-operative. The maximum 
number of committee members was eight, with only three being required for a 
quorum, and the committee voted for the chairman of the credit co-operative. The 
chairman presided over the annual general meeting of the credit co-operative. The 
committee members were expected to perform their duty on a voluntary basis. It was 
the committee’s duty to meet as regularly as the business of the credit co-operative 
required and it was the committee that dealt with issues such as loan applications and 
member applications. The committee also had the authority to borrow from a joint 
stock bank on behalf of the society. 
The credit co-operatives were supposed to be organised in a series of checks and 
balances to make sure that the system operated effectively. The supervisory council 
was intended to be a check on the powers of the committee and ensure that nothing 
untoward was taking place. The council was a smaller body comprised of at most five 
members, with three being the required quorum, who were elected annually at the 
general meeting. The council met less frequently than the committee. The IAOS rules 
stated that:  
The council shall meet at least once every three months to review the business transacted 
by the committee, and shall satisfy itself that all rules have been complied with. It shall 
present a report to the Annual General Meeting and may at any time call for a Special 
General Meeting for any purpose. It can also call a meeting of the committee to consider 
jointly with itself any matters which it deems desirable to be settled by both bodies 
together.167  
 
Although the rules cited above are from the 1914 inquiry into agricultural credit 
in Ireland, the IAOS did write the initial rules of the Raiffeisen societies and a copy of 
instructions issued by the IAOS in 1901 is shown in an appendix to this chapter. 
There were two other positions that were decided at a society’s A.G.M., 
trustee(s) of the credit co-operative and treasurer. The trustees were given the right to 
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invest the surplus funds in a number of specified investments, mainly post office 
savings banks, government bodies or government stock. The treasurer’s role was to 
keep the accounts of the society in order. These two positions were unsalaried. The 
only position within the society that was to receive remuneration, and that was an 
unelected post, was that of secretary. The secretary’s activities were time-consuming 
and as such it was necessary to remunerate the efforts of the secretary. It was also 
quite common for the role of the secretary to double up as treasurer owing to the lack 
of competent members. The position of secretary was arguably the most important 
role of the credit co-operative as it ensured a well functioning society. Given the 
importance of this position it was essential that the right person was selected for the 
post. Inadequate or incompetent personnel would be detrimental to the effective 
running of a credit co-operative. Henry Wolff stated that:  
 
Raiffeisen used to say that, provided that a good chairman and a Rechner (secretary or 
cashier) could be found, a new bank might begin work counting upon other members to 
drop in.168 
 
As the credit co-operatives were staffed entirely by their members, membership 
participation was imperative to the successful operation of a credit co-operative. 
Larger societies were more likely to be affected by free rider problems, whereby 
members would not participate in the working of the society and leave the work to 
other members. Member apathy would spell the end of a credit co-operative.  
 
6.4.3 Monitoring, screening, and loans  
The use of local information, or knowledge, is what theoretically makes Raiffeisen 
co-operatives operable. The co-operative management structure may have 
inadvertently implemented Hayek’s theory on the use of local knowledge.169 
Raiffeisen societies were in an ideal position to gather information on borrowers as 
they were local community-based lenders and could gather information from various 
sources regarding borrowers and overcome problems of adverse selection. As co-
operatives could decide by vote whom was eligible and ineligible to join, they were 
able to decide based on local knowledge of the borrower whether to admit him or her. 
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This method of selecting borrowers had an effect of reducing adverse selection. But 
the advantages of such benefits can be undermined if the community is too close and 
willingly accepts all borrowers regardless of borrower type, or of accepting loan 
applications without considerations of potential profitability. The problems of ex post 
and ex ante moral hazard can be overcome by peer monitoring. This peer monitoring 
was virtually costless and was able to be undertaken in the course of daily events as 
members of a co-operative were able to see if a borrower had misapplied funds that he 
or she was given. They would also have been able to monitor whether the investment 
made bore fruit or whether it failed and thus ameliorate the ex post moral hazard 
problems. As was discussed above, if a society was integrated with other co-operative 
enterprises it would have obtained additional information regarding ex post 
investment performance. But many Irish Raiffeisen societies did not possess such 
information. The members of the co-operative society screened the loans by having a 
formal loan application process; they would then have information of what the loan 
was to be used for, and information on the borrower. 
As localised credit institutions, they would not have been able to diversify their 
loan portfolio and as such were vulnerable to risk covariance amongst their 
borrowers. An example of such risk covariance came in 1905 when a number of 
societies experienced difficulties with loan repayments due to a depreciation in the 
price of livestock.170 The IAOS commented that ‘these delays, however, prove the 
necessity for caution on the part of the Committees, not only as regards the ability of 
the borrowers to pay, but as regards the objects to which the money is applied’.171 It is 
more apt to describe this as an inherent weakness of localised lending institutions, as 
any exogenous shock will affect all borrowers equally. 
The co-operative banks were not the only microcredit orientated institutions that 
were able to overcome problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Joint stock 
banks and loan funds utilised surety systems which in effect delegated monitoring of 
the borrower to the surety. This gave the surety an economic interest in what the 
borrower used the funds for, as default by the borrower required the surety to step in 
and repay the debt on his or her behalf. A surety would therefore be careful about who 
he or she gave services as a surety to. This meant that the adverse selection problem 
was resolved. The joint stock banks also had information regarding both borrowers 
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and sureties in terms of deposits held in the bank, as was argued in chapter 3. Informal 
rural moneylenders had the ability to overcome such asymmetric information 
problems as they were well positioned in the local community to utilise information 
they had regarding borrowers and thus gauge their credit worthiness.172  
Extending credit facilities was the main aim of Irish Raiffeisen societies and this 
is indicated by their title as recognised by the IAOS, ‘agricultural credit societies’. 
The maximum amount of interest that a credit co-operative could charge for loans was 
7 per cent, but the amount charged by individual societies varied. The amount of loans 
issued from 1895-1922 is shown in figure 6.7. 
Figure 6.7  
Real and nominal amounts of loans issued by Raiffeisen societies, 
1895-1922
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Source: Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, p. 206. [Cd. 7375], 
H.C. 1914  xiii, 1; IAOS annual reports 1912-1922; and Liam Kennedy, ‘The cost of living in Ireland, 
1698-1998’ in David Dickson and Cormac Ó Gráda (eds.), Refiguring Ireland, essays in honour of L. 
M. Cullen (Dublin, 2003), pp 249-276. 
 
As can be seen in figure 6.7, the amount of loans made by Raiffeisen societies in the 
period 1895 to 1922 increased in the initial period and then fell off after 1909. When 
we take war time inflation into consideration, the fall of the amount of loans issued is 
more significant. It is also noticeable that the total value of loans made in the period 
was less than that of the LFB loan funds discussed in chapter 2.  
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Figure 6.8  
Ratio of Raiffeisen loans (number and amount) to LFB loan fund loans 
(number and amount), 1895-1922
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Sources: Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, p. 206. [Cd. 7375], 
H.C. 1914  xiii, 1; IAOS annual reports 1912-1922; Annual reports of the Loan Fund Board, Thom’s 
Directory , and Commission of inquiry into banking, currency and credit, memoranda and minutes of 
evidence, volume ii, 1938, R. 63/2, xxxi, p. 1081. 
 
If we look at the percentage ratio of Raiffeisen loans to LFB loan fund loans shown in 
figure 6.8 we can see that they did not match the LFB loans in terms of amount or 
number. This is partially explained by the shorter loan terms of LFB loan funds, but 
the evidence suggests that the Raiffeisen societies failed to compete in the market. 
The mean loan sizes in Raiffeisen societies from 1902 -1920 are shown in figure 
6.9. It must be borne in mind that the inflation associated with the First World War 
was a contributory factor in pushing up the mean loan size from 1914 to 1920. In 
some of the IAOS annual reports examples were given of loan usage in Raiffeisen 
societies. These included the purchase of pigs, manure and seeds.173 The IAOS bank 
organisers reports also give us an indication of how loans were used, and from the 
available evidence it seems as though loans were used primarily for the purchase of 
livestock. A list of loan uses for a number of Raiffeisen societies is shown in an 
appendix to this chapter. It is worth commenting on the fact that a commonly cited 
loan use was for the ‘holding over of stock’. This, according to evidence from the 
money lending commission, referred to loans to pay rent to prevent the sale of stock at 
awkward times.174 
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Figure 6.9  
Mean loan size in Raiffeisen co-operative socieites, 1902-1920
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Source: IAOS annual reports, 1902-1920. 
 
Various safeguards were used to reduce the risk involved in lending, such as lending 
being restricted to members. Inadvertently there was also a statutorily imposed loan 
ceiling of £50, this was the maximum which a society registered under the ‘Friendly 
Societies Act’ was permitted to lend.175  
The reason for the use of a surety system rather than a mortgage-based collateral 
system was the fact that land title in Ireland up until the early twentieth century was 
inadequately defined; therefore lending on mortgage was not a common banking 
practice.176 Personal security also offered greater liquidity than asset-based security. 
‘Personal credit’ had the enthusiastic support of Henry Wolff who stated that 
‘personal credit may be taken to be at once the most creative and the most educating 
form of credit. It is, in addition, by far the most convenient to bankers…’177 As loans 
were given on personal security, they were inherently for short periods of time (i.e. if 
someone died it would add complications to proceedings, etc.). This was the case for 
the credit co-operatives who had loan terms of up to a year. Short-term loans were 
also the norm for joint stock banks and loan fund societies.  
The use of sureties by credit co-operatives effectively created group contracts 
similar to those used by many microfinance institutions today. These were group 
contracts because, unlike the use of sureties by joint stock banks, the sureties used by 
borrowers from the credit co-operative were, like the borrowers themselves, members 
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of the credit co-operatives. As membership of a credit co-operative was a prerequisite 
for borrowers, having sureties who were also members meant that the credit co-
operative was able to monitor the surety. Not only was this an assurance that the 
principal, and the interest, would be repaid, but it gave an incentive to sureties to 
monitor the activities of the borrower to ensure that he, or she, had applied the loan to 
that which the loan was sanctioned. In the ideal situation, whereby the capital of a 
credit co-operative is comprised of the combined savings of the members of the co-
operative, there would be an incentive, not only for sureties, but for the entire group 
of members, to monitor the borrowers’ actions. Savings were not emphasised in 
Ireland, and many societies did not mobilise savings, so this element of the 
monitoring incentive structure was lost. 
The length of the loan contract was fixed at a maximum of one year under the 
rules drawn up by the IAOS. Yet in reality the length of the loan term was flexible 
and was determined according to the purpose for which the loan was issued. R.A. 
Anderson gave an example of the loan terms as follows: 
A loan might be granted for the purchase of fertilisers and seeds, the period of repayment 
was extended to the date upon which the resultant crop would be harvested. Loans 
granted for the purchase of milch cows, whose milk would be sent to a neighbouring 
creamery, were allowed to be repaid in instalments spread over a period of perhaps a 
year and a half, in order that the borrower might be enabled to make repayment out of the 
profit derived from his investment. Loans to be repaid in bulk were only granted for a 
maximum period of twelve months.178 
 
This flexible approach to loan terms enabled borrowers to derive the full benefit 
of the loan without experiencing untoward stress, but it was not beneficial in 
inoculating members with a commercial spirit. The IAOS made frequent references to 
loan renewals in its annual reports. In addition to the loan terms being set for one year 
and loans to be repaid either in instalments or in bulk, loans were not supposed to be 
renewed until they had been repaid. But this condition was repeatedly violated by 
many credit co-operatives.  The lack of strict adherence to loan limits was a problem 
and was seen as a serious defect in the system. In 1914 the committee on agricultural 
credit stated that: 
 
Extensions of time to a borrower are, we admit, in some cases inevitable owing to 
exceptional circumstances, such as failure of crops or the disease of animals. But, as a 
rule, the mere renewing of loans is not only injurious to the borrower; it seriously 
cripples the activities of a Credit Society by confining the use of its funds to a limited 
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group of persons, thus preventing the benefits of the society reaching all the members, as 
intended by the Rules.179  
 
Another feature of the loan contract was that, when applying for a loan, 
borrowers had to specify the object for which the loan was required. A loan was not 
approved if the loan application did not meet with the approval of the committee of 
the credit co-operative. And the committee was comprised of men, and in some cases 
women, who were aware of local economic factors and could advise the borrower on 
what the best course of action could be. Loans were not supposed to be sanctioned for 
purposes which were not deemed to be productive. Essentially the entire layout of the 
co-operative was designed so that the borrower was not to divert from the stated 
objective without his or her peers becoming aware of it and therefore reducing the 
level of risk to the credit co-operative. Coincidentally, this structure was theoretically 
similar to the loan fund system as described in chapter 1. This was the system as 
devised by Raiffeisen, but it did not always work in Ireland. For example, it was 
stated in an IAOS report in 1910 that: 
Of course there are cases in which faults arise. In one case only has it come under notice 
that loans have been given to non-economic purposes – the payment of rent and the 
purchase of clothes and bicycles. Such cases must of course, be and are entirely 
discountenanced. Against these few isolated cases, however, it is certain that the objects 
for which loans are sought are the kind for which Raiffeisen credit is intended. The 
adaptation of the system to Irish conditions needs no defence.180  
 
Tim Guinnane believed that such failures were due to informal constraints, 
namely a culture that did not recognise debt. But this may not necessarily hold true as 
was argued in the conclusion to chapter 3. If we analyse the balance sheet of the 
Raiffeisen societies, in particular the structure of liabilities, and compare it to the 
market leader (and the main lender), namely the joint stock banks, we will get a better 
appreciation of what went wrong. 
 
6.4.4 Raiffeisen capital 
The credit co-operatives had three potential sources of capital available to them: 
firstly deposits, secondly loans from joint stock banks which in effect were inter-bank 
loans, and thirdly loans from public bodies, the CDB, the DATI and county councils.   
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Sustainability is a key issue in microfinance literature. If an institution is not 
sustainable then it will be short-lived and its outreach will be curtailed. One of the key 
determinants of sustainability for a microfinance institute is the creation of a solid 
capital base. In unlimited liability credit co-operatives there was no requirement for 
the issue, and purchase, of shares. Therefore, share capital was not an option. 
Admittedly, members had to pay an admission fee but the amount was trivial. There 
was also a gradual build up of an indivisible reserve fund, but this was not to be used 
for lending purposes. Lionel Smith-Gordon and Laurence C. Staples indicated that 
The sources of capital are three in all, namely members deposits, loans from Government 
Departments, and other loans, mainly bank overdrafts. The ideal method of capitalising 
the societies is, of course, by means of members’ deposits, thus ensuring that the savings 
of the district should be reinvested in that district. The Raiffeisen banks in Germany are 
called thrift and credit banks (Spar-und Daarlehenskassen), and the emphasis is 
distinctly on the thrift. In fact these societies attract almost more deposits than they can 
safely use, and during the war they have been able to make large contributions to war 
loans. In Ireland, thrift has been omitted, not only from the name, but in too many cases 
from the practice of these societies.181 
 
Deposit mobilisation was not characteristic of the Raiffeisen experience in Ireland. 
This section aims to outline some reasons why this was the case. 
As was seen in figure 6.4 above, the number of Raiffeisen societies grew slowly 
at first, then experienced rapid growth, before declining with equal rapidity. This 
section aims to illustrate how the early growth in Raiffeisen societies was actually 
related to the availability of concessional loans. The first Raiffeisen society was 
established in 1894 and there was only one society formed from 1895 to 1897; then 
the number of societies formed annually saw a dramatic increase in 1898. The low 
number of formations was primarily due to the legal constraints that the Raiffeisen 
societies faced, which are discussed below. The constraints essentially prevented 
societies borrowing from non-members, but following the Societies Borrowing 
Powers Act in 1898182 individual Raiffeisen societies were offered incentives to form 
via the availability of concessional loans from Government departments. The CDB 
had been willing to give loans earlier than 1898 but legal constraints prevented the 
Raiffeisen societies borrowing money.183 The CDB, which was a development agency 
operating in the West of Ireland, began offering concessional loans to societies 
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operating within its area of jurisdiction. These loans from the CDB were part of a 
wider lending policy operated by the CDB in the congested districts, details of which 
are shown in an appendix to this chapter. The first set of loans were made in 1898 
very shortly after the societies borrowing powers act was passed and 20 loans were 
made to Raiffeisen societies during 1898 year. The loans for either £50 or £100 were 
issued at 5 per cent, with the rate being reduced to 2.5 per cent if the loans were 
punctually repaid.184 The following year it was decided to continue the Raiffeisen 
loan scheme, but at a uniform rate of 3 per cent.185  
As the initial loan schemes were confined to Raiffeisen societies established in 
the Congested Districts, it is not surprising to see that the majority of Raiffeisen 
societies established in those years were located within the Congested Districts. Using 
the year of establishment figures that the IAOS began publishing in 1902 we can see 
if the existence of concessional loans had an influence on the number of Raiffeisen 
societies formed. If they did we would see a concentration of Raiffeisen societies 
within the Congested Districts. If they did not then we would expect to see a uniform 
distribution of Raiffeisen societies across all provinces.  From table 6.3 we can see 
that the majority of societies formed between 1898 and 1901 were actually formed 
within the Congested Districts. 
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Table 6.3: Annual formation of Raiffeisen societies in Ireland by province, 1894-
1901 
 
Year Connaught Munster Ulster Leinster Total 
Ireland 
% in 
Congested  
1894 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1895 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1896 1 0 0 0 1 100 
1897 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1898 19 3 (C) 6 (4 C) 5 33 78.79 
1899 12 4(C) 7 (4 C) 0 23 86.96 
1900 10 0 2 1 13 76.92 
1901 5 12 (11 C) 10 (8 C) 1 28 89.29 
 
Note: C indicates located in Congested region. 
Source: IAOS Annual report 1903.  
 
Table 6.3 indicates that the increase in the number of societies formed from 1898 to 
1901 was due to the availability of concessional government loans as outlined above. 
In 1901 the DATI also began to issue concessional loans to Raiffeisen societies 
on a national basis. The loans ranged from £25 to £100 and were given for terms of up 
to 18 months.186 The data on the number of loans were published in the annual reports 
of the DATI, and combining this information with the information on the annual 
formation of Raiffeisen societies, shown in figure 6.10, it appears as though there was 
a link between the two. 
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Figure 6.10  
Number of registered Raiffeisen societies and the number of loans from 
the DATI, 1894-1915
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Note: The DATI reports give information for the years 1900-01 etc, this means they give information 
for the 2nd to the 4th quarter of one year, and the 1st quarter of the next. Therefore the information is not 
directly compatible with other sources that give information for calendar years. 
 
Sources: Annual reports of the DATI, 1900-1915; IAOS annual reports, 1902-1915; Annual reports of 
the Registrar of Friendly Societies, 1894-1915. 
 
 
If the concessional loans were an important consideration in the establishment of 
Raiffeisen societies we would expect to see more societies being formed in non-
congested regions of Ireland in the period from 1902 to 1910 due to the fact that they 
were available from a nationwide body. This in fact is the case, as in the period 1902 
to 1910 there were 209 Raiffeisen societies formed, with a greater number formed in 
the non-congested regions187 of Leinster and Ulster than had previously been the case. 
This is shown in figure 6.11. Given that two state departments were engaged in 
lending capital to credit co-operatives it is not surprising that 80 per cent of credit co-
operatives were in receipt of state funds in 1907.188  
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Figure 6.11  
Provincial distribution of Raiffeisen co-operatives by year of 
formation, 1902-1910
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Source: IAOS Annual reports, 1902-1910. 
 
The Raiffeisen societies also received loans from local government bodies. A number 
of county councils gave loans to Raiffeisen societies formed within their 
jurisdiction.189 Figure 6.12 shows the ratio of government loans to total capital in the 
Raiffeisen societies. As can be seen, government loans made up a significant portion 
of the capital of the Societies in the period 1898-1904, before declining. 
Figure 6.12  
Ratios of government loans to capital, 1896-1911
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Source: Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, p. 128. [Cd. 7375], 
H.C. 1914  xiii, 1. 
 
                                                 
189
 IAOS annual report 1902, pp 13-14, and IAOS annual report 1904, p. 19. 
 100 
The credit co-operatives received a significant amount of their capital from joint stock 
banks. Guinnane stated that ‘the Irish credit co-operatives were essentially re-lending 
schemes, institutions which have worked, but which rely on very different incentives 
than imagined by Raiffeisen’.190 Perhaps a view that could be more representative of 
the credit co-operatives is that of a coalition of borrowers of varying size to 
effectively create one large borrower. This coalition used their combined liability as a 
means to obtain advances from the joint stock banks.  
Initially the joint-stock banks had been wary of the co-operative movement in 
general, not just the Raiffeisen societies. In 1901 the IAOS outlined a number of 
grievances it held against the joint stock banks, and threatened to establish a co-
operative bank to finance the movement if the grievances were not addressed, 
discussed in greater detail below.191 The following year the IAOS negotiated 
preferential treatment for all its co-operative societies from all the joint stock 
banks.192 From 1902 onwards the joint stock banks agreed to lend money or set up 
overdraft accounts for societies at a fixed rate of 4 per cent.193 It is worth noting that 
there were conditions attached to the loans from the joint stock banks. Most notably 
the National Bank stipulated that if it lent money Raiffeisen banks were not permitted 
to accept deposits.194 So not only were the Raiffeisen societies designed to forego 
cheap information in the form of deposits in the present, they were also foregoing 
cheap information in the future.  This essentially meant that the Raiffeisen model as 
practised in Ireland would be unsustainable, both in terms of financial viability and in 
terms of access to information.  
Individual members of the Raiffeisen societies could have borrowed from the 
joint stock banks; all they had to do was provide sureties known to the joint stock 
banks. It was reported that the banks accommodated borrowers on the following 
terms: The length of a loan was for a 3 month period and with varying charges of 
interest. Interest charged could vary from 7 ½ per cent to 12 ½ per cent depending on 
whether the interest was repaid with the principal or whether interest was discounted 
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from the principal before the loan was made. There was also evidence that a flat rate 
of 10 per cent was charged in some bank branches.195 The cost of the loan to the 
borrower included the rate of interest charged, travel costs, surety costs and 
opportunity costs associated with lost labour. The cost of the loan to the joint stock 
bank involved labour costs, screening costs and monitoring costs. Banking prior to the 
era of computerisation was a labour intensive industry, and each loan regardless of 
size required the same procedures. Even though small loans could have been cross-
subsidised by larger loans, there was a greater attraction in making larger loans. But 
given that banks were profit-motivated firms, why would they want to subsidise small 
loans? Evidence that banks may have taken other considerations into account when 
making loans comes from the evidence of a representative of the Munster bank to the 
1875 banking inquiry: 
Q: I hardly understood you, I think, correctly to say that if you found an account 
unprofitable for a series of years you would still continue to keep it?  
A: It is a most unusual thing to refuse to keep an account unless you anticipate an actual 
pecuniary loss; that is to say, that a man will not be able to pay his liabilities. If a man 
opens a cash account and does not leave a balance at all, or leaves so small a one that it is 
not worth keeping, it is a very unusual thing to say that you will not keep it longer. 
Q: That is, I suppose, because you hope that in course of time it will become a profitable 
account?  
A: We always court popularity, and if you turn a man out, he will tell other people what 
you have done to him, but he will not tell why you have done it, and therefore it tells 
against you. He may have a very respectable name outside, and yet keep very little 
money at his bankers, but he will not tell that. (sic)196  
 
As was cited above, George Russell believed that the Raiffeisen societies were 
auxiliaries of the joint stock banks. So if we view the coalition of individual 
borrowers to borrow money from the joint stock banks from an economic perspective 
there appear to be gains from trade. Both parties, the joint stock banks, effectively 
their profit maximising shareholders, and the credit co-operatives, effectively their 
mutual coalition of members, stood to benefit. If co-operation amongst borrowers did 
not take place the outcome would not have been as beneficial to both parties and the 
players would not have been as well off had a different choice been made. There 
would have been a deadweight loss from the decisions that deviated from the 
borrower coalition as the borrowers were required to give up time during which the 
joint stock bank was opened for business. These hours of business were not normally 
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hours that suited agriculturalists. This would have resulted in a decrease in labour 
input in the production process and a decrease in overall production to the detriment 
of the borrower, and as the position is replicated the aggregated actions would have 
had an effect on the rural economy as a whole. The joint stock banks found the 
arrangement beneficial and according to George Russell the joint stock banks found 
lending at 4 per cent to the combined pool of borrowers more profitable than lending 
to each borrower individually at 7 per cent,197 the reason being that banking was 
labour intensive, and each loan, regardless of value, had to be given the same 
treatment from the banks. 
The economic analysis above illustrates that there were gains-from-trade from 
this banking agreement; therefore this raises the questions why this outcome only took 
place with the establishment of the credit co-operatives and why it did not take place 
at any time previously. It could be argued that the answer to this is that prior to the 
formation of credit co-operatives there was not a conduit which could effectively 
signal the borrowers’ intention to combine and form a credible means of borrowing 
and disbursing funds amongst themselves. Borrower communication and combination 
was only realised with the formation of credit co-operatives. As co-operation was not 
static, future events could erode the benefits of co-operation. Joint stock banks were 
able to negotiate with larger borrowers and with the creation of credible property 
rights banks became willing to lend on mortgage. This undermined the benefits of the 
Raiffeisen system from the joint stock bank perspective.  
Bank managers may also have been able to capture information that the banks 
created. This seems plausible as it was stated by the IAOS that managers of the joint 
stock banks were attending society AGMs.198 Joint stock bank managers attended the 
meetings of these societies as a way of monitoring the performance of loans and they 
had a right to attend as they had given the societies the wherewithal to allow them to 
operate. It is also likely that banks could capture co-operative information given the 
agreements, cited above, whereby banks lent money to Raiffeisen societies in return 
for Raiffeisen societies not mobilising savings. 
In 1911 the total amount of capital held by the Raiffeisen societies was £56,554, 
with the total amount of deposits held by Raiffeisen societies equalling £27,290, 48 
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per cent of their total capital. The provincial distribution of deposits in Raiffeisen 
societies in 1911 is shown in figure 6.13. 
Figure 6.13  
Provincial distribution of deposits, number of societies holding 
deposits,and  number of registered societies in 1911
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In 1911, of the total number of Raiffeisen societies in operation 39 per cent of 
them did not hold any deposits. The deposits that were held were distributed unevenly 
among the other societies in operation.199 This is shown in figure 6.14. 
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Figure 6.14  
Number of societies, furnishing annual returns for 1911 posessing deposits
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
£1
-
£5
0
£5
0-
£1
00
£1
00
-
£2
00
£2
00
-
£3
00
£3
00
-
£4
00
£4
00
-
£5
00
£5
00
-
60
0
£6
00
-
£7
00
£7
00
-
£8
00
£8
00
-
£9
00
£9
00
-
£1
00
0
£1
00
0-
£1
50
0
£1
50
0-
£2
00
0
>
£2
00
0
Amount of deposits
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f s
o
c
ie
tie
s
Number of societies, furnishing
annual returns for 1911
posessing deposits
 
Source:  Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, p. 158. [Cd. 7375], 
H.C. 1914,  xiii, 1. 
 
Reliance on external sources of capital is something which is common in many 
modern microfinance institutions, but it was, in hindsight, detrimental to the long-
term sustainability of the credit co-operatives in Ireland. A number of plausible 
explanations can be brought forward to explain why there was not an increase in 
deposits held by the Raiffeisen societies.  
Perhaps the main reason is that savings were not particularly encouraged. The 
opinion of G. Russell, one of the first bank organisers for the IAOS, may give us an 
inkling as to why many societies did not possess deposits. G. Russell was frank and 
stated: ‘I don’t think that I feel strongly about the taking of local deposits’.200  
Another key factor in explaining why deposit mobilisation did not take place is 
the fact that the rates of interest on governmental loans were less than the maximum 
rate, 4 per cent, which the Raiffeisen societies offered on deposits.201 The inter-bank 
rate was equal if not less than this rate and although 4 per cent might appear to be 
equal, loans from joint stock banks were less costly in regards to the fact that they did 
not require deposits to be safely maintained and accounted for. Thus, the availability 
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of alternative sources of funds, the availability of which was negotiated by the IAOS, 
undermined the need of many credit co-operatives to aggressively compete for 
available deposits in their localities. Figure 6.15 shows the distribution of capital of 
Raiffeisen societies by type, and it can be seen that at the early stages capital 
borrowed from public bodies and joint stock banks made up the largest proportion of 
capital. Although the proportion of deposits did increase, this was confined to a few 
societies. 
Figure 6.15  
Distribution of Raiffeisen capital, 1905-1911
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Another factor which affected the deposit accumulation of the credit co-
operatives was the pre-existence of an established financial market, as was discussed 
above. There were well established savings services in operation which were 
reasonably competitive and quite competent. Poorer households are, in general, more 
concerned about the security and accessibility of their savings than the amount of 
interest which they can earn. This feature is not confined to poorer households and 
Raiffeisen societies were very risky and they would have had to pay a high risk 
premium to attract deposits. It is, therefore, not surprising that the POSB, given its 
government security, had the largest accumulation of microsavings as it was 
perceived to be the most secure and as such it was able to secure the confidence of 
savers.202 
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This perception of security was derived from the fact that the POSB was effectively a 
government bank and the government was the guarantor of these deposits. The 
Raiffeisen societies and the LFB loan funds, discussed in chapters 1 and 2, generally 
did not instil such levels of confidence in savers and as such were not able to attract 
deposits despite the fact that they offered higher interest rates. The credit co-
operatives would have found it difficult to compete in this environment, for although 
their interest of 4 per cent exceeded the 2 ½ per cent offered by the POSB, the 
security and privacy of the POSB compensated for this 1 ½ per cent interest 
differential.  
If the problem of savings is viewed from the perspective of agency theory a 
greater appreciation of security can be understood and why depositors would have 
been reluctant to save with the nascent co-operatives. In the case of savings, in 
contrast to the case of lending, depositors are the principals and the credit co-
operative is the agent. In this case the principals are worried about the actions of the 
agent as to whether it will act responsibly with the savings in their custody and if it 
will undertake any risky ventures.  Without means to create incentives for the co-
operative to behave in their interests, depositors would be unwilling to save with the 
credit co-operative. Although savers may have information regarding the operation of 
credit co-operatives, this information may give them a signal that saving in other 
institutions would be the best course of action for them. Therefore, the 1.5 per cent 
interest rate differential did not adequately compensate depositors for the risk they 
were undertaking.  
It must also be borne in mind that the POSB was paying above market interest 
rates, as was argued in chapter 4. The rate of 4 per cent paid by Raiffeisen societies 
might have been relatively more attractive in comparison to rates paid by the joint 
stock banks, but the joint stock banks adhered to market rates.  The Raiffeisen 
societies were not designed with the Irish financial structure in mind. As was referred 
to in chapter 4, the joint stock banks were also aggrieved about POSB competition but 
they were adequately able to compete with it. If there was no POSB, the Raiffeisen 
banks would still have to compete with the deposit mobilisation policy of the joint 
stock banks. The joint stock banks would have been seen as less risky than the 
Raiffeisen societies to potential depositors, and the Raiffeisen societies would still 
have had to pay a high risk premium to attract depositors. Even in such a case, the 
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high risk premium may not have made the Raiffeisen model profitable as the returns 
on small personal loans were negligible. 
A key consideration in the above concessional loan policy of the CDB and the 
DATI is the role of Horace Plunkett. Plunkett was a permanent member of the CDB 
from its establishment in 1890 and was also a key figure in the establishment of the 
DATI. Plunkett was the first vice-president of the DATI in 1899 and remained in the 
office until 1907.203 It is not a coincidence that a key figure in the co-operative 
movement held positions of power in two bodies that gave concessional loans to the 
Raiffeisen societies. What is interesting is that the policy of concessional loans 
highlights the contradictory views of Plunkett himself. For example, in his evidence to 
the committee on money lending Plunkett stated that: 
I should not myself wish to see the government at this stage advance money to these 
banks; it would be very demoralising that money should be advanced to these banks from 
any source, until they had justified the confidence of the lender.204 
 
Yet within a few paragraphs he said that he had ‘no objection to England giving 
all the money she likes,’ but at the same time he would not recommend it.205 He went 
on to say that the Raiffeisen societies would be set up with concessional loans from 
the CDB as it ‘was quite prepared to advance money to banks [Raiffeisen 
societies].’206 So what Plunkett appears to be saying is that he does not agree to the 
principle of state loans to Raiffeisen societies, but if the state wishes to lend money 
well he would not say no. Coincidently, however, the report on money lending 
suggested that Raiffeisen societies could be a remedy to money lending, but did not 
recommend that the state provide start-up loans to Raiffeisen co-operatives.207 The 
availability of concessional loans seems to have influenced the decisions to establish 
societies, so then the decision to withdraw loans would also be expected to affect the 
decision to continue a Raiffeisen society or not.  
 It should also be noted that Henry Wolff was not supportive of a policy of 
over-reliance on state aid, stating that: 
 
Not a single seedling of genuine co-operation has thus far sprung from these exotic roots. 
Nor can any spring. For the tendency of vegetation which it brings forth is in a different 
direction altogether from that of true co-operation. A simple test by which true co-
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operation may in every instance be distinguished from false is to be found in these 
questions: is it based on self help? And does it tend to make those who practice it self-
reliant and independent? If it is not, and if it does not, it is certainly not co-operative.208  
 
The advice of Henry Wolff and others was not heeded and the system of credit 
co-operatives supported by government loans would only have been quasi-
sustainable, albeit heavily subsidised, if support for co-operation was maintained at a 
political level and government support continued unabated. Support for Raiffeisen 
societies could be based on economic grounds if it was proven that there was a market 
failure, as in such a situation the externalities from the market failure were a lag on 
economic development. There was pre-existing subsidisation of the savings market 
via the savings banks, discussed in chapter 3. So probably the only way to effectively 
subsidise the Raiffeisen societies, if there was a political willingness, would have 
been to dissolve the POSB and support the Raiffeisen societies.  The German system 
gave greater government support to the co-operative banks by establishing state-
administered central banks to give concessional loans to Raiffeisen banks.209 These 
state-sponsored central banks also made concessional loans to co-operatives a policy 
of agricultural support during the agricultural crises of the 1880s.210 In Ireland the 
state was already engaged as a subsidised lender to agriculture in the form of state-
funded mortgages, discussed in greater detail in chapter 7, so a similar policy may not 
have been feasible. 
Horace Plunkett lost his seat as an M.P. in 1900, but still held the position of 
vice-president of the DATI. This was slightly anomalous, and undemocratic, as the 
position was a junior ministerial post and the minister was supposed to answer 
questions in Parliament. Plunkett tried to regain a parliamentary seat on a number of 
occasions and was unsuccessful. It was not until a change in government in 1905 that 
there was a concerted putsch to remove Plunkett from office. Plunkett’s successor as 
vice-president, and who also became a member of the CDB, was T.W. Russell. 
Horace Plunkett had established the system and under his influence government 
policy towards co-operation had been formed. By contrast, T.W. Russell, it has been 
claimed, was antipathetic towards co-operation in all its forms and did not see credit 
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co-operation in a favourable light.211 R.A. Anderson highlighted the level of his 
dislike for the credit co-operatives in particular stating that: ‘He [T.W. Russell] 
declared publicly that the system under which the credit societies were formed was 
“rotten and indefensible” and gave it as his opinion that the £24,000 lent by the Board 
was “not worth more than half a crown in the £.”’212  
However, T.W. Russell’s stance seems to have been consistent, as he was the 
chairman of the inquiry into money lending that did not recommend government 
support for Raiffeisen societies. T.W. Russell also did not indiscriminately recall 
loans issued by both the DATI and the CDB, but instead made inquiries as to how the 
loans were being used. On the basis of his inquiries he decided to recall a number of 
loans, and was forced to write off the loans made to three societies. But the ultimate 
withdrawal of state loans came at the onset of the First World War. When the IAOS 
highlighted the decrease in Raiffeisen activity it was stated that: 
The cause of this is clear; It is the decision of the Department of Agriculture to withdraw 
their loans from these societies and of the Congested Districts Board to recall most of 
their loans also. It is realised that, under war conditions, state capital, which might wisely 
continue to be lent to these societies is now required for the financing of other necessary 
operations for which the provision may be more and more sparingly made or may be 
withheld altogether.213 
 
 Societies that were over-reliant on government loans and failed to diversify 
their sources of capital were left with no alternative source of capital to fall back on. 
Evidence of this can be seen in figure 6.16 which shows the percentage of societies 
not possessing deposits, and the percentage of societies not possessing loan capital, 
capital on loan from government bodies and banks. If figure 6.16 is viewed with 
figure 6.4 in mind, it shows that as the number of societies decreased the number of 
societies that did not possess deposits decreased and the number of societies that did 
not have loan capital increased - something which suggests that deposit mobilisation 
was a key consideration to the long-term survival of Raiffeisen societies. 
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Figure 6.16  
Percentage of active Raiffeisen societies with no deposits, and no loan 
capital, 1899-1920
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Structurally, Raiffeisen societies were able to accept deposits from members, and 
from non-members post-1898, and therefore were bona fide financial intermediaries. 
But the majority of societies did not do this. Instead they chose to act as re-lending 
agencies. Credit co-operatives had the capacity to act as intermediaries between joint 
stock banks and borrowers, in effect re-lending funds received from joint stock banks. 
‘Gombeenmen’, butter merchants, trust auctioneers et al. performed a similar 
function.214 The difference was mainly that the Raiffeisen societies formed a mutual 
group which, theoretically, was to use the liability of the co-operative as security and 
borrow for the benefit of the group as a whole. This combined security was supposed 
to be greater than that which could be pledged by any one individual member of the 
society. 
When analysing the Raiffeisen societies it should be taken into consideration 
that the joint stock banks did not experience the same difficulties as the Raiffeisen 
societies in terms of unpunctual repayment and debt default, etc. As was illustrated in 
chapter 3, evidence of this fact comes from the Money Lending Commission where it 
was observed that there were very few cases of foreclosure by the joint stock banks 
and that the banks experienced prompt repayment.215 T.W. Russell posed the question 
whether ‘the only thing in arrears is the payment of rent’ to Joseph Pratt, a secretary 
of a Raiffeisen society in Enniscoe, Co. Mayo, and he received an affirmative 
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response.216 Given that the joint stock banks held a large amount of deposits this is 
something which suggests that reciprocity, the enhanced possibility that depositors at 
a financial institution may have of obtaining loans from that financial institution,’217 
was a key factor in determining the success of a financial institution in Ireland. Both 
the LFB loan funds and the Raiffeisen societies experienced similar problems in terms 
of punctuality of loan repayments, and neither had broad deposit bases. What this 
suggests is that rather than the failure of the Raiffeisen societies being due to informal 
cultural constraints, it is more likely due to the institutional design, intentional and 
unintentional, of the Raiffeisen societies as advocated by their propagator, the IAOS.  
 
 
6.5.1 Legislative constraints: The Friendly Societies Act v the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act 
 
This section will outline the legal context that faced co-operative societies forming 
and formed in Ireland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Co-
operatives could form under a number of legal acts, but the body of legislation most 
commonly associated with co-operatives was the Industrial and Provident Societies 
Acts. When Raiffeisen societies were established they faced a choice between 
registration under the ‘Industrial and Provident Societies Act’218 or the ‘Friendly 
Societies Act.’219 As was discussed in chapter 5, the Friendly Societies Acts were a 
body of legislation which gave legal recognition to friendly societies and any other 
societies that were not engaged in illegal activity.220 Friendly societies were life and 
sickness insurance societies that came into existence in Britain and Ireland in the late 
eighteenth century. They were given legislative recognition in an attempt to 
encourage their development as it was believed that such insurance societies would 
place less of a burden on the community for poor relief.221 The early British co-
operatives registered under the Friendly Society legislation and were enabled to do so 
by the clause that they were not engaging in illegal activity. Further developments in 
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co-operative organisation and methodology in the 1840s, especially the payment of 
dividends on shares, led to the enactment of the Industrial and Provident Societies 
Act.222 The Industrial and Provident Societies Acts diverged from the Friendly 
Societies Acts and converged with the Company Acts, especially with the granting of 
limited liability to industrial and provident societies in 1862.223 Co-operative banking, 
which was prohibited under early legislation, was legalised in the 1876 Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act.224  
When agricultural co-operatives were established by the IAOS all bar the 
Raiffeisen societies were registered as industrial and provident societies.225 The 
overwhelming majority of credit co-operatives registered as specially authorised 
friendly societies under the ‘Friendly Societies Act’, as this allowed for unlimited 
liability. This does not seem to have been suitable due to a number of constraints that 
were immediately clear to the propagators.  George Russell outlined the position in 
his evidence to the committee on agricultural credit: 
The system of co-operative credit desired by Raiffeisen seemed exactly the thing to suit 
our small Irish farmers, but when the attempt was made to draw up rules, embodying the 
full constitution of the Continental associations, the founders were met with these 
difficulties. There were two Acts – the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, which 
gave trading powers, but did not permit of the principle of joint and several liability, 
which was the essential feature of the German system, and there was also the Friendly 
Societies Act, which permitted societies to be constituted so that the members became 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of the association, and could mutually back each 
other up, but it did not permit of trading powers, and it was very inadequate in other 
ways for the purposes required, as the IAOS soon found out.226  
 
Firstly, the Friendly Society legislation did not permit societies to borrow from 
non-members. The Raiffeisen societies that were initially established were identical to 
the friendly society loan funds discussed in chapter 5 in that they could only borrow 
from members and make loans to members. This meant that the Raiffeisen societies 
could not accept deposits or loans from third parties; this constraint was overcome in 
1898 when a private members bill was passed which enabled Raiffeisen societies to 
borrow from non-members.227 Coincidentally, Horace Plunkett played a significant 
role in the introduction of the Societies borrowing powers bill in parliament. The act 
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did not apply to the friendly society loan funds discussed in chapter 5 as it was only 
applicable to non-profit societies that had indivisible reserves. The friendly society 
loan funds annually divided profits between members. This was a practice common 
with friendly societies in the UK and it was one of the reasons why many friendly 
societies had ephemeral existences. The amendment to the friendly societies act also 
stipulated that loan use by members be constrained to those approved by the 
committee of a society.228 It is also interesting that the borrowing restrictions were 
highlighted when the CDB realised it could not make loans to Raiffeisen societies.229 
This suggests that the legislation was aimed primarily at facilitating loans to the 
societies. This is an important factor in Raiffeisen development in Ireland as it 
permitted people, joint-stock banks, and government departments to lend money to 
the Raiffeisen societies. It also undermined efforts for Raiffeisen societies to be 
started and funded by the deposits of members. Given the small number of Raiffeisen 
societies that were established between 1894 and 1897, perhaps this is an indication 
that the movement was not going to be supported by thrifty members. 
Although, from the perspective of the IAOS, the problem of borrowing from 
non-members was overcome, the remaining faults proved insurmountable. The 
Friendly Societies Acts did not allow the credit co-operatives registered under it to 
have corporate status, enjoy trading powers, or form centralised bodies, and it also 
placed a limit on the lending capacity of societies. Essentially this decision limited the 
scope of development for Raiffeisen societies as they could not develop ancillary 
structures similar to those that developed in Germany. In contrast, societies registered 
under the ‘Industrial and Provident Societies Act’ were permitted to have limited 
liability, trading powers, federation, and corporate status, and there was no restriction 
on loan size. 
So what made the IAOS decide to establish the Raiffeisen societies as friendly 
societies?  R.A. Anderson stated that ‘at a very early stage, and acting on the advice 
of Mr Henry W. Wolff, it was decided to adopt the plan of Herr Raiffeisen and form 
our little credit societies on the unlimited liability principle.’230 So the question should 
be asked, what made Henry Wolff choose the Friendly Societies Acts? Wolff in his 
evidence to the committee on agricultural credit in Ireland said that he ‘found some 
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difficulty in selecting a convenient act’.231 Wolff also said that it was on the advice of 
the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies that he chose to have the Raiffeisen societies 
registered as specially authorised friendly societies.232 Wolff, with the help of the 
Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, drew up the model rules for Raiffeisen 
societies.233 Wolff was aware of the immediate limitations of the Friendly Societies 
Acts. He knew that the societies could not borrow from non-members, and he did not 
think that it was a concern, as he believed that the societies should be self-financed 
from the deposits of members.234 He was more concerned about the fact that legally 
the reserve fund of the society was dissolvable after the dissolution of a society; hence 
there would be an incentive to dissolve a society as was done with Friendly 
Societies.235 The other difficulty was that friendly society legislation required that 
loans were to be secured by a reserve of a third of the amount on loan.236 These were 
Wolff’s main considerations writing in 1896, and he seems to have overlooked other 
legislative restrictions that Raiffeisen societies would face under the Friendly 
Societies Acts. These he recognised in later works. Writing in 1907 Wolff noted that: 
 
As our law at present stands in the United Kingdom – there is reason to hope that it will 
soon be modified – co-operative banks with limited liability (such must necessarily be 
Share banks), in addition to having things made easy for them in their individual, purely 
banking, action, also enjoy these two valuable advantages, that they are free to combine 
to federation or Central Banks, and to couple, in country districts, trading in goods with 
trading in money. Unlimited liability banks, registered under the Friendly Societies Act, 
can at present do neither the one thing or the other.237 
  
As the Raiffeisen system had not developed as anticipated, efforts, such as the 
‘Thrift and credit societies bill’,238 were made to reform the friendly societies acts to 
make them compatible with the demands of Raiffeisenism. The Thrift and credit 
societies bill aimed to address three difficulties. Firstly, to give Raiffeisen banks 
corporate status; secondly, to enable Raiffeisen banks to federate and form central 
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institutions; and thirdly, to give Raiffeisen banks the right to possess trading 
powers.239 Support for the ‘thrift and credit banks bill’ was unanimously agreed upon 
at the annual general meeting of the IAOS in 1910.240 George Russell believed that 
the thrift and credit societies bill241 was the only legislative support that the Raiffeisen 
societies needed as he felt that the Raiffeisen banks needed the trading powers to 
become self-sustainable.242 When asked what he would do if the bill did not become 
law, G. Russell stated that preference would be given to the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Acts.243 The bill was first introduced in the House of Lords in 1910 by the 
Earl of Shaftsbury, the chairman of the Agricultural Organisation Society (AOS).244 
The bill was passed in the Lords and sent down to the Commons, the lower house of 
the British parliament, in 1911,245 but it appears as though it was ignored in the 
Commons.246 Perhaps an explanation of this can be found in the constitutional crisis 
that the UK faced at the time. 
 Legislative constraints prevented the adoption of key institutional structures 
such as trading powers and federation, so the question that must be asked is if the 
Raiffeisen societies could have been registered as Industrial and Provident Societies. 
The key distinction between the Industrial and Provident Societies Act and the 
Friendly Societies Act was unlimited liability, so what was meant by it?  
 
6.5.2 Unlimited v limited liability 
 
The modern legal definition of unlimited liability is that ‘the members of an unlimited 
company have an unlimited liability for the debts of a company in the event of a 
company being unable to meet its debts when due. The member cannot be personally 
sued by the company creditors, and it is the company liquidator, the person who 
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manages the liquidation of the company, who must pursue the members for the 
company debts.’247 Henry Wolff maintained that it was not to be confused with 
unlimited liability associated with the City of Glasgow Bank which crashed in 1878, 
with debts of more than £6 million.248 The City of Glasgow Bank is an important 
reference point because its failure influenced the introduction of shareholder liability 
under the companies act in 1879.249 Members in a Raiffeisen society were actually 
limited in the amount for which they could be held liable.250 When the IAOS set up a 
Raiffeisen co-operative, one of its first actions was to vote to limit the borrowing 
powers of the society to a fixed amount.251 From some archival source material this 
seems to have been common practice. For example, at the A.G.M. of the Corrigan 
Agricultural Bank in 1914 it was voted to limit the borrowing power of the society at 
£250, but then this was subsequently increased to £300 at the Bank’s 1915 A.G.M.252 
How the IAOS practised ‘unlimited liability’ begs the question why the IAOS did not 
recommend the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts as, in the words of G. Russell, 
‘to call it unlimited liability is a mistake’.253 Unlimited liability may have been a 
factor that inhibited the adoption of Raiffeisen societies. As Plunkett noted: 
The farmers are anxious to have these agricultural banks [Schulze-Delitzsch limited 
liability banks], but there they object to the unlimited liability, and quite rightly, because 
it would mean, until the system was better understood, that the “have-nots” would be 
leaning upon the “haves.”254  
 
Evidence from the IAOS annual reports also shows that it was willing to forsake 
the principle of unlimited liability in the case of co-operative creameries and 
agricultural trading societies that offered credit facilities.255 It may be argued that 
creameries and agricultural societies advancing loans is not immediately relevant to 
the Raiffeisen system, but if co-operative societies were able to advance credit to their 
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own members it would have undermined the need for a distinct credit branch within 
the co-operative movement. 
Of the two distinct forms of German credit co-operatives that were available, 
the Schulze-Delitzsch model and the Raiffeisen model, the Raiffeisen model was 
chosen for Ireland. Henry Wolff stated that: 
There are districts and there are populations in which, and among whom, cooperative 
banking by means of sharebanks is not, or else is scarcely, possible. And those are 
precisely the districts and populations amid which the assistance to be rendered by co-
operative banking is probably particularly needed. Working capital is wanted. And for 
want of it the field, the allotment, the little homestead, the country workshop, languish 
and opportunities must be allowed to run to waste.256 
 
The Raiffeisen model had been active in rural environments, whereas the 
Schulze-Delitzsch was generally more urban based. The Raiffeisen model was 
assumed to be the best when dealing with a homogeneous rural population whereas 
the Schulze-Delitzsch was for heterogeneous urban populations. Schulze-Delitzsch 
had a golden rule which was ‘that the more varied in respect of callings is the 
membership, the safer will be the foundation on which the banks rest, simply because 
in different callings want and abundance of money are apt mutually to supplement 
and equalise one another. A blending of callings, accordingly, tends to bring about the 
ideal state of balance between supply and demand which makes business easy.’257 
This diversification of membership was not a condition that could be met in rural 
Ireland. Henry Wolff, writing in 1898, stated that: 
None of the few attempts recently made to acclimatise Raiffeisen banking elsewhere can 
be said to have succeeded. It is only among a small, steady, stable, settled population, 
such as is provided by country parishes, that it can be expected to work well. Among 
such a population, in which there are few changes, few sudden departures and new 
arrivals, in which everyone knows his neighbours, and can, without inquisitive prying or 
any special trouble, watch and observe them, in which the circumstances, the wealth or 
poverty, the manner of life of every inhabitant are known to all, this system may truly be 
said to have worked wonders, raising up wealth out of apparently nothing, and educating 
economically and morally in an even more marked way.258 
. 
Unlimited liability was a contentious issue that the committee inquiring into 
agricultural credit in Ireland believed was hampering the development of the credit 
co-operatives. The committee believed that there should be a choice between the form 
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of liability which a credit co-operative could and should take,259 but the norm was for 
unlimited liability.  This, as was outlined above, was due to the legislative choice 
taken by the IAOS. 
From a game theoretic perspective unlimited liability ensures that everyone 
behaves, and if one person disobeys the rules all are penalised - hence an incentive to 
monitor all members. Unlimited liability implied that if a credit co-operative were to 
fold, all the members in unison would be liable for all debts outstanding, yet at the 
same time it did not imply that the liability would be shared equally. If the asset 
holding of members was not homogenous then those with greater assets would be 
forced to contribute more to the settlement of outstanding liabilities.  
When all forms of credit co-operation began in the German states they were 
formed under unlimited liability. The reason for this was because limited liability was 
not legalised in Germany until 1889.260 When they had formed, limited liability was 
not an option open to consideration, but when limited liability was legalised both 
Schulze-Delitzsch and Haas banks adopted it. The reason for this was that both forms 
of credit co-operatives were share banks and raised capital from the sale of shares. It 
was this share-capital that was to act as their security. Raiffeisen banks differed in this 
respect, as they did not have share capital; their unlimited liability was the only 
guarantee against losses made by the credit co-operative. As it was the Raiffeisen 
system that was introduced into Ireland, it was established incorporating the principle 
of unlimited liability. 
Unlimited liability theoretically enabled the credit co-operatives to extend their 
outreach. Henry Wolff was an advocate of the use of both limited and unlimited 
liability, depending on the circumstances. His views on unlimited liability credit co-
operatives were quite favourable. In one instance he noted that: 
The particular recommendation of this method [unlimited liability] is, that it enables the 
co-operative bank to offer its services and open its doors to the very poorest, to those 
who have not sixpence to contribute, so long as their honesty can be satisfactorily 
vouched for. This is, in very truth, one of the main reasons why the man who invented 
this particular form of organisation, the German Raiffeisen, resorted to it. He would help 
the very humblest. He would ask nothing of anyone who desired to be helped, except a 
warranty from his neighbours for his good character. By an ingenious device he managed 
to link rich and poor together in a thoroughly democratic, fraternal union, enabling one to 
help the other without setting himself above him or demoralising him by gifts. The 
system – which is, of course, open to abuse – has under proper management 
accomplished veritable wonders of good work. By dispensing with any ‘qualification; it 
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has not only let in the very poor, but it has also served to emphasise still more the co-
operative principle of ‘no profit,’ since, there being no shares, there can be no 
dividend.261 
 
In principle, and in theory, the approach of pledging unlimited liability as 
security against a co-operative’s debtors is quite admirable, but when it is put in 
practice in an environment where limited liability had been an established principle it 
became a hindrance to effective co-operative development. Limited liability had a 
longer history in the United Kingdom, where it was introduced in 1855,262 and in 
Ireland where a form of limited liability was introduced in 1782.263 It is therefore not 
surprising that there would be some reluctance for some members of rural society to 
join credit co-operatives adhering to unlimited liability. When the joint stock banks 
were formed in the early nineteenth century they were established as unlimited 
liability enterprises. But it must be recalled that these were joint stock companies 
where capital was raised through the sale of shares. The share values were quite high 
which meant that shareholders were self-selected as they were wealthier members of 
society. The joint stock banks were also profit-maximising companies. Neither holds 
true for a Raiffeisen society. As membership was not precluded due to inability to 
purchase shares, and membership gave voting privileges, it could mean that the 
society was not profit maximising.  
  Rural Ireland was not a homogenous society, and for success a credit co-
operative required the co-operation and collaboration of the diverse elements of rural 
society. Unlimited liability would have been suitable for a homogenous society. Using 
the mean distribution of land occupation as an indicator for homogeneity it can be 
seen from figures 6.17 and 6.18 that rural Irish society was not homogenous.264  
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Figure 6.17  
Mean distribution of the occupiers of land in Ireland, 1895
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Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, with detailed report on agriculture, for the year 1895, p. 12. 
[c. 8126] H.C. 1896, xcii, 309.  
 
Figure 6.18  
Mean distribution of occupied land in Ireland by province, 1895
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Source:Agricultural statistics of Ireland, with detailed report on agriculture, for the year 1895, p. 12. 
[c. 8126] H.C. 1896, xcii, 309.  
 
Wealthier landholders had no pressing need to join a Raiffeisen society as they had 
access to other credit streams. They would also have been unwilling to accept 
unlimited liability. If the wealthier members of Irish society had joined Raiffeisen 
societies the quality of leadership and administration could have been enhanced, as 
they could have contributed their knowledge, expertise and wealth. As can be seen the 
distribution in figure 6.17 is skewed to the right and a greater percentage of occupiers 
hold land greater than 1 acre and less than 30 acres in size. This distribution does not 
indicate the existence of a homogenous rural society, as there was variance in the size 
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of land occupation amongst the populace.  This would mean that if a Raiffeisen 
society was established under the guise of unlimited liability, and if members were 
chosen randomly from each category of land occupation in figure 6.16, then the 
liability for the debts of a society, in the event of a society crashing, would fall 
heaviest on those occupying larger tracts of land. As membership was a voluntary 
decision, this would effectively discourage participation in a Raiffeisen society for 
many large land occupiers. But the large land occupier, who represented 29 per cent 
of the distribution of landholdings, also happened to be the wealthiest members of 
rural society, and therefore they were needed if the Raiffeisen society was to have a 
sustainable future.  
Admittedly this line of argument suffers from some defects, most notably that 
land has been assumed to be of equal value and quality, but acknowledging this, I 
believe that the argument does carry weight. A society comprised in its entirety of 
members of limited means would find it difficult to raise capital, as their combined 
assets would not have amounted to much and their pledge of unlimited liability would 
have appeared to have been a hallow promise to outsiders. Wealthier members were 
needed by the co-operative, as it was these who could give additional value to the co-
operative both in terms of assets which the co-operative could put into circulation, and 
in terms of credibility to the co-operative’s pledge of unlimited liability.  
Unlimited liability was more suited to areas where rural society was practically 
homogenous, and it was noted that the majority of credit co-operatives were to be 
found in Ulster and Connaught where, as can be seen in figure 6.17, social distinction 
was marginal. It is also interesting to note that the majority of Raiffeisen societies 
recorded by the IAOS in 1920 were active in Ulster, Connaught and Leinster: 39.22, 
29.41 and 25.49 per cent respectively. Raiffeisen societies in Wexford and Wicklow 
comprised 50 per cent of active Raiffeisen societies in Leinster in 1920. Using the 
1895 land occupation figures above, we can see that the majority of farms were less 
than 50 acres.265 Munster, the province with the greatest share of large landholders 
plus a pre-established co-operative creamery tradition, only had 5 per cent of active 
Raiffeisen societies in 1920. 
Unlimited liability was chosen for two reasons, firstly that it could be offered as 
security, as discussed above, and secondly because it was believed that unlimited 
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liability would influence the behaviour of members towards borrowers. Henry Wolff 
believed that: 
He does not want to be made liable. Hence he watches, he checks, he inquires, he lays 
aside all scruples of etiquette, he denies membership and refuses a loan, as he would not 
under the influence of any other consideration.266 
 
Unlimited liability would give a society an incentive to monitor a borrower to 
ensure that he/she applied a given loan to the object for which it was originally stated 
and not to deviate from such course. If the borrower did not do so, then the members 
of the society as a whole would be responsible for the repayment of the sum 
borrowed. It was believed that if a society opted for limited liability, it would negate 
the influence of the incentives associated with unlimited liability. But if a Raiffeisen 
society had chosen limited liability, it might have been able to attract more deposits 
and this would have led to monitoring from depositors. 
Unlimited liability may have deterred many prominent members of the 
community from becoming active members of the co-operative. Support may have 
been forthcoming in the form of deposits because, following the 1898 borrowers act, 
depositors were not required to be members. It was not just deposits that many credit 
co-operatives required; they needed members with practical experience which they 
could share with other members. It is also possible that the unlimited liability clause 
could have hampered the outreach capacity that the societies could possess, as 
members may have voted not to admit members who, they viewed, did not have 
sufficient means to join. Joseph Lee stated that: 
Agricultural credit banks, in which the members guaranteed loans to one another, formed 
an important component of the co-operative movement, but, as credit worthiness varied 
with the value of the farm, loans were naturally made to men with the most security. 
Those in least need managed to borrow most on the basis of local communal farmer 
guarantees. By helping to widen differences in income between larger and smaller farms, 
the co-operative movement fostered dissension and jealousy within the rural 
community.267 
 
So it is possible that unlimited liability prevented an incentive harmonisation whereby 
both sustainability and outreach could have been maintained.  
Other streams of the co-operative movement in Ireland did not adhere to the 
principle of unlimited liability, but rather chose to register as limited liability 
corporate bodies. This encouraged the active participation of wealthier farmers and 
ensured the success of the co-operative creamery system. It must also be noted that 
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only one credit co-operative formed along the lines of limited liability, that being the 
Ballindaggin in Co. Wexford. The Ballindaggin society registered under the 
‘Industrial and Provident Societies Acts’.268 Based on evidence received from the 
secretary of the Ballindaggin credit co-operative the committee reported that: 
The Society had never sought to obtain deposits, as the overdraft at the Joint Stock Bank 
provided quite sufficient for all requirements. The Reserve fund amounted in 1912 to 
£14. Since its inception the Society has made on an average only 6 loans per year, which 
seems a proof that the members, now numbering 44, do not in reality require, or at any 
rate do not feel the need of obtaining advances. Only three loans, amounting to £52 in all, 
were made in 1911. The total capital of the society in that year amounting to £38 18s. 1d. 
It is of interest to note that this society – the only one in Ireland based upon limited 
liability – is, with two exceptions, the oldest Credit Society in the country.269 
 
The committee also noted the evidence it gave it regards to the Ballindaggin 
credit cooperative that it was not enough to adjudicate either for or against the issue of 
unlimited liability. 
The existing legislation prevented societies registered under the Friendly 
Societies to have complementary trading powers. But the unlimited liability 
Raiffeisen societies were in some areas integrated with the existing limited liability 
co-operative infrastructure. Patrick Bolger claimed that some offices of the Raiffeisen 
societies were actually located within a co-operative creamery.270 There are a few 
notable cases where Raiffeisen societies were located next to creameries; for example 
one of the registered Raiffeisen societies was called the ‘Kilrea Dairy’.271 Archival 
source material also shows that there a link between the established co-operatives and 
the Raiffeisen societies. In many cases the surviving correspondence from credit co-
operatives was written on stationery with headings of the associated dairy co-
operative, as in the case of the Ballymoyer credit co-operative whose letter heading 
stated ‘the Whitecross agricultural and dairy co-operative’.272 This was not 
coincidental as the IAOS bank organisers report for 1905 stated that the Ballymoyer 
Credit Society worked in conjunction with the Whitecross creamery and that loan 
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repayments were made in both milk and cash.273 The Columbkille Credit Society, 
which IAOS regarded as the most successful proponent of Raiffeisenism, was also 
associated with a Creamery. The Columbkille society used stationery with a heading 
in the name of the co-operative creamery. This led to confusion in 1914 when it tried 
to amend some of its rules. The members had sent a letter to the IAOS Secretary, R.A. 
Anderson, asking for the necessary forms to amend their rules, but because of the 
paper heading R.A. Anderson sent them the forms for an Industrial and Provident 
Society rather than for a Friendly Society. The Columbkille society was forced to 
resubmit its amendment based on this fault, which is also an indication of the high 
level of bureaucracy associated with co-operation. In a subsequent correspondence, 
R.A. Anderson suggested that: 
…apart from the fact that the mistake in this case arose in the manner I have indicated 
[that the society was confused with the creamery] it is important that any correspondence 
made in reference to the bank should be carried out on paper headed – Columbkille 
Credit Society. Failure to do this might involve the society in a prosecution as it is laid 
down in the act itself that this must be done.274 
 
The Columbkille society was an outlier in that it was one of the few Raiffeisen 
societies that possessed deposits. But these deposits were invested in the creamery in 
Columbkille.275  
Using some information from the annual reports of the IAOS, if we match the 
names of creamery societies and agricultural societies we can attempt to measure the 
prevalence of Raiffeisen societies being linked with a creamery. The annual reports of 
the IAOS provide information on the location of Raiffeisen societies based on the 
name under which they were registered.  
 
Table 6.4: Percentage of Raiffeisen societies registered with the IAOS that 
shared the same name as a co-operative creamery and co-operative agricultural 
store in 1908 and 1920 
 
Co-operative type Percentage (%) 
Co-op creamery 1908 15.67 
Co-op creamery 1920 13.81 
Co-op store 1908 17.54 
Co-op store 1920 22.76 
Sources: IAOS annual report 1909 and 1921. 
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The methodology used to construct table 6.4 may be flawed as some societies may 
have registered under different names. But what table 6.4 suggests is that there was a 
low level of integration between the various forms of co-operation in Ireland. 
The case of the agricultural societies is more relevant to the Raiffeisen banks as 
the agricultural societies were trading societies similar to those associated with the 
German Raiffeisen movement. Initially they mainly traded manure and seeds and they 
also gave credit to members.276  In the 1909 annual report the IAOS stated that: 
It has been suggested that these societies might, with great benefit, amend their rules so 
as to be in a position to make loans to their members for productive purposes in the same 
way that the credit banks now make advances. Thus, the agricultural society would fulfil 
the dual function of a source of supply of agricultural requisites and a means whereby 
farmers needing capital could procure it at a reasonable rate.277 
 
The IAOS repeatedly made similar statements as it believed that the agricultural 
societies were unprofitable as stand alone institutions and would have been better 
served providing both services. This was also the case for many of the Raiffeisen 
banks. The number of agricultural societies experienced a surge in growth in years 
following the outbreak of the First World War. This was due to the fact that they 
became general co-operative stores selling more goods and offering to rent machinery 
and they also provided members with credit. Through the active encouragement of the 
IAOS the unlimited liability Raiffeisen societies were displaced by alternative forms 
of limited liability co-operatives. The question then must be asked, why, if they were 
willing to allow limited liability co-operatives to offer credit services, could they not 
have encouraged the Raiffeisen banks to operate as limited liability operations? Or 
was there even a need for Raiffeisen banks? 
The question as to whether or not a limited liability form of credit co-operation 
could have been introduced depends on whether it would have been possible to raise 
capital through the sale of shares. Using the data on mean paid-up share capital from 
the two main limited liability co-operatives we can get a sense of whether or not a 
limited liability form of credit co-operation could have been feasible. 
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Table 6.5: Mean paid up share capital per member in limited liability 
agricultural co-operatives, 1908 and 1920 
 
 Paid up share 
capital per 
member – 
creameries 
1908 (£) 
Paid up share 
capital per 
member – 
creameries 
1920 (£) 
Paid up share 
capital per 
member – 
agricultural 
societies 1908 
(£) 
Paid up share 
capital per 
member – 
agricultural 
societies 1920 
(£) 
Ireland  4.52 (5.15) 5.21 (6.00) 0.88 (4.91) 2.33 (3.56) 
Ulster 3.43 (2.59) 3.20 (1.93) 0.21 (0.18) 3.84 (5.30) 
Munster 6.25 (5.82) 7.52 (8.07) 0.51 (0.66) 2.79 (4.08) 
Leinster 4.73 (2.87) 4.58 (2.35) 2.63 (9.29) 1.37 (1.83) 
Connaught 3.51 (9.38) 2.64 (3.07) 0.18 (0.11) 1.70 (2.02) 
 
Note: The numbers in brackets refer to the standard deviation. 
 
Sources: IAOS annual reports, 1909 and 1921. 
 
The data from table 6.5 suggest that there was the capacity within the co-operative 
movement to raise capital via share issues as the mean paid-up share capital was 
relatively low. 
 
6.5.3 Co-operative Federation 
One of the major drawbacks of the Raiffeisen co-operatives in Ireland was the lack of 
co-operation between individual co-operatives to form federated bodies. This lack of 
inter-co-operative co-operation was not confined to the Raiffeisen societies. 
Breathnach observed that the ‘dairy co-operatives also remained largely isolated units, 
showing no tendency to form the local, regional and national alliances which were a 
key factor in the success of the Danish co-operative system’.278 But in terms of 
Raiffeisen development, federation was a key factor. M.L. Darling observed that in 
Germany:  
When a village society is formed, it is at once affiliated to three co-operative 
organisations, to a central bank for finance, an agricultural wholesale society for 
supplies, and to the local provincial union for audit, inspection and control.279  
 
Although legally constrained as friendly societies from establishing the 
agricultural wholesale federations or central banks, there were no such restrictions on 
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the formation of audit unions. So why did the Irish Raiffeisen societies not form audit 
unions? The absence of a federated auditing service in Ireland was due to the failure 
of Raiffeisen societies to co-operate with each other both at a regional and national 
level, but also due to the existence of a paternalistic apex institution. Audit unions in 
Germany provided the Raiffeisen societies with an important service, not only in 
auditing accounts but also by ensuring that the co-operative principles were 
understood and maintained.280 On-the-spot auditing services could be beneficial and 
used as a teaching tool to ensure that the credit co-operatives were able to function. 
 The importance of auditing was more as a teaching tool, because many 
members of Raiffeisen societies had no prior banking experience. Auditing services in 
Ireland were provided by the IAOS, but audits took place in Dublin and not in the 
societies themselves. The IAOS subsidised the annual audit of all Raiffeisen societies, 
but as their numbers grew the IAOS began offering its services to the more successful 
societies. The services provided by the IAOS were inadequate; evidence of this is 
shown by the following passage from the 1906 annual report: 
There were some inevitable delays in the auditing of the accounts of the Credit Societies 
in the Spring of this year, owing to the large number of books sent up simultaneously, 
some of which were not fully written up, and required a good deal of time to put right. It 
is hoped that arrangements can be put in force next year which will obviate these delays, 
and enable the audit staff to deal with the books without the congestion occurring which 
has marked this and some previous years.281 
 
The audit department of the IAOS conducted annual audits of the accounts of 
the Raiffeisen societies, but these were costly and the Raiffeisen societies did not 
contribute to the cost of these audits.282 There was an over-reliance on the IAOS for 
auditing services, and as the co-operatives were not actually contributing to the 
services the IAOS was making losses on the service. The IAOS began curtailing its 
auditing services to the Raiffeisen societies as a result of them being loss-making 
activities. The existing Raiffeisen societies did not have an alternative auditing 
scheme with which to replace the increasing apathy of the IAOS towards the 
Raiffeisen system. Many societies were unable to afford annual audits from private 
accountants. The IAOS auditing services declined after the withdrawal of a 
government subsidy in 1907 and the IAOS neglected to audit the accounts of the 
surviving Raiffeisen banks in the 1920s, choosing instead to focus on the expanding 
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agricultural societies.283 The IAOS stated that it had ‘to put aside this work in favour 
of the inspection of trading societies, which were in a position to make better if not 
adequate payment for the services they required.’284 The importance of the trading 
societies to the IAOS was enhanced as they generated more income in the form of 
affiliation fees, and as a result pro rata government grants. The IAOS stated that the 
Raiffeisen societies: 
Have been of necessity passed over by the IAOS in favour of trading co-operation, from 
which alone could the Society derive the income from affiliation fees and societies 
subscriptions that for many years formed the basis of its claim for a grant from the State. 
If only for this reason is it desirable that State aid in future should take the form of a 
“block” grant. Obliged to spend the income obtained from trading societies and the 
added State subvention, upon specified  services to those societies, funds could  not be 
found for the educational propaganda, inspection  etc of backward, remote and neglected 
credit societies, an expensive service, and one to which, as they do not trade, are not 
profit-making bodies, they cannot themselves adequately contribute.285  
 
The Raiffeisen societies would have been better served had a federated body formed, 
but the paternalistic treatment of the IAOS prevented any such movement emerging.  
The formation of central banks was also hindered by legal constraints, but the 
actions of the banks themselves show no signs that there was any effort at federation. 
Central banks were effectively clearing houses where co-operatives with surplus 
deposits could transfer these surpluses to other credit co-operatives with excess 
demand, or invest the surplus funds (i.e. introduce economies of scale). The central 
bank system could also be a way to overcome risk covariance as regional shocks 
would not affect the system as a whole; also a central bank could have insulated the 
Raiffeisen societies from macro-financial shocks. An example of this was the sudden 
increase in the rate of interest charged by joint stock banks in 1908.286 The joint stock 
banks were forced to increase interest rates due to changes in money market 
conditions following a banking crisis in the United States,287 but the IAOS had 
expected that the 4 per cent rate would be paid ‘irrespective of the fluctuations of the 
bank rate’.288 This system of central banks was a prominent feature of most forms of 
credit co-operation. The Raiffeisen union in Germany established many central banks 
in different regions, yet the Irish system never developed an effective system. 
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The history of the attempts to establish a central bank for the Raiffeisen societies in 
Ireland is quite interesting.  There were isolated incidents of local federation, most 
notably in Wexford where there was co-operation between a number of societies. 289  
But this kind of federation was a local concern and was limited to Wexford, where a 
number of societies were actually limited liability credit co-operatives. Elsewhere 
federation was an uncommon occurrence.  
There were numerous calls in the IAOS annual reports for the formation of a 
national co-operative central bank. There was a call for the formation of a national 
central bank in the IAOS report for 1901, the reason for this being the hesitant stance 
taken by the joint stock banks towards the co-operative movement. The IAOS saw a 
central bank as the solution to the financial problems of the co-operative movement as 
a whole, not just the Raiffeisen co-operatives.290 But, as was previously stated, the 
establishment of a central bank seems to have been used as a veiled threat to the joint 
stock banks to co-operate with the IAOS and its affiliated societies. In the 1901 
annual report the IAOS laid out a list of complaints against the joint stock banks in 
Ireland.291 When the joint stock banks overcame their hesitancy in dealing with co-
operative societies, as a result of negotiations with the IAOS,292 the calls for the 
creation of a central bank were not as vociferous. The following year the IAOS 
believed that a federation of Raiffeisen banks was premature.293 
 The 1902 annual report of the IAOS note that as Raiffeisen societies could 
obtain credit from the joint stock banks at ‘4%, which is a reasonable rate and as low 
as could be expected,’294 that federation was ‘not a matter needing any very pressing 
consideration’.295  In the 1904 report the IAOS stated that a new rule had been passed 
which permitted credit societies to lend to one another and that this rule would ‘be a 
first step towards a more systematic organisation of agricultural credit by general co-
operation among the societies’.296 There was no further mention of establishing a 
central bank in the IAOS annual reports until the annual general meeting in 1909 
where there was a call for the establishment of a co-operative central bank. But the 
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call for a central bank was not a call for the federation of Raiffeisen societies, but 
rather a call for ‘the federation of all the co-operative societies of Ireland for the 
establishment of a co-operative bank for Ireland, or one for each province’.297 A 
Central Co-operative Credit Society (CCCS) was established in 1913 and its role 
outlined in the 1913 report. The IAOS stated that the CCCS: 
….can act as a clearing house in collecting, from societies which have surplus deposits, 
sums which they may wish to dispose of and which the CCCS can lend out to other 
societies in need of additional loan capital. It can also – and this should become one of its 
most important functions – give attention to the societies with which it may have 
dealings, either directly or through the machinery for the inspection of the societies now 
started by the IAOS, or in both ways.298 
 
 
The CCCS was a failure. In its duration it only made 5 loans to credit co-
operatives and they were made in 1914. No other business was transacted between 
then and its cessation, which was continually threatened every year from 1916 
onwards.299  
The committee on agricultural credit was unsupportive of the formation of a 
central bank for the credit co-operatives. It was their belief that the functions 
performed by the joint stock banks were adequate and that a central bank was 
superfluous to the needs of the credit co-operatives. Arguably such a system of central 
banks was not required in Ireland as the Raiffeisen societies did not make a 
determined effort to mobilise savings. The Societies purposely limited the amount of 
deposits to the amount of business that they transacted. From the archival sources it 
appears as though there were a small number of depositors, but with a large average 
deposit size. George Russell’s opinion was that the Raiffeisen societies should stop 
taking deposits if they could not use them.300  As this seems to have been the policy of 
the IAOS, then there was definitely no need for a central bank. Yet, as evidence to the 
committee on agricultural credit showed, there were credit co-operatives who had 
surplus deposits. These surpluses were placed in accounts in the POSB or in accounts 
in joint stock banks.301 Such funds could have been redistributed to other credit co-
operatives had there been a central institution able to perform such a task. 
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Also a central bank, or some kind of central agency, could overcome the localism of 
the movement that greater awareness and confidence could be felt in the system. With 
a national identity it may have been possible to attract deposits. The POSB had such 
national characteristics which were lacking in other localised savings institutions. But 
the CCCS was not a federation of the existing Raiffeisen societies. It was a creation 
imposed on the system by the IAOS. Without the cooperation of the all societies, and 
members of these societies, the central bank could not feasibly work. 
Smith-Gordon and Staples saw the potential benefits that a central co-operative 
bank could give. They stated that: 
In Ireland the Post Office Savings Banks hold deposits to the amount of £18,000,000 and 
the long term deposits in the joint stock banks amount to £65,000,000. A great proportion 
of this money is derived from agricultural sources, but most of it leaves the country 
altogether. If a central co-operative bank existed which was able to attract even one per 
cent. of this money, the lack of capital from which the movement suffers could be 
remedied at once, even if the joint-stock banks were to some extent alienated.302 
 
Perhaps they were too optimistic - they saw the central bank as a means to 
finance the co-operative movement as a whole, rather than just the credit co-
operatives. When Paul Gregan, the IAOS bank organiser, was asked if he thought that 
there was a financial need for a central bank, he said he did not think so. But when 
asked why he thought a central bank should be established he said, ‘I want to bring 
the co-operative movement together.’303   
The main reason for the failure to establish central banks was based on the 
business model chosen by the IAOS where their Raiffeisen banks were financed by 
concessional government loans and inter-bank loans. The IAOS did not encourage the 
mobilisation and maximisation of deposits, and as such Raiffeisen banks never 
emerged as a natural savings institution. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The initial rapid growth of the credit co-operatives was not to be sustained. As was 
stated in the introduction, at their peak there were 268 Raiffeisen societies, but after 
1914 the numbers decreased. The Raiffeisen societies were introduced in Ireland by 
the IAOS in 1894 and were a top-down social movement. The societies had an 
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ephemeral existence despite the resources devoted to them in the early 1900s. The 
Raiffeisen societies never mobilised savings to any great extent, and were mainly 
funded by concessional loans from government bodies. Not all societies failed in 1907 
when there was a change in leadership of the government bodies dispersing 
concessional loans, but decline set in after 1914. The accessibility of cheap credit for 
members of rural Irish society from government bodies gave an incentive for many 
such co-operatives to form. When this avenue of credit was closed off the number of 
active credit co-operatives declined. The easily available government funds inflated 
the real number of genuine credit co-operatives. The remnants of the credit co-
operative system continued operating until the 1950s.304 Therefore, it can not be said 
that the credit co-operatives were a failure, or that they lacked that ill-defined concept 
which is ‘co-operative spirit’. In 1920 there were 51 active Raiffeisen societies that 
were active and figure 6.19 shows the distribution of these societies by year of 
formation. 
Figure 6.19  
Percentage distribution of Raiffeisen societies in 1920 by year of 
formation
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Source: IAOS annual report 1921. 
 
It would be interesting to see what set these societies apart from the rest. The 
most logical answer is that these were the best managed societies, and that they were 
the ones that had access to alternative sources of capital. 
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Figure 6.20  
Percentage of societies formed in given year between 1894 and 1915 
that were active in 1920
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Source: IAOS annual reports, 1902-1920 
 
Figure 6.20 shows the portion of the societies formed in a given year in the period 
1894-1915 that were active in 1920. What figure 6.20 shows is that, apart from the 
outlier in 1896, there was a very low survival rate of these societies. Given that all 
societies formed after 1900 faced similar economic conditions, this is something to 
suggest that the key difference was access to capital in the form of deposits and 
management. 
Given that a number of Raiffeisen societies were still registered with the IAOS 
in 1920, it is possible to perform some econometric analysis in an attempt to 
determine what may have caused these societies to succeed, and others to fail. Data 
were taken from the year 1908, the year when the highest number of Raiffeisen 
societies were registered with the IAOS. 
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Table 6.6: Relationship between Societies registered with the IAOS 1908 (N=268) 
and key variables  
Variable Percent (%) 
Survival in 1920 43.66 
Survival and active 1920 17.91 
Co-op creamery 1908 15.67 
Co-op creamery 1920 13.81 
Co-op store 1908 17.54 
Co-op store 1920 22.76 
Joint Stock Branch (1908) 5.60 
JS sub-branch (1908) 8.21 
Number of JS branches* (1908) 16.79 
Post Office (1908) 45.15 
POSB (1908) 32.46 
 
Sources: IAOS annual reports, and Thom’s Directory 
 
The joint stock banks and POSB banks were matched to the Raiffeisen societies based 
on a shared name; this does not therefore include JS bank branches that are located 
outside of the area of operations indicated by the name of a Raiffeisen society. But the 
evidence from the maps, shown in an appendix to this chapter, of the Raiffeisen 
societies suggests that they were located in remote parts of the country. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that there were a low percentage of banks active in these areas. It is 
also interesting to note the low percentage of limited liability co-operatives that were 
linked to the Raiffeisen societies, something which highlights the low levels of 
integration within the Irish co-operative movement. The following regressions have 
been estimated using Logit models. The dependent variables being tested were 
whether a society in 1908 was still in existence (i.e. on the register of the IAOS) in 
1920, and whether a society in 1908 was both in existence and active in 1920. This 
was done by using dummy variables (binary numbers: 1=active, 0=inactive) to 
distinguish between the societies that survived and those that did not. As was stated 
previously the IAOS annual reports recorded societies in their annual reports despite 
the fact that they did not submit any returns. Table 6.7 shows the results of a 
regression of all societies recorded for 1908. The independent variables are all 
dummy variables. It is interesting to note that the statistically significant relationships 
are between the limited liability co-operatives. 
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Table 6.7 
Logit (MLE) Dependent variable: 
Survival in 1920 
Survival and active 
1920 
Independent variable   
Joint stock branch -.2752 (0.636) 0.0515 (0.942) 
Joint stock sub-branch -0.0769 (0.877) -9.4473 (0.237) 
POSB -0.4278 (0.164) -0.1486 (0.699) 
Co-op creamery 1920 0.7732 (0.04)** 1.1318 (0.009)*** 
Agricultural store 1920 1.42355 (0.000)*** 0.9448 (0.012)** 
Constant -0.5159 (0.003)*** -1.8531 (0.000)*** 
Number of observations 266 266 
Log-likelihood value -171.22073 -119.73802 
Pseudo R2 0.0612 0.0465 
 
Notes: All explanatory variables are included in the regression as dummy variables. p 
values are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the results of regressions involving the active societies in 
1908.  In table 6.8 an attempt was made to isolate the influence of deposits on the 
survival of Raiffeisen societies, in this case a dummy variable was used to describe 
where a society had no deposits. There is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between a society having no deposits and the survival and activity of a 
society in 1920. Table 6.8 also shows the significance of a relationship between a 
Raiffeisen society and other forms of co-operation. Additionally it indicates that there 
is a negative relationship between the existence of a POSB and survival in 1920, and 
the existence of JS sub-branch and survival and activity in 1920. 
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Table 6.8 
Logit (MLE) Survival 1920 Survival and active 1920 
JS branch -0.5634 (0.470) -0.2493 (0.762) 
JS sub-branch -0.3644 (0.619) -1.9571 (0.095)* 
POSB -0.7932 (0.085)* -0.4201 (0.402) 
Co-op creamery 1920 0.8557 (0.133) 1.1805 (0.037)** 
Co-op store 1920 1.2827 (0.007)*** 1.0751 (0.023)** 
No deposits -0.5902 (0.127) -1.4532 (0.004)*** 
Years in operation -0.0994 (0.152) -0.1494 (0.065)* 
Membership 0.0018 (0.740) 0.0034 (0.515) 
Amount of loans 0.0061 (0.000)*** 0.0017 (0.106) 
Constant -0.5860 (0.349) -1.0327 (0.072)* 
Number of observations 182 182 
Log  likelihood -92.270855 -77.973959 
Pseudo R2 0.2558 0.2340 
 
Note: p values are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6.9 includes information contained in the annual reports of the IAOS controlled 
for membership in each society. Again table 6.9 shows a significant positive 
relationship between Raiffeisen society survival and the existence of limited liability 
forms of co-operation in 1920. Survival and activity in 1920 is positively related to 
the proportion of deposits in total capital. The amount of loans per member is also 
positively linked to survival and activity in 1920. 
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Table 6.9 
 
Logit (MLE) Survival 1920 Survival and active 1920 
JS branch -.3313274 (0.671) -.1257355 (0.883) 
JS sub-branch -.1667559 (0.818 ) -2.035207 (0.093)* 
POSB -.7695481 (0.110) -.4032801 (0.458) 
Co-op creamery 1920 1.118381 (0.060)* 1.189157 (0.057)* 
Co-op agricultural store 
1920 
1.724194 (0.001)*** 1.125487 (0.028) 
Loan capital per member -.781041 (0.029)** -.6360744 (0.268) 
Ratio deposits per total 
capital 
1.033315 (0.524) 5.428235 (0.003)*** 
Deposits per member -.4728806 (0.303) -1.433583 (0.037)** 
Number of loans per 
member 
.7518291 (0.256) -.177983 (0.814) 
Amount of loans per 
member 
.4225557 (0.041)** .3675268 (0.076)* 
Amount of loans 
outstanding per member 
.3940331 (0.267) .5874653 (0.303) 
Profit per member -25.04619 (0.020)** -10.50398 (0.314) 
Reserves per member 7.022014  (0.026)** 3.552725 (0.304) 
Expenses per member 6.100462 (0.361) 14.87765 (0.026)** 
Ratio reserves to total 
capital 
-.0254128 (0.671) -.0452793 (0.542) 
Years in operation -.3039964 (0.002)*** -.267181 (0.021)** 
Constants .3776243 (0.600) -2.269492  (0.007)*** 
Number of observations 182 182 
Log-likelihood -92.722156 -73.857345 
Pseudo R2 0.2522 0.2744 
 
Notes: p values are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
What is not possible to measure is the effect of management on the long-run 
performance of a society. The low pseudo R2 values suggest that perhaps a significant 
missing variable in this context is the quality of management. 
The results from these logit regressions support the statements made in this 
chapter about the importance of deposit mobilisation as a source of information and 
about the importance of integration with other co-operative enterprises, both as 
sources of information and for economies of scale. The importance of other forms of 
co-operative activity may also be a reflection that there was an element of cross-
subsidisation present in the co-operative structure. Other forms of co-operation may 
have been more profitable and supported the Raiffeisen societies, or they may have 
had access to better management. The logit regression results suggest that it was the 
societies who inadvertently replicated the German conditions (i.e. co-op integration 
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and savings mobilisation) that were successful; the reality was that not many societies 
did this. 
Given the importance of Henry Wolff in establishing credit co-operation in 
Ireland it is only fair to give him a voice in the conclusion of this chapter:  
Co-operative Credit Societies have certainly conquered for themselves an honoured place 
among the useful institutions established in Ireland, upon which King Edward on his last 
visit to the country bestowed high and merited praise. If for the moment their splendour 
is a little obscured by the more vigorous agitation in progress for the formation of 
distributive stores, to free the small farmer from the oppressive yoke of the grasping 
gombeen man – whom the Department appears to favour – that is, of course, to be 
accounted for, in the first place by the fact that the need of stores has become acutely 
more urgent, and that its urgency has at last been realized by the farming community; 
and, in the second, by the circumstance that up to a certain point the banks formed, as is 
proper among impecunious people, upon the Raiffeisen principle – without shares and 
with unlimited liability – have done their work, placing the whilom struggling farmer on 
firmer ground, where his immediate want of cash is not as present as it was. He for the 
moment needs stores more than banks and cannot well fight two great battles at the same 
time. The temporary obscuring of the banks by no means signifies that credit societies 
are done with. Their utility has been too well ascertained and recognised for that. Only it 
seems likely that, being now in a more prosperous position, Irish farmers will be able to 
form some of their new banks on the share and limited liability system.305 
 
Elsewhere in the same text Wolff used the Irish case as an example of the 
dangers of ‘assisted’ co-operation.306 So what we can take from Henry Wolff’s 
perspective is that the Raiffeisen societies were not a failure, but that there was a 
greater need for co-operative societies and therefore they were sidelined for the 
foreseeable future. This is an interesting observation given Wolff’s role in writing the 
‘Thrift and Credit Societies’ bill.  Wolff’s argument had always been that Raiffeisen 
societies could tackle gombeenism; the thrift and credit societies bill aimed to arm 
Raiffeisen societies with trading powers. Wolff stated, in evidence to the committee 
on agricultural credit in Ireland, that the trading powers for Raiffeisen societies were 
not demanded in England, but were demanded in Ireland.307 The citation from Wolff 
above then seems to suggest that he reckoned that co-operative stores are the way to 
address gombeenism. Given that gombeenism was the initial ‘problem’ that he 
suggested Raiffeisen societies would combat, maybe this is a reflection that they were 
the wrong instrument to achieve this goal. Or perhaps there was a greater demand for 
co-operative stores? 
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In 1920 there were 387 agricultural societies, 335 co-operative creameries, and 117 
Raiffeisen societies on the IAOS register. If we look at these by their year of 
formation, shown in figure 6.21, we can see that there was a shift in emphasis from 
the Raiffeisen societies to the agricultural societies. This was a conscious decision on 
the part of the IAOS, who believed that: 
There is a wide field for development in such directions, and it is possible that out of the 
agricultural will be evolved “the general purposes” society, to rival in importance, if not 
to surpass, the co-operative creamery. It should not be forgotten that many of the 
creameries do a large business in goods which, strictly speaking, come more properly 
within the sphere of the agricultural societies.308 
 
Figure 6.21   
The year of formation of co-operative socieites registered with the IAOS in 
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Source: IAOS annual report 1921 
 
The IAOS abandoned the Raiffeisen societies in favour of these new 
agricultural societies that were formed in the late 1920s.  It is interesting to see that 
the agricultural societies experienced similar problems to the Raiffeisen societies that 
the IAOS attempted to establish earlier in the twentieth century. They were 
mismanaged and under-capitalised.309 In relation to the trading societies the IAOS 
noted that there was a ‘credit habit’ in rural Ireland. 310 One of the ironies of the IAOS 
policy was that they ended up practising what they had defined as the ‘gombeen’ 
system despite the fact that they had stated they were trying to combat gombeenism.  
The Raiffeisen system that was introduced in the period 1894 to 1915 was 
unsuccessful, but this did not stop the IAOS and the Free State DATI trying the same 
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lending methodology once more. A new strain of Raiffeisen societies, ‘fluke 
societies’, were introduced in the 1920s to distribute a loan of £100,000 from the 
DATI for the purpose of replacing stock loss caused by an outbreak of liver fluke.311 
These were not necessarily new, as loans were given to societies that had previously 
existed, but the terms of the loan were that they were only to be given to societies in 
the south of Ireland. The life cycle of these institutions was identical to the experience 
of the earlier Raiffeisen societies as they did not build up a deposit base. When loans 
were recalled or repaid the societies ceased to operate. Some also experienced similar 
problems to the earlier societies, namely loan renewals and unpunctual repayment of 
loans.  But the case of the ‘fluke societies’ makes us question what the people thought 
these societies were used for. Were they to become bona fide financial institutions, or 
were they a more efficient means of distributing state aid?  Both the DATI and the 
CDB offered short- and medium-term loan programmes in the early twentieth 
century,312 and possibly the large number of loan applications may have induced them 
to outsource the loan distribution to the Raiffeisen societies. 
Figure 6.22  
DATI loans (£) for agricultural purposes, 1901-02 to 1916-17
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Sources: Annual reports of the DATI, 1901-1917. 
 
The DATI gave loans for a number of purposes, the amounts are shown in 
figure 6.21, but for small-term loans the existing government infrastructure would not 
have made such loans feasible and hence the Raiffeisen societies were used to 
distribute funds for short-term loans. Effectively the DATI outsourced the business of 
small loans. 
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The credit co-operatives provided a conduit for government funds to be channelled to 
individuals in rural Ireland who required small loans for various purposes. Credit co-
operatives made issuing such small loans feasible, as issuing small loans to 
individuals on such a scale would not have been practical for a centrally organised 
body. The credit co-operatives enabled individuals to self-select themselves so that 
the loans were given to those who believed they required them, rather than giving 
loans for the sake of giving loans. 
It is worth noting that of the government funds lent to credit co-operatives most 
were repaid. Smith-Gordon and Laurence claimed that: 
 
The whole sums outstanding, with the exception of a few small loans, have been already 
repaid. The net loss to the Department on the fifteen years’ experience was £91, or less 
than one year’s interest. The C.D.B. has been even more fortunate, having lost practically 
nothing. These facts form a remarkable testimony to the honesty of the much-abused 
small farmer.313 
 
This statement is supported by the DATI annual report for 1918 which stated 
that all outstanding loans had been repaid.314 In the life-span of the DATI loan scheme 
only three loans, totalling £150 out of £18,000 (0.83%), were written off as 
irrecoverable.315 This could be viewed as positive evidence of the monitoring system 
incorporated by the credit co-operatives and perhaps vindicate the view propagated by 
Henry Wolff in regards to the bank’s safety. He stated that: 
 
It has made the banks so safe that leaders of the movement make it their boast that under 
it never has a penny been lost, which is true to this extent, that, so far as facts are known, 
never has a member had to be called upon to answer to his liability and make good by 
payment a loss sustained by the bank.316 
 
One serious criticism which can be made of the credit co-operatives is that they 
never seriously competed in the savings market. As small localised banking units it 
cannot be believed that they would have been serious contenders to the deposit base 
of the joint stock banks; rather their realistic opponents would have been the POSB. 
The Raiffeisen co-operatives never established themselves as serious challengers to 
the POSB as an alternative mode of savings. There were numerous reasons for this as 
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highlighted above, but the sizeable amounts of Irish deposits which the POSB held in 
its possession were accumulated from all corners of the island. This vast collection of 
deposits was transferred from the communities and invested elsewhere. This can be 
seen as evidence that there was capital available within Ireland which could have been 
used to finance Irish economic development. The credit co-operatives could have 
facilitated such economic development had adequate support been given to them. If 
the credit co-operatives had been given a government guarantee for deposits that they 
held, effectively if the government offered deposit insurance, in the long run this 
would have been a better policy than offering concessional loans to societies.  Smith-
Gordon and Lawrence believed that a 1 per cent transfer of deposits from the 
prevailing institutions could have solved the capital inadequacies of the credit co-
operatives, and of the co-operative movement as a whole. Perhaps more realistically if 
at the very minimum 1 per cent could have been diverted from the POSB to a 
government-backed system of credit co-operation it could have given the Irish people 
a more financially rewarding and economically efficacious return. But the availability 
of concessional government loans meant that the Raiffeisen societies had no incentive 
to mobilise savings.  
The fact that Raiffeisen societies did not establish themselves as long-term 
financial institutions led commentators to believe that co-operative credit would never 
work in the South of Ireland. This view was changed however by the sustainable 
adoption of credit unionism in Ireland. The credit unionists have acknowledged the 
fact that they shared the same principles as the early Raiffeisen societies. For 
example, A. T. Culloty wrote that ‘these agricultural credit societies, or “village 
banks” as they became known, were modelled on the Raiffeisen credit system which 
is the system on which the credit union is based.’317 Credit Unions were first 
established in Canada by Alphonse Desjardins, and subsequently diffused in the 
United States. Ironically, given the role of Henry Wolff in advising the IAOS, it was 
claimed by Wolff that his friend Desjardins had learnt the principle of co-operative 
banking from reading his book. 318 Wolff maintained that the system of credit unions 
was not actually Raiffeisen in nature, but that it was in fact a variant of the Schulze-
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Delitzsch branch of credit co-operation,319 i.e. that credit unions differed from 
Raiffeisen societies in that members were required to purchase shares. 
So given that there is a link between credit unionism and Raiffeisenism, what 
caused the successful adoption of credit unionism? The credit union movement was 
propagated by a group of enthusiasts who did not confine their activities to small 
areas of the country, as was the initial policy of the IAOS. There was greater support 
for credit unions both within communities and from the clergy, with the Rev Lucey 
being an example of this clerical support.  Credit unions when first introduced were 
also constrained by the existing legal structure, but successful lobbying overcame 
these constraints and a designated credit union act was formulated. Coincidentally this 
act allowed credit unions to have the benefit of the Industrial and Provident Societies 
Act that was discussed above.320 The credit unions were limited liability societies and 
their main source of capital came from member savings. Noticeably the credit unions 
were not started with the promise of concessional loans from government bodies. 
Admittedly shifts in social attitudes enabled the credit unions to develop, most 
noticeably the role of the clergy in the movement, but the concentrated emphasis on 
credit unions and not a general emphasis on multiple forms of co-operation gave 
potential adaptors better information. It seems that first hand accounts from foreign 
credit unions helped to spread information and induce adoption. Credit union 
members from the United States and Canada gave media interviews and speeches 
about the benefits of membership in a credit union. So credit unionism was not an 
abstract concept. The credit union movement was also broader; it encompassed 
different socio-economic groups. This is in contrast to the IAOS who specifically 
targeted the Raiffeisen societies at low-income farmers/labourers in the west of 
Ireland. The credit union movement was also both urban and rural in outlook and 
there was a greater dispersion of societies across the island, something which the 
Raiffeisen societies never achieved. In the words of John Hume, ‘it is a matter of fact 
to describe the credit union movement as the most successful co-operative movement 
in the history of Ireland.’321 
Horace Plunkett, when discussing a paper on Agricultural banks in 1896, said 
that it was ‘his own experience in introducing co-operative enterprises of various 
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kinds in Ireland that, although imitation from the continent was extremely helpful, at 
the same time exact and servile imitation was in practice most misleading and tended 
to barren results.’322 From the experience of the Raiffeisen societies in Ireland it 
would seem as though he did not heed his own warning. 
The key question to ask is whether or not there was a market failure in Irish 
credit markets, and if so, what could have been done to solve this. The evidence 
suggests that market failures were not present; this is evident if we look at the 
question in terms of competition. Interest rates were not excessive, and credit was 
accessible. The German model of Raiffeisen societies may have been more efficient 
in terms of establishing agricultural lending mechanisms. But these were difficult to 
introduce in Ireland based solely on the fact that there was an existing financial 
structure in place, and this financial structure was reasonably competitive. In terms of 
German Raiffeisen societies, they were not just credit institutions, they were also 
savings institutions and the Irish market was already well served with savings 
institutions. Given that it was shown in chapter 4 that savings banks were subsidised, 
this brought two government policies to subsidise financial institutions into conflict. It 
must not be forgotten that people, even to this day,323 rarely switch bank accounts, so 
the pre-existing savings market made it almost impossible for the Raiffeisen banks to 
establish themselves. 
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7 State funded land purchase 1870-1909 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The ‘land question’, a name given to problems associated with the land ownership 
structure in Ireland, emerged as a central issue in Irish politics and political economy 
in the late nineteenth century, with various attempts made to ameliorate and solve it.  
The ‘land question’ is something which has attained significance in the wider Irish 
historiography; it is seen as key component in the development of Irish national and 
political identity.1 A number of perceived solutions to the ‘land question’ saw the 
direct involvement of the state in landlord-tenant contractual relationships; also the 
introduction of long-term state-funded lending schemes. In fact the ‘land question’ is 
an illustration of the high level of government involvement in the Irish economy and 
it indicates the extent to which Irish agricultural development was influenced by 
dirigisme.  
There are two aspects of government land policy which are significant to this 
thesis. Firstly, state land policy aimed to redistribute agricultural income from 
landlords to tenants.2 Under the 1881 land act the state became an, arguably biased, 
arbitrator in landlord-tenant contracts and universally reduced rents paid by tenants. In 
terms of this thesis, the income effects of land policy are significant as they were in 
effect an alternative to microcredit programmes, and may in fact have stimulated 
demand for savings services.  Secondly, state land policy shifted to the provision of 
loans to tenants to purchase their holdings and, from 1870 onwards,3 the state played 
an active role as a mortgage provider to the agricultural sector of the Irish economy.  
The state provision of long-term loans was a novel introduction to the Irish 
financial sector. State intermediation enabled both tenant farmers to purchase their 
holdings and landlords to sell their estates. During the period 1870 to 1914 the policy 
of land purchase was gradually made more accessible, with the aim of encouraging 
the transfer of ownership from landlords to tenants. The increasing accessibility of the 
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state land purchase schemes places them within the remit of a study of microfinance, 
as the loans were provided to small- and medium-sized borrowers of amounts and 
loan terms which could not have been provided within the existing financial structure. 
The existing financial structure, namely the lending institutions heretofore described 
in this thesis, did not have the capacity to make long-term loans as their lending 
methodology was secured by sureties, rather than by land which was the case with the 
state-funded land purchase schemes. Also, in the case of the microfinance institutions 
outlined in chapters 1 and 6, they were constrained by legally imposed lending 
ceilings. Put simply, prior to state entry into the mortgage market there was not a 
similar large-scale mortgage lender in the Irish market.  
The primary focus of this chapter is to analyse the government policy of land 
purchase. The chapter will examine the complexities of the state mortgages from 
different perspectives. These will include analysing the state’s lending contract, and 
its mechanisms for screening and monitoring loans. The chapter will make 
comparisons between state mortgages and the loan contracts offered by existing 
financial intermediary institutions to illustrate how the state was the sole agent that 
could have performed such a function.  
The chapter will consider the hugely significant question as to whether these 
loans, although politically expedient, were economically desirable. This will be done 
by analysing the structure of the Irish agricultural sector, in terms of trends in land 
distribution, land ownership, and agricultural output. It will also analyse land 
purchase policy before the institution of a general land purchase policy in 1903. The 
chapter will argue that the land purchase policy led to the subsidisation of the entire 
Irish agricultural sector, and that the concentration on land purchase as a solution to 
the ‘land question’ led to more effective alternative policies being either completely 
overlooked or given insufficient support. The chapter will argue that structural 
problems, namely the high proportion of small farms, were a more significant factor 
than the concentration of land ownership, and that a policy of ownership transfers did 
not address these immediate structural problems. The chapter will conclude by 
questioning the role of the state in the economy, firstly, by assessing land purchase as 
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a form of state banking as outlined by Verdier,4 and secondly, based on the criteria 
raised by Gerschenkron.5  
 
7.1 The origins of Government land policy: the 1870 Land Act, agricultural 
depression, and the ‘land war’  
 
There was prominent government intervention in the area of land law, and in 
particular landlord tenant contractual relations in the period 1870 to 1909. During the 
period of study, there were two significant acts passed in 1869 and 1870 which set 
precedents, in terms of land purchase, for subsequent legislation. The Irish Church 
Act was primarily an act which disestablished the Church of Ireland as a state-
sponsored church in Ireland, but clauses in the act enabled tenants on church lands to 
purchase their holdings through a state-financed mortgage.6 This was followed by the 
1870 land act, which also included land purchase clauses, whereby the state would 
advance money for the purchase of a tenant’s holding.7 Neither of these acts had a 
high uptake in terms of land purchase, and of the two the 1869 act saw the greater 
number of tenant purchases.8 
Admittedly, the primary purpose of the 1870 land act was not to introduce land 
purchase schemes; this was an afterthought included in the Act.9 The primary aim of 
the act was to reform the existing law governing landlord tenant contracts. The 1870 
land act is most commonly associated with the Liberal Prime Minister William 
Gladstone, who is cited as saying that ‘his mission was to pacify Ireland’.10 The initial 
reasoning behind the 1870 land act was due to a perception that agricultural 
investment was impeded by inadequate definition of property rights in Ireland. The 
case of the prosperity of farms in the northern counties of Ulster was used as an 
example of the benefits of reform, as it was believed that Ulster’s prosperity was 
caused by what was known as the ‘Ulster custom’. The Ulster custom consisted of 
what were known as the ‘three F’s’. Guinnane and Miller referred to the ‘three F’s’ 
as: 
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 Barbara Lewis Solow, The Land question and the Irish economy, 1870-1903 (Harvard, 1971), p. 16. 
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“Fixity of tenure” or the right to remain on a holding so long as rent was paid; the right to 
pay a “fair” rent; and the right to “free sale” of the tenant’s interest or tenant right when a 
tenancy changed hands. Fixity of tenure amounted to an informal, perpetual lease. Fair 
rent meant to Irish peasants a rent less than the “rack” rent: a rent at which a holding 
would let should the landlord solicit bids on an open market.11 
 
There was a common impression that the perceived prosperity of Ulster 
farming, small tillage farming, was based on the ‘Ulster custom’. But Vaughan has 
suggested that this prosperity in Ulster may in fact have been a flax boom, as flax was 
a cash-crop used at the time. Vaughan has suggested that perhaps contemporaries 
were not able to distinguish between this flax boom and the customs prevailing in 
Ulster.12 Support for Vaughan’s argument comes from the general report of the 1871 
census where it was stated that: 
Unless where grain is used for distillation, Irish agriculture outside the province of Ulster 
can scarcely be regarded as contributory to manufactures. In that province, however, 
throughout almost its entire extent, the cultivation of flax is connected with the one 
manufacture – that of linen - deserving to be called great. The remarkable growth of 
Belfast in population and extent, and the relatively considerable growth of other towns in 
the northern province, are attributable to the development of this particular manufacture, 
steadily and regularly progressive, during a long series of years, but expanded during the 
first half of the decade (1861-71), with a suddenness tending already to a contraction, 
which it is to be hoped may prove more gradual.13 
 
The 1870 Land Act was an attempt to give formal legal recognition to informal 
traditional customs in Ulster. One of the main bases of the acts was that the tenancy 
system in Ireland was an impediment to agricultural investment. The assumption was 
that tenants were unwilling to invest in agricultural improvements because of a fear 
that such investment would lead to an increase in rents or arbitrary eviction. Solow 
and Vaughan have argued that this scenario did not exist, and that tenancies were 
relatively secure before the 1880s.14 The evidence on evictions used in chapter 3 of 
this thesis also suggests that there was a low probability of eviction in post-famine 
Ireland. Solow summarised the situation by stating that: 
…If Ireland’s economic difficulties were traceable to defects in tenure arrangements, the 
Land Act of 1870 was soundly conceived and well drafted. It was well designed to cure 
the evils it assumed. It would work to deter eviction and deter landlords from raising 
rents on tenant improvements. But if its assumptions were wrong, it could not hope to 
play a major role in improving the economic condition of Ireland. Its success rested 
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squarely on the historical facts about the frequency of evictions, the course of rents, and 
the nature of investment incentives.15  
 
One of the consequences of the 1870 Land Act was an increase in government 
intervention in the agricultural economy in Ireland, and the reduction of landlord 
property rights. The continued intervention by the state in subsequent land legislation 
led to a debasement of the position of landlord, and landlords were eager to abandon 
their role. 
The initial encroachment of the state in landlord-tenant relations in 1870 pre-
dated two significant events. One was a very bad harvest in the late 1870s,16 and the 
second was the new world ‘grain invasion’.17 An illustration of the ‘grain invasion’ is 
seen in figure 7.1, which is a graph of UK wheat imports from 1860 to 1905.  
The economic problems facing Irish agriculture in the late 1870s were not 
unique to Ireland, but common across Europe. The increase in grain exports from 
granaries in the new world competed with traditional agricultural producers. A 
number of countries responded by placing tariffs on grain imports, notably France and 
Germany.18 Other countries continued free trade policies. Of these, the two most 
important from a comparative perspective were the UK and Denmark.  
Figure 7.1  
UK wheat imports 1860 to 1905
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, British historical statistics (Cambridge, 1988). 
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Following the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s, the UK had implemented a free 
trade policy in agricultural produce. The UK had specialised in industrial production 
in the nineteenth century, and was increasingly reliant on foreign imports for its food 
supplies. The immediate beneficiaries of a free trade policy in the UK were the 
inhabitants of urban centres who required cheap supplies of food. Ireland, as a 
constituent member of the UK, also followed this free trade policy. There were 
objections to free trade in Ireland and calls for tariffs were raised,19 but these went 
unheeded as they went against the economic interests of the UK as a whole. It is also 
interesting to note that when the Irish Free State was established in 1921 the 
agricultural sector was in favour of free trade with the UK.20 The impression therefore 
was that protection from the foreign competition in UK markets would have been 
welcome, whereas protected Irish domestic markets were not required as Irish 
agriculture was export-orientated.  
The combination of bad harvests in 1877, caused by continuous heavy rainfall,21 
and an increase in international competition meant that Irish agricultural producers 
experienced a reduction in income from farming. The response to events in Ireland 
came in the form of social agitation which resulted in a ‘land war’. Subsequent land 
acts were part of a deliberate government policy to pacify the social agitation; 
therefore it can be seen as a form of social policy. 
Denmark also continued a free trade policy in the wake of the grain invasion 
and concentrated on productive reforms in its agricultural sector. As Denmark had 
previously been a grain exporter to the UK, it shifted into other areas of production. 
The Danes developed co-operative methods of agricultural production, specialising in 
co-operative creameries, enabling them to export high-quality standardised butter, and 
co-operative pig curing stations enabling them to export bacon of a higher quality. 
Danish co-operative marketing and organisation also developed in the 1880s as a 
response to international competition.22 The significance of both British and Danish 
actions was that Ireland did not have the luxury of agricultural protection, and it was 
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faced with a more productive competitor that began competing in traditional Irish 
export markets. It must be highlighted that Irish agriculture did receive some non-
tariff protection in the form of infectious disease control, something which hindered 
the importation of livestock from countries outside the UK.23 As Ireland was a 
constituent member of the UK it participated in this common UK policy, but it was 
largely exempt from the regulations on livestock that affected foreign exporters.24 
The social and economic responses in Ireland and Denmark to the changing 
economic climate are worthy of comment. In Denmark co-operative production 
developed on a mass scale. This involved the combination of numerous economic 
agents to reduce costs in agricultural production. The Irish response was also the 
combination and cooperation of numerous economic agents, but with the intention 
reducing rents and of acquiring their own landholding. The Land League was 
attractive to many in Irish society as it promised a reduction in rents and aimed to 
achieve owner occupancy of farms. The supporters of the Land League, it seems, saw, 
or believed, that the payment of rent was the root cause of their problems. The ‘land 
war’ was an attack on landlordism, but this does not seem to be where the problems 
circa 1880 lay.  
Irish historiography is somewhat divided on the issue regarding landlord-tenant 
relations. The traditional view was a scenario of heroes and villain history, with 
tenants portrayed as the heroes fighting rapacious landlords. This has led to a series of 
revisionist interpretations of landlord-tenant relations which argued that the 
relationship between landlords and tenants was not as malevolent as popularly 
supposed. A number of historical works which have been cited heretofore in this 
thesis fall into this ‘revisionist’ school.25 In response came a ‘second revision’26 
which aimed to question the findings of the first revision and redirect scholarship to a 
path closer to the traditional view of malevolent landlordism, or to show that the 
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landlords were not ‘genial all-the-year-round embodiments of Santa Claus himself’.27 
But the effectiveness of this ‘second revision’ is undermined by the cross-referencing 
of these revisionists. For example, Turner has cited Hoppen’s earlier work to support 
his views,28 while Hoppen’s later work in turn cited Turner (who had originally cited 
Hoppen) to re-support himself.29 The main gripe of the ‘second revision’ appears to 
be the estimations of agricultural output in the post-famine period and the distribution 
of this increase between landlord and tenant. Hoppen does not seem to refer to the fact 
that the majority of the original ‘revisionist’ research was based on both archival 
material, whereby data were generated from surviving estate records, and official 
records. The work of Turner does not suggest that such archival research was 
undertaken, and this is something which lends support to the case of the original 
‘revisionists’. This thesis has unintentionally sided with the revisionist view by 
presenting evidence in chapter 3 to suggest that evictions in the post-famine period 
were not as prevalent as made out to be, something which implies that landlords were 
not as rapacious and as malevolent as they are traditionally portrayed. The evidence 
from Solow, Donnelly and Vaughan indicates that rents were not as high as 
commonly regarded, nor were evictions as prevalent as made out to be. 30   
Under the auspices of the initial Land League - an umbrella coalition of interests 
groups - protests started in the west, in Mayo, and then spread across the island. The 
reason the protests started in the west was that this was an area comprised of small 
subsistence farming that was directly affected by the fall in tillage prices. The 
significance of the ‘grain invasion’ in the story of the ‘land war’ is that when there 
was a bad harvest in 1877 agricultural prices did not increase due to a decrease in 
domestic supply, but instead were internationally determined. The protests spread as 
other sectors of the economy were adversely affected by the bad weather conditions. 
Economic interests coincided and colluded to make the league economically and 
politically effective.31 The economic conditions would have been worse in the western 
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counties, and were not indicative of the experience of the rest of the island. The ‘land 
war’ inspired a social and economic mobilisation similar to what would be required 
for a co-operative movement, but it was directed towards land reform, or rather rent 
reductions and land purchase. Horace Plunkett, the founder of the co-operative 
movement in Ireland, saw the relation between the Land League and co-operation in 
Ireland. According to his biographer, Plunkett was aware that: 
The Land League had given the people insight into the power of combination and had 
educated them in the conduct of meetings; but little progress could be made by the Irish 
farmer acting alone, harassed as he was, first by cheaper production from vast tracts of 
soil in the uttermost parts of the earth, and second by a nearer and keener competition 
from the better organised and educated producers on the Continent.32 
 
The immediate response of the government to the Land League agitation was to 
introduce new land law legislation.33 The 1881 Land Act was essentially a rent control 
act, with a Land Commission established by the act to mediate in landlord-tenant 
contractual disputes. The aim of the act was to grant the tenants a ‘fair rent’, but the 
policy seems to have been to reduce rents regardless of their level. Initially the act had 
not extended to leaseholders or tenants in arrears, but thanks to the Arrears of Rent 
Act and the so-called Kilmainham Treaty, both groups received the benefits of the 
1881 Land Act.  The result of the ‘land war’ was the decline of landlordism in Ireland 
through the introduction of state land purchase schemes. The goal of land ownership 
was one common to many in Irish society, regardless of land quality. Comerford 
stated that: 
The land war underlined the extent to which the ‘farming ideal’ had taken hold of society 
over much of the island. The model of the independent farm was cherished not only by 
those who benefited from such an amenity, but also by those who had uneconomic 
holdings and by landless labourers – the latter a large element in many land meetings.34   
 
This ‘ideal’ was solidified by the extension of land purchase to the masses.  The 
1881 Land Act attempted to reduce the pressure on the farming sector by establishing 
courts to judicially review landlord-tenant relations and reduce rents. A further act in 
1882 legitimised rent strikes which had been used as a weapon during the ‘land war’. 
Arrears of rent were to be met by the state,35 with funds coming from the Irish Church 
Temporalities fund,36 which arose from the surplus proceeds of the sale of church 
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 Trevor West, Horace Plunkett; cooperation and politics (Washington D.C., 1986), p. 21. 
33Land law (Ireland) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict.) c. 49.  
34
 R. V. Comerford, The Fenians in context: Irish politics and society 1848-82 (Dublin, 1998 edition), 
p. 247. 
35
 Arrears of Rent (Ireland) Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict.) c. 47. 
36
 Arrears of Rent (Ireland) Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict.) c. 47, section 8. 
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lands under the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland act, cited above. One of the 
most significant aspects of the 1881 act was that it brought land purchase schemes to 
greater prominence than under the previous legislation. Subsequent legislation was 
specifically designed to encourage the greater transfer of ownership from landlords to 
their tenants, and this is immediately noticeable from the titles of the legislation which 
began to be called land purchase acts. The institution created under the 1881 land act 
to mediate rent disputes, the Land Commission, was transformed into an institution 
that supervised the sale of land. The Land Commission was to continue its existence 
in independent Ireland, with a bill for its dissolution only passed into law in 1999.37  
It is interesting to note that at the same time as facilities were provided for the 
purchase of land from landlords, with purchase prices set at a number of years rent, 
the state was interfering with landlord-tenant contractual relations by judicially 
reducing rents. This is perhaps why land purchase schemes failed to attract much 
support in their initial phases; judicial rent reductions may have been seen as less 
costly than the terms of land purchase schemes discussed below. Future land 
purchases saw tenants purchase their holdings with the purchase price set in terms of 
judicially reduced rents.  
 
7.2 Government land purchase schemes 
A number of acts were passed between 1870 and 1925 which enabled tenants to 
purchase their holdings in Ireland.38 Table 7.1 contains a summary of the various acts 
passed that related to land purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Terence Dooley, ‘The land for the people’: the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004), 
p. 199. 
38
 There were a number of Land Acts passed by governments of the Free State and Republic, but these 
have not been included in table 7.1 as they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Table 7.1: Land purchase acts; 1869-1925 
Act Year 
Irish Church Act 1869 
Landlord and Tenant Acts 1870 and 1872 
Land Law (Ireland) Acts 1881 
Land Purchase Act 1885 
Land Law (Ireland) Act 1887 
Land Purchase Acts 1888,1889, and 1891 
Land Law (Ireland) Act 1896 
Land Purchase Acts 1901 
Irish Land Act 1903 
Evicted Tenants Act 1907 
Irish Land Act 1909 
Land Act 1923 
Land Bond act 1925 
 
Sources: W. F. Bailey, The Irish land acts: a short sketch of their history and development (Dublin, 
1917), and Joseph Thomas Sheehan, ‘Land purchase policy in Ireland, 1917-23: from the Irish 
convention to the 1923 land act’ (M. A. Thesis, National University of Ireland, St. Patrick’s College, 
Maynooth, August 1993).  
 
 
There were also a number of Acts which provided loans for buildings and permanent 
improvements on holdings. These are listed in table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Acts providing credit for buildings and permanent improvements or 
for other facilities 
 
Acts Years 
The Congested Districts Board Acts 1891, 1893, 1894, 1899, and 1901 
Public Works Loans Act 1892, section 4 
Land Act 1896, part IV 
Land Act 1903 part II 
Land Act 1909 part III 
Land Law (Commission) Act 1923 
Labourers Acts 1883 to 1919 
 
Sources: W. F. Bailey, The Irish land acts: a short sketch of their history and development (Dublin, 
1917), and Joseph Thomas Sheehan, ‘Land purchase policy in Ireland, 1917-23: from the Irish 
convention to the 1923 land act’ (M. A. Thesis, National University of Ireland, St. Patrick’s College, 
Maynooth, August 1993). 
 
Table 7.2 is interesting as it illustrates the various public bodies that provided 
credit facilities. In terms of long-term investment the Board of Public Works was the 
supplier of finance for the purpose of drainage, something that was seen as 
synonymous with long-term, or permanent, investment in nineteenth century Irish 
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agriculture.39 Drainage loans were operated by the Board of Public Works from 1842. 
In the period 1842 to 1913 loans to the total of £2,917,106 were made by the Board of 
Public Works for the purpose of arterial drainage. Of this sum 71.37 per cent was lent 
during the period 1842 to 1863.40  It was stated in the 1914 report on agricultural 
credit in Ireland that ‘in recent years the advances made by the Commissioners of 
Public Works to farmers for the purpose of drainage have become practically 
negligible as compared with the real needs of the country in this respect’.41 Drainage 
loans were to be increasingly unlikely given the trend in diffusion of land ownership, 
as investment in drainage was cost-effective when implemented on a large scale. 
Buildings were also another investment associated with long-term investment in 
Ireland.  By 1914, 43,702 cottages were provided under the labourers acts shown in 
table 7.2 and interestingly, of these, 39.34 per cent were in arrears of rent.42 The 
primary focus of this chapter is on land purchase schemes, but it is interesting to 
highlight that the main sources of credit for long-term ‘investment’ projects also came 
from public institutions. This may suggest that there were crowding-out effects, but 
also that the returns to such long-term, or what contemporaries called permanent 
investment, were negligible if not negative.  
This chapter will focus on the land purchase schemes in the period 1870 to 
1921. The reason for this is that it is within the scope of this thesis, but also happened 
to be when the majority of sales took place. From 1881 onwards the state land 
purchase schemes were conducted by the Land Commission. There were two other 
bodies established that catered to land purchase, the Congested Districts Board (CDB) 
established by the 1891 Land Act and the Estates Commissioners established by the 
1903 Land Act. Both of these bodies were subsequently merged with the Land 
Commission in the period of independence. In Northern Ireland the affairs of the Land 
Commission were undertaken by the Land Purchase Commission, Northern Ireland, 
until the body was wound up in 1935 when its functions were transferred to other 
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 Barbara Lewis Solow, The Land question and the Irish economy, 1870-1903 (Harvard, 1971), p. 78. 
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 Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, paragraph 656, p. 279. [Cd. 
7375], H.C. 1914, xiii, 1. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Return showing the number of Cottages and allotments provided by each district council, the rents 
reserved, the cottages and allotments unoccupied, the rent in arrears, the number of cottages applied 
for, applications for extra land, applications sanctioned, the cost, and the number of advances made to 
Agricultural Labourers up to 31st March, 1914 (in continuation of No. 232 of 1908), H.C. 1914, (276), 
lxv, 539. 
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government bodies.43 Dooley discusses land purchase policy in ‘independent 
Ireland’,44 but a criticism of this work is that it does not make reference to land 
purchase policy and land policy in the North of Ireland. The split in North and South 
provides us with natural experiment to see whether there were different long-run 
effects of land policy in both regions, and also to see whether continued state 
interference in agricultural production, á la the 26 counties, was replicated in the 
North. But such concerns are beyond the scope of this current work. 
Table 7.3 is a breakdown of a number of land purchase acts from 1869 to 1909 
into land purchase contracts, based on the percentage of the purchase price issued, 
loan term, and interest rate. 
 
Table 7.3: Initial land purchase contracts for buyers 
 
Year Percentage of 
mortgagea 
Loan term –
(Annuity 
repayment)b 
Interest 
Ratesd 
Issue of 
land 
stocke 
Limit 
1869 75% 32 years (64 
half yearly 
repayments) 
4% No - 
1870 66% 35 years 5% No - 
1881 75% 35 years 5% No - 
1885 100% 49 years 4% No - 
1891 100% 49years 4% Yes - 
1896 100% Decadal 
reductions c 
4% Yes - 
1903 100% 68.5 years 3.25% Yes £1,000 
1909 100% 66 years 3.5% Yes £3,000 
 
a- Refers to the percentage of the agreed purchase price which the state would advance under the 
act. 
b- Loan terms were estimated by contemporaries based on the expected performance of sinking 
funds. 
c- The 1896 land act introduced the concept of decadal reductions on the repayment of annuities.  
d- Interest that borrowers were charged included interest, and a sinking fund rate charge. Interest 
here refers to both 
e- Land stock refers to issue of land stock either as a means of payment, or as a means to raise 
cash on open markets, or both. 
 
 
 
Sources: Irish Church Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict.) c. 42, section 52. 
Landlord and tenant (Ireland) act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict.) c. 46, part II, section 44. 
Land law (Ireland) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict.) c. 49, part V, sections  24 and 28. 
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 Northern Ireland Land Purchase (Winding Up) Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. 5.), c. 21. 
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 Terrence Dooley, ‘The land for the people’: the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004). 
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Purchase of land (Ireland) Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict.) c. 73, sections 2 and 4. 
Purchase of land (Ireland) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict.) c. 48, sections 1, 7, 9.  
Land law (Ireland) Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict.) c. 47, part iii, sections 1 and 25. 
Irish land act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.) c. 37, sections 45, 46 and 53. 
Irish land act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7.) c. 42, sections 1 and 15. 
W. F. Bailey, The Irish land acts: a short sketch of their history and development (Dublin, 1917), and 
Joseph Thomas Sheehan, ‘Land purchase policy in Ireland, 1917-23: from the Irish convention to the 
1923 land act’ (MA thesis, National University of Ireland, St.Patrick’s College, Maynooth, August 
1993). 
 
As can be seen from table 7.3, there was an increase in the percentage of the mortgage 
which the state was willing to provide. The term mortgage is used because loans were 
secured on land, and if a borrower defaulted the land would be foreclosed. The term 
mortgage was also used in 1908 by R. A. Walker, a lecturer in land law in Dublin 
University, in lectures he gave to the Institute of Bankers on land as security in 
Ireland. Walker stated that ‘the money is secured by what is practically a first 
mortgage of the tenant’s holding, with a provision for re-payment of the debt by 
instalments’.45 Initially, under the 1869 to 1881 acts, the state did not finance the 
entire purchase price, and it was up to the tenant to raise the necessary residual 
capital. This could be done by the tenants either by using savings or borrowing, or by 
selling their assets, but it appears that only the wealthier tenants were able to take 
advantage of this facility.  
From 1885 onwards government support of land purchase was more prominent, 
and this can be seen in the increase in the percentage of the mortgage which the state 
advanced to tenants. Government bodies from 1885 onwards were issuing loans worth 
100 per cent of the purchase price of a given holding. This is significant as it no 
longer excluded tenants who had insufficient assets to raise additional capital, and the 
state was made the primary mortgagee on the land. Stipulations in the acts restricted 
the amount that other mortgages, from private mortgage lenders, could be charged on 
the land. The 1903 land act stated that: 
The proprietor of the holding shall not, without the consent of the Land Commission, 
mortgage or charge the holding, or any part thereof, for any sum or sums exceeding in 
the aggregate ten times the amount of the purchase annuity payable in respect of the 
holding or part upon the making of the advance, and every instrument of mortgage or 
charge on a holding or part thereof, by which the holding or part is charged with any 
larger sum, shall be null and void as to the excess. Where part of a holding is mortgaged 
or charged, the Land Commission shall, for the purpose of this enactment, estimate the 
amount of the purchase annuity payable in respect of that part. The consent of the Land 
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 R. A. Walker, ‘Irish land as security, parts i’ in Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Ireland, x, nos. 
1, 3 and 4 (April, July, and October, 1908), p. 140. 
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Commission under this enactment may, in the case of a charge created by a will, be given 
at any time, whether before or after the death of the testator.46 
 
The increase in the percentage of the loans advanced was also coupled with 
increasing loan terms. The initial loan terms were for 32 years, but the later acts 
approximately doubled this loan term. The 1903 and 1909 acts issued loans on terms 
of 68.5 and 66 years. To put this in perspective figure 7.2 shows the population in 
Ireland in 1901, the closest census year to the 1903 act, by age cohort. 
 
Figure 7.2  
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Source: Census of Ireland, 1901. 
 
Assuming that the majority of tenant purchasers would have been in the age 
cohort groupings from 35 onwards it is very likely that the loan term would have been 
greater than their life expectancy. So, under this assumption, the average tenant 
purchaser would not have seen the loan term through to its conclusion, and would 
have bequeathed the farm to the next generation.47 Mortgages taken on by this group 
for terms of 68.5 and 66 years would have essentially meant that these loans were 
inter-generational loans. If we compare this to the other lending institutions discussed 
heretofore in this thesis we can appreciate the significance of the loan terms. The 
lending models of the loan funds, joint stock banks and Raiffeisen societies were 
                                                 
46
 Irish land act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7.) c. 37, section 54, sub-section 2. 
47
 For a discussion on intergenerational inheritance see: Timothy W. Guinanne, The vanishing Irish: 
households, migration, and the rural economy in Ireland 1850- 1914 (New Jersey, 1997), pp 146-151. 
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based on personal security. Given the probability, or fear, of death of one of the 
participants in the lending procedure, this restricted the term for which a personal loan 
could be secured. In a recent document on agricultural risk, the European Commission 
outlined a number of risks associated with agriculture: human or personal risks, assets 
risks, production or yield risks, price risk, institutional risk, and financial risks.48 The 
report also stated that ‘the various risks are often interrelated’.49 Therefore, the longer 
a loan term the more exposed a lender would be to any number of risks associated 
with agricultural production. The private market may have been able to provide some 
sort of mortgage lending facility, but at a much lesser extent and not on such lengthy 
loan terms. 
The interest rates are also worthy of comment. The rates charged to buyers in 
1869 to 1896 were reasonably high and at competitive market levels. Evidence on 
private mortgages in the early twentieth century suggests that rates charged for 
mortgages were at 4 to 10 per cent and were repaid in lump sums.50 Comparing the 
rates charged under the acts with long- and short-term interest rates for the period 
1861 to 1920 puts the land purchase schemes into perspective. Figure 7.3 illustrates 
the trend in long- and short-term interest rates in the UK from 1861 to 1920. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
48
 European Commission Agriculture Directorate-General, ‘Risk management tools for EU agriculture 
with a special focus on insurance’, working document January 2001, pp 12- 13. 
49
 Ibid, p. 13. 
50
 Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, paragraph 823, p. 357. [Cd. 
7375], H.C. 1914, xiii, 1. 
 161 
Figure 7.3  
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Notes: EstCon=Estimated Consol yield; BofE%=Bank of England discount rate; Open %=Open market 
rate; Other variables refer to the interest rates prevailing at time of acts cited in table 7.3. 
 
Sources: Bank of England discount rate and open market discount rate in Sidney Homer and Richard 
Sylla, A history of interest rates (4th ed. New Jersey, 2005).  
Estimated consol yield, 1850-1914 in Jan Tore Klovland, ‘Pitfalls in the estimation of the yield on 
British Consols, 1850-1914’ in The Journal of Economic History, liv, no. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 164-187. 
Consol yields from 1914-1920 have been estimated from data in Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla. 
 
   
The long-term interest rates are represented by Consol yields, and short-term interest 
rates are represented by the Bank of England discount rate and the open market 
discount rate. Although there were some discrepancies between the short-term interest 
rates in Ireland and Great Britain, the various banking companies in Ireland were 
prone to follow rates set by the Bank of England, as was illustrated in chapter 3, so 
monetary conditions in Ireland would not have been too dissimilar. Also a number of 
the Irish joint stock banks had their headquarters in London and operated branches in 
London.51 So it is not implausible that the UK discount rates would have been 
representative for Ireland. The long-term interest rates in Ireland would have been 
represented by the yields on Consols. Prior to the Act of Union the public finances of 
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 Both the Provincial Bank and the National Bank had their headquarters in London, and both were 
large branch banking institutions in Ireland. 
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Ireland and Great Britain operated on a separate basis.52 This situation was altered by 
the Union. The public finances of Britain and Ireland were merged and so too were 
the Irish and British national debts.53 Therefore UK consol yields would have been the 
barometer for long term interest rates in Ireland.  
The nineteenth century in the UK was a period of falling long term interest rates 
with a plateau reached in 1897. Thereafter long-term rates began rising, and they rose 
considerably as a result of the Boer war. The condition of the purchasers under the 
later acts should be seen in this perspective; they were the beneficiaries of 
concessional interest rates received on more favourable terms than purchasers under 
the previous acts. The differential between the rates paid and prevailing long-term 
interest rates decreased under the various acts. As the long-term rates increased during 
the war, the fixed interest rates paid by those purchasing under the 1903 and 1909 acts 
looked more attractive because the borrowers were paying rates less than the market 
rates. In terms of private mortgage lenders, their actions would have been much more 
constrained by market rates than those of government lenders. This is because their 
sources of capital, mainly deposits in the case of joint stock banks, would have been 
responsive to interest rate variability. 
The issue of stock and loan limits was included in table 7.3 to emphasise the 
accessibility of the schemes. From 1891 to 1909, the acts were financed by the issue 
of government-guaranteed land bonds. It is worth emphasising that these loans were 
not financed out of UK exchequer funds, but were raised in the open market by 
government-backed bonds. John Edward Vernon, a governor of the Bank of Ireland, 
was one of the first people to suggest that the government raise money for land 
purchase through the issue of government-backed bonds.54 Vernon viewed the fact 
that there was a large amount of money held on deposit in the joint stock banks as 
evidence ‘that there is an element of wealth there which might be tapped and applied 
to the purposes of the Land Commission’.55 When he was asked ‘What do you 
consider the effect of bonds of that kind would be upon the general state of Ireland, if 
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 F. G. Hall, The Bank of Ireland 1783-1943 (Dublin, 1948), p. 115. 
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held by the people of that country?’ he replied: ‘I think the effect would be very 
favourable to the stability of the government, and the peace and order of the 
country’.56 Vernon also suggested that the issuance of land bonds would restore order 
to the countryside as the bonds would ‘connect them with the primary security on 
which they would be charged, viz. the land itself, that is, the land sold to the 
occupiers’.57 This policy of issuing bonds, secured by land, to fund agricultural 
mortgages is something which is very similar to the Prussian practice of Landschaften 
mortgage co-operatives, referred to in chapter 6. Such a means of raising funds to 
finance mortgage lending was not an option to the private market in Ireland, and as 
such capital would have to be raised elsewhere. 
As is shown in table 7.3, the land purchase schemes began to issue bonds to 
fund payments in 1891. The initial bonds were issued with a coupon rate of 2 ¾ per 
cent,58 but this was increased to 3 per cent under the 1909 act.59 The issue of 
guaranteed land bonds enabled funds to be raised to finance land purchase. Under the 
1891 and 1896 acts, vendors (landlords) were paid only in government-guaranteed 
land stock.60 Landlords could then sell these bonds if they needed cash forthwith, or 
retain the bonds and receive a 2 ¾ per cent dividend on the stock. This was a very 
attractive offer to landlords in the late 1890s, because guaranteed land stock seems to 
have been regarded as equivalent to Consols61 and Consol prices peaked during this 
period. Although a report on the finances of the 1903 land act gave evidence that 
guaranteed land stock was not equivalent to Consols and that the prices diverged,62 
the Consol price is a useful proxy in terms of this discussion as the guaranteed land 
stock seems to have fluctuated in a similar manner as Consols.63 The yields would 
also have been different as the coupon rate on Consols changed from 3 per cent to 2.5 
per cent, whereas the guaranteed land stock was 2 ¾ per cent.   
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Figure 7.4  
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Source: Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A history of interest rates (4th ed. New Jersey, 2005). 
 
The five-year period from 1894 to 1899 saw Consol prices rise above par. This, it 
seems, was due to confusion in the pricing of Consols caused by a revaluation in 
1884, and by increased demand caused by increases in the savings bank limits.64 
Bonn, writing in 1906, referred to the high Consol prices as being one of the reasons 
for the success of land purchase during this period. Landlords receiving payment in 
stock were able to redeem this stock above par, something which was not possible 
after 1900. Bonn stated in 1906 that: 
The fall of Consols of course transformed the premium into a loss and was one of the 
main reasons why land purchase came to a standstill in recent years. To this must 
however be added a multitude of bureaucratic obstacles originating with the Land 
Commission.65  
 
The fault regarding the finance of land purchase outlined by Bonn did not go 
unheeded and the 1903 act allowed vendors to receive payment in cash, which was 
raised through the sale of stock. The de facto ‘premium’ which Bonn refers to in the 
1891 and 1896 acts was included in the 1903 act as a land purchase aid fund, 
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‘bonus’.66 This was a fund of £12,000,000 to be distributed to landlords ostensibly to 
cover legal costs involved in sales, but it has been perceived to be an inducement to 
encourage landlords to sell. The act also allowed landlords to sell their demesnes to 
the Land Commission and repurchase them under the terms in table 7.3,67 essentially 
a soft loan. The loan limits were upper bounds, and Cosgrove showed that these were 
incorporated in the acts in an attempt to stop large graziers availing of the act.68 
It should be noted that the financing of the land purchase by the issue of 
government-backed bonds was not financially sustainable. As can be seen from figure 
7.4, Consols were trading below par after 1900, and each subsequent issue of 
government-backed bonds was sold below par.69 Evidence from the Runciman report 
in 1908 suggests that there was a significant divergence between the Consol price and 
the price for the guaranteed land stock. This seems to have been caused by the amount 
of land stock issued between 1903 and 1908, and the fact that there were no new 
Consol issues after 1902.70 This meant that there was a shortfall in the finances which 
the Runciman report estimated would be around £20 million over the 68.5 years of the 
1903 act, on the assumption that the market prices were constant.71 Deficiencies in 
stock issues were to be met from the Irish development grant, probabte duty grants 
and agricultural grants administered under the 1898 local government act.72 The fact 
that the programme was financially unsustainable effectively meant that the 
purchasers of land under the government land purchase schemes actually received 
their farms under concessional terms, and that the programme therefore needed some 
form of state subsidisation. This subsidisation came via taxes in other areas of the 
economy. 
The second issue, bureaucratic delays, raised by Bonn in the above citation, was 
also prominent under sales which took place under the 1903 act. The Land 
Commission was understaffed and unable to deal with the demand to take advantage 
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of the generous terms offered by the 1903 Land Act. It appears as though the demand 
for land purchase under the 1903 Land Act was underestimated. Initially there were 
not enough funds available to purchase holdings which in turn created a backlog of 
cases; £5,000,000 was made available per annum but the demand exceeded this 
amount.73  
 All factors outlined in table 7.3 show that state mortgages were becoming more 
accessible to borrowers of lower means, and that there were greater inducements 
created for landlords to sell their estates. Land purchase was becoming an irreversible 
policy. Initially all land purchase arrangements were negotiated freely between 
landlords and tenants, but the 1903 Land Act introduced an element of compulsion by 
giving the state the power to force tenants to purchase land.74 Subsequent legislation 
introduced compulsory purchase powers for the agencies of state-funded land 
purchase whereby they had powers to compel landlords to sell their land: this was 
done for the explicit purpose of transferring land ownership. Compulsory purchase of 
land was introduced in 1907 under the Labourers Act75 and the Evicted Tenants Act.76 
Compulsory purchase was extended to wider land purchase policy in 1909 by the 
Land Law Act.77 Compulsory purchase powers were also to be a constant feature of 
the legislation relating to land purchase in independent Ireland in the twentieth 
century.78  
The 1903 Land Act stated that ‘every advance shall be repaid’79 and repayment 
was supposed to be in accordance with the terms outlined in table 7.3 above, but this 
did not turn out to be the case. It is worth highlighting that in the long run tenant 
purchasers in the Irish Free State did not have to fully meet their debt obligations as 
outlined in table 7.3, as the terms of repayment were ‘fundamentally altered’.80  This 
is because the 1933 Land Act permanently reduced all annuity payments by 50 per 
cent and also cleared arrears of defaulting purchasers under the pretext that tenant 
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purchasers were overburdened by their debt.81 This is an interesting angle on the story 
of Irish land purchase which is not often cited. It is also interesting given that the 
contemporary opinion seems to have been hesitant about borrowing funds from 
‘London’. For example, Cosgrove stated that there were: 
…doubts held by some tenants who perhaps realised that a government in Dublin or 
London would not be influenced as easily as the local landlord. Unlike a benevolent 
landlord, the government would demand that land purchase annuities be paid in full and 
on time, no matter how good or bad an agricultural year had been.82  
 
But the reality is that governments can be influenced, based upon the fact that 
the borrowers are also voters. The extent of voter power determines the influence on 
the elected representative bodies. The scale of influence of the Irish voters to revise 
their debt obligations and cancel arrears in a UK legislative assembly would not be 
the same as the case where the Irish electorate have their own assembly, dominated by 
agrarian interest groups. The same cannot be said of landlords who would have been 
under no direct political pressure, vis-à-vis an electoral mandate, to reduce rents, 
although a landlord may have been sympathetic to a tenant’s plight and granted some 
respite. This is also a key distinction between a public and private lender; private 
lenders would not have any political obligations to alter loan repayments. Loans could 
be renegotiated in order to minimise losses, but private lenders would not be as 
willing as the state to completely absolve debt obligations, especially on a grand 
scale.   
It is also important to emphasise that without government intervention there 
would have been no alternative means to purchase land on such a scale for the 
majority of borrowers. Private mortgages were available but their dispersion was not 
widespread, nor were they accessible to the majority of tenant farmers. Landowners, 
namely landlords, had no difficulty accessing mortgages in the period before 1877. 
This was due to the fact that land (mortgage loans) was deemed to have been the 
‘soundest possible investments’.83 But, as Curtis acknowledged, ‘the larger or 
wealthier the estate, the easier loans at low interest were to obtain’.84 Evidence from 
the 1914 report on agricultural credit suggests that only the wealthier farms had 
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access to such mortgages. The suppliers of mortgages were private individuals who in 
many cases used solicitors as intermediaries.85 Given that the majority of the farms in 
Ireland were actually very small, shown below, this would suggest that they would 
not have been able to access private mortgage funding to purchase land, and if they 
were the terms would not have been as generous as those of the state. The following is 
a mortgage advertisement that appeared in Thom’s Directory86 in 1881: 
 
MORTGAGES 
MONEY TO LEND 
IN SUMS OF  
£10,000 AND UPWARDS 
ON FEE-SIMPLE LANDED PROPERTIES 
Interest – FOUR to FOUR and a half per cent 
ADVANCES also made on Mortgages of life interests, Reversions, Leasehold, and other 
approved Security. 
LIFE INTERESTS AND REVERSIONS PURCHASED ON MOST FAVOURABLE TERMS. 
TRUSTEES AND OTHERS REQUIRING GOOD LAND INVESTMENTS WILL BE SUPPLIED 
WITH SAME, FREE OF CHARGE, ON FURNISHING PARTICULARS OF THE FUNDS 
AVAILABLE FOR INVESTMENT. 
J. A. O’SUILLIVAN, 
INSURANCE, MORTGAGE, AND INVESTMENTS OFFICES, 
42 DAWSON STREET, DUBLIN 
 
Although one advertisement is not representative of all mortgage lenders, this 
advertisement gives an indication of the services that mortgage providers offered. 
They provided large loans on various forms of security.87 The 1914 report on 
agricultural credit compared the situation in Ireland with that on the continent where 
mortgaging of smallholdings was more prevalent.88  
The joint stock banks in Ireland were reluctant to make long-term loans on 
mortgage security. This was due to a number of complications, mainly the risk 
associated with long-term lending, illiquidity of landed assets, and the cost of 
determining property rights.89 Illiquidity of lending on security of land was common 
at the time, mainly due to the fact that money is lent on land for a long period and the 
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lender will not have access to the money during this period. A problem in lending 
long term is the fact that many of the bank’s liabilities were short term in nature, as 
was outlined in chapter 3. Long-term lending of this nature would not have been 
compatible with the bank’s liability structure. The absence of a central bank with 
lender of last resort powers would also have deterred bank lending. The Bank of 
Ireland was ostensibly a central bank and could have acted as a lender of last resort, 
but its role in the collapse of the Munster Bank suggests that it was not a willing 
lender of last resort.90 There was also the problem of sale of land in the event of 
default, and in Ireland this was a significant deterrent to the entry of the joint stock 
banks in the mortgage market. This became obvious in the 1926 banking commission 
as evidence was shown that the sale of foreclosed land was difficult due to social 
pressure on buyers.91 Therefore, mortgage assets were practically worthless if a 
borrower defaulted on loan repayments. State entry into the mortgage market was a 
novel approach to the Irish credit market, and is thus worthy of consideration in this 
study of microfinance in nineteenth century Ireland. But novelty aside, the question of 
whether this policy was appropriate, or even necessary, also has to be addressed. 
Private mortgage lenders took commercial consideration when making loans, whereas 
state mortgage loans seem to have been based on a policy of social entitlement 
disregarding commercial considerations. 
 
7.3 The outreach and impact of state mortgages 
The aim of this section is to analyse the land purchase schemes from 1903 onwards. 
Information on earlier land purchase schemes is shown in table 7.4. As can be seen 
the earlier land acts did not have the same scope of operation as the later acts. Table 
7.4 is interesting as it shows that there was not a large uptake in land purchases before 
1903. If we use land occupation statistics for 1903 we can see that 13.55 per cent of 
occupiers were owners before the 1903 act.92 The tenants who purchased under the 
initial acts were also atypical as they held more land than the average farmer. For 
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example, in 1903, 70.36 per cent of all land occupiers held under 30 aces, and 49.11 
per cent of all land occupiers held less than 15 acres.93 
 
Table 7.4: Land acts 1870 to 1896 
Acts Holdings Acres Average 
holding 
size 
Amount of 
advances 
Cash 
lodged 
by 
tenants 
Total 
purchase 
money 
Average 
loan 
    £ £ £ £ 
1870 877 52,906 60.33 514,536 344,986 859,522 586.70 
1881 731 30,657 41.94 240,801 114,793 355,594 329.41 
1885-8 25,367 942,625 37.16 9,992,536 170,298 10,162,834 393.92 
1891-6 46,834 1,482,749 31.66 13,146,892 254,334 13,401,226 280.71 
Total 73,809 2,508,937 33.99 23,894,765 884,411 24,779,176 323.74 
 
Source: Report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31st March,. 1920 [Cmd. 1150], H.C. 
1921, xiv, 661, p. iv. 
 
What does the information in table 7.4 tell us? That before the 1903 act, and 
before the terms for land purchase became more attractive to tenants, there was not a 
large uptake in land purchase. When term sizes increased and interest payments 
decreased, there was a higher uptake rate. 
The following tables are derived from the report of the Estates Commissioners 
for the year ending 31 March 1920, Congested Districts Board reports, and 
appendices from ‘The Wyndham land act 1903: the final solution to the Irish land 
question?’94 In some cases the data represented only include transactions completed 
up to a certain date, and as such they are incomplete. There were a number a cases 
still pending due to both bureaucratic delays and interruptions to land purchase during 
the war years. Firstly, it would be interesting to compare both the 1903 and 1909 
Land Acts, shown in table 7.5, in respect to their outcomes.  
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Table 7.5:  Number of estates sold, number of purchasers and amount advanced 
under the 1903 and 1909 land acts (1 November 1903 to 31 March 1920) 
 
 Number of estates 
sold 
Number of 
purchasers 
Amount of advances 
(£) 
 1903 1909 1903 1909 1903 1909 
Ulster 1,770 490 70,563 10,164 16,765,275 1,357,342 
Leinster 2,286 628 44,183 5,215 22,481,377 2,110,840 
Connaught 1,066 568 43,296 22,789 9,644,160 3,854,465 
Munster 2,961 964 51,764 9,443 22,487,286 2,452,790 
Ireland 8,083 2,650 209,806 47,611 71,378,098 9,775,437 
 
Source: Report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31st March, 1920 [Cmd. 1150], H.C. 
1921, xiv, 661. 
 
The 1903 land act has commonly been referred to as the solution to the land question 
in Ireland, and in certain respects admittedly this is true. As can be seen from table 
7.5, there were a greater number of purchasers under the 1903 act than under previous 
and subsequent acts. There were also 41,477 pending sales under the 1903 act, and 
6,073 pending sales under the 1909 act.95 By comparison, the total number of 
holdings sold under the previous acts from 1870 to 1896 was 73,809.96 But the land 
purchase acts had not facilitated the complete transfer of land from landlord to 
tenants, and this led to a call for renewed land purchase schemes. 
A significant aspect of the land acts was the role of the CDB as a land 
purchaser. The CDB was created under section II of the 1891 land purchase act97 with 
the view to improve conditions in the west of Ireland. Congestion was somewhat 
arbitrarily defined as an area where the tax valuation divided by the population is 
equal to or less than £1.50.98  Table 7.6 gives us some indication of the location of 
these Congested regions circa 1891. As can be seen, the CDB’s work was focused 
mainly on areas in the west of Ireland. The remit of the CDB remained unchanged 
until 1909 when the areas defined as congested were increased and included within 
the jurisdiction of the CDB. When the remit of the CDB was extended in 1909 one-
third of the land of Ireland was described as ‘congested’.99 An interesting feature of 
table 7.6 is that it shows us there was a low population density in the congested 
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districts, a common feature of areas of rural poverty.100 In reality it seems that 
‘congestion’ was not confined to the west. In fact there were areas of ‘congestion’ in 
other locations in Ireland. 
 
Table 7.6: Congested districts, c. 1891 
Congested 
Districts 
County 
Number 
of 
congested 
districtsa 
Area Population 
in 1891 
Poor law 
valuation 
Poor law 
valuation 
per head 
Population 
density 
  
Statute 
acres  £ £ Per acre 
Donegal 19.5 824,132 110,220 99,171 0.90 0.13 
Leitrim 4.5 174,004 35,250 46,952 1.33 0.20 
Sligo 2.5 148,099 32,565 41,382 1.27 0.22 
Roscommon 5.5 104,862 26,185 29,838 1.14 0.25 
Mayo 18.5 893,480 143,201 130,864 0.91 0.16 
Galway 14.5 564,958 75,248 67,176 0.89 0.13 
Kerry 13 661,042 86,981 93,876 1.08 0.13 
Cork 6 237,992 39,866 46,882 1.18 0.17 
 84 3,608,569 549,516 556,141 1.01 0.15 
 
Notes: a – this refers to the number of congested districts within the county in first column. In some 
cases, only part of county was classified as congested, or only certain districts within the county. And 
some districts cross county boundaries. 
Source: First annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, p. 4. [C. 6908], H.C. 1893-
94, lxxi, 525. 
 
Under section 37 of the 1891 land purchase act, the CDB’s main goal was to 
amalgamate small holdings in the west. Up until the 1909 act the CDB’s work had 
been constrained in this regard and it had been slow to undertake land purchase 
activity, focusing on other projects to relieve congestion. The CDB’s role in land 
purchase changed significantly after the passing of the 1909 land act. A statement to 
this effect was made in the CDB’s twentieth annual report:  
 
The chief and most important function of the Board is the purchase of land from 
landlords and its resale to tenants, after making such arrangements and improvements as 
the circumstances in each case seem to require.101  
 
The 1909 Land Act gave the CDB the power and the financial ability to 
undertake this. As was stated above, the 1909 Land Act enabled the CDB to make 
compulsory purchases of land, and this accelerated the process of land purchase. The 
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CDB could force landlords to sell in cases where landlords were reluctant to sell. In 
such cases the CDB would make a final offer and the landlord would be forced to 
accept it. The legitimacy of such powers was challenged in a case taken by the 
Marquis of Clanricarde,102 but the verdict from the House of Lords in 1915 favoured 
the CDB and firmly established the principle of compulsory purchase.103 
 
Table 7.7: CDB estates before and after the 1909 land act (up to 31 March 1919) 
 No of 
estates 
Tenanted Untenanted Resale to 
vendor 
Total Purchase 
money 
 
 Acreage Acreage Acreage Acreage £ 
1891-
1910 a 
204 378,435 100,003 19,114 497,552 2,261,079 
Sales 
agreed 
under 
1909 act  
733 1,390,761 365,816 11,450 1,768,027 6,730,525 
Offers 
pending 
under 
1909 act 
b
 
8 19,581 3,635 284 23,500 71,801 
  
Notes: a – These are the sales under the land acts before 1909 
            b –These are offers to purchase under the 1909 act that were still pending in 1920. 
 
Source: Twenty seventh report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, [Cmd. 759], H.C. 1920, 
xix 
 
As can be seen from table 7.7, the CDB purchased more land under the 1909 act 
than it had done in the preceding nineteen years of its existence. The majority of land 
purchases came within the period 1910 to 1914, as the Treasury ordered the 
suspension of land purchase due to the outbreak of the First World War.104 It must be 
stressed that the majority of the CDB sales would not have been possible if there was 
no recourse to state lending. The existing private market may have funded mortgage 
schemes in the prosperous parts of the island, but the tenants in the west would have 
found it very difficult, if not impossible, to access similar funds from a free and 
                                                 
102
 Twenty-first report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, p. 16.[Cd 7312], H.C. 1914, xvi. 
103
 Twenty-third report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, p.8.[Cd. 8076] H.C. 1914-16, 
xxiv. 
104
 Ibid, p.8.  
 174 
private market. In some respects this liberated landlords in the west whose land 
portfolios were not worth much. 
Table 7.8 puts the CDB’s land purchase activities in perspective. Under the 
1903 legislation, CDB land purchase was a small percentage of all land purchase 
activity. Given that the poorest landholders, by definition, were in the region 
administered by the CDB, this would suggest a failure of the 1903 land act if the aim 
of land purchase was to encourage widespread owner-occupancy. It also suggests a 
failure in the sense that the majority of borrowers who took advantage of the 1903 act 
were from wealthier agricultural lands and less in need of government assistance and 
subsidisation. The activity of the CDB as a land purchaser was more pronounced 
under the 1909 Land Act than it had been in the earlier legislation. This is shown by 
its percentage of all activity in table 7.8, and by the expansion of activity in table 7.7.  
 
Table 7.8: CDB land purchase activity as a percentage of all land purchase 
activity from 1 November 1903 to 31 March 1920 
 
Act Percentage of 
estates 
Percentage of 
purchasers 
Percentage of 
advances 
1903 3.20 6.62 3.69 
1909 15.58 56.69 40.28 
 
Source: Report of the Estates Commissioners for the year ending 31st March 1920 [Cmd. 1150] H.C. 
1921, xiv, 661. 
 
The following tables are used to give a comparison of land purchase conditions 
and existing microfinance arrangements. Firstly, table 7.9 is an account of the 
government lending for the purposes of land purchase under the 1903 land act. 
 
Table 7.9: Number of purchasers who received advances and total amount of 
advances under the 1903 Wyndham land Act 
Province Number of 
purchasers who 
received 
advances 
Percentage 
of total 
purchasers 
(%) 
Total Amount 
advanced (£) 
Percentage 
of amount 
advanced 
(%) 
Connaught 45,418 20.70 10,949,066 13.25 
Leinster 46,163 21.04 26,362,935 31.90 
Munster 53,724 24.48 25,536,608 30.90 
Ulster 74,118 33.78 19,787,934 23.95 
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Source: Derived from appendix x in Patrick John Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham land act 1903: the final 
solution to the Irish land question?’ (PhD thesis, NUI Maynooth Department of History, September 
2008). 
 
During the operation of the 1903 Land Act a total of £82,636,543 was advanced to 
219,423 tenants for the purchase of land.  The distribution of the average price paid to 
landlords, and the average amount lent to tenants is shown in table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10: Average prices paid to landlords and advanced to tenants under the 
1903 Wyndham land act105 
Province Average price paid to 
vendors(£) 
Average amount 
advanced to tenants (£) 
Connaught 8,981 241 
Leinster 10,068 571 
Munster 7,604 475 
Ulster 9,371 267 
 
Source: Derived from appendix x in Patrick John Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham land act 1903: the final 
solution to the Irish land question?’ (PhD thesis, NUI Maynooth Department of History, September 
2008). 
 
The loans were required to be repaid on a bi-annual basis, replacing the 
traditional ‘gale days’ for the payment of rents.106 Given that we know the loan term, 
68.5 years, and the interest rate, 3.25 per cent, it is possible to work out what the 
average annual and bi-annual repayment was. The average bi-annual repayments are 
important for comparing the land purchase loans with microfinance loans, for reasons 
outlined below.  
A slight difficulty with the figures is that they do not explicitly state whether the 
interest is included in the total sum advanced or not, but this is not a major concern as 
it is possible to make allowances for the inclusion or omission. If interest is included 
in the total sum, the bi-annual repayment would be £2.75, and if not then by adding 
3.25 per cent to the data the bi-annual repayment would be £2.84.107 Table 7.11 gives 
an indication of what the provincial distribution of the bi-annual repayments were.108 
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Table 7.11: Calculation of average bi-annual repayment under terms of the 1903 
Land act 
Province Bi-annual repayment, 
(assuming interest 
included in original data) 
£1=240d 
Bi-annual repayment 
(adding interest to  the 
original data) £1=240d 
Leinster 4.17 4.30 
Munster 3.47 3.58 
Ulster 1.95 2.01 
Connaught  1.76 1.82 
 
Source: Derived from information in appendix x in Patrick John Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham land act 
1903: the final solution to the Irish land question?’ (PhD thesis, NUI Maynooth Department of History, 
September 2008). 
 
These are interesting statistics which are usually overlooked in the debates on 
the issues of state finance involved in land purchase. The important point which 
should be observed here is that the structure of the land purchase schemes enabled 
tenants of land of varying quality and quantity to purchase their holdings and offered 
favourable repayment facilities. Dooley has illustrated that the Land Commission, the 
body supervising loan dispersal, did not actually have a set modus operandi. Dooley 
stated that the 1938 banking commission ‘were rather surprised to find that there was 
no formal policy, no written document setting out the role of the land commissioners 
other than directions issued in the various land acts’.109 It appears that the loans were 
advanced, in many cases, with little evidence of the potential cash flow from the 
investment, and this could have the effect of crippling the borrower and diminishing 
the prospects of long-term economic development. The state land purchase schemes 
also had legacy effects, as mortgages were given to inefficient farms. These farms 
would still remain inefficient (why increase productivity if inefficiency is rewarded?), 
and would expect further government support. Effectively it poses the question of 
whether the provision of purchase for a large number of farmers effectively tied them 
to economically unviable farms which in the long term would not be efficient 
producers and would be uncompetitive in a free market economic environment. 
The average loan sizes as shown in table 7.10, and annual repayments in table 
7.11, are useful for analysing the role of microcredit providers in land purchase. The 
information contained in tables 7.9 and 7.10 illustrates the scale of the state land 
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purchase schemes, and it shows us that the existing microfinance infrastructure would 
not have been able to match the funds required to fund these mortgages. The existing 
financial intermediaries discussed heretofore in this thesis were primarily providers of 
short-term loans and as such were not designed to offer long-term credit facilities. For 
example, the LFB loan fund system, discussed in chapters 1 and 2, would not have 
been able to offer such favourable facilities for the purchase of land. This was mainly 
because its loan sizes were restricted to £10, but also because its loan terms were for 
20 weeks, and it charged a discount rate of 1.67 per cent on loans. All three factors 
militated against providing long-term loans required, and it seems desired, by tenant 
farmers. The land purchase schemes also dealt with any legal costs that might have 
arisen in the process of purchasing land - if these costs were to be borne by the 
borrower they would have added significantly to the cost.  
The Raiffeisen system that was established in Ireland, discussed in chapter 6, 
was inadequately structured to facilitate borrowers who wished to purchase land. The 
Raiffeisen banks were subject to a size restriction, £50 in their case, and although loan 
terms were flexible, 68.5 years is something which they would not have been able to 
offer. Raiffeisen banks in Germany offered long loan terms but the average loan term 
was about 5 years; in Ireland the average loan term was about 1 year. The Raiffeisen 
banks also charged a higher interest rate than that offered by the land purchase 
schemes. In both cases the primary element that prevented both institutions 
facilitating land purchase was the loan terms that would have been required.  
The land purchase schemes were not designed to compete with the existing 
market structure, as the market was not providing long-term credit contracts to the 
majority of the rural community. But the features of the land purchase schemes led to 
indirect effects on existing credit institutions. The loan terms offered by the land 
purchase schemes were also offered in terms of years purchase, and this was 
commonly used as the scale to measure the loans under the 1903 acts.110  
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Table 7.12: Average number of years purchase rent under the 1903 land act for 
tenanted land (1 November 1903–31 March 1920), and average rental saving 
over loan term. 
 Average number of years 
purchase rent  
Average rental saving 
over loan term (%)- a 
Ulster 23.86 65.17 
Leinster 22.52 67.12 
Connaught 21.93 67.99 
Munster 21.23 69.01 
Ireland 22.52 67.12 
 
Note: a - savings are based on the percentage of 1 minus the number of years purchase rent divided by 
the loan term: (1-(years purchase/68.5)*100), where 1 represents the value of 68.5 years constant rent. 
 
Source: Report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31st March. 1920 [Cmd. 1150] H.C. 
1921, xiv, 661. 
 
Table 7.12 shows the average number of years purchase rent on sales. Given 
that the loan terms were for 68.5 years, shown in table 7.3, and purchase prices were 
based on annual rentals, this would indicate a saving to tenants-purchasers. They 
would no longer pay their existing rent, but instead they would repay a loan by 
instalments and these instalments were less than their original rent. Furthermore, 
when purchase prices were set, in many cases they were based on reduced rents, the 
judicial rents discussed above. It must also be stressed that the loan repayments were 
fixed amounts, so unlike rents there was no possibility of increases or decreases 
during the term of the loan. The net effect of this would be to increase disposable 
income of a borrower, through the redistribution of income from landlord to tenant, 
which would have influenced the demand for financial services. In fact it appears that 
the increase in income was saved,111 and this in turn may have led to a decrease in 
demand for credit. This would have affected institutions that were primarily focused 
on credit disbursement, namely loan funds and Raiffeisen societies, whereas 
institutions that had been competitive in savings markets would have seen increases in 
savings deposits.   
Another feature of the land purchase schemes which indirectly affected the 
demand for credit was the fact that borrowers were able to delay the payment of their 
                                                 
111
 Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: its volume and structure (Cork, 1966), p. 89. 
Also chapters 3 and 4 have shown that there were increases in deposits in both the POSB and JS banks 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
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instalments, and use the instalment as a quasi-loan. No action would be taken against 
a borrower provided that they repaid the instalment following a warning. This was 
observed by the 1914 commission on agricultural credit, and it was stated that: 
Several witnesses brought under our notice a practice adopted by a considerable number 
of purchasers who, with a view to obtaining the use of money at a low rate of interest at 
the cost of a small fine, intentionally allow the repayment of their land purchase annuities 
to get into arrear, and a process to issue, the arrears being paid without allowing the case 
to come into court.112  
 
If we observe some of the repayment behaviour of borrowers under the land 
purchase schemes we can see some evidence that such credit strategies may have been 
pursued. For example, information on loan repayment is available for Free State 
borrowers in the period at the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s. Information on 
early periods is unavailable, and later periods do not give us the comparable 
information. Table 7.13 provides us with information on the arrears of annuity 
repayments in the Irish Free State somewhat before the slump associated with the 
Great Depression. 
 
Table 7.13: Arrears of annuity repayments in the Irish Free State, 1927-28, 1930-
31.  
Purchase 
acts 
Arrears  
1927-
1928 
Arrears 
1928-29 
Amount of 
1928-1929 
arrears 
uncollected 
at 31 July 
1929 
Arrears, 
1929-
1930 
Amount of 
1929-1930 
arrears 
uncollected 
at 31 July 
1930 
Arrears, 
1930-31 
Amount of 
1930-1931 
arrears 
uncollected 
at 31 July 
1931 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
1881-
1888 26,573 26,459 19,065 23,453 15,236 24,988 16,312 
1891-
1896 25,684 24,220 16,847 22,365 15,755 22,137 15,422 
1903 292,807 287,259 208,747 278,092 198,342 296,060 215,040 
1909 42,830 44,109 31,574 42,211 30,409 46,599 33,463 
1923-
1927 37,044 31,474 16,560 17,807 13,106 26,342 19,209 
 424,938 413,521 292,793 383,928 272,848 416,126 299,446 
 
Note: The bureaucratic calendar year runs from  1 April to 31 March.  
 
Sources: Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the period from 1st April 1928, to 31st March 
1929, L1/3 (p. 55); Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the period from 1st April 1929, to 31st 
March 1930, L1/4 (p. 302); Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the period from 1st April 1930, 
to 31st March 1931, L1/5 (p. 550). 
                                                 
112
 Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ireland, paragraph 753, p. 326. 
[Cd. 7375] H.C. 1914, xiii, 1.  
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If we compare the information in table 7.13 with additional information on the 
amount of instalments due we can see that the arrears made up roughly 10 per cent of 
the instalments due. But if we look at the information on the arrears repaid within 4 
months of the instalment due date we can see that there were a significant number of 
borrowers who repaid instalments within this four-month window. What tables 7.13 
and 7.14 tell us is that there were genuine arrears, but also delayed arrears. This is 
evidence to support the claims made by the 1914 report on agricultural credit that 
there was an intentional credit-augmenting strategy being pursued on the part of land 
purchase borrowers. The Great Depression did have an impact on Irish agriculture, 
and in the period 1931-32 total arrears outstanding had risen to £607,172, which 
amounted to 14.71 per cent of the total instalments due in the period.113 By 1932-33 
the proportion of arrears had risen to 42.90 per cent of instalments.114 But the increase 
seems to be related to the Irish government’s failure ‘to honour the July “gale” in 
1932.’115 This was a deliberate Fianna Fáil policy to renege on the annuity repayments 
to the UK government. In fact, the actions by tenant-purchasers can be seen as a 
continuation of long-established strategies in respect to rent payment, or rather non-
payment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the year from 1st April 1931 to 31st March, 1932, L1/6, 
(p. 764). 
114
 Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the year from 1st April 1932 to 31st March, 1933, L1/7, 
(p. 1239). 
115
 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: a new economic history 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994), p. 412. 
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Table 7.14: Arrears as a percentage of instalments due and arrears paid within 4 
months of instalment, 1928-29 to 1930-31. 
purchase 
acts 
Arrears as 
a % of 
instalments 
due,  
1928-29 
Arrears as 
a % of 
instalments 
due,  
1929-30 
Arrears as 
a % of 
instalments 
due,  
1930-31 
Arrears 
repaid 
within 4 
months of 
instalment 
due, 1928-
29 
Arrears 
repaid 
within 4 
months of 
instalment 
due, 1929-
30 
Arrears 
repaid 
within 4 
months of 
instalment 
due, 1930-
31 
 % % % % % % 
1881-
1888 11.38 10.12 10.94 27.95 35.04 34.72 
1891-
1896 8.49 8.14 8.39 30.44 29.56 30.33 
1903 11.48 11.12 11.86 27.33 28.68 27.37 
1909 12.23 11.06 11.64 28.42 27.96 28.19 
1923-
1927 24.13 10.65 12.31 47.39 26.40 27.08 
 11.38 10.43 11.17 29.20 28.93 28.04 
 
Sources: Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the period from 1st April 1928, to 31st March 
1929, L1/3 (p. 55); Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the period from 1st April 1929, to 31st 
March 1930, L1/4 (p. 302); Report of the Irish Land Commissioners, for the period from 1st April 1930, 
to 31st March 1931, L1/5 (p. 550). 
 
7.4 Agricultural structure in Ireland 
This section will assess the structure of the Irish agricultural sector in order to 
determine how important ownership was in Irish agriculture. The land purchase acts 
described in the previous sections were designed to transfer the ownership of 
landholdings from landlords to their tenants. The assumption, as stated in section 7.2, 
was that property rights for tenants were lacking formal definition. Underlying this 
policy was the assumption that the lack of formal property rights distorted incentives 
and discouraged tenants from making long-term investments. The assumption was 
that by creating more formal property rights there would no longer be inhibitors to 
long-term agricultural investment. 
The following sub-sections will discuss developments and trends in agricultural 
structure in Ireland. It will outline trends in landholding distribution, the dispersion of 
land ownership before land purchase policy was instigated, and trends in agricultural 
output during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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7.4.1 Land distribution 
This section will analyse the trends in landholding distribution in Ireland from 1841 to 
1917. The aim in analysing landholding distributions is to see whether or not there 
was a trend towards land consolidation over the period in question. If there were signs 
of consolidation it would indicate that there were trends towards more efficient land 
usage.  
Figure 7.5  
Landholding distributions in Ireland, 1841-1861
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Sources: Census of Ireland, 1841, 1851 and 1861. 
 
We discussed the distribution of landholdings from the 1841, 1851 and 1861 
census in chapter 1. The census returns showed significant changes in the percentage 
distribution of landholdings from 1841 to 1861. Prior to the famine there were a large 
number of landholdings in the category 1-5 acres, and in the category of 5-15 aces. 
This pattern changed significantly in 1851 and 1861, with a considerable decrease in 
the proportion of farms in the 1-5 acre category. Figure 7.5 highlights the major 
structural changes which occurred within Irish agriculture as a result of the famine of 
the late 1840s.116 In chapter 1 we also discussed the limitation of the 1841 census in 
terms of the reported landholding returns and highlighted the poignant criticism made 
by P. M. Austin Bourke. Bourke showed that returns of holdings were not reported in 
                                                 
116
 Straying into the realms of hypothetical history: if such structural changes did not take place there 
might have been a greater support for the radical wing of the ‘land war’. Michael Davitt, influenced by 
the economic thought of the American political economist Henry George, wished to nationalise the 
land in Ireland. But this solution was not politically feasible at the time.  
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a consistent unit of measurement, with some reported in terms of Irish acres, 
Cunningham Acres and Statute acres.117 Therefore, the data presented for the census 
year 1841 in figure 7.5 must be treated with caution. Thus, what Bourke’s criticism 
suggests is that, instead of a dramatic shock-induced consolidation from 1841 to 1851, 
there is more likely to have been a more gradual drive towards land consolidation. By 
1861 there was an evident trend towards land consolidation, even though the pace of 
consolidation was not dramatic, and this continued during the remainder of the period, 
as will be seen in the following graphs in this section. However, there are some 
important caveats regarding the data which must be acknowledged. 
The collection of the annual statistics of Irish agriculture commenced in 1847 
and continued throughout the nineteenth century. The collection and publication of 
the agricultural statistics was subsequently transferred to the Department of 
Agriculture and Technical Instruction when it was established in 1900. In most works 
analysing land distribution and landholdings in Ireland, the decadal census returns on 
landholdings are either directly used or referred to in appendices.118 These are 
included in the agricultural statistics, and updated on an annual basis. The use of the 
annual statistics can give an indication as to whether or not there are any evident 
trends in landholding distribution.  
Also, the use of annual statistics points to some faults in the data itself, a pitfall 
which those using decadal census would be unaware of.119 In 1914 there was a 6.8 per 
cent decrease in the number of recorded landholdings. This was caused by the 
realisation that the number of landholdings had been over-estimated.120 This meant 
that: 
The figures published in previous reports were considerably too high in the case of 
holdings from 1 to 100 acres and appreciably too low in the case of holdings over 200 
acres. Some of the latter holdings were cut by townland boundaries and were counted as 
two or more smaller holdings. This appears to have added as many to the class from 100 
to 200 acres as were deducted from this class by the fact that some were divided by 
townland boundaries and counted as two or more holdings under 100 acres.121  
 
                                                 
117
 P. M. Austin Bourke, ‘Uncertainties in the statistics of farm size in Ireland, 1841-1851’ in Journal 
of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, xx, 3 (1959-60), pp 20-26. 
118
 See appendix 11, Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minnesota, 
1958, reprint 1997), p. 163, and Appendix 1a in Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: its 
volume and structure (Cork, 1966), p.351; Appendix I in Terence Dooley, ‘The land for the people’: 
the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004), pp 233 and 235. 
119
 Turner has also highlighted this data problem: Michael Turner, After the famine: Irish agriculture, 
1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1996), pp 65-96. 
120Agricultural Statistics of Ireland; with Detailed Report for 1914, p. xvii [Cd. 8266], H.C. 1916, 
xxxii, 621.   
121
 Ibid, p. xix. 
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The new measure of landholdings was continued from 1914 onwards. As such there is 
a discrepancy between data pre- and post-1914. The report suggested a way to correct 
for the measurement error in previous years122 and these are shown in table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15: correction for measurement error in landholdings 
 
Land distribution (acres) Correction (%) 
Less than 1 +0.7 
1-5  -17.1 
5-15 -14.2 
15-30 -9.9 
30-50 -7.1 
50-100 - 4.2 
100-200 +1 
200-500 + 7.1 
Over 500  + 41.3  
All holdings - 8.6 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Ireland; with Detailed Report for 1914, 1916, [Cd. 8266]. 
 
Undoubtedly, it is important to be aware of the existence of such measurement 
error before analysing landholding distributions in nineteenth century Ireland, 
especially since it appears that it was the smaller sized landholdings which were over-
represented. There are alternative statistics relating to farm sizes available, land 
occupation, from the 1860s onwards and they converge towards the corrections 
suggested for landholdings in table 7.15.  If one is unaware of this data inconsistency 
one might be lured into making fallacious statements. For example, in a recent history 
of the CDB, Ciara Breathnach used evidence of changes in landholding distribution in 
1881, 1891 and 1917 to assess CDB land policy.123 But what Breathnach is observing 
is the change in the way statistics were collected. It would have been more 
appropriate to look at the land occupation statistics as they do no suffer from the 
problems outlined above. The only fault with the land occupation statistics is that 
other pieces of useful information are presented in relation to the landholding 
                                                 
122
 Ibid, p. xix. 
123
 Ciara Breathnach, The Congested Districts Board (Dublin, 2005), p. 159. 
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statistics. For example, there is information regarding livestock per holding size, but 
not for land occupiers. Hence while we must still use the landholding statistics, we 
must also be aware of their limitations. 
Figure 7.6 shows the number of landholdings in the period 1859 to 1917, using 
both adjusted and unadjusted data, and the number of occupiers. Landholdings and 
occupiers in figure 7.6 are divided into two categories. One grouping includes 
landholdings under 1 acre, and the other excludes them. When the total number of 
landholdings are graphed it appears that there is an increase in the number of 
landholdings, but when the holdings less than one acre are excluded one can see that 
there is a decrease in the number of landholdings over time. It is also interesting to 
note that the adjustments of landholdings, as suggested above, are similar to the land 
occupation data.  
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Note: LH = landholding 
          LH adj = Landholdings adjusted with criteria in table 7.15 
          LO = Occupied land. 
Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, various years. 
 
The percentage distribution of all landholdings, and adjusted variants based on 
table 7.15 and occupiers can be seen in figures 7.7 and 7.8. In figures 7.7 and 7.8 
landholdings of less than 1 acre are included. This is done to illustrate how the growth 
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in the number in this category can affect the total number of landholdings shown in 
figure 7.6. 
Figure 7.7  
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Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, various years. 
 
The measurement error as reported in the 1914 Agricultural statistics would 
suggest that the occurrence of small holdings is somewhat over stated. It is worth 
highlighting that when one analyses both the adjusted and unadjusted data, there is a 
decrease in the proportion of small farms in the category 1 to 15 acres.  
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Figure 7.8  
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Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, various years. 
 
Excluding landholdings below 1 acre gives us a different set of graphs, shown in 
figures 7.9 and 7.10.  
Figure 7.9  
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Note: The distribution has been calculated by excluding the number of landholdings under 1 acre. 
Therefore the aggregate total used is not the same used in figures 7.7 and 7.8. 
Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, various years 
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Figure 7.10  
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Note: The distribution has been calculated by excluding the number of landholdings under 1 acre. 
Therefore the aggregate total used is not the same used in figures 7.7 and 7.8. 
Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, various years. 
 
 It is evident from figures 7.7 to 7.10 that there was a trend towards consolidation of 
landholdings in the period 1859 to 1917. There was a decrease in the number of 
landholdings in the category 1-15 acres, and an increase in the larger landholding 
categories. It must also be noted that this trend is evident before the commencement 
of government land purchase schemes, discussed in sections 7.2 and 7.3. Furthermore, 
it must be stated that the majority of land purchases took place under the 1903 Land 
Act, as was illustrated above. The evidence suggests that, taking measurement error 
into account, there was a trend in land consolidation in the post-famine period.  
The holdings in the category not exceeding 1 acre, while large in number, did 
not contribute much to the agricultural output of the country,124 and it was 
recommended that they be excluded from calculations where landholdings are used. 
In the period 1861 to 1911 the mean percentage change in the number of landholdings 
under one acre was 123.55 per cent (the standard deviation was 117.50).125 Only three 
counties, Galway, Roscommon and Sligo, experienced negative percentage changes in 
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 Agricultural Statistics of Ireland; with Detailed Report for 1914, p. xx. [Cd. 8266], H.C. 1916, 
xxxii, 621. 
125
 This is the mean and standard deviation in percentage change across the 32 counties. 
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the number of landholdings under 1 acre in this period. The growth in the number of 
holdings under 1 acre may have been caused by an increase in labourer holdings, but 
it is not immediately discernible from the available statistics if this was in fact the 
case. 
Based on the information from figures 7.6 to 7.10, it appears that there was a 
large proportion of small landholdings in Ireland, but that the number and percentage 
of small landholdings decreased in the period 1861 to 1917. 
 
Figure 7.11  
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Source: Agricultural statistics of Ireland, various years. 
 
Figure 7.11 summarises the point that there was a decrease in the number of 
landholdings. The acknowledgement of measurement error, or not, influences the 
magnitude of this change. 
  
7.4.2 Land ownership in Ireland and the UK, c 1875-76 
 
Since government land-purchase policy involved the transfer of ownership from 
landlord to tenant, it would be useful to analyse trends in land ownership in Ireland. 
As was stated previously, the premise of this policy was that land transfers would 
improve property rights and thereby encourage agricultural investment. 
Unfortunately, there were no annual returns of land ownership in Ireland or in Great 
Britain, but we can use some proxies to assess the logic of the land purchase policy. 
Firstly, if we look at the distribution of lease holders we can get an 
understanding of the scale to which security or insecurity was a factor. Table 7.16 has 
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been derived from a report on the types of tenure held by occupiers of Irish land c. 
1870. The information from the land tenure report gives us information regarding the 
different forms of tenancies. In total there were 12 forms of tenancies, and of these 10 
were forms of leases of varying lengths.  Tenancy at will was a form of tenancy which 
could be renewable annually, or could be terminated annually. 
 
Table 7.16: Tenancy at will and Leases in Ireland c. 1870 
Holding 
valuation Occupiers Tenancy at will 
Leases (of some 
description) 
 % % % 
Under £15 75.67 86.48 13.52 
£15 less than 
£30 13.85 68.87 31.13 
£30 less than 
£50 5.55 57.47 42.53 
£50 less than  
£100 3.43 45.04 54.96 
Over £100 1.50 31.22 68.78 
All holdings  79.55 20.45 
 
Source: Return of Number of Agricultural Holdings in Ireland, and Tenure held by Occupiers, [C. 32], 
H.C. 1870, lvi, 737. 
 
From table 7.16 we can see that a large proportion of farms valued under £15 
were held in the form of tenancy at will, but leases were more common in farms of 
greater value. Table 7.16 also gives us information on the distribution of the various 
occupiers and, as we can see, the largest proportion of tenants was found in the 
category under £15. What this suggests is that the incentive problems associated with 
insecure property rights were found on smaller farms (i.e. lower value), but that 
similar incentive problems did not exist for owners of larger farms. Therefore, it 
would seem more appropriate to state that the problem facing Irish agriculture circa 
1870 was one involving the distribution of land and the large proportion of small 
holders. The policy of ownership transfer from landlord to tenant can be considered 
the equivalent of abolishing tenancy at will forms of tenure and making leases 
uniform. If we look at the policy from this perspective we can see, based on table 
7.16, that this would not affect the distribution of land and small farms would remain 
small and economically unviable.   
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In 1875-76 there was an attempt to determine the number of landowners in the UK. 
This report provides some useful information regarding the distribution of land 
ownership in the UK, and it is a useful comparison of the constituent countries. 
Firstly, figure 7.12 is a graph of the provincial distribution of the number of 
landowners.  Ulster, with approximately 37 per cent, had the largest percentage of 
landowners owning more than 1 acre of land, Leinster had 30 per cent, and Munster 
had 23.5 per cent. Connaught scored lowest with 9 per cent. These are useful statistics 
for a number of relevant issues. For example, they can be used as indicators for the 
number of landlords, and in terms of chapters 1 and 4 may help explain the dearth of 
LFB loan funds and TSBs in Connaught, both institutions which were reliant on 
landlord support in rural areas.  
It is important to state that the population and area of the four provinces varied. 
If we look at the number of landowners as a percentage of the provincial population 
we will see that the points made in the following graphs are not invalid. Connaught 
had the lowest percentage of landowners over 1 acre at 0.35 per cent, followed by 
Munster at 0.55 per cent, Ulster at 0.65 per cent, and Leinster with the highest at 0.75 
per cent. In terms of area the lowest landowners (over 1 acre) per acre was in 
Connaught at 0.07, this was followed by Munster at 0.13, Leinster at 0.21 and Ulster 
had the highest at 0.22.126 
Figure 7.12  
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Source: Return of Owners of Land of One Acre and upwards in Counties, Cities and Towns in Ireland 
[C. 1492], H.C. 1876, lxxx, 61. 
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 Population and area figures are from the 1871 census of Ireland; Census of Ireland 1871, part III, 
[C. 1377], H.C. 1876, lxxxi, 1. 
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Figure 7.13 shows the distribution of the area of land owned. It does not include the 
area of land owned by those owning less than 1 acre, as the amount of land that they 
owned was trivial. Figure 7.14 is an indication of the average amount of land owned 
per landowner. In terms of the land in Ireland, landowners in Munster were in 
possession of 30 per cent of the land, those in Ulster owned 27 per cent, those in 
Leinster owned 25 per cent, and those in Connaught owned 21 per cent. Given the 
difference in the provincial distribution of landowners and land owned, it is not 
surprising that the size of the average acreage owned per landowner, shown in figure 
7.14, was highest in Connaught. 
Figure 7.13  
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Source: Source: Return of Owners of Land of One Acre and upwards in Counties, Cities and Towns in 
Ireland [C. 1492], H.C. 1876, lxxx, 61. 
 
Figure 7.14  
Average size of land owned, c 1875-76
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As was stated in the introduction to this section, the goal of land purchase policy was 
to transfer ownership from landlords to tenants. Therefore the issue of land ownership 
prior to this policy shift is relevant. The land purchase acts, as outlined in section 7.3, 
did not address land occupation. They primarily created a ‘peasant-proprietorship’, 
and so the ownership structure prior to the change in land policy is significant. 
Figures 7.12 to 7.14 would suggest that if there was to be a reform in land 
ownership, and if the aim was to encourage a greater variance in land ownership, then 
the province that should be targeted ought to have been Connaught, and possibly, to a 
lesser extent, Munster. 
Figure 7.15  
Landowners and leaseholders as a percentage of landholdings over 
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[C. 1492], H.C. 1876, lxxx, 61 and The agricultural statistics of Ireland, for the year 1875, [C. 1568], 
H.C. 1876, lxxviii, 413. 
 
Figure 7.15 is a comparison of landowners and long lease holders as a 
percentage of landholdings over 1 acre circa 1875.127 In figure 7.15, Connaught 
makes a poor comparison with the other provinces as it has the smallest percentage of 
landowners to land holdings circa 1875. 
The report on land ownership in Ireland in 1875-76 was part of a UK wide 
attempt to determine the value of rentals in the UK. It was possible to do this for 
England and Scotland, but unfortunately this was not possible for Ireland and 
Griffith’s valuations were used as a substitute. Although it was not possible for 
contemporaries to make comparisons regarding rentals on both islands, the reports do 
allow comparisons regarding the distribution of land ownership. Table 7.17 shows the 
                                                 
127
 The agricultural statistics of Ireland, for the year 1875, [C. 1568], H.C. 1876, lxxviii, 413. 
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distribution of land ownership and land owned in the UK by constituent kingdom. But 
it must be noted that the population of each constituent kingdom differed, so therefore 
we must first look at the number of landowners as a percentage of the population. 
England and Wales had the highest percentage at 4.28 per cent, followed by Scotland 
at 3.93 per cent and Ireland at 1.27 per cent.128 It is quite noticeable that the Irish trend 
in land ownership falls below that in the UK. If we look at table 7.17 we can find out 
where the difference originated from.  
Table 7.17 shows the distribution in land ownership within the UK by land size 
classification; this enables us to see the variance in land ownership. The distribution 
of landowners, as opposed to the percentage of landowners, in Ireland differs 
marginally from that in Great Britain, and this may be due to the introduction of land 
purchase acts in 1869 and 1870 which were discussed above. In fact, there were no 
equivalents to the land purchase acts in Great Britain.  
 
Table 7.17: Percentage distribution of land owners and of the land held by 
owners in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, c. 1875-76 
 
 England & Walesa & b Scotland b Ireland c 
 Land 
owners 
Land 
(acres) 
held 
by 
owners  
Land 
owners 
Land 
(acres) 
held 
by 
owners  
Landowners Land 
(acres) 
held 
by 
owners  
Acres % % % % % % 
Less than 1 72.29 0.46 85.52 0.15 52.60 0.04 
1<10 12.54 1.45 7.17 0.15 10.03 0.14 
10<50 7.47 5.30 2.63 0.41 11.27 0.97 
50<100 2.66 5.43 0.92 0.46 5.06 1.24 
100<500 3.32 20.68 1.79 2.94 11.63 9.70 
500<1000 0.49 10.05 0.63 3.08 3.95 9.50 
1000<2000 0.28 11.51 0.45 4.41 2.62 12.48 
2000<5000 0.19 16.75 0.44 9.73 1.74 18.23 
5000<10000 0.06 12.04 0.19 9.11 0.66 15.65 
10000<20000 0.02 9.39 0.12 11.35 0.27 12.30 
20000<50000 0.01 5.81 0.08 16.21 0.13 12.69 
50000<100000 0.0003 0.59 0.03 15.97 0.02 5.08 
Greater than 
100000 
0.0001 0.55 0.02 26.03 0.004 1.97 
                                                 
128
 These figures have been calculated using the 1871 census figures. The figures for England & Wales 
are biased as the population figures include London whereas the land ownership figures do not. The 
Irish figures include all landowners, even less than 1 acre; Census of England and Wales 1871, vol IV 
[C.872-I], lxxi, pt 11, 1; Census of Scotland 1871, vol I [C. 592], H.C. 1872, lxviii, 1; Census of 
Ireland 1871, part III, [C. 1377], H.C. 1876, lxxxi,1. 
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Note: a - The figures for England and Wales are exclusive of the metropolis (London). 
b - The owners were ‘classed, according to their acreage, on the actual numbers given in each separate 
county, without reference to the fact that some of such owners held property in more counties than 
one’.  
c -  In Ireland ‘when the returns for all the unions in any county were received and examined, and had 
been subjected to revision where necessary, a return for the entire county was prepared and from then 
in the office – the names of the owners being arranged alphabetically; and when the same owner 
appeared in the returns for more than one union, the acreage and valuation were amalgamated’. 
 
Sources: Summary of Returns of Owners of Land in England, Wales and Scotland, H.C. 1876, (335), 
lxxx, 1; and Return of Owners of Land of One Acre and upwards in Counties, Cities and Towns in 
Ireland [C. 1492], H.C. 1876, lxxx, 61. 
 
 
Table 7.17 shows there were broadly similar trends in land ownership across the UK, 
but that there was a small proportion of landowners owning less than 1 acre in Ireland.  
There was a greater percentage of land ownership evident in the categories up to 1000 
acres in Ireland than there was in England and Scotland. Table 7.16 highlights the 
extent of variance in terms of land ownership and amount of land owned. The highest 
grouping of land owners, those owning land under 1 acre,129 owned 0.26 per cent of 
the UK land, despite them making up 72 per cent of land owners in the UK. This 
inequality is prevalent across the UK, but it shows that Ireland is not so different from 
trends in GB overall. Ireland shared a similar variance in land ownership with GB as a 
whole, which makes the state intervention in land ownership in Ireland seem 
somewhat anomalous. It would appear that the policy of land purchase in Ireland was 
driven politically rather than by a desire to achieve a more egalitarian solution 
throughout the UK. 130 This places the land purchase schemes in Ireland in a similar 
bracket as the other microfinance programmes that had socially driven goals, such as 
the Monts-de-Piété and the Raiffeisen societies, rather than being economically driven 
and profit motivated like the joint stock banks. 
 
 
7.4.3  Agricultural output in Ireland 
 
This section will outline some of the trends that were evident in Irish agricultural 
output. Firstly, it is worth illustrating the ratio of tillage to pasture in the period. 
 
 
                                                 
129
 The return did not specify if the landowners were urban or rural. The return for Great Britain 
excluded London. 
130
 Cosgrove cited cases of English farmers calling for access to land purchase schemes similar to 
Ireland, but these were not provided. 
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Figure 7.16  
Percentage ratio of tillage to pasture in Ireland, 1851-1961
0
10
20
30
40
50
18
51
18
61
18
71
18
81
18
91
19
01
19
10
19
10
19
21
19
31
19
41
19
51
19
61
A B
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
ra
tio
Percentage ratio of tillage to
pasture
 
Note: A refers to the island of Ireland as a whole, B refers to the 26 counties. 
 
Source: Appendix table II ‘Area of crops and pasture’ in Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural 
production: its volume and structure (Cork, 1966), p. 351. 
 
As can be seen from figure 7.16 the area of land devoted to tillage decreased over the 
period from 1851 to 1910, and the trend was evident in period B from 1910 to 1961. 
Period B in figure 7.16 is also interesting since there were government schemes in 
existence which deliberately tried to encourage an increase in tillage. This explains 
the rise in the ratio in 1941 as compulsory tillage schemes were introduced, but the 
ratio fell when compulsory legislation was removed. 
Figure 7.17 shows the output of corn crops from 1847 to 1919. As can be seen, 
there was a gradual decrease in the output of corn crops, but with an increase at the 
end of the period. This was due to war-time incentive schemes designed to increase 
the output of corn crops. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 197 
Figure 7.17  
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, European historical statistics 1750-1970 (London, 1975). 
 
Figure 7.18 shows the output of potatoes over the period 1847 to 1919, as can be seen 
the potato output was very volatile. This is due to the continued susceptibility of 
potato crop to blight which affected potato output from the 1840s onwards. Decreases 
in the output of potatoes are also useful indicators of agricultural depression in 
Ireland. The period 1850 to 1864 was a period of agricultural depression which saw a 
sharp drop in potato output; so too was the period 1877 to 1882. 
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Figure 7.18  
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, European historical statistics 1750-1970 (London, 1975). 
 
Figure 7.19 shows the yield per acre of corn crops from 1847 to 1939. As can be seen, 
there was a trend in increasing crop yields, but this must be weighted against the fact 
that crop output was decreasing. The growth in crop yields also pre-dates many of the 
land purchase schemes. 
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Figure 7.19  
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British historical statistics (Cambridge, 1962) 
 
Figure 7.20 shows the crop yields of root and green crops and hay. Here too there is 
evidence to suggest that crop yields were improving before the introduction of land 
purchase schemes. 
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Figure 7.20  
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British historical statistics (Cambridge, 1962) 
 
Figures 7.21 to 7.23 show the number of livestock in Ireland from 1841 to 1919. In 
figure 7.21 it can be seen that there was an increase in the number of cattle and sheep. 
The number of pigs did not seem to experience the same rate of growth as cattle and 
sheep, but this may be explained by the fact that potatoes, a volatile crop in the 
period, had been one of the main inputs in swine farming. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201 
Figure 7.21  
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Note:  There were data gaps from 1842-1846, and in 1848. These have automatically been estimated by 
STATA. 
 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, European historical statistics 1750-1970 (London, 1975). 
 
Figure 7.22 shows the number of poultry in Ireland, and it can also be used as a proxy 
for the number of eggs produced. As can be seen, there was a trend in the increase of 
poultry throughout the nineteenth century. 
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Figure 7.22  
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Note:  There were data gaps from 1842-1846, and in 1848. These have automatically been estimated by 
STATA. 
 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, European historical statistics 1750-1970 (London, 1975). 
 
Finally, figure 7.23 shows milch cows as a percentage of total cattle. The numbers of 
milch cows were relatively constant during the period, whereas the number of dry 
cattle increased over the period. This explains the trend in a decreasing proportion of 
milch cattle in Ireland. Milch cows also showed a high regional variation. For 
example, 41.48 per cent of milch cows were found in Munster in 1910,131 the area 
with the richest pasture. This was followed by Ulster with 28.69 per cent, Leinster 
with 15.56 per cent and Connaught with 14.28 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131
 Agricultural Statistics of Ireland; with Detailed Report for 1910, p. 99. [Cd. 5964], H.C. 1911, c, 
517. 
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Figure 7.23  
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Source: Agricultural Statistics of Ireland with detailed report for 1917, p. 8 [Cmd. 1316], H.C. 1921, 
xli, 135. 
 
To summarise the changes in agricultural output over the period in question, table 
7.18 shows the percentage change in output from 1841 to 1914. Table 7.18 clearly 
illustrates that there was a decrease in tillage products, but an increase in products 
derived from livestock. Table 7.18 combined with the preceding figures 7.17 to 7.23 
do not suggest that there was a lack of investment in Irish agriculture. This was the 
argument which the proponents of land legislation inferred, believing that tenurial 
insecurity was an impediment to agricultural investment. But the foregoing evidence 
suggests that perhaps contemporaries were biased as to what they felt constituted 
agricultural investment. We have seen in the previous chapters of this thesis that there 
were institutions that made loans to agriculture. The joint stock banks were willing 
lenders, but on average they were debtors to the agricultural sector. This indicates that 
the failing was not the lack of agricultural investment opportunities, but the lack of 
profitable investment opportunities. It must also be borne in mind that Irish 
agriculture at this time did not have the luxury of tariff barriers on agricultural 
imports. The decreasing prices of tillage goods relative to livestock products would 
have encouraged a shift to livestock production, and this would not have required as 
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much long-term investment. So it would be accurate to conjecture that the existing 
financial structure did not hamper agricultural development. 
 
Table 7.18: Percentage change in agricultural output 1841 to 1914 
 
 Percentage change in output 
Wheat -92 
Oats -50 
Barley -50 
Hay +100 
Potatoes -33 
Butter Cow numbers: no change 
Pork +20 
Eggs +260 
Mutton +70 
Cattle 1-2 year old +104 
Cattle 2-3 +119 
 
Source: Table 56 ‘Index numbers in 1914 of general prices and of prices of principal agricultural 
products Base year 1840=100’ in Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: its volume and 
structure (Cork, 1966), p. 205. 
 
Crotty has argued that security of tenure was less urgent in a pastoral activity.132 
This is evident due to the fact that livestock is a moveable form of property, whereas 
tillage is immoveable until harvest. In terms of investment, this meant that if farmers 
invested in livestock they could take their investment with them if evicted. If they 
invested in tillage they could not.  Donnelly has also suggested that the distrainment 
of livestock was rare, only resorted to in extremis.133 What this indicates is that in the 
event of an arbitrary eviction, in a case where rent was paid, pastoral farmers could 
take their livestock with them, whereas tillage farmers would be in a more precarious 
position in the case of arbitrary eviction as their investment is fixed and unmoveable. 
What this section has shown is that there were structural changes, shifts from tillage 
to pasture, evident in Irish agriculture prior to the introduction of land purchase 
policies. Therefore, it could be argued that security of tenure, or ownership transfers, 
were not of pressing urgency on economic grounds, and as such long-term investment 
programmes that the state oversaw were superfluous to the needs of the agricultural 
sector. But such lending schemes were desired by agriculturists and their leaders on 
                                                 
132
 Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: its volume and structure (Cork, 1966), p. 89. 
133
 James S. Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth century Cork: The rural economy and the 
land question  (London, 1975), pp 103 and 64-65. 
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social and political grounds, so it would be more appropriate to view land purchase 
schemes as a social policy. 
Figure 7.24  
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Source: Figure 5.5 and appendix table A.18, Liam Kennedy and Peter M. Solar, Irish agriculture: a 
price history (Dublin, 2007), p. 98 and pp 192-195. 
 
Crotty hypothesised that changes in relative prices, shown in figure 7.24, 
influenced the structural development of Irish agriculture. Crotty’s hypothesis was 
that changes in the relative prices of pasture to tillage following the end of the 
Napoleonic wars encouraged a shift to pasture, and that the influence of this relative 
price shift ‘which has been a noticeable feature of Irish agriculture since the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars, is likely to continue’.134 This hypothesis has been questioned by 
Kennedy and Solar in terms of the timing of the relative price change,135 but Kennedy 
and Solar do acknowledge the influence of the change in relative prices on the long-
term structural development of Irish agriculture. Kennedy and Solar stated that: 
Taking the long view, it is changes in the profitability of different types of farming that 
determined the pattern of land use and the volume and structure of Irish agricultural 
output. Prices were fundamental determinants, along with climatic and soil conditions, of 
the profitability of different farming systems, and hence of people’s livelihoods. Whether 
the balance of advantage lay with labour-intensive tillage farming or land-intensive 
livestock farming had enormous implications for farm size, labour demand, local 
population densities and social stratification in the countryside.136 
                                                 
134
 Raymond D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: its volume and structure (Cork, 1966), p. 236. 
135
 Liam Kennedy and Peter M. Solar, Irish agriculture: a price history (Dublin, 2007), p. 99. 
136
 Ibid, p. 100. 
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7.5 An interim report of land purchase policy, pre-1903 Land Act  
 
A report on the effect of government land-purchase policy on tenant purchasers in 
Ireland was commissioned in 1902 and was undertaken by William Bailey, who was 
an Assistant Commissioner in the Land Commission. The publication of the report 
pre-dated the first reading of the 1903 land bill.137 The terms of reference for Bailey’s 
report were outlined as follows: 
(1.) The present condition of the holdings purchased not less than 7 years ago, as regards 
general improvement, treatment and cultivation, and more particularly as regards 
permanent improvement works carried out since purchase. 
(2.) Whether the tendency to sell, sublet, or subdivide has increased or diminished as a 
consequence of purchase 
(3.) Whether the general solvency and credit of the purchasers have improved or not 
since purchase, and 
(4.) The effect generally of the land purchase system on the character and well-being of 
the tenant purchasers.138 
 
It is worthwhile to consider this report and analyse the information presented in 
it.  The report is important as it is a record of the result of land purchase policy prior 
to the widespread adoption of a land purchase policy by the state in Ireland under a 
series of different governments from 1903 onwards.139  
Bailey’s treatment of 1 and 3 listed above are interesting in regards to credit and 
microcredit, but his report is flawed due to a number of sample selection biases. The 
sample selection biases primarily result from the terms of reference. The first 
objective is to compare the condition of tenant purchasers before and after they 
became owner-occupiers. Such a definition automatically excludes others who did not 
avail of tenant purchase; this effectively excluded approximately 85 per cent of the 
agricultural community from the sample and the sample population used, 15 per cent 
of the farming community, may not have been very representative.140 Bailey’s 
conclusion under the first heading was that ‘the holdings in all parts of Ireland as 
regards cultivation, treatment, and general improvement is unquestionable’.141 This is 
                                                 
137
 Patrick John Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham land act 1903: the final solution to the Irish land question?’  
(PhD thesis, NUI Maynooth Department of History, September 2008). 
138
 Report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, Legal Assistant Commissioner, of an inquiry into the present condition 
of tenant purchasers under the land purchase acts, p. 3, (92) H.C. 1903, lvii, 333. 
139
 For discussion on land purchase policy in the Free State and the Republic see: Terence Dooley, ‘The 
land for the people’: the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004). 
140
 These figures are based on the calculation above of the percentage of tenant purchasers before the 
1903 land act; See table 7.4 and land occupation statistics from Agricultural Statistics of Ireland, with 
detailed report on Agriculture for 1903, p. 18 [Cd. 2196], H.C. 1904, cv, 333. 
141
 Report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, Legal Assistant Commissioner, of an inquiry into the present condition 
of tenant purchasers under the land purchase acts, p. 5, (92) H.C. 1903, lvii, 333. 
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somewhat of a contradictory statement as Bailey makes references to a number of 
cases of failed tenant purchases and struggling tenant purchases. He concludes that 
the tenant purchase schemes have generally been successful, and that it is due to 
tenant purchase that a number of improvements have occurred. Ideally to make such a 
statement one would need to compare the conditions of farmers on the basis of land 
holding size, accessibility to capital, labour, skill/ability, and ownership. The sample 
Bailey used in his report is only a sample of owners of farms, not a sample of all 
farms. The report implies that ownership is causing prosperity, but there is 
contradictory evidence in the report regarding the causality of ownership and 
prosperity in farming. Not all owners were successful or thriving, and as Bailey said 
many were experiencing ‘stagnation’ and there was ‘no desire for change’.142 So to 
determine if ownership made a significant impact on those involved in agriculture, or 
to rephrase, if there were incentive effects associated with land ownership, it would be 
logical to compare them with similar farms held by tenants to see if there was a 
difference during the period. This was not done, and therefore improvements were 
believed to have been as a result of ownership alone. There are instances where tenant 
purchasers claimed that they had worked harder and that they were more eager to 
invest as they were not afraid of rent rises,143 but the evidence is only for tenant-
purchasers and we do not know if the opposite holds for tenants. Market conditions 
such as price, demand and access to markets were not addressed. 
Ó Gráda made a number of observations on the growth in productivity in Irish 
agriculture during the post-famine period and table 7.19 highlights growth in 
agricultural output and productivity in this period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142
 Ibid, p. 6. 
143
 Ibid, p. 6. 
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Table 7.19: Output and productivity in Irish agriculture between the 1850s and 
the 1910s 
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1850-4 89.0 92.0 74.3 65 - 
1855-66 94.0 91.8 82.3 45 - 
1867-76 100 100 100 38 100 
1877-85 99 101.4 117.1 28 99.9 
1886-93 102 114 133 26 96.9 
1894-03 110.5 129.1 154.8 23 99.7 
1904-13 124.7 135.3 177.3 21 90.3 
Notes: (1) Real output per head of agricultural labour force 
(2) Real output per head of ‘farm’ population 
(3) Nominal output deflated by SSPI 
           (4) Tillage share in total output 
           (5) Real GB output per head of agricultural labour force. 
Source: Turner, ‘Agricultural Output and Productivity’, p. 427, cited in Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: a 
new economic history 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994), p. 258. 
 
The output and productivity estimates illustrated in table 7.19 are those made by 
Turner, who illustrated that there was growth in productivity in post-famine 
agriculture. In the conclusion to his work, Turner suggested that transfers in land 
ownership would increase productivity further by creating incentive effects.144 This is 
an interesting statement, especially as Turner had shown that trends in productivity 
increases pre-dated land purchase policy. Also, Turner’s calculations only go as far as 
1914, whereas Ray Crotty’s work takes a longer view of Irish agriculture.  
Ray Crotty’s study of Irish agriculture is actually interesting on two accounts.  
Firstly, it is an innovative analysis of the history of modern Irish agriculture from the 
seventeenth century, and secondly, he was writing especially to show the need for 
reform in agricultural policy and also to propose alternative policies. The final 
chapters of his work include agricultural policy recommendations.145 From Crotty’s 
perspective agricultural policy, à la land purchase, was flawed, and Crotty argued that 
the volume of Irish agriculture had stagnated. But if one uses Turner’s criteria in the 
post-independence period, productivity per person would also have increased as 
population continued to decrease and output remained constant. What Turner’s 
                                                 
144
 For example Turner refers to the Irish peasants attaining economic independence: Michael Turner, 
After the famine: Irish agriculture, 1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1996), pp 196-197. 
145
 Chapters 9 to 11: ‘The lessons from the past’, ‘A land tax’, and ‘complementing policies’: Raymond 
D. Crotty, Irish agricultural production: its volume and structure (Cork, 1966), pp 212-272. 
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estimates suggest is that the main growth in productivity came as population 
decreased, but this does not indicate the presence of incentive effects. In fact the 
introduction of land policy discouraged people from leaving the land, and would have 
affected productivity per person as measured by Turner. 
Ó Gráda’s discussion for the causes of the increase in agricultural productivity 
in Ireland in the post-famine period cited the importance of the decrease in the 
number of landholdings exceeding one acre, the decrease in the proportion of 
holdings in the category 1-15 acres, and a decrease in the farming population.146 He 
also cited a number of technological improvements during this time period: 
The chief mechanical innovations included the reaping, mowing, threshing, and potato-
spraying machines, and the centrifugal separator. The spread of the creamery system and, 
in remote areas, smaller separators, boosted productivity in the dairying regions.147 
 
Other factors which would also have contributed to increased returns from 
agricultural output were the development of steam transport, railway networks, as 
shown in figure 7.25, developments in the postal service, and the introduction of 
telegraphy. These infrastructural developments would have enhanced the spread of 
information regarding market prices and enabled a faster transport of agricultural 
produce. The importance of railway and steam transport to developments in Irish 
agriculture is understated148 as the greater the speed that perishable goods such as 
agricultural products can reach their market destination, the higher the price that is 
realisable by the producer. Kennedy and Solar stated that milk was highly perishable 
until the advent of rail and refrigeration.149 Both rail and steam transport reduced the 
cost of exporting livestock, in terms of days transport but also in terms of feed 
required for the duration of the voyage. It must also not be forgotten that the period 
1877-82 in which the ‘land war’ took place was a recessionary period where bad 
harvests played a significant role. The activities of the land war agitators made it an 
extremely volatile period, but once this recessionary period ended, market conditions 
improved and trade resumed. This would also have improved conditions for many of 
the people in Bailey’s survey.   
 
 
                                                 
146
 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: a new economic history 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994), p. 259. 
147
 Ibid, p. 259. 
148
 Michael Turner, After the famine: Irish agriculture, 1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 60. 
149
 Liam Kennedy and Peter M. Solar, Irish agriculture: a price history (Dublin, 2007), p. 33. 
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Figure 7.25  
Length of railway line open in Ireland, 1839-1913
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Source: Irish railway statistics in Thom’s Directory, various years 
 
Another problem with the sample used in Bailey’s report is that many on the 
participants are self-selected.150  This is evident from the fact that many were 
purchasers and sellers of lands before the concept of land purchase was popularised. 
Many of these bought and sold their land under the earlier acts which had required 
that a fraction of the purchase price be contributed by the borrower and these were 
able to do so. Many of the participants in the study of tenant purchase schemes may 
have reflected underlying structural differences in Irish agriculture at this time. The 
data in figures 7.26 and 7.27 give an indication of the provincial distribution of tenant 
purchasers and the provincial distribution of the sample used in Bailey’s report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150
 Self-selection refers to an omitted and unobservable variable that determine’s an individuals 
decision to enter a programme, see Jeffery Wooldridge, Econometric analysis of cross section and 
panel data (Massachusetts, 2002), p. 254. 
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Figure 7.26  
Bailey's sample of tenant purchasers c 1902
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Source: Report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, Legal Assistant Commissioner, of an inquiry into the present 
condition of tenant purchasers under the land purchase acts, p. 6, H.C. 1903, (92), lvii, 333. 
 
Figure 7.27  
Number of loans issued under the 1885 and 1891-6 land acts
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Source: Thom’s Directory, 1923, p. 687. 
 
Sixty-eight per cent of the tenant purchasers in Bailey’s sample were from the 
province of Ulster. Ulster had always been seen to have the most dynamic agricultural 
sector, and the 1870 land act had attempted to replicate the ‘Ulster custom’ 
throughout Ireland. Bailey’s report did not explain the predominance of Ulster tenant-
purchasers in his sample of the effectiveness of the tenant purchase schemes. As can 
be seen from figure 7.27, Ulster had a larger proportion of tenant purchasers. 
Therefore it would have been useful if Bailey had gone into greater detail to explain 
this. A reasonable explanation for the predominance of Ulster tenant purchasers in the 
sample is the fact that Ulster had a more commercially responsive agricultural sector 
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and that the farm holdings in Ulster tended to be of small size specialising in 
tillage.151 This commercial responsiveness would have meant that they would have 
appreciated the benefits of concessional loans to purchase their farms, and the issue of 
smaller holders meant that a greater number of such commercially responsive 
holdings could have been sold. It may also be the case that Ulster farmers were the 
ones most affected by the ‘Grain invasion’. Any sample with such a high Ulster 
representation making claims about the benefits of land ownership without making 
reference to the reasons for the predominance of Ulster participants in the sample 
would be liable to make erroneous conclusions.  This produces a biased sample of 
tenant purchasers from which to draw any conclusions regarding the benefits of land 
purchase. So not only was Bailey’s original sample unrepresentative of the total 
agricultural population, but the actual sample he used was biased in favour of Ulster 
tenant-purchasers. It is also interesting to note that both Hoppen and Turner have 
suggested that landlords in Ulster were in a position of financial strength and did not 
need to sell their land.152 If this is the case, how do Hoppen and Turner explain the 
high proportion of land sales in Ulster? If landlords had no need to sell, why then did 
land purchases take place at such a high level in a province where it was believed 
ideal tenurial security existed?  
Another issue which cannot be directly traced to the land purchase policy, but 
which Bailey associated with improvement due to land purchase, was the 
consumption of American bacon.153 The case of American bacon shows the intra-
agricultural trading patterns of the nineteenth century. Imported American bacon was 
cheaper and of lower quality than the Irish bacon. It was used as a substitute for Irish 
bacon which was exported to Great Britain. This also happened to be a novel import, 
one which would not have been consumed as readily before. Such propensity to 
import does not necessarily have to have been caused by land ownership. Again, it 
would be worthwhile if Bailey corroborated his findings with evidence of 
consumption patterns for non-purchasers.  
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What Bailey’s report does give reliable information on is the effect of government 
land purchase policy on tenant purchasers. The information in Bailey’s report gives an 
indication as to the screening and monitoring procedures involved in the government 
land-purchase policy. There is also information as to the effect of the land purchase 
schemes on the investment patterns of tenant-purchasers. Firstly, it must be stated that 
the screening of land purchase policies was not based on the economic rationale of the 
time. The government wished to quell agro-political agitation through concessional 
loans and this is evident from its screening policy, although this does not necessarily 
explain the high incidence of Ulster tenant-purchasers.154 The state provided loans to 
purchase agricultural land, and given that these were loans, not grants, one would 
expect a rational lender to lend based on the prospect of the borrower’s ability to 
repay out of either the borrower’s existing assets or the expected returns from the 
lending project. It does not appear as though these were factors taken into 
consideration under the land purchase policies. Evidence of this can be seen in 
Bailey’s accounts of struggling and prospering purchasers. Those who prospered were 
those who had sufficient capital beforehand and good quality land to work with, 
whereas those who had insufficient capital and poor quality land struggled. They 
struggled despite the fact that they were now owners of their land. Ownership cannot 
bestow fertility on infertile land, or rather ownership is not solely the criterion for 
efficiency or prosperity.  
Bailey also referred to the fact that many made their repayments from non-farm 
income such as the earnings from migratory labour and remittances from emigrants.155 
This indicates that loans were given to purchase land that was inadequate for farming 
purposes. These holdings were deemed ‘uneconomic’ but credit was still given to 
purchase them. Proper screening would have realised that these borrowers would not 
have been able to repay loans from the earnings on the farm. This meant that even 
with a rent reduction and subsidised loans these smallholdings, primarily in the west, 
were not economically viable as farming enterprises. Monitoring was another feature 
that was lacking and one which Bailey recommended be introduced in the future. 
There was a fear that tenant purchases would result in subletting and subdivision of 
the land, akin to the problems from the 1840s, and this was made illegal under the 
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1881 Land Act. But the investigation for Bailey’s 1903 report was the first time that 
there was direct contact with many borrowers since the instigation of a land purchase 
policy.156  
The borrowers in Baileys sample seemed satisfied with the land purchase 
schemes, the reason for this was that the repayments for the government lending 
schemes were lower than the rents that borrowers had previously paid, and lower than 
the interest charged by other commercial lenders.157 The reduction of rents led to a 
decrease in the cost of farming, and a subsequent increase in disposable income 
caused by the reduction in costs. A farmer now experiencing a decrease in costs 
would have a number of options available, depending on the increased level of the 
disposable income. If, for example, a decision was to be made between whether to 
borrow or not, the increased disposable income would lead to an income effect 
whereby a farmer would be able to substitute the increased income for borrowed 
capital and thereby reducing costs of borrowing. An example of the use of this 
increase in income can be seen from the following observation: ‘On an estate in 
Tyrone, we found that many of the smaller purchasers immediately earmarked their 
savings – as between rent and annuity – and employed them in the acquisition of 
agricultural machinery, reapers, cultivators, and such like,’158 thus leading to increases 
in productivity and greater efficiency.  
 
7.6. The ‘economic’ holding  
 
Land purchase policy was centred on ownership transfers from landlords to tenants, 
but another issue considered by land policy was the commercial viability of farms. 
These are two separate issues. Farm viability refers to the farm size and land quality 
and strives to increase farm size and access to quality land in order to increase 
income, whereas ownership transfer assumes that land ownership creates incentives to 
invest and increase productivity. The fact that both policies were pursued suggests 
that it was unclear where the fault lines lay: were farms too small, or were there 
inefficient property rights, or both?  
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In terms of assessing the Irish banking structure in the nineteenth century, if a large 
proportion of the farms were commercially unviable, then it would also have been 
commercially unviable to offer them long loan terms. As was shown above, there are 
a number of risk categories to which agricultural lending is susceptible,159 and 
commercial unviable farms would be more vulnerable to each of these risk categories 
than other farms. Commercial lending institutions would therefore not risk long-term 
lending to small farms in Ireland. This would suggest that there were structural 
problems in Irish agriculture, and not capital constraints. 
Bailey, the advocate of land purchase cited in section 7.5, in evidence to the 
committee on congestion in 1906, stated that there was a dichotomy between 
‘economic’ and ‘uneconomic’ holdings. Bailey stated that: 
One class holds land of a fertility, quantity, and situation that enables the occupier to live 
at a reasonable standard of comfort out of the produce and pay a rent. The other class 
also lives on and partly out of land, but land of a character, quantity, or situation, that 
will not support a family at a proper standard of living without extraneous help. (sic)160 
 
An important issue in land reform policy from 1891 onwards was the idea of an 
‘economic holding’ and this was the central idea behind the creation of the CDB, 
referred to in section 7.3. The subsequent land acts that dealt with the island as a 
whole also aimed to increase the number of economic holdings, by either 
consolidating ‘uneconomic’ holdings, or purchasing untenanted land and 
redistributing it amongst existing holdings.  
Dooley has shown that a similar policy was pursued in the 26 counties in the 
twentieth century. Some observations on the issue of economic and non-economic 
holdings appeared in publications of the DATI in the early 1900s. In the 1902 
General Report of the Agricultural Statistics of Ireland, William P. Coyne, the 
superintendent of statistics of the DATI and professor of political economy at 
University College Dublin,161 gave an outline of landholdings from an economic 
perspective. Coyne believed that an economic holding was the function of soil, 
population density, education, subsidiary industries, proximity to markets, 
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infrastructure, agricultural organisation/ co-operatives, and development of 
agricultural credit.162 Coyne believed that ownership was an important factor, but not 
the only factor, stating that: 
It is generally agreed that the progress of Irish agriculture will become more assured and 
continuous in proportion as the occupiers are converted into owners; but this can only be 
expected, of course, in the case of holdings that are not too small to support a family in 
average well-being. The magic of ownership can do much, but there are, in these days of 
world-wide competition, very definite limits to its potency, as the most sympathetic 
student of peasant proprietorship on the continent of Europe must admit.163  
 
A subsequent article published in the journal of the DATI discussed what was 
required for a holding to be considered economic. The article stated that: 
The greatest bar to progress will then be the existence of an excessively high proportion 
of holdings which no abolition of dual ownership – nor even of rent itself – could render 
economic. Next to this, and closely connected with it, is the serious want of working 
capital.164   
 
J. R.  Campbell went on to state that he believed that 50 acres was the minimum 
size of a holding for it to be deemed economic if it specialised in tillage. The criteria 
for 50 acres was that there would be enough space so that 2 horses could be used, and 
the size of the farm could be lowered to 30 or 25 acres if the land showed greater 
fertility or if there was co-operation in the ownership of horses. And ‘that any smaller 
area could be economic under the extensive system would be extremely difficult to 
prove’.165 Dooley has shown that there were official views of what size should be 
considered the standard for an economic holding. What is interesting from Dooley’s 
account is that the official view of the standard farm size was continually revised. For 
example, in the 1920s and 1930s the standard size was considered to be 20 acres. This 
rose to 25 acres in 1937. By 1947 25 acres was considered to be subsistence. In 1949 
33 acres was considered to be standard. This rose to 35 acres in the 1950s. By the 
1960s 45 acres of ‘good land’ was considered to be the standard, and by the 1960s 
and 1970s the view of 50 acres returned.166 Dooley commented on this changing 
official standard of what was an economic farm, stating: 
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By extension, this meant that there could be no solution to the problem of uneconomic 
holdings: as time passed one standard size would have to be replaced by another and the 
process of acquisition and division would have to commence all over again.167  
 
The fact is that commentators in the early twentieth century were aware of this 
problem of economic holdings, the 50 acre example cited above, but the official views 
on what constituted an ‘economic holding’/subsistence holding in the twentieth 
century were continually changed in response to different policy objectives. Dooley’s 
view was that ‘uneconomic’ holdings could not be made ‘economic’ because the 
target was continually revised. But it should also be acknowledged that it was known 
that small farms were uneconomic from an early time and government policy 
remained in wilful ignorance of this fact. As the farms were uneconomic, the choice 
was either to subsidise them or let them fail (commercial failure). Successive 
governments chose the policy of farm subsidisation, motivated by political rather than 
economic concerns. 
It would be interesting to review the arguments of J. R. Campbell and William 
P. Coyne by looking at the census returns for 1901 and comparing them to the number 
of holdings. In the 1901 census land was categorised under the following 
classifications: under tillage, grass, woods and plantation, turf bog, marsh, barren-
mountain, and roads, fences etc. Of the land in Ireland, 75 per cent was suitable 
farmland, divided between tillage and pasture. With the majority of the land being 
under grass, land devoted to tillage was 43 per cent of the land devoted to pasture.168 
These statistics are shown in figures 7.28 and 7.29 at a provincial level. 
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Figure 7.28  
Percentage ratio of farmland (tillage and pasture) to total land in 
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Source: Census of Ireland, 1901. 
 
Figure 7.29  
Percentage ratio of tillage to pasture in 1901
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Source: Census of Ireland, 1901. 
 
In both figure 7.28 and 7.29 Connaught has a lower percentage ratio of arable land to 
total land, and a lower percentage ratio of tillage to pasture compared to the other 
three provinces. 
In terms of the holdings, it is possible to compare the average holding size with 
a ‘minimum’ of 50 acres, to see whether or not land holdings in 1901 conformed to 
this rough estimate of an economic holding. The census figures do not give an 
indication as to the variance in the quality of the farm land, something which is key to 
the question of economic holdings. It could be argued that the viability of 50 acres 
would depend on the type of holding.  
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Figure 7.30  
Number of landholdings in 1901, actual and minimum
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than using all available land. The ‘actual’ are the number of landholdings as returned in the agricultural 
statistics. 
Sources: Census of Ireland, 1901, and Agricultural Statistics of Ireland, with detailed report on 
Agriculture for 1902, [Cd. 1614], H.C. 1903, lxxxii, 309. 
 
 
If 50 acres was the size of an economic holding, figure 7.30 would suggest that there 
were a lot of holdings that were uneconomic. In fact using this methodology 48.46 per 
cent of landholdings were uneconomic.169 The belief at the time, and as practised by 
the CDB and Estates Commissioners, was that the number of holdings had to be 
amalgamated. The ‘minimum’ of 50 acres shown in figure 7.30 is calculated by 
dividing the area of farmland by 50. In reality not all holdings were comprised of only 
farmland, and were comprised of all available land. Also, the minimum in figure 7.30 
does not take the quality of farmland into account, and there was a high degree of 
variance in land quality.   
Given that the aim of the CDB and the estates commissioners was to create 
economic holdings from non-economic holdings, and that their policy was to do so by 
purchasing untenanted land, the success of such a policy would be marginal at best. 
Land is a scarce resource, and although increases in farmland can be achieved by land 
reclamation and drainage schemes, these are costly to undertake. For example, using 
the 1901 census, if all marsh land was drained, this would have increased the 
available farmland by roughly 3 per cent. But many contemporaries were 
unconvinced of the returns to drainage and as a result it was not widely undertaken. 
The condition of uneconomic holdings could have been improved with increased 
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investment in livestock and fertilisers, but even at this a saturation point would have 
been reached when diminishing returns to capital would set in. One possible solution 
to the ‘land question’ would have been to reduce the number of people directly 
earning a living from the land and to increase the average size of holdings to levels 
that would make them economically viable. The lack of industrial development in 
Ireland meant that emigration would have been the only way to achieve this goal. Co-
operative organisation can make small holdings more economically viable, through 
the combined effort in marketing and distribution, but to ensure economic viability 
efforts must be made to consolidate land.  
Another difficulty with land purchase that emerged in Ireland after the land 
purchase acts had been passed was the low turnover of land in Ireland, with both 
Crotty and Dooley making reference to this fact.170 In fact, Dooley stated that there 
was a very low turnover of land ownership in Ireland until the 1980s.171 Crotty was 
highly critical of this and saw it as a misallocation of land in Ireland, with land being 
held by owners rather than being sold to another farmer who might be able to derive 
greater use from it.172 Dooley has suggested that this was a reflection of Irish ‘land 
hunger’, but Crotty was critical of such ‘subjective’ explanations and wanted to find 
the underlying causes that created cultural constraints on Irish agricultural 
development, stating that: 
It is common in Ireland nowadays to explain, or to explain away, the outstanding 
characteristics of its agriculture in terms which are mainly subjective and to the 
economist quite unsatisfactory. Resistance to change, individualism, unwillingness to co-
operate with official and semi-official bodies, a preference for holding assets in liquid 
bank deposits rather than investing them in farming, “land hunger” – these are subjective 
phenomena which are unusually prevalent in the Irish countryside. But it is pertinent to 
inquire into the nature of the underlying material facts which give rise to these subjective 
attitudes or to their exceptional prevalence in Ireland.173  
 
 If we analyse the Irish land situation there seems to have been an endowment 
effect associated with land ownership in Ireland.174 This endowment effect caused 
land owners to value land more highly than did the market and as a result these land 
owners were unwilling to sell their land. Social pressures also precluded sale, as to 
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sell land was seen as social failure. Another factor which hampered the consolidation 
and rationalisation of land in rural Ireland was the social value of land. Land 
ownership, regardless of size, had a status effect in rural Irish society. This status 
effect in turn fed the endowment effect and, therefore, it would have been difficult to 
consolidate small holdings. As a result the long-term financing of land purchase 
schemes in order to encourage ownership transfers was not a profitable investment, 
and it did not encourage the efficient use of land in Ireland. The social goal of peasant 
proprietorships had been accomplished, but at the cost of economic efficiency. As was 
stated above, this social goal also had a legacy effect; many of the farms purchased 
were uneconomic, inefficient and required further government subsidies.  
In outlining the above argument, it must be acknowledged that it was not a 
widely held view. The final report of the royal commission on congestion argued that 
the average holding size in acres was not a reliable indicator for an economic holding, 
and they preferred to use tax assessments, Griffith valuations, as indicators of the 
economic capacity of a holding.175 
As discussed previously, one of the main roles of the CDB was as a purchaser 
of land in the congested districts. The CDB outlined its views on land redistribution in 
its seventh report in 1898, stating that: 
We regard the improvement and enlargement of holdings, through purchase and re-sale 
of estates to the tenants, as likely to prove, if wisely and prudently carried out, the most 
permanently beneficial of the measures it is in our power to take for bettering the 
condition of the small occupiers in certain of the congested districts. The same remark 
holds good of migration schemes also, provided the difficulties involved in moving 
occupiers to a distance from their homes can be overcome. It is evident that agriculture 
must always be the chief industry and support of the population of the inland districts, 
and it is no less certain that a very large number of occupiers have not sufficient land, 
regard being had to both quantity and quality, to give full employment to their labour or 
to afford them a bare subsistence.176  
 
The CDB would purchase estates and reorganise holdings before selling them to 
tenants under the terms of the land acts. In 1899 the CDB stated that: 
The difficulties that have been encountered in re-striping some estates, that is, in 
squaring and re-arranging the holdings so as to make each as compact and convenient as 
possible and not less in annual value than before, can only be appreciated when the 
manner in which the land is sub-divided has been fully explained. On many estates in the 
west where we have purchased additional land, a grazing farm for example, and are thus 
enabled to considerably increase the size of all the old holdings it is a comparatively easy 
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matter to satisfy the tenants, but where, and this must occur in many cases, very little 
land can be added to the existing holdings, the problem becomes a difficult one.177  
 
Some of the arguments during the debates in 1903 and 1909 prior to the 
introduction of the land purchase acts came from those exhorting the compulsory 
purchase of grazing lands and advocating their redistribution to small farmers. The 
belief was that if grazing lands were redistributed it would improve the economic 
circumstances of tenant-purchasers. This line of thought continued throughout the 
twentieth century in the 26 counties and land policy was targeted at breaking up large 
tracts of grazing land.178 The proponents of this argument sought to redistribute 
grazing land to augment available land for farmers, although they did not make it 
clear whether they wanted to use the land for extensive tillage or for smaller scale 
grazing. Given Ireland’s comparative advantage in grazing in the late nineteenth 
century, any largescale break up of grazing land would have been an uneconomic 
investment.  
An early example of such land redistribution policy based on the redistribution 
of grazing can be seen from some of the activity of the CDB. In 1893 the CDB 
acquired the Ffrench estate in Co. Galway, and in the third report of the CDB gave an 
outline of the redistribution work. Prior to the CDB acquiring the estate, the total 
acreage of the estate was 1,419. This was divided between grazing, 350 acres, bog and 
woods, 208 acres, and agricultural tenancies, 861 acres. The attraction of grazing to 
landlords is discernible from the description of rental income. Bog and woodlands did 
not contribute a ‘rental’ income but this is possibly a misrepresentation of the 
marketable value of turf and wood as fuel; agricultural tenants paid £400 9s 0d in rent, 
and grazing paid £182 10s 0d in rent. Tenancies paid more rental, more than double, 
but required more land. If this is broken down to rental per acre and rental per 
tenancy, the results are as follows, given that there was one grazier, grazing paid 
£0.52 per acre versus £0.46 for agricultural tenants, and rental per grazing tenants was 
£182 versus £5.33 for an agricultural tenant. There were 75 agricultural tenants on the 
Ffrench estate, and after CDB intervention and redistribution there were 77. Before 
redistribution land per agricultural tenant was 11.48 acres and after redistribution this 
was raised to 15.72 acres, an increase of 36 per cent. In the third report of the CDB it 
was stated that: 
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The land available for distribution, owing to the surrender of the grazing holding, was 
not sufficient for the enlargement of all the small holdings to any material extent, and it 
was therefore decided to apportion it among the tenants whose judicial rents did not 
exceed £7 a year each. The tenants whose rents exceeded that amount did not get any of 
the grazing holding, but every tenant on the estate got a stripe of turbary and cut-away 
bog added to his holding free of rent, and in nearly every case the quantity of turbury 
given will yield a supply of fuel for upwards of sixty years.179  
 
This case was also problematic in that when the CDB acquired the grazing land 
it was not able to dispose of it immediately due to the fact that ‘most of the small 
occupiers were absent in England as “migratory labourers”.’180 As a result the CDB 
had to re-let the land for grazing.  
If this case is treated as a microcosm of the grazing question in Ireland, one 
might deduce that such a land redistribution policy would not be a solution to the 
economic problems of the Irish agricultural sector. Land is a fixed resource, and 
transfers from graziers to tenant purchasers would not have been sustainable in the 
long run, mainly because it decreases the amount of available farming land, i.e. if 
people built more houses and fences, this would lead to a decrease in the amount of 
land for grazing purposes,181 making the policy self-defeating. Trends in England and 
Europe had been towards consolidation of agricultural holdings in order to secure 
economies of scale. This would not have been possible via a disintegration of land 
holdings, unless farmers were able to consolidate their land through co-operative 
action. Interestingly, after the reorganisation of the holdings on the Ffrench estate 
many failed to increase their valuation to the £10 standard that was used as a 
benchmark.182 This illustrates the limitations of such policies.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
The Irish ‘land question’ was a complex problem, and one which land purchase by 
itself could not solve. Land purchase schemes became an integral part of government 
policy from 1885 onwards. The analysis of the land purchase schemes is often 
ideologically motivated and focuses on the political element while neglecting 
economic analysis. In some cases the writing is teleologically motivated and the ‘land 
question’ is analysed up until the split between north and south, but the analysis is not 
continued any further.  
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This chapter has argued that the land purchase schemes were successful in what they 
intended to do, which was to create a peasant proprietorship in Ireland. This was 
achieved by making the land purchase more accessible to all who wanted to purchase 
their land.  It could not have been achieved within the available financial 
infrastructure of the time. The microfinance institutions that have heretofore been 
discussed in this thesis would have been unable to match the financial conditions that 
the government land-purchase schemes offered to tenants.  
Given that the majority of microfinance institutions that we have discussed only 
made short-term loans, were the land purchase schemes the completion of the market 
and were they correcting a market failure? No, there was a long-term mortgage 
market in Ireland prior to the land acts, but it was inaccessible to the majority of 
tenants. The private market would not have been able, or willing, to finance the land 
purchase on the terms or scale that the state offered and implemented under the 1903 
land act. There was little screening done, something that one would expect a rational 
profit-maximising lender to do. The land purchase schemes were politically motivated 
by the social goal of creating a peasant proprietorship, but this political motivation 
blinded people to the fact that many of the farms were uneconomic and inefficient. 
The land purchase acts were in many respects similar to the other microfinance 
institutions discussed heretofore in this thesis in that they were motivated by social 
rather than economic objectives. In the case of land purchase programmes emphasis 
was given to solving the ‘land question’ by transferring ownership from landlords to 
their tenants, but this was done without taking into consideration why the private 
market could not do the same. The reason why the private market would not lend to 
tenants to purchase land on long-term mortgage was because of the fact that there was 
a high risk attached to it; this was based on the fact that the majority of farms were 
small. In 1917, excluding landholdings under 1 acre, 64.50 per cent of land holdings 
were under 30 acres.183 If we use the criteria that 50 acres was the minimum 
commercially viable farm size, referred to above, this suggests that the majority of 
Irish farms in 1917 were uneconomic. So if we look at the absence of widespread 
mortgage lending from this perspective, it could be argued that there was no market 
failure as private lenders knew that there was a high risk of default. It was also shown 
that there was a significantly high level of arrears, something to suggest that long-
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term lending to Irish agriculturists was not a profitable venture. We should also take 
into consideration the fact that there was a high emotive attachment to the land and, as 
was stated above, if a borrower defaulted it would have been very difficult to 
foreclose and re-sell the land. 
The land acts and the land purchase schemes effectively reduced the cost, i.e. 
rent, of farming and therefore increased the income from farming. The following 
figures will look at a hypothetical simulation of what would happen if rents were 
reduced by a figure of 20 per cent, as was the case under the judicial rents system 
introduced under the 1881 Land Act to Ireland, and the subsequent land purchase 
arrangements.184  
The data are taken from Mitchell’s British historical statistics,185 and are an 
estimate of UK farm incomes and rents. The logic for using UK farm incomes and 
rents is that they would have been subject to the same economic conditions regarding 
international competition. The data from Mitchell’s are a time series and can be used 
to illustrate what would happen to agricultural income if rents were decreased.   Rent 
decreases in Ireland took two forms. One was direct rent reductions through judicial 
intervention in agrarian land contracts, and the second was through land purchase 
schemes where land was sold to farmers under concessional interest rates, and annual 
repayments were designed to be lower than prevailing rental rates. It would be 
interesting to see what effect this could have by assuming a 20 per cent reduction in 
all cases, and applying this to the UK agricultural data.186 Assuming rent reductions 
begin in 1885 and continue throughout the period, figure 7.31 shows the difference 
between rent before and after such rent reduction.  
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 The statistics in Mitchell do not indicate whether the data on rents have already been corrected for 
rent reductions. The assumption here is that they have not. 
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Figure 7.31  
UK rent 1855-1919
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, British historical statistics (Cambridge, 1988). 
 
Figure 7.31 assumes a structural break in rents at 1885. If the data from Mitchell’s 
include the rent reductions, then figure 7.31 is a 40 per cent reduction in rents which 
will further illustrate the point regarding the effect of rent reductions on disposable 
income. 
Figure 7.32  
UK farm income
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The policy of judicial rent reductions and land purchase led to reductions in 
agricultural rents in the region of 20 per cent. Assuming rents decreased by 20 per 
cent per annum, this decrease is transferred to the income of farmers as they would no 
longer have to pay that amount in rent. Rent was not the singular cause of 
profitability, as profitability relied on a number of exogenous factors. The question 
then is: what effect does a 20 per cent decrease in rents have on the hypothetical 
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income of a farmer? An estimate of this can be derived from the percentage change in 
the income excluding a rent decrease and the income including a rent decrease. A 20 
per cent decrease in rents can have an immediate impact of increasing farm income by 
up to 50 per cent, but then subsequent impact of rent decreases does not have the 
same marginal effect on income. To give a better impression of the effect of rent 
decreases on farm income, figure 7.33 is an illustration of growth rates in farm 
income. Given that rent decreases were constant, would this lead to constant growth 
in farm incomes?  
Figure 7.33  
Growth rates in farm income, including and excluding rent 
decreases, 1856-1919
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, British historical statistics (Cambridge, 1988). 
 
Farm incomes fluctuated with the price levels of agricultural products, and not 
with the levels of rent. If rents did not exist, incomes in commercial farming would 
still be dependent on prevailing price levels.  The importance of prices in terms of 
agriculture was acknowledged by Lord Faber in the debate on the Thrift and Credit 
Banks Bill in 1910 (discussed in chapter 6).187 Faber cited the importance of prices to 
agriculture, and also the fact that many continental European countries had 
implemented tariff policies to protect their agricultural sectors. Faber stated that:  
Speaking from a commercial point of view I have no hesitation in saying that from 1880 
till now the lending of money merely on agricultural land has been a dangerous 
proceeding to the lender unless the margin has been very large. All these matters depend 
on the price of produce. The price of produce has been low until the last year or two…It 
is all a question of the price of produce. I should have thought that it would not have 
passed the wit of man to decide on some policy which would give cheap food to the 
towns and also a little help to agriculturists by such a system as the bounty system on 
home produce. But this is not the moment to discuss that matter.188 
                                                 
187
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The largest rise in farm income came at the onset of the First World War which 
coincided with considerable price increases and the existence of guaranteed markets 
because of the decrease in UK imports. Dooley when commenting on the negative 
aspects of the war cited the fact that emigration outlets were closed, land purchase had 
been curtailed, and the CDB had to put a halt to its estate-purchasing activities.189 But 
this was counterbalanced by the high prices experienced during the War, so much so 
that Dooley stated that ‘Irish agriculture had rarely, if ever, had it so good’.190  
To continue to increase the income of a farmer in the manner of rent decreases 
can only be achieved by continually reducing the rent paid by a farmer until it reaches 
the level of zero, and then possibly paying negative rents (i.e. subsidies) to farmers. 
Once a zero level of rents, or negative rents, is achieved will this enable farmers to 
compete with international competitors? The answer is no, as reducing costs in this 
manner does not address the efficiency advantages that foreign agriculture production 
possessed. There are limits to what can be achieved through land reform of this type, 
and sooner or later the question of efficiency needs to be addressed. The issue of land 
reform was important in improving the condition of agricultural production in Ireland, 
but it was only one facet of land improvement; other areas also needed to be 
addressed which were neglected in the face of calls for land reform.  
To illustrate this point in the context of the areas under the jurisdiction of the 
CDB, table 7.20 shows rent as a percentage of the estimated income of twelve types 
of farming budgets. 
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Table 7.20: Rent as a percentage of estimated income in CDB households c. 
1893191 
Type of household Rent as a 
percentage of 
income (%) 
1. Good circumstances being derived from agriculture and 
fishing 
8.30 
2. Very poor circumstances agriculture and fishing 15.30 
3.Family in ordinary circumstances from agriculture, fishing 
and home industries 
7.35 
4. Family in ordinary circumstances –  agriculture, migratory 
labour, and home industries 
3.66 
5. Ordinary circumstances –  agriculture and earnings as 
migratory labourers 
12.61 
6. poor circumstances – agriculture and earnings as migratory 
labourers 
8.82 
7. Ordinary circumstances –  agriculture and home industries 9.66 
8. Ordinary circumstances –  agriculture and home industries 7.69 
9. Ordinary circumstances –  agriculture and home industries 7.69 
10. Ordinary circumstances – agriculture and home industries 10.66 
11. Receipts and expenditure of a family in ordinary 
circumstances, the receipts being derived altogether from 
agriculture 
21.88 
12. Poorest possible circumstances – agriculture and labour in 
the locality 
12.27 
 
Source: Appendix in First annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, pp 32-37. [C. 
6908], H.C. 1893-94, lxxi, 525. 
 
In the case of the congested districts (districts within the jurisdiction of the CDB) it is 
interesting to note that it was stated by Henry Doran in 1906 that there were ‘few, if 
any, estates in the congested districts without arrears’.192 Doran stated that it was the 
CDB policy to purchase these arrears when purchasing an estate, but that these arrears 
were not transferred to the tenant-purchasers.193 Given the low levels of rent in these 
districts, as illustrated in table 7.20, this suggests that the income from agriculture 
alone was not sufficient in the congested districts. Therefore, if loans were made to 
these tenants, the motivation was political rather than economic. 
This chapter has argued that perhaps land ownership was not the panacea for 
economic efficiency.  In 1903 Joseph Compton Rickett, Liberal M.P. for 
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Scarborough, warned of the limitation of land purchase as a policy of land reform. He 
cautioned that: 
We have also to remember that there are other improvements needed. A vast number of 
these farmers are very poor. A mere reduction of 15 per cent in their rent is not sufficient 
to make them capable farmers, or to bring their land to a cultivatable condition. To 
suppose that we shall change the condition of the population, and effect reformation in 
economic conditions simply by a reduction in rent is surely beyond the conception of any 
reasonable man.194 
 
Figure 7.34 shows the provincial distribution of landowners as a percentage of 
landholdings. These statistics were available in the Agricultural statistics of Ireland 
from 1906 onwards, and as such they suffer from the same data problems discussed in 
the fourth section of this chapter. But it is worth referring to the fact that by 1917 
Connaught had a larger proportion of owners as a percentage of landholdings than any 
of the other provinces.  
Figure 7. 34 
Provincial distribution of owners as percentage of holdings
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This may be a reflection of the work of the CDB who dedicated itself to land 
purchase and resale after the 1909 land act. But given the fact that endowment effects 
existed and continued to exist, this suggests a failed and counter-acting policy. 
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Figure 7.35  
Provincial distribution of landholdings in 1917 
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Given that Connaught had the largest percentage of owners to landholders in 1917, 
comparing this to the landholding distribution in 1917 shows that Connaught also had 
a larger proportion of small farms compared to the other provinces. While figure 7.34 
shows that the land purchase schemes were accessible to all, it also shows the limits to 
the land purchase policy. As it was, the province with the highest distribution of small 
landholdings had the highest proportion of owners as a ratio of landholdings. This 
would not have solved the structural problems associated with land distribution in 
Connaught; it may have made structural adjustment even more difficult. The creation 
of peasant proprietorship meant that owner-occupiers would be even more attached to 
their plot of land than they had been previously, and this would be an inhibitor to 
internal and external migration, and efficiency.   
An interesting feature of the land purchase policy was the issuance of 
guaranteed land bonds to fund the schemes. Figure 7.36 shows the number of Irish 
securities held by the POSB as a whole as a ratio of the deposits of the POSB in 
Ireland. This is an interesting facet to the land purchase policy which is often 
overlooked. There was a common belief that the land purchase acts were financed by 
the British exchequer. Turner (and in turn Hoppen)195 claimed that ‘the clever trick 
was that British capital was used to pay for the buyout’.196 But the truth was that in 
reality the initial funding came from diverse sources via the issue of land bonds.    
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Figure 7.36  
Irish securities of the POSB
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David Verdier has analysed the rise and fall of state banking in OECD countries, and 
he found that the supply side of state banking, or the willingness of states to enter the 
market, was the result of ‘class politics’.197 The demand for state banking he believed 
came from groups that were displaced by international competition and felt they 
needed access to credit.198 Verdier acknowledged the existence of state interference in 
savings markets: 
Finally, within the category of state banks, it is important to distinguish between deposit 
and credit banks. On the deposit side of state banking one finds postal savings, which 
were almost universally created in the second half of the 19th century to provide central 
treasuries with access to individual deposits and which are cheaper than bonds. One also 
finds systems of national savings in Britain and Belgium performing the very same 
function, although in the Belgian case, state control may have been initially decreed to 
consolidate fledgling private savings banks. I will exclusively focus on the credit side of 
state banking, that is, banks that are specialized and were founded to meet a strongly felt 
need for credit by a category of borrowers whose relative borrowing power from the 
capital market was below their political power.199  
 
 
Verdier felt that the UK savings bank system did not constitute state banking as 
he defined it, namely the ‘allocation of credit by the central government through so-
called state banks, which finance their needs by issuing state-guaranteed bonds’.200  
Gerschenkron believed that the role of an historian in analysing government 
economic policy ‘consists in pointing at potentially relevant factors and at potentially 
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significant relevant factors among them which could not be easily perceived within a 
more limited sphere of experience’.201  Applying this criterion we can see that state 
banking did in fact exist in nineteenth century and early twentieth century Ireland. 
Firstly, as was discussed in chapter 4, state intervention in savings markets does affect 
credit markets, since by definition banking deposits are needed to create credit (i.e. 
financial intermediation). Therefore, the intervention of the state in the savings market 
did affect the other microfinance providers analysed in this thesis, the loan funds and 
the Raiffeisen cooperatives. But more importantly from an Irish historical perspective, 
and an ironic twist to the story outlined in this chapter, is the fact that Irish savings 
were used to finance the purchase of Irish land.  
It was alluded to in chapter 4 that the savings bank funds were used to purchase 
government securities and the assumption was that these were Consols. But as was 
highlighted by the savings bank committee in 1858, the government securities 
purchased were not always Consols. The CRND could use the savings bank funds 
however they wished. The situation was clarified by the 1893 savings bank act, with 
government stock being defined as ‘two and three-quarters per cent Consolidated 
Stock, two and three-quarters per cent annuities, two and a half per cent annuities, 
local loans three per cent stock, and Guaranteed Land Stock’.202 It is the guaranteed 
land stock that is significant from an Irish perspective, as the land purchase schemes 
from the 1890s onwards were funded by the issue of government-guaranteed land 
stock.  
Given that Verdier described state banking as the issue of state bonds, it is quite 
clear that state banking did take place in Ireland. If we look at the ratio of these 
guaranteed land bonds to the deposits in the Irish wing of the POSB, shown in figure 
7.35, we can see clearly that the POSB played a significant role in the land purchase 
schemes of the late nineteenth century. What we can see in the land purchase schemes 
is largescale investment in Irish agriculture, but the investment did not take place 
along productive lines. The issuance of land bonds brought capital back to Ireland, but 
the capital was used to fund unprofitable and uneconomic ventures in Ireland, and it 
subsidised the Irish agricultural sector.  
It is also interesting to note that these land bonds became ‘worthless’ after the 
1933 Land Act as the government of the day defaulted on the repayments of the loans. 
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Under the 1933 Land Act annuities were not repaid to the British government. But 
coincidentally the annuities were still paid to the Land Commission. For example, in 
the last report of the Land Commission in 1987 it was reported that there was 
£5,819,334 due for repayment that year.203 The annuities have been described as a 
‘tax’ by Ó Gráda, and to some extent this is true as they were converted from a loan 
repayment into a tax. But they were not a tax before the default took place, so it is 
erroneous to say that they were ‘a tax levied on Irish peasant proprietors to pay for the 
cost to the (British) exchequer of compensating Irish landlords’.204 The debt default 
may also be an explanatory factor as to why landlords were reluctant to accept land 
bonds as payment in the years after the 1933 Land Act, as there would have been a 
fear of further debt default by the Irish Free State, and subsequent Republican, 
governments. 
This chapter showed how the land purchase policy was made more accessible to 
those involved in agriculture in Ireland. The long loan terms associated with the 1903 
and 1909 acts created an indebted agricultural class that continually complained of 
inadequate access to capital. Crotty believed that Irish agriculture stagnated as a result 
of the land purchase policies. Other commentators were also critical.  For example, 
Garvin noted: 
The British Land Acts had been motivated not by a wish to produce a vibrant Danish-
style commercial export-led agriculture, but rather by political and distributivist 
considerations, aiming at giving as many families as possible a reasonable living, by the 
modest standards of late Victorian times, on the land. The original ‘killing home rule 
with kindness’ policy consisted in the British government’s creation of the owner-
occupied Irish farmer. British governments scarcely concerned themselves with the 
dynamics of Irish economic development; from their point of view, the Irish economy 
was a trivial and rather hopeless part of the British economy, and Ireland was a suitable 
case for treatment by massive subsidy from the ample imperial exchequer. In effect, 
Whitehall wanted to keep the Paddies happy by throwing land and money at them, and 
de Valera found himself doing the same thing on a far smaller budget.205 
 
The land purchase policies may not have been needed throughout the Irish 
agricultural sector. The area of the island which required the most urgent treatment 
was in the west, yet the 1903 Land Act which was supposed to solve the land question 
gave preferential treatment to areas least in need. This in effect subsidised the entire 
agricultural sector. The use of land purchase policy, in the shape of subsidised loans, 
blindly created economic dependency for an unsustainable economic activity. The 
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continuation of the policy was path-dependent in that previous land acts established 
precedents and as some borrowers/voters had benefited other borrowers/voters wanted 
access to similar privileges. The fact that the land purchase policy took place within a 
democracy suggests support for Verdier’s view that a government pursues the policy 
because of the fact that there is electoral support for it. This also illustrates the hazards 
of a democracy in a politically undeveloped country. The low level of political 
development in the Irish Free State and Republic is something that has been 
bemoaned by Garvin.206 The policy of land purchase and government interference in 
land markets only ceased when Ireland joint the European Economic Community in 
1973 and it was forced to abide by EEC directives.207 The actions of the government 
land purchase policy may also be a political reason why the industrialised North of 
Ireland would not support an agrarian government, as such an agrarian government 
would tax industry in order to subsidise agriculture.  
In conclusion, as was outlined in chapter 3, Gerschenkron held an hypothesis, 
based on his analysis of the economic development of Germany and Russia, that in 
relatively backward economies banks, investment banks or government can substitute 
the role of private entrepreneurs in economic development.208 Ó Gráda has disputed 
the applicability of Gerschenkron’s hypothesis that government may act as a 
substitute in the process of economic development, arguing that it does not explain 
conditions in Ireland in the twentieth century.209 In chapter 3 we argued that this was 
not applicable in terms of Irish banks, but the evidence from this chapter illustrates 
the role of government in the Irish economy. Gerschenkron’s hypothesis can be seen 
in the land purchase policy schemes and their path dependence, although in this case 
providing a negative substitute. The government land-purchase policies created an 
indebted rural class, discouraged drives towards efficient use of land and also created 
inhibitors to the development of cultural norms that would be beneficial for future 
economic development. The government land purchase policies focused many 
agriculturalists on land purchase as the only solution of the ‘land question’ and 
blinded them to alternatives. 
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8 Emigration and microfinance; some evidence from Ireland in the latter 
nineteenth century 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Migration, remittances and microfinance are topical issues in contemporary 
development economics,1 and the focus of economists on these contemporary issues 
has influenced economic historians to do likewise.2 This chapter will apply 
contemporary development economic theory to an Irish context in the late nineteenth 
century. 
Emigration was one of the most salient features of nineteenth century Irish 
economic and social history. It was a widespread phenomenon, with all areas of the 
island experiencing some level of emigration. In fact, of all European countries, 
Ireland had one of the highest emigration rates per 1,000 population in the latter 
stages of the nineteenth century.3 A by-product of this stream of emigration was a 
supply of emigrant remittances, in the form of ‘passage money’ and ‘American 
money’, both to finance subsequent emigration and to contribute to household 
incomes in Ireland. 
The influence of emigration has been multifaceted. During this period there 
were also numerous microfinance institutions that offered financial services to low-
income groups. Irish historiography to date has noted the relationship between 
emigration and remittances, but has overlooked the relationship between emigration, 
remittances and microfinance. This, in effect, neglects the influence of emigration on 
the microfinance sphere.   
This chapter endeavours to explain how emigration, emigrant remittances and 
microfinance are interrelated. Firstly, this chapter will outline key features of Irish 
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emigration patterns and discuss the available evidence on remittances. Secondly, the 
chapter will trace key development in the establishment of public institutions which 
were specifically designed to facilitate the international transmission of remittances. 
The accessibility of post offices as a remittance transmitter will be emphasised, and 
aggregate country-level data on the volume of money order transfers through post 
offices will be analysed. Then, since local level data on remittance flows is currently 
unavailable, the chapter will investigate the spatial distribution of postal money order 
offices in Ireland during the period 1861 to 1911 and illustrate how it can be seen as a 
proxy for the distribution of emigrant remittances. The chapter will conclude by 
exploring how various formal and informal agents in the microfinance sector were 
affected by emigration and emigrant remittances.   
Given the paucity of information regarding informal remittances and 
disaggregate formal remittances, this chapter aims to illustrate how emigration played 
a significant role in the realm of microfinance. As it is a constituent part of a broader 
thesis on microfinance in Ireland in the latter nineteenth century, specific reference 
will be made to contemporary developments in formal suppliers of microcredit 
already in existence and new informal suppliers of microfinance, the family members 
who had emigrated. The goal of the chapter is to demonstrate the possibility that 
emigration influenced the market for microcredit by decreasing demand for existing 
microcredit services, thereby adversely affecting extant microcredit institutions, and 
that this coincided with remittances acting as substitutes for the existing supply of 
microcredit. 
 
8.2 Irish emigration and UK remittances 
 
In order to put this discussion in context, figures 8.1 and 8.2 will show the annual 
amount and rate of emigration from Ireland in the nineteenth century. It is important 
to stress that migration in Ireland came in the form of both permanent emigration and 
seasonal migration. The incidence of return migration was low for migrants to areas 
other than Great Britain.  It is also an interesting fact that the overwhelming majority 
of emigration in this period was self-financed. The reliability and accuracy of the 
available data on Irish emigration has been questioned.4 But the difficulty in 
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accurately measuring demographic variables must also be taken into consideration. 
For example, in a recent article in The Economist it was observed how difficult it is to 
keep a tally of migrant flows in the EU given the existence of free movement of 
labour,5 a feature that is similar to labour movements both within the UK and 
internationally in the nineteenth century. 
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1978), pp 261-263.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  ‘Open up: a special report on migration’ in The Economist (5 January, 2008), p. 4. 
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Figure 8.2  
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Source: W. E. Vaughan and A.J. Fitzpatrick, Irish historical statistics: population, 1821-1971  (Dublin, 
1978), pp 261-263. 
 
Figure 8.3 illustrates the distribution of Irish emigrants by overseas destination, 
excluding Britain, during the period 1841-1914. What is evident from figure 8.3 is 
that a large proportion of Irish emigrants went to the US. There are a variety of 
reasons for this, one of which was the cost factor. Excluding Britain, the US was one 
of the cheapest destinations to get to in terms of cost of passage and steerage; it took a 
shorter amount of time and hence less food was required for the trip. The initial cost 
advantage made further emigration patterns path-dependent as they were influenced 
by pre-existing emigration patterns.  
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Report of Commission on Emigration and other population problems, 1948-1954 (Department of social 
welfare ,Dublin , 1954), R. 84 (Pr. 2541). 
 
A noticeable fault line in figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 is that they do not include 
information for Irish ‘emigration’ to Great Britain. This is due to the fact that Ireland 
was part of the UK and there was free movement of labour between Ireland and Great 
Britain, so it is difficult to determine the number of annual migrants to Great Britain. 
This is somewhat compensated for by the fact that there is information on the number 
of Irish in Britain in both the English and Welsh and Scottish censuses, shown in table 
8.1. 
 
Table 8.1 The Irish-born population of Great Britain, 1841-1921  
Year GB % England % Scotland % Wales % 
1841 415,725 2.3 281,236 1.8 126,321 4.8 8,168 0.78 
1851 727,326 3.6 499,229 2.98 207,367 7.2 20,730 1.78 
1861 805,717 3.6 573,545 3.06 204,083 6.7 28,089 2.18 
1871 774,310 3.0 544,533 2.56 207,770 6.2 22,007 1.56 
1881 781,119 2.7 539,502 2.21 218,745 5.9 22,872 1.46 
1891 653,122 2.0 438,702 1.61 194,807 4.8 19,613 1.11 
1901 631,629 1.8 407,604 0.92 205,064 4.6 18,961 0.94 
1911 550,040 1.4 362,500 1.08 174,715 3.7 12,825 0.53 
1921 524,043 1.3 343,174 0.92 159,296 3.3 21,573 0.81 
 
Source: Table 1.2, Donald M. Macraild, The Irish in Britain 1800-1914 (Dundalk, 2006),p. 9. 
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Figures 8.1 and 8.2 support the statement made in the introduction that emigration 
was exceptionally common in Ireland in the latter nineteenth century. An outcome of 
the emigration process was that it established a supply of remittances that assisted 
many households in Ireland. Remittances can be defined as the transfer of a portion of 
income earned by emigrants from the country where they have immigrated back to 
their country of origin. Emigrant remittances can be transferred in either monetary or 
non-monetary form and also via formal and informal channels.  
Some modern studies have found no correlation between emigration and 
remittances, but, as Sander and Maimbo observed, emigration ‘is the underlying 
reason for remittances’.6 The existing evidence on emigrant remittances to the UK 
from the US, Canada and Australia comes mainly from the reports of the 
Commissioners of Emigration, and from Board of Trade records.7 The Commissioners 
of Emigration recorded remittance flows from 1848 to 1872. Then the Board of Trade 
continued the enumeration of remittance inflows until 1887.8 There are a number of 
issues relating to these statistics, mainly due to the fact that they were compiled from 
the voluntary return of banking houses and shipping agencies, and secondly they did 
not include any remittances sent through informal channels. Given these lacunae the 
Commissioners of Emigration warned that their figures should only be viewed as ‘an 
approximation to the sums actually sent home’.9 
The evidence from the Commissioners of Emigration and from the Board of 
Trade also assumed that all formal remittance flows were directed towards Ireland, 
but given that the flow of emigrants from all parts of the UK increased from the late 
1860s onwards this assumption may not be entirely valid.10 The picture we get from 
the combination of both sources is shown in figure 8.4. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Cerstin Sander and Samuel Munzele Maimbo, ‘Migrant remittances in Africa: a regional perspective’ 
in Samuel Munzele Maimbo, and Dilip Ratha (eds.), Remittances: Development impact and future 
prospects (Washington D.C., 2005), p. 59. 
7
 Thirty-third report of the Emigration commissioners, 1872, p. 78 [c. 768] H.C. 1873, xviii, 295 and 
Statistical tables relating to emigration and immigration from and into the United Kingdom in the year 
1887, and Report to the Board of Trade thereon, p. 18, H.C. 1888 (2) cvii, 43.   
8
 Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minnesota 1958, reprint 1997), pp 
106-107. 
9
 Thirty-third general report of the emigration commissioners, p. 78. [C.768], H.C. 1873. 
10
 For example Marjory Harper gives some discussion on Scottish remittances see: Marjory Harper,  
Adventurers and exiles: The great Scottish exodus (London, 2003), pp 93, 111, 153, 279, and 306. 
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Figure 8.4  
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Note: Remittances refer to pre-paid passages and bank drafts. The majority of remittances came from 
the US.   
Sources: Thirty-third report of the Emigration commissioners, 1872, p. 78 [c. 768] H.C. 1873, xviii, 
295 and Statistical tables relating to emigration and immigration from and into the United Kingdom in 
the year 1887, and Report to the Board of Trade thereon, p. 18 H.C. 1888 (2) cvii, 43.   
 
It must be stressed that the data represented in figure 8.4 are comprised of both 
monetary and non-monetary remittances. The non-monetary remittances were pre-
paid passages and their nominal value was included in the amount of remittances. For 
the years that statistics were given for the value of non-monetary remittances such as 
in 1867 where they constituted 37 per cent of the remittances or in 1870 when they 
comprised 45 per cent of the remittances, it appears that non-monetary remittances 
made up a significant portion of the remittances recorded by the emigration 
commissioners. But the fact that non-monetary remittances made up such a large 
proportion of these remittances gives us a better understanding of the real value of 
remittances sent in this fashion. The real value of pre-paid passages increased with the 
decreased opportunity cost of overseas travel, and a greater proportion of emigrants 
travelled by steam ship in the 1870s. In 1863 the proportion of people travelling by 
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steam vessel was 45.9 per cent, and in 1873 it had increased to 98 per cent.11 The 
costs of passage had decreased significantly over the course of the century. Brinley 
Thomas observed that ‘a passage to America had cost £20 in 1825, whereas by 1863 
steamships were charging only £4 15s. a head and sailing ships £2 17s. 6d’.12 
There is further evidence to suggest that the cost of travel continued to decrease 
over the course of the nineteenth century. There were a number of state-funded 
emigration programmes, and although the proportion of assisted migrants relative to 
the total number of migrants was low, 1.10 per cent,13 the schemes provide us with a 
source of information relating to the minimum cost of emigration from the period 
1851 to 1906. 
Figure 8.5  
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Source: First Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation 
of the Acts dealing with Congestion in Ireland; Evid. and Documents, p. 338 [Cd. 3267], H.C. 1906, 
xxxii, 621. 
 
The remainder of the remittances that were shown in figure 8.4, those other than 
pre-paid passages, came in the form of bank drafts sent from the banking institutions, 
exchange agencies, press agencies and immigrant support groups in the US, Canada 
and Australia to counterparts in the UK.14 The Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank was 
                                                 
11
 Brinley Thomas, Migration and economic growth: A study of Great Britain and the Atlantic 
economy (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1973), p. 39. 
12
 Ibid, p. 96. 
13
 This is the total number of assisted migrants as a percentage of the total number of recorded 
emigrants in the period 1851-1906; First Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into and 
report upon the operation of the Acts dealing with Congestion in Ireland; Evid. and Documents, p.338 
[Cd. 3267]. H.C. 1906, xxxii, 621; Source: W. E. Vaughan and A.J. Fitzpatrick, Irish historical 
statistics: population, 1821-1971  (Dublin, 1978), pp 261-263.  
14
 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Lines of credit, debts of obligation’: migrant remittances 
to Britain, c. 1875-1913’ in Economic History Review, lix, 3 (2006), p. 542. 
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an example of an immigrant support group that helped Irish emigrants transfer 
remittances. 15 
A fundamental problem with analysing remittance flows in the nineteenth 
century is the paucity of data. Firstly, remittances are in most cases private 
transactions and often do not leave formal records. The evidence shown in figure 8.4 
is incomplete in two senses; it consisted of the voluntary returns made by banking 
houses and it excluded informal transfers of monetary and non-monetary remittances. 
A recent study of emigrant remittances to the UK has attempted to estimate the 
volume of remittances received in the UK from UK emigrants, and to estimate the 
volume of remittances received in the UK from various countries.16 Magee and 
Thompson based their estimates on an equation that included the value of remittances 
sent via financial intermediaries and the Post Office. They then made estimates of the 
value of informal transfers, and estimates of the proportion of commercial transfers.17 
It is a laudable attempt, but their study is limited in a number of respects. The most 
noticeable is the fact that their estimates are based on estimated returns from financial 
intermediaries, the Board of Trade sources cited above. They also overlook some 
significant structural breaks in the Post Office transfers, discussed below, and there is 
also no way to validate their estimates of informal transfers. 
From an Irish perspective it is disappointing as the authors did not distinguish 
between Britain and Ireland, interchanging the words ‘Britain’ and ‘the UK’ 
throughout the article. For example, in the abstract for their article it was stated that 
‘Britain of the nineteenth century was a net recipient of migrant remittances. 
Surprisingly little, however, is known about the flow of such funds to the UK.’18 
What is surprising, or rather what seems to be oxymoronic, is that remittances in the 
form of contributions to the Irish Home Rule movement were included in their 
example of British remittances.19  
There was a significant difference in the relative importance of remittance flows 
to Ireland, a relatively backward economy, than to Britain, one of the leading 
industrial nations of the nineteenth century. This is a key distinction as Irish 
                                                 
15
 Cormac Ó Gráda and E.N. White, ‘The panics of 1854 and 1857: a view from the Emigrant 
Industrial Savings Bank’, Journal of Economic History, lxiii (2003), pp 213-40. 
16
 Gary B. Magee, and Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Lines of credit, debts of obligation’: migrant remittances 
to Britain, c. 1875-1913’ in Economic History Review, lix, 3 (2006), pp 539-577. 
17
 Ibid, p. 549. 
18
 Ibid, p. 539. 
19
 Ibid, p. 540. 
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emigration rates and trends differed significantly to those from Britain. In fact Magee 
and Thompson do not distinguish between migration destination for British and Irish 
emigrants. This is highly significant. For example, if one looks at the distribution of 
UK immigrants in the US by country of origin, shown in figure 8.6, one can see that 
Irish immigrants made up a significant proportion of UK immigrants to the US. In 
contrast British (English, Scottish and Welsh) emigrants made up a greater proportion 
of migrants to the Colonies.   
Figure 8.6  
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Source: Appendix 4, tables 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 in Brinley Thomas, Migration and economic growth: 
A study of Great Britain and the Atlantic economy (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1973), pp, 382-286. 
 
Another major distinction that was not made was the ratio of skilled to unskilled 
migrants. For example, Magee and Thompson stated that remittances from South 
Africa ‘grew extremely rapidly in the nineteenth century’. They believed that this 
growth was due to presence of Cornish miners.20 If we look at the Irish experience of 
emigration to South Africa we can see that it made up a negligible proportion of the 
aggregate number of recorded Irish emigrants and that these emigrants were outliers 
in terms of their skill distribution,21 whereas the Irish experience of emigration to the 
US shows a high proportion of unskilled emigrants. The skill level of emigrants is 
important as it determines what wages immigrants can expect to earn. This in turn has 
implications for Magee and Thompson’s estimates for the proportion of wages 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, pp 556-557. 
21
 Donald Harman Akenson, The Irish Diaspora: a primer (Belfast, 1996), p. 124. 
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remitted by emigrants,22 and their use of such figures as proxies for the level of 
‘connectedness’ with home societies.23 Magee and Thompson stated that:  
The South Africans and New Zealanders were typically the most generous colonial 
remitters. In fact, up until the second half of the 1890s they matched, if not exceeded, 
Americans in the sums of monies they were willing to remit.24 
 
But this did not take into account the skill distribution of emigrants to both 
regions. For example, if we look at figure 8.7 we can see that there was a lower ratio 
of skilled to unskilled for Irish immigrants to the US than for the other UK polities. 
Figure 8.7  
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Source: Appendix 4, tables 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 in Brinley Thomas, Migration and economic growth: 
A study of Great Britain and the Atlantic economy (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1973), pp, 382-286. 
 
 
8.3 The Post Office and remittances 
Post Office networks were important institutions in terms of their facilitation of both 
formal and informal remittances. The UK Post Office provided key financial services 
in the nineteenth century and it was also the conduit for sending and receiving letters. 
                                                 
22
 Gary B. Magee, and Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Lines of credit, debts of obligation’: migrant remittances 
to Britain, c. 1875-1913’ in Economic History Review, lix, 3 (2006), table 4, p. 562. 
23
 Ibid, p. 562. 
24
 Ibid, p. 561. 
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The importance of the development of nineteenth century postal networks should be 
stressed as it was an accessible service to both remitters and receivers, in the UK and 
all major emigrant destinations. Developments in the postal infrastructure in the UK 
in the nineteenth century played a key role in facilitating the transmission of 
information and remittances from emigrants to their homelands, although the 
importance of postal developments seems to be overlooked by economic historians.25  
In terms of a discussion of remittances in the context of an Irish experience one 
avenue that should not be ignored is the postal money order department. Money 
orders were a secure means to transfer money via the Post Office, so that rather than 
sending cash the Post Office would send a note that could be converted into cash at a 
money order office. The money order information is also interesting as it is an 
example of micro-transfers.  
Postal money orders started as an informal money order service run by 
employees in the Post Office from the late 1700s, and it was not until 1838 that the 
service was transformed into a formal institution. 26 It is difficult to get an estimate of 
money order activity before 1838. The Postmaster General could not give any returns 
based on money order activity in 1835 as he said that ‘the money order office is a 
private establishment, and the business carried on by private capital’.27 The Post 
Office money order service had a ceiling on the amount that could be sent per money 
order. From 1838 to 1862 the ceiling was £5, it was raised to £10 in 1862 and this 
ceiling remained in place until 1904 when it was raised to £40.28 The money order 
system was specifically for the transmission of small amounts of money. This point 
was reiterated by the Postmaster General who stated that ‘the money order system 
affords the means of safely transmitting sums of moderate amount, and larger sums 
should be sent in the form of crossed cheques, bills of exchange, half notes, or 
through a bank’.29 
Stanley Jevons, writing in 1883, gave a description of how the money order 
service worked: 
                                                 
25
 An article by Richard R. John laments the economic historians’ lack of interest in postal systems; 
Richard R. John, ‘Postal systems’ in Joel Mokyr (editor in chief), The Oxford encyclopedia of 
economic history, vol iv (Oxford, 2003), pp 315-318. 
26
 The post office an historical summary (London, 1911), p. 102. 
27
 Return of poundage charged by Postmasters in G.B. and Ireland on Money-Orders, 1832-34, H.C. 
1835, (294), xlviii, 379. 
28
 The post office: an historical summary (London, 1911), pp 104-105. 
29
 Eighth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, pp 10-11. [2984] H.C. 1862, xxvii, 393. 
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In safety and eventual certainty of acquittance, money orders leave little to be desired. 
The payer has only to walk to the nearest Money Order Office; wait five or ten minutes 
while other customers are being served; fill up a small application form; decide, after 
mature deliberation with the postmaster, and reference to a private official list, upon the 
Money Order Office most convenient to the payee; then wait until the order is duly filled 
up, counterfoiled, stamped, etc.; and finally hand over his money, and his work is done, 
with the exception of enclosing the order in the properly addressed letter. The payee, too, 
may be sure of getting his money, if all goes well. He need only walk to the Money 
Order Office named, sign the order, give the name of the remitter, and then the 
postmaster, if satisfied that all is right, and if furnished with the indispensable advice 
note from the remitting office, will presently hand over the cash. But sometimes the 
advice note has not arrived, and the applicant must call again; not uncommonly the 
payer, with the kindest intentions, has made the order payable at a distant office, 
imagining, for instance, that Hampstead Road Post Office must be very convenient to a 
resident of Hampstead Road.30   
 
From 1838 until 1860 the statistics of money order activity were published in 
the annual reports of the Postmaster General. Using these statistics it is possible to get 
a view of money order flows, and to use these as an indicator for micro-level 
remittance flows within the UK. It must be highlighted that the postal money order 
service was not solely used for the purposes of emigrant remittances, but its uses were 
varied and it was used to pay for goods and services in different parts of the UK. 
Magee and Thompson were aware of the distinction between commercial payments 
and remittances,31 but the same distinction was overlooked by Schrier.32 From the net 
flows of remittances, and evidence from the profitability of the money order service in 
Ireland, we can get an indication of the amount of micro-level remittances sent 
through the Post Office in Great Britain and Ireland. 
To illustrate the significance of the Post Office money order service in the mid-
nineteenth century, figures 8.8 and 8.9 show the gross amount of money orders sent 
and received in England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland respectively. The 
information on money orders in Ireland and Scotland has been illustrated in a separate 
graph as money orders sent and received in England and Wales made up the largest 
proportion of money orders. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 William Stanley Jevons, ‘Postal notes, money orders, and bank cheques’, in Methods of social 
reform and other papers (London, 1883), p. 308. 
31
 Gary B. Magee, and Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Lines of credit, debts of obligation’: migrant remittances 
to Britain, c. 1875-1913’ in Economic History Review, lix, 3 (2006), table 4, p. 551. 
32
 Ibid, p. 551.  
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Figure 8.8  
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Source: Postmaster General reports, various years. 
Figure 8.9  
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Source: Postmaster General reports, various years. 
 
From figures 8.8 and 8.9 we can see that there was a divergence between the amount 
of money orders sent and the amount received. If we subtract the amount of money 
orders received from those sent, shown in figure 8.10, we can get an understanding of 
the money order flows within the UK. 
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Figure 8.10  
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Note: The flows have been calculated by subtracting the amount (£) received from the amount (£) sent 
(sent (£) – received (£)) 
Source: Postmaster General reports, various years. 
 
The information in figure 8.10 shows that the flow of money order transfers made via 
the Post Office were negative in Ireland during the period 1846 to 1862. 33 Figure 8.10 
gives us an idea of the internal flow of transfer within the UK. The fact that Ireland 
was a net recipient of money order transfers from other parts of the UK is a reflection 
of both seasonal and permanent migration from Ireland to Great Britain. In 1865 the 
Postmaster General stated that: 
…the excess in the remittances to Ireland is mainly attributable to the employment of the 
Money Order Office by Irish reapers and hay-makers for the purpose of remitting to their 
own country the sums which they earn in England and Scotland. Some, indeed, have 
been known to use the Money Order Office for the purpose of transmitting their money 
from town to town along their whole route, by which means they have not merely 
avoided the risk of losing their money on the road, but have been enabled by repeatedly 
drawing it out and paying it in again, to satisfy themselves from time to time of its 
safety.34 
 
                                                 
33
 The flow is calculated by subtracting money orders received from the money orders sent. Therefore 
positive values indicate a greater number of money orders sent, and negative values indicate a greater 
number of money orders received. 
34
 Eleventh report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 12 [3558] H.C. 1865, xxvii, 583. 
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The low values that are initially recorded for Ireland can be explained by the fact the 
service was only formally introduced in 1838 and it would have taken time before the 
service was accepted and fully adopted by the population. If we look at the number 
and amount of money orders per 1,000 population in 1841, 1851 and 1861, we can see 
that there was a gradual increase in usage of the service.  
 
Table 8.2: Money orders sent and received (number and amount) per 1,000 
population, 1841-1861 
Year England and Wales Scotland Ireland 
 Sent 
 
Number 
per 1000 
Amount 
(£) per 
1000 
Number 
per 1000 
Amount 
(£) per 
1000 
Number 
per 1000 
Amount 
(£) per 
1000 
1841 30.34 50.45 19.67 30.91 6.54 9.44 
1851 216.34 419.35 134.88 245.41 59.94 99.69 
1861 322.10 623.98 191.72 360.03 91.42 171.26 
% 1851-
1861 48.89 48.80 42.14 46.70 52.51 71.79 
 Received 
1841 27.00 46.50 19.43 31.82 10.93 14.79 
1851 208.82 414.56 138.66 263.66 81.10 110.12 
1861 316.25 613.12 195.30 391.44 107.88 187.04 
% 1851-
1861 51.44 47.90 40.84 48.46 33.02 69.85 
 
Sources: Postmaster General Annual reports, and censuses of England and Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland. 
 
From the annual reports of the Postmaster General we can see that the amounts 
sent and received through the money order service were quite small, around £2 on 
average. In chapter 1, we saw that the average agricultural wage in the 1840s and 
1850s was between £6 and £8. So in relation to the prevailing wage levels and in 
terms of microfinance the money order service was significant. 
Information on the regional distribution was only sporadically published in the 
early reports of the Postmaster General, but using the available information it is 
possible to get an indication of the distribution and pattern of money orders in Ireland. 
Table 8.3 shows the net amount of money orders in major Irish towns and cities in 
1856 and 1857. The information was extracted from a table showing money order 
distribution throughout the UK. In 1857 the Postmaster General commented that ‘in 
many places more Money Orders were paid than issued…this no doubt arises from 
the practice of persons in the country sending money orders to towns in payment for 
 252 
goods. (sic.)’35 But from the available evidence it appears that this statement only 
holds true for Dublin and Waterford. The years shown in table 8.3 may also not be 
representative of the money order system in general, as it was stated that in 1857: 
There has again been a decrease in the amount of money orders paid in Ireland, but more 
than an equivalent increase in the amount issued; showing, as in previous years, a 
diminished habit of seeking for labour in England and Scotland (and, consequently, of 
sending money by Irishmen in Great Britain to their families in Ireland), and an increased 
command of money at home.36  
 
Table 8.3: Net postal money orders in major Irish towns and cities, 1856 and 
1857 
 
 1856 (£) 1857 (£) 
Belfast -2,869 -4,747 
Cork -7,815 -3,420 
Drogheda -2,544 -2,540 
Dublin 55,485 57,059 
Limerick -4,739 -3,530 
Londonderry -2,527 -3,104 
Waterford 1,028 1,981 
 
Note: These figures have been derived by subtracting the amount of money orders issued from the 
amount of money orders paid (Sent (£)- received (£)) 
Negative amounts indicate that the amount of money orders received was greater than the amount sent. 
 
Source: Fourth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office [2342] H.C. 1857-58, xxv, 549 
 
In the succeeding years there was a decrease in information regarding the 
distribution of money orders in Ireland in the Postmaster General reports. But the 
three major Irish cities were included in the list of money order activity in UK cities. 
As can be seen in tables 8.4a and 8.4b, the trend of the amount of money orders sent 
exceeding the amount of money orders received was most prevalent in Dublin. It must 
be noted that this was a feature similar to London. This may be a reflection of 
transfers from Dublin to other areas in Ireland, but as we do not have detailed 
information of all towns in Ireland it is difficult to determine the direction of internal 
flows. By contrast, the amount of money orders received in both Belfast and Cork, 
two other major cities, exceeded the amount that was sent. This is something that 
suggests that the money order system was used as a conduit for the transfer of 
remittances. 
 
                                                 
35
 Money orders issued refer to sent, and money orders paid refers to received: Fourth report of the 
Postmaster General on the Post Office , p. 20. [2342] H.C. 1857-58, xxv, 549. 
36
 Ibid, pp 19-20. 
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Table 8.4.a: Postal money orders in Belfast, Cork and Dublin, 1856 to 1870 
 Belfast Cork Dublin 
 
Issues 
(£) 
Payments 
(£) 
Issues 
(£) 
Payments 
(£) 
Issues 
(£) 
Payments 
(£) 
1856 41,506 44,375 30,062 37,877 266,043 210,558 
1857 40,946 45,693 31,213 34,633 274,905 217,846 
1858 41,881 49,174 31,289 35,580 285,297 227,927 
1859 41,000 55,335 33,540 37,905 305,743 234,798 
1860 44,,701 60,584 34,438 40,111 328,584 238,504 
1861 44,785 62,765 35,403 42,909 351,268 240,990 
1862 50,316 71,397 38,561 49,466 378,335 256,082 
1869 63,734 95,284 41,592 57,406 453,190 313,177 
1870 66,695 101,354 43,754 59,565 467,128 293,331 
 
Table 8.4.b: Net postal money orders in Belfast, Cork and Dublin, 1856 to 1870 
 
 Belfast (£) Cork (£) Dublin (£) 
1856 -2,869 -7,815 55,485 
1857 -4,747 -3,420 57,059 
1858 -7,293 -4,291 57,370 
1859 -14,335 -4,365 70,945 
1860 -15,883 -5,673 90,080 
1861 -17,980 -7,506 110,278 
1862 -21,081 -10,905 122,253 
1869 -31,550 -15,814 140,013 
1870 -34,659 -15,811 173,797 
 
Note: These figures have been derived by subtracting the amount of money orders paid from the 
amount of money orders issued (Sent- received). Negative amounts indicate that the amount of money 
orders received was greater than the amount sent. 
 
Sources: Information for the years 1856 to 1862 appeared in appendices of the following Postmaster 
General reports: Fourth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office [2342] H.C. 1857-58, xxv, 
549; Fifth report… [2493. Sess. 1] H.C. 1859, viii, 431; Sixth report… [2657] H.C. 1860, xxiii, 311; 
Seventh report…[2899] H.C. 1861, xxxi, 197; Eight report… [2984] H.C. 1862, xxvii, 393; and Ninth 
report…[3155] H.C. 1863, xxvi, 281. 
Information for the years 1869 and 1870 appeared in the Seventeenth Report of the Postmaster General 
on the Post Office [c. 438] H.C. 1871, xvii, 353 
 
Further corroboration that the money order service was used for the transfer of 
remittances is seen by the profitability of the Irish money order service. The UK 
money order service was profitable, as shown in table 8.5, but these profits came 
mainly in England and to a lesser extent Scotland. The Irish wing of the money order 
department was loss-making as the number of money orders received exceeded the 
number of money orders sent, and as such was cross-subsidised by the activities of the 
money order department in England and Wales. However, it must be acknowledged 
that the Irish Post Office in general was seen as a loss making commercial 
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enterprise.37 Whether or not the total costs relate to the money order office or the loss-
making activities of the Irish Post Office is uncertain. 
 
Table 8.5: Net profit of the money order service in 1854 
 Commission(£) Total costs (£) Net profit (£) 
England and Wales 18,550 14,471 4,079 
Ireland 1,642 2,113 -470 
Scotland 1,810 1,597 213 
UK 22,004 18,181 3,823 
 
Source: Return of sums received by Post Office for printed forms of application, for money orders, 
number of money orders issued, cost of expenses incidental to money order offices in G. B. and Ireland 
(519) H.C. 1854, lx, 15. 
 
From the 1860s the information on the money order service in the UK lacks the 
level of depth that existed in its previous 20 years as the Post Office reports only gave 
information on the total monetary value of money orders sent domestically in the UK 
and not the amount of money orders received domestically. This is shown in figure 
8.11, and table 8.6 shows the amount of inland money orders per person from 1841 to 
1911. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Mairead Reynolds, A history of the Irish post office (Dublin, 1983), p. 84. 
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Figure 8.11  
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Note: The Post Office money orders stopped using the normal calendar year (January-December) in 
1875 and switched to a bureaucratic calendar year (April-March). 
Sources: Postmaster General reports, various years 1854-1916. 
 
Table 8.6: Inland money orders sent (£) per person in England and Wales, 
Scotland and Ireland, 1841-1911 
Year England and Wales Scotland Ireland 
 £ £ £ 
1841 0.05 0.03 0.01 
1851 0.42 0.25 0.10 
1861 0.62 0.36 0.17 
1871 0.82 0.53 0.27 
1881 0.77 0.59 0.25 
1891 0.71 0.64 0.28 
1901 0.95 0.80 0.47 
1911 0.98 0.94 0.54 
 
Note: The Post Office money orders stopped using the normal calendar year (January-December) in 
1875 and switched to a bureaucratic calendar year (April-March), from 1881 to 1891. I have used the 
money order information for the years 1881-82, 1891-92, 1901-02, 1911-12. 
 
Sources: Postmaster General reports, various years 1854-1916, and census of England and Wales, 
Scotland and Ireland. 
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Another important development in the postal system in the UK was the establishment 
of the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) in 1861.38 The POSB was a savings bank 
that was targeted towards lower socio-economic groups, something which places it 
within the realm of a microfinance institution.39 Evidence of such a policy is seen by 
the fact that initially depositors were only allowed to save up to £30 per annum and a 
maximum ceiling of £150 was also set.40  
As was stated in chapter 4, the POSB was established on the premise that the 
Post Office staff already had experience and competence in dealing with cash 
transactions through its money order service. An example of the competence which 
was cited in POSB parliamentary debates was that between 1841 and 1860 only 
£5392 was lost through fraud out of £171,916,888 money orders that were sent, or 
losses of 0.003 per cent.41 As a result the newly established POSB branches were 
linked with the existing money order offices. This is a key development in the context 
of savings banks in the UK. Although the TSBs42 were in existence they did not offer 
a money transfer service.43 In the context of remittances the POSB now offered 
recipients of remittances sent via the Post Office the option of saving their money at 
the point of receipt, which opened the possibility for a spillover between the services.  
Another feature of money transfers which the POSB offered was the ability to 
withdraw savings from any POSB branch in the UK. This no longer tied savers to any 
one POSB branch, or to any one location. Over time there was an increase in the 
number of what the POSB called ‘cross entries’. These were ‘entries relating to 
deposits or withdrawals at banks other than those at which the person making the 
deposits or withdrawals opened their accounts’ (sic.).44  
An important development in the institutional structure of remittance flows was 
the establishment of an international postal money order service. The international 
                                                 
38
 The POSB began operating in England and Wales in 1861, and in Scotland and Ireland in 1862. 
39
 It would be most apt to define it as a microsavings institution. 
40
 As was stated in chapter four the limit was increased to £50 per annum by the 1893 Savings Bank 
Act. Given prevailing wage levels the initial ceiling of £30 was relatively high. This accounts for the 
high proportion of depositors from the professional classes. But the POSB did encourage the saving of 
small amounts of money; the lowest amount accepted was 1 shilling (£0.05).  
41
 Return of losses and defalcations in money order offices of G.P.O. in U.K, 1841-60, (148), H.C. 
1861, xxxv, 213. 
42
 TSB is an anachronistic term. It was first used in association with the old savings banks in 1863, but 
to distinguish between the POSB and the other savings banks they will be referred to as TSBs. 
43
 For some discussion on the earlier savings bank movement see: Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘The early history 
of Irish savings banks’ in UCD centre for economic research working paper series, WP08/04 
(February 2008). 
44
 Twelfth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 20. [3641] H.C. 1866, xxvi, 245. 
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money order system was built up gradually, with the first records of it being the 
money order services offered to British troops during the Crimean War. This led to 
the establishment of colonial money order services.45  In 1859 a colonial money order 
service was established between the UK and Canada46 and in the other British 
colonies shortly afterwards.47 In 1861 when the money order service was extended to 
Canada the Postmaster General made the following statement: 
This enlargement of the money order system has worked very satisfactorily, and will, I 
hope, soon lead to its extension to other colonies. Such an extension would, I am 
convinced, be productive of much good; would save much money that now probably 
runs to waste; would afford great relief to many weak or aged persons, separated by the 
broad ocean from the younger and more vigorous members of their family; and would 
materially promote self-supporting emigration.48 
 
Following the creation of the colonial money orders, agreements were made 
between the Post Office in the UK and foreign post offices to establish foreign money 
order services.   
Arnold Schrier stated that negotiations for the establishment of an American 
money order convention had been in consideration before the start of the American 
Civil War.49 But whether this was a realistic proposition is doubtful as the US postal 
system had not fully established an internal money order system at this stage. 
According to Howard Robinson, the US postal money order system originated during 
the Civil War as a way for troops to send money home.50 This is a development 
somewhat similar to the British colonial money order system, as the public service 
originated from military needs. An article from the New York Times in 1862 outlined 
the key developments of the British money order system and advocated that the US 
should adopt a similar system.51 This coupled with arguments from Robinson seem to 
indicate that the developments in the US postal system were directly influenced by the 
events in the UK. Negotiations to establish a money order convention with the US 
began in the late 1860s52, and an agreement was reached to establish a money order 
system between the US and the UK in 1871.  
                                                 
45
 Third report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 12. [2195] H.C. 1857 session 1, iv, 293 
46
 Sixth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 18. [2657] H.C. 1860, xxiii, 311. 
47
 Eighth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 11 [2984] H.C. 1862, xxvii, 393. 
48
 Sixth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 18 [2657] H.C. 1860, xxiii, 311. 
49
 Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minnesota 1958, reprint 1997), p. 
109. 
50
 Howard Robinson, The British Post Office: a history (Princeton, 1948), p. 380. 
51
 New York Times, 17 March 1862. 
52
 Fourteenth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 14. [4064] H.C. 1867-68, xxii, 
721. 
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A summary of the US-UK money order convention was given by The Economist: 
United States papers announce that preliminary arrangements have been completed for 
the interchange of postal money orders between Great Britain and the United States on 
and after 2nd of October. Of the 2,455 money order offices of the United States 570 have 
been authorised to issue postal orders on the postmaster at New York City for payment in 
the United Kingdom, and to pay orders issued by him for sums certified by the Post 
Office Department of that country for payment in the United States. These offices have 
been selected in all the states and territories with a view of accommodating the localities 
where the greatest numbers of such foreigners reside as will be likely to make use of 
them. All exchanges are to be made through the two government exchange offices in 
New York and London. In the United States applications can be made only for the 
equivalent in sterling of a certain sum of money in the United States currency, which 
latter amount being deposited at the local office is transmitted to New York, and there 
converted into a postal sterling draught at the current rate for gold on the day of its 
receipt. This draught is made payable by the British authorities in any designated locality 
of the kingdom. No single order will be issued for more than $50, but persons desiring to 
remit larger sums can obtain additional money orders. The rates of commission on these 
money orders range from 0.25 on orders not exceeding $10 to $1.25 for over $40 and not 
exceeding $50. (sic.)53  
 
From the UK perspective the monetary limit on US money orders was £10, with 
varying rates of commission. The limit on colonial and foreign money orders was 
increased to £40 in 1904, but a number of countries including the US did not 
reciprocate the increase in the money order limit.  Table 8.7 shows the commission 
charged on all UK foreign and colonial money orders. 
 
Table 8.7: Commission charged on foreign and colonial money orders, 1869, 
1883, 1897 and190454 
 1869 1883 1897 1904 
 £ £ £ £ 
Orders not exceeding £1 - - - 0.02 
Orders not exceeding £2 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Orders not exceeding £4 - - - 0.038 
Orders not exceeding £5 0.08 0.05 - - 
Orders not exceeding £6 - - 0.05 0.042 
Orders not exceeding £7 0.11 0.08 - - 
Orders not exceeding £10 0.15 0.10 0.08 - 
Orders not exceeding £40 - - - 0.0125 
for every 
additional 
£2, or 
fraction 
thereof 
 
Note: Commission rates were set in the years 1869, 1883, 1897 and 1904. 
Sources: The post office: an historical summary (London, 1911), p. 107. 
                                                 
53
 The Economist, 2 September 1871. 
54
 The commission charges have been decimalised, whereby £1=240d. 
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Table 8.7 shows the commission on money orders from the UK perspective, i.e. 
sending money from the UK to foreign or colonial destinations. But evidence from the 
committee on money orders in 1877 suggests that these charges were reciprocated by 
other postal systems participating in money order conventions.55 
Hancock alleged that there was Irish involvement in the establishment of the 
international money order exchange between the US and the UK.56 In an article 
written on the subject of emigrant remittances Hancock praised the role of William 
Monsell. Monsell was an Irish landlord and president of the Statistical and Social 
Inquiry Society of Ireland, and he was also a Liberal MP who held the position of 
Postmaster General from January 1871 to November 1873.57  
There was hope in Ireland that the new system would replace the other means of 
transferring remittances, namely bank transfers, pre-paid passages and money 
enclosed in letters.58 Whether the money order system superseded the pre-existing 
remittance facilities is unknown as the records ceased after 1887.59 But the continued 
growth in money order transfers seems to indicate that this may have been the case. 
The money order system that operated in the UK was a loss-making venture 
mainly due to the fact that there were a large number of small money orders being 
sent and the commission charged on these did not cover the cost of providing the 
service. This led to the introduction of a new postal order service in 1880 which 
facilitated the transfer of very small sums of money.60 The postal orders were 
extended throughout the British colonies and it was reported that in 1905 the postal 
orders had replaced money orders as a means of ‘sending small remittances’.61 
Other significant developments in the mechanisms for the transfer of small sums 
of money in the early twentieth century were the establishment of international 
telegraph orders and inter-colonial POSB transfers. Telegraphic money orders came 
into use in the late nineteenth century, and similar to the money orders the system was 
                                                 
55
 Committee of inquiry into the money order system, pp v-vi. (289) H.C. 1877, xvii, 261. 
56
 W. N. Hancock, ‘On the remittances from North America by Irish emigrants, considered as an 
indication of character of the Irish race, and with reference to some branches of the Irish labourers 
question’ in Journal of Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland , part xliv, (December 1873), p. 
282. 
57
 W. P Courtney, Rev H. C. G. Matthew, ‘William Monsell, first Baron Emly (1812-1894)’ in Oxford 
dictionary of national biography, xxxviii (Oxford, 2004), p. 671. 
58
 Ibid, p. 282.  
59
 There is some qualitative evidence to suggest that bank orders and cheques were still used to transfer 
remittances. 
60
 Post Office (Money Orders) Act, 1880, (43 & 44 Vict.), c.33; and Twenty-seventh report of the 
Postmaster General on the Post Office, p.6. [c. 3006], H.C. 1881, xxix, 583. 
61
 Fifty-first report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 10. [c. 2634] H.C. 1905, xxiv, 687. 
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a domestic service at first in the UK. Then subsequent international agreements were 
made to establish telegraphic money order exchanges between the UK and various 
countries. In 1907 the Postmaster General reported that the UK Post Office entered 
negotiations to establish a telegraphic money order exchange with the agencies of the 
Western Union Telegraph Company in the US and Canada.62 The negotiations were 
completed in 1909, and the Western Union telegraphic money orders commenced in 
1910.63 The 1904 POSB act enabled POSB account holders to transfer money from 
POSB accounts in the UK to POSB accounts abroad,64 and the Postmaster General 
reported that a large number of such transfers were made from the POSB in the UK to 
the Canadian POSB.65 In their estimates of remittances to ‘Britain’ Magee and 
Thompson did not include information on Telegraph money orders, as the service 
began too late in their period of inquiry.66  They also did they not make any reference 
to inter-Colonial POSB transfers, as they had overlooked it. 
From the foregoing narrative it can be seen that the post office played an 
important role as a mechanism for remittance transfers. Figure 8.12 is a summary of 
foreign and colonial money order activity in the period 1873-1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
 Fifty-third report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 11.[c. 3624], H.C. 1907, xxi, 349. 
63
 Fifty-sixth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 8. [c. 5270]. H.C. 1910, xlv, 165. 
64
 Fifty-second report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 12 [c. 3114], H.C. 1906, xxvii, 
595 
65
 Sixtieth-report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, 1913-14, p. 12 [Cd. 7573], H.C. 1914, 
xliv, 737.  
66
 Gary B. Magee, and Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Lines of credit, debts of obligation’: migrant remittances 
to Britain, c. 1875-1913’ in Economic History Review, lix, 3 (2006), p.554. 
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Figure 8.12 
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Note: The Post Office money orders stopped using the normal calendar year (January to December) in 
1875 and switched to a bureaucratic calendar year (April to March). 
Source: Annual reports of the Postmaster General on the UK Post Office. 
 
Although the data on remittances are limited, what figure 8.12 does tell us is that 
based on postal money order records, the UK was a net recipient of foreign and 
colonial remittances. 
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Figure 8.13  
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Note: The graph represents the monetary value of money orders received in the UK minus the 
monetary value of money orders sent from the UK. 
The Post Office money orders stopped using the normal calendar year (January to December) in 1875 
and switched to a bureaucratic calendar year (April to March). 
Source: Annual reports of the Postmaster General on the UK Post Office. 
 
Of the foreign countries, the largest exchange of money orders was with the US. The 
colonies provided an approximately equal share of money orders, but in the latter 
years covered by figure 8.13 the majority of the money orders came from Canada. As 
the majority of Irish emigrants went to the US, it is important to illustrate how much 
of the foreign money orders came from the US. Figure 8.14 shows the amount of 
money orders sent in the US to the UK and the amount in the UK sent to the US. As 
can be seen, the UK was a net recipient of money orders from the US. This is 
important because of the evidence that a significant proportion of UK immigrants in 
the US came from Ireland, as was shown in section 8.2 above. 
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Figure 8.14  
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Note: The Post Office money orders stopped using the normal calendar year (January to December) in 
1875 and switched to a bureaucratic calendar year (April to March). 
Source: Annual reports of the Postmaster General on the UK Post Office. 
 
Magee and Thompson stressed the importance of Post Office money orders stating 
that: ‘The volume of funds entering the UK in the form of money and postal orders – 
some £19,112,145 from the colonies alone between 1856 and 1914 – was certainly 
not negligible’.67 But given the importance which Magee and Thompson attached to 
the postal money order service it is striking that they do not make reference to the fact 
that there was a significant increase in money order limits in the early 1900s, from 
£10 to £40, referred to above. Magee and Thompson based their estimates on 
remittance flows on the Board of Trade data, cited in section 8.2, and on money order 
data outlined in this section. The increase in the limits was clearly significant, as can 
be seen in figures 8.12 and 8.13, something which suggests that there may have been 
a shift from bank transfers to postal money order transfers. This, it appears, has been 
overlooked by Magee and Thompson. As they used both bank transfers and postal 
money order transfers in their estimation of remittance flows, it is quite possible that 
                                                 
67
 Gary B. Magee, and Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Lines of credit, debts of obligation’: migrant remittances 
to Britain, c. 1875-1913’ in Economic History Review, lix, 3 (2006), table 4, p. 545. 
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their estimates may be biased as they could be double-counting the shifts from bank 
transfers to postal transfers. 
 
8.4 Money order offices and the Post office Savings Bank in Ireland, 1861-1911. 
The foregoing discourse highlighted the importance of the Post Office as a conduit for 
the transmission of remittances. Although the available source material does not at 
present permit us to determine the exact distribution of remittance flows in the 
nineteenth century, it is possible to use some proxy variables in order to determine the 
relationship between money orders and emigration. One such proxy variable is the 
spatial distribution of the money order offices over time.68 Data on the geographic 
distribution of post offices, money order offices, telegraph offices and postal annuity 
offices has been collected at census intervals from 1861 until 1911. The data for the 
period 1861 to 1911 were derived from directories of post towns in Ireland published 
in Thom’s Directory, and were cross-referenced with POSB branches listed in 
parliamentary returns.69 From a Post Office report in 1845 we know that there were 
330 money order offices in Ireland.70 From Thom’s Directory we can see that by 1911 
the number of money order offices had increased to 1,009.  
In order to assess this we need to know how significant was the increase and 
what caused the growth in the number of money order offices. It will be argued here 
that the growth in the number of money order offices in the late nineteenth century 
was demand driven, and that the demand mainly came from a growth in the number of 
money orders received in Ireland through the Post Office. Support for this argument 
can be seen in the following statement from the Postmaster General in 1866: 
Of these [money order offices] many were opened with a view to afford additional 
accommodation to the public by lessening the distance between their homes or places of 
business and a Money Order Office, and with a view also to relieve the chief Money 
Order Offices by distributing the pressure of Money Order business…It is right that I 
should here declare, both for my predecessors and myself, that this satisfactory result 
[profitability of the Post Office] has not been brought about by any special effort to 
produce a revenue from the Post Office. It was their practice, and it has been mine, to 
extend Post Office accommodation wherever such extension seemed to be required, and 
to incur any reasonable expense for the attainment of an adequate public good. If in the 
                                                 
68
 Maps of the spatial distribution of MO/POSB are found in an appendix to this chapter. 
69
 Tables showing for each Post Office and Trustee Savings Bank in Ireland open on 31st December 
and 20th November, 1912, respectively, the number of depositors' accounts, and the amount to the 
credit of those accounts in 1881, 1896, 1907, and 1912, together with a table of similar figures for 
Joint Stock Banks, and the percentages by which the total rental dealt with under the Land Law (I.) 
Acts between August, 1881, and April, 1913, has been reduced for a first or second statutory term; (in 
continuation of No. 119 of 1909), (272) H.C. 1913, lvii, 915. 
70
 Return of the places in U.K. having benefit of money-order post offices (433) H.C. 1845, xlvii, 213 – 
Derry was doubled counted in the return. 
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course of this prolonged and systematic endeavour to promote the public advantage we 
had not frequently declined to incur an expense which seemed likely to purchase no 
commensurate benefit for the public, it is more than probable not only that there would 
have been no surplus revenue to exhibit, but that there would have been no funds for the 
carrying out of many measures by which in the past ten years the whole community has 
benefited.71  
 
Further support for the view that the growth in money order and POSB 
institutions was demand driven can be seen by the fact that the Postmaster General 
expressed the view that it was not the intention of the Post Office to open money 
order offices or POSB branches in every Post Office. The reason given was that they 
were expensive to operate.72 If we look at the growth in the number of post offices 
over time we can see that there was some increase in the opening of new post offices, 
but that there was a higher growth rate in the opening of money order (MO) offices.  
The number of Post Offices, MO offices, MO/POSB branches, TSB’s and Joint Stock 
Bank branches are shown at various years from 1861 to 1911 in table 8.8. 
 
Table 8.8: Number of post offices, MO, POSB, Insurance and telegraph offices and 
TSBs in Ireland, 1861-1911. 
Year Post 
Offices a 
MO - 
send 
and 
receive 
b
 
MO, 
POSB, & 
Insurance 
and  
annuity b 
MO 
send 
only c  
Telegraph 
d
 
TSBs JS Bank  
branches 
e
 
1861 1,539 428 - - - 55 187 
1871 1,655 - 517 - 141 41 319 
1881 1,919 - 592 - 510 31 413 
1891 1,896 - 716 203 584 19 528 
1901 1,896 - 716 206 594 13 668 
1911 1,900 - 1,009 - 989 12 828 
 
Notes:  
a- Although the Postmaster General reports show a greater number of post offices in the later period 
covered in table 8.8, this is due to the fact that the Postmaster General reports include the number 
of post boxes which were an innovation in the period. 
b- Initially money order offices only sent money orders. From 1862 with the introduction of the 
POSB they also doubled up as the POSB and MO offices. The Post Office also operated an 
                                                 
71
 Twelfth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 18 and p. 36. [3641] H.C. 1866, xxvi, 
245. 
72
 Twenty-fifth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 53 [c. 2405] H.C. 1878-79, xxi, 
197. 
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insurance and annuity service but there was very little uptake on it in either Great Britain or 
Ireland.  
c- In 1891 and 1901 there was a list of money order offices that only sent money orders and did not 
receive any money orders. 
d- Telegraphs were nationalised and placed under the administration of the Post Office. 
e- Joint stock bank branches refer to the number of branches operated by the individual joint stock 
banks in Ireland. Some operated in the same towns, so as such they are spatially correlated. 
 
Sources: Thom’s Directory, 1861-1911. 
 
Table 8.8 shows that after the introduction of the POSB, MO offices were no longer 
distinct institutions and that they were linked to the POSB and post office insurance 
and annuity schemes. This was a deliberate policy, as was shown in the preceding 
discourse, and the policy was reaffirmed in successive Postmaster General reports.73  
The provincial distribution of MO offices, POSB branches and population is 
shown in table 8.9.74 Table 8.9 suggests that the distribution of the institutions is 
strongly correlated with population distribution. But it is interesting to note that the 
distribution of the money order offices that only sent money orders and did not 
receive them in 1891 and 1901 was heavily concentrated in Ulster.  
 
Table 8.9: Percentage distribution of Money Order offices, Post Office Savings 
Banks and Population by province, 1845-1911 
 Connaught Leinster Munster Ulster 
 MO/POSB POP MO/POSB POP MO/POSB POP MO/POSB POP 
1845a 13.33 17.37 35.15 24.16 23.03 29.33 28.48 29.15 
1861 16.12 15.75 32.01 25.14 21.73 26.10 30.14 33.01 
1871 16.44 15.63 28.81 24.75 23.21 25.75 31.53 33.87 
1881 15.37 15.88 28.21 24.72 23.99 25.72 32.43 33.68 
1891 15.36 15.41 27.93 25.25 24.58 24.92 32.12 34.43 
1891b 6.40  24.14  8.87  60.59  
1901 15.22 14.51 27.93 25.86 25.14 24.14 31.70 35.50 
1901b 7.28  26.21  8.74  57.77  
1911 15.46 13.92 29.34 26.47 27.06 23.59 28.15 36.03 
 
a – The population distribution used for 1845 is taken from the 1841 census 
                                                 
73
 For example in the nineteenth report of the Postmaster General there is reference to the opening of 
new Money Order offices that also serve as Savings Banks – Nineteenth report of the Postmaster 
General on the Post Office, p. 11 [c. 816] H.C. 1873, xxi, 353. 
74
 Maps of the MO/POSB are included in an appendix to this chapter. 
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b - Refer to money order offices that only send money orders. 
Sources: Return of the places in U.K. having benefit of money-order post offices, H.C. 1845, (433), 
xlvii, 213, and Thom’s Directory, 1861-1911. 
 
In terms of our goal to determine whether the distribution of money order offices is 
demand driven, the co-existence of POSB branches may bias any findings as they 
may simply be a detection of POSB demand. Another factor which seems to indicate 
a growth in POSB demand was the decrease in the number of alternative TSBs, 
discussed in chapter 4. The POSB and TSBs competed under the same deposit 
ceilings in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The decline in TSBs and 
growth in POSB branches would seem to suggest that there was a growth in demand 
for POSB services. As the MO office was linked with the POSB, and the evidence 
suggests there was demand for both services, the only way to isolate the demand for 
MO services is if we can determine whether or not there was a correlated demand for 
both money order and savings services from the Post Office, or rather whether 
remittances were saved. As was stated in chapter 4, the POSB experienced 
consistently positive growth rates from the time of its establishment until 1914. The 
savings balances in the POSB grew consistently from 1862 to 1914, even during the 
recessionary period of 1877-1882 known as the ‘land war’ in Irish historiography. 
 Arnold Schrier, one of the few historians who looked directly at the volume of 
remittances in Ireland, concluded that although there might be a positive relationship 
between remittances and savings deposits, the growth in savings was more likely due 
to prosperity in Irish agriculture. Schrier believed that: 
For the vast majority of tenant farmers and labourers who received this money there were 
too many immediately pressing needs, such as rents and debts, to have allowed them the 
luxury of salting it away for a rainy day.75  
 
On the other hand Kerby Miller, another prominent historian of Irish emigration 
to the United States, has argued that remittances were saved.76  
From looking at Schrier’s work there is a noticeable fault line in his analysis. 
Primarily he compared remittance inflows with savings balances (accumulated 
savings) over time.77 Schrier referenced the banking statistics of Ireland and he 
compiled a series for ‘deposits’ that was an accumulation of the savings balances in 
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 Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minnesota 1958, reprint 1997), p. 
119 
76
 Kerby Miller, Emigrants and exiles: Ireland and the Irish exodus to North America (Oxford, 1985). 
77
 This is observable from the source material that Schrier referenced, source material which showed 
the annual savings balances in both TSBs and the POSB in Ireland from 1845 to 1900. 
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both TSBs and the POSB. This led to a finding of an insignificant relationship 
between savings and remittances, but the variables that were compared were 
measured in stocks and flows, the stock of savings and the flow of remittances. 
Figure 8.15  
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Source: Figure 3 in Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minnesota 1958, 
reprint 1997), p. 118. 
 
Figure 8.15 is a reproduction of Schrier’s comparison between Irish savings 
deposits78 and American remittances and money orders.79 Schrier attempted to 
compare the US remittances, derived from incomplete returns made by the Emigration 
Commissioners and the Board of Trade, and data on US money orders.80 
But on the other hand if one compares the net remittance flows, inflows minus 
outflows, and the annual deposits in the POSB one can get a different picture. It is not 
possible yet to create an inflow-outflow equivalent of the ‘remittances’ term used in 
Schrier’s graphical comparison, as the data are not available. But given that the 
variables in the term ‘remittances’ were comprised entirely of bank drafts and pre-
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 Arnold Schrier used a variable that pooled POSB and TSB savings. 
79
 For the sources used see: Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 
(Minnesota 1958, reprint 1997), pp 119-120.  
80
 I have been using UK Postmaster General reports whereas Schrier used US Postmaster General 
reports. 
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paid passages, it would probably be more accurate to compare them with joint stock 
bank deposits over time to get a completely accurate picture of remittance flows and 
deposit flows.81 
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Note: The point at 1876 is an outlier for the period and it is possible that it is a data input error. In 
Grimshaw’s statistics the figures for money orders received was 2499000 and the figure for money 
orders sent was 2464000. The number of money orders sent exceeded the number of money orders 
received. It is possible that there was an input error on the part of Grimshaw.  
Also Grimshaw’s statistics only began recording deposits in the POSB from 1869. 
 
Source: Appendix in Thomas Wrigley Grimshaw, Facts and figures about Ireland (Dublin, 1893). 
 
The main difficulty with analysing remittance flows and savings flows in 
Ireland is the shortage of reliable data. The POSB was a UK-wide banking institution, 
and the annual reports of the Postmaster General gave information on the deposits and 
withdrawals for the UK as a whole. The same level of detail was given for money 
orders. But as the data are for UK variables it is impossible to isolate Irish remittances 
and savings. From Grimshaw’s statistical extract, shown in figure 8.16, we can get a 
glimpse of what the situation was like in Ireland.82 Grimshaw gave data on the 
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 Joint stock banks did encourage savings mobilisation and accepted deposits from as low as £5. See: 
Bulletin of the Society of St. Vincent De Paul, xii (Dublin, 1867), p. 369. 
82
 Sources taken from an appendix in Thomas Wrigley Grimshaw, Facts and figures about Ireland 
(Dublin, 1893). 
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amount of deposits in the Irish wing of the POSB, and also of all money orders sent 
and received in Ireland. Perhaps this is a more realistic picture than the one described 
by Schrier who over-emphasised the savings stock and under-estimated money order 
flows from the colonies and the rest of the UK.  
Given the information at hand, what seems most likely is that there were a 
number of formal means available to transmit remittances. One form was via the 
formal money transfer services of the banking houses in the USA and London and 
pre-paid boat tickets. These are accounted for by the Commissioners of Emigration 
and Board of Trade statistics. The establishment of colonial and international postal 
money orders was a novel means for transferring remittances. As the money order 
offices in the UK were predominantly attached to the POSB, it is not beyond the 
realms of plausibility that there were spillovers between money remitted via money 
order and the POSB deposits.  
Schrier’s argument is also challenged when one considers the rapid growth of 
the POSB, which was tied with the money order service, and the stagnation of the 
TSBs in the post-famine period. Looking at the ratio of savings in TSBs and the 
POSB, shown in figure 8.17, it becomes apparent that the POSB outgrew the TSB in 
the 1880s. This growth coincides with the increased amount of international money 
orders received through the Post Office. The coincidental growth in both POSB 
savings and international money orders suggests that we should question Schrier’s 
arguments. 
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Figure 8.17  
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Sources: Thom’s Directory and Parliamentary banking statistics, various years. 
 
If we take the growth of the POSB into account, it is obvious we should compare 
money orders with the deposits in the POSB as was outlined above. Also the 
remittance flows that Schrier used to support his argument were those cited from the 
Emigration Commissioners and the Board of Trade, and these included remittances in 
the form of pre-paid passages on ships to the USA. The inclusion of these non-
monetary variables also skews any findings, as it is obvious that pre-paid boat 
passages were not going to find their way into Irish savings bank accounts.  
Some qualitative evidence also supports the view that remittances were saved in 
the POSB.  Kerby Miller cited evidence from the Royal Commission on Congestion 
in Ireland, a parliamentary inquiry into congestion in the west of Ireland, which 
showed that a number of people saved the remittances they received.83 Given the 
dearth of TSBs in Ireland,84 it is not surprising that people, if they were going to save, 
would save in POSB accounts. Depositing surplus funds in POSB accounts was 
convenient, but also offered benefits in the form of secrecy. The importance of 
                                                 
83
 Kerby Miller, Emigrants and exiles: Ireland and the Irish exodus to North America (Oxford, 1985), 
p. 483. The referencing scheme used by Miller was very poor and I cannot find where exactly he got 
his sources. 
84
 The number of TSBs continually declined after 1847.  The reasons for the decline were numerous, 
but they were mainly to do with a loss of confidence in the TSBs due to fraud, and also because of the 
emergence of the POSB. In 1901 there were 13 TSB’s and of these none were located in Connaught.  
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financial secrecy should not be undervalued, especially in a time when rents were in 
arrears. 
 
Table 8.10: Growth in Money Order offices and Post Office Savings Banks, 
1845-191185 
 
 Ireland Connaught Leinster Munster Ulster 
 % % % % % 
1845-61 a 31.77 49.67 17.32 26.83 44.37 
1861-71 b 22.83 33.61 14.07 28.04 26.07 
1871-81 14.75 9.99 11.08 19.77 18.93 
1881-91 20.07 16.09 19.49 24.98 19.76 
1881-91 c 55.41 34.07 51.96 37.34 83.91 
1891-1901 c 1.27 1.01 3.12 2.48 -1.86 
1901-1911 43.55 44.94 49.56 59.32 24.23 
1901-1911 c 14.18 23.01 18.33 47.33 -18.35 
1845-1891 c 186.12 188.14 120.49 163.07 287.86 
1891-1911 c 16.13 23.91 22.52 50.83 -19.86 
1845-1911 c 212.60 250.95 159.57 292.54 208.72 
 
a- These figures refer to the mean percentage change in money order offices only 
b- The Post Office Savings Bank was established in Ireland in 1862. 
c- The percentage change is calculated by adding the values for money order offices that only 
send money orders and the MO/POSB variables 
  
Sources: Return of the places in U.K. having benefit of money-order post offices (433) H.C. 1845, xlvii, 
213, and Thom’s Directory 1861-1911. 
 
 
Table 8.10 shows the mean percentage change in the number of MO offices and 
POSB branches by province in the period 1845 to 1911. Given that we know 
international money orders did not commence until the 1870s we can split the 
development of the money order offices into three phases.  
The first phase from 1838 until 1861 is the core development of the money 
order department in Ireland. An interesting feature from table 8.10 is the high 
percentage change in the number of MO offices in Connaught during the period 1845-
61. This is perhaps explained by the existence of seasonal migration from the 
province. Ulster also experienced high growth rates compared to Leinster and 
Munster. This is mainly a reflection of the industrial status of Ulster. Evidence of this 
can be seen in the fact that Donegal, a county with a propensity to engage in seasonal 
migration, had the lowest growth rate.  
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 These figures are the mean percentage change calculated from the mean of all the percentage 
changes within the stated group in the table. Statistics of the percentage changes in the number of MO 
offices and POSB branches are found in appendix to this chapter. 
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The period 1861-1871 saw the continuation of high growth rates in the establishment 
of MO offices in Connaught. But this growth rate is also a reflection of an increase in 
the number of POSB branches, which, as previously stated, were established in 1862 
(1863 in Scotland and Ireland). What can be deemed the second phase of development 
in MO/POSB is the establishment of international money order exchanges, in 
particular the establishment of a money order service with the US. In the late 1870s 
there was an increase in the rate of emigration. The high growth rates in money order 
offices and POSB branches from 1881-91 seem to be a reflection of the pattern in 
emigration. As emigrants sent home remittances there would be a lag in the 
establishment of new MO offices, and this would explain why they show up in the 
1881-1891 period. Evidence from the Postmaster General reports would seem to 
explain developments in the number of MO offices. In the early 1870s it was stated 
that there was a fall-off in foreign and colonial orders due to a ‘scarcity of 
employment and diminution of wages’.86 The increase in money orders sent from the 
colonies in the late 1870s and early 1880s was attributed ‘in a great measure to 
remittances from emigrants to their relatives in Ireland in relief of the prevailing 
distress’.87 The fact that there was a lower rate of growth in the number of MO/POSB 
offices in the latter periods may reflect the establishment and patterns of chain 
migration. 
The growth rates in the final section 1901 to 1911 may be a reflection of the 
demand for POSB rather than for MO services as the rate of emigration had subsided. 
In 1894 the POSB had expanded its maximum deposit from £30 to £50 and was 
paying 2.5 per cent interest on deposits which was a higher rate of interest than that 
paid by the joint stock banks.  In the period 1845 to 1891 there was a large growth in 
the number of money order offices and POSB branches, whereas in the same period 
population, measured at decadal periods, declined. The decline came through 
relatively high rates of emigration, something which suggests that the growth in 
money order offices and POSB branches was correlated with emigration. The high 
growth rates in Connaught and Munster compared with Leinster and Ulster in the 
period 1901-1911 shown in table 8.10 may also be an indication of the policies of the 
Congested Districts Board (CDB). It was stated by Micks, an inspector and secretary 
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 Twenty-third report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 16. [c. 1863] H.C. 1877, xxvii, 
201. 
87
 Twenty-sixth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 18. [c. 2670] H.C. 1880, xix, 1. 
 274 
of the CDB, that the CDB acted as a guarantor to facilitate the opening of money 
order offices.88 But the role of the CDB does not explain the growth rates in MO 
offices and POSB branches in Connaught and Munster before 1891. 
 
Table 8.11a: Correlation between Money Order offices and Post Office Savings 
Banks and demographic variables, 1861-1911 (N=32) 
 Emigration 
and MO 
Emigration 
and 
MO/POSB 
Emigration 
+ 
Emigration 
lagged and 
MO/POSB 
Urban 
Population 
% Urban 
population 
1861 0.605 - - 0.636 0.395 
1871 - 0.704 0.709 0.491 0.29 
1881 - 0.836 0.801 0.579 0.355 
1891 - 0.801 0.841 0.532 0.323 
1901 - 0.791 0.806 0.470 0.283 
1911 - 0.768 0.768 0.415 0.311 
 
 
Table 8.11b: Correlation between Money Order offices and Post office Savings 
Banks and demographic variables, 1861-1911 (excluding Cork) (N=31) 
 Emigration 
and MO 
Emigration 
and 
MO/POSB 
Emigration 
+ 
Emigration 
lagged and 
MO/POSB 
Urban 
Population 
% Urban 
population 
1861 0.365 -  0.570 0.376 
1871 - 0.420 0.443 0.404 0.215 
1881 - 0.730 0.662 0.545 0.357 
1891 - 0.665 0.727 0.517 0.324 
1901 - 0.645 0.669 0.473 0.282 
1911 - 0.638 0.621 0.406 0.331 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88William L. Micks, An account of the constitution, administration and dissolution of the Congested 
Districts Board for Ireland from 1891 to 1923 (Dublin, 1925), p. 90. 
 275 
Table 8.11c: Correlation between Money Order offices and POSB per 1,000 
population and emigration per 1000 population, and urban population per 1,000 
population (N=32) 
 
 
MO and 
emigration 
Emigration 
and 
MO/POSB 
Emigration + 
emigration 
lagged and 
MO/POSB 
MO and 
urban 
population 
1861 0.149 - - -0.232 
1871 - 0.534 0.582 0.207 
1881 - 0.576 0.668 0.223 
1891 - -0.123 -0.191 -0.178 
1901 - -0.326 -0.186 -0.409 
1911 - -0.188 -0.292 -0.415 
 
 
Note:  The emigration statistics used were taken from tables in Vaughan and Fitzpatrick. They are the 
total number of emigrants per county for a ten year period. 
The urban population statistics are based on tables in Vaughan and Fitzpatrick and based on the 
number of towns in a county in Ireland that at one stage had a population over 2,000. There was no 
town listed for County Leitrim, so Leitrim was excluded from the money order side as well, i.e. n=31. 
Cork was an outlier both in terms of emigration and the number of money order offices. Therefore 
table 8.11b has excluded Cork. 
 
Sources: Thom’s Directory 1861-1911, and W. E. Vaughan and A. J. Fitzpatrick, Irish historical 
statistics: population, 1821-1971  (Dublin, 1978), pp 28-41, and pp 269-343.  
 
 
Tables 8.11a and 8.11b show the correlation coefficients relating to money order 
offices and emigration and urban population. What table 8.11a and 8.11b suggest is 
that the distribution of money order offices, and money order and POSB offices was 
positively correlated with emigration and that perhaps emigration was a greater driver 
of the growth in MO/POSB offices than urbanisation was.  
Table 8.11c illustrates the difficulty in attempting to measure the relationship 
between the money order service and the emigration. The money order office was not 
just a money order office, but it was a Post Office, a POSB branch, a telegraph office, 
a life insurance office, and a stockbroker’s office.89 We can see a positive correlation 
between emigration per 1,000 population and MO/POSB per 1,000 population in 
1861, 1871 and 1881, but thereafter there is a negative relationship. This is perhaps an 
indication of the increased demand for the POSB in the latter years. In chapter 4 it 
was shown that there was an increase in POSB savings deposits during the period 
1877-1882, and thereafter. As the postal services were demand driven, this would 
                                                 
89
 From 1881 onwards the Post Office sold government stock directly through the Post Office for sums 
between £10 and £100: Twenty-seventh report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 5 
[c.3006], H.C. 1881, xxix, 583. 
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suggest that the demand for institutions from the 1880s onwards was for POSB 
services, and this overshadows the MO demand that is also present. Support for this is 
based on the negative relationship between MO/POSB per 1,000 population and urban 
population per 1,000 as it was shown in chapter 4 that the majority of the savings in 
the POSB came from rural Ireland. 
 
8. 5 Conclusion: emigration and microfinance 
Microfinance is a term that has recently entered Irish historiography and to date the 
main study of microfinance in Irish history has been on Irish loan funds.90 The 
existing studies have overlooked the dynamic nature of the microfinance sphere, and 
have not taken account either of the impact of emigration or of the development of 
financial institutions within the postal service as was shown in this chapter. What this 
chapter has mainly contributed to the existing literature is an awareness of the 
financial services provided by the Post Office. But as yet the chapter has not fully 
assessed how emigration and microfinance interacted. 
The first question that needs to be addressed is how microfinance and 
emigration are related. Their relationship springs essentially from the fact that people 
use microfinance services. Therefore if people emigrate this will have an impact on 
the operations of the microfinance suppliers. There are numerous ways in which 
emigration can affect microfinance directly and indirectly. A direct influence of 
emigration would be if there was a decrease in demand for a particular service. This is 
inherently logical; why would people use the service if they were in another country? 
Migration can stimulate demand for other services, notably money transfers. Emigrant 
remittances can be transferred in either monetary or non-monetary form and also via 
formal and informal channels. If these transfers were of a monetary nature people may 
have decided that they required microfinancial services for their newly acquired 
funds. Another effect of emigration on microfinance is that transferred funds could act 
as a substitute for previously available microfinance services. An indirect, but equally 
important, effect is poverty reduction. Poverty reduction caused by emigration can 
have a knock-on effect on microfinance providers. Poverty reduction will decrease the 
number of low income individuals. As a result it can increase the profitability and 
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 For example see: Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘Microcredit in prefamine Ireland’ in 
Explorations in Economic History, xxxv (1998), pp 347-380.; Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, 
‘Microfinance and Famine: The Irish Loan Funds during the Great Famine’ in World Development, 
xxxii, no. 9 (2004), pp 1509-1523. 
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decrease the risk of the individuals with increased income from the perspective of 
formal financial service providers. Emigration can also erode the informational 
advantages that microfinance institutions possess. As was discussed in chapter 3, 
Hollis and Sweetman argued that it was informational advantages which enabled the 
loan funds to operate successfully in the early nineteenth century.91 But, as was 
argued in the same chapter, the decreasing population, coupled with growth in bank 
branches, enabled joint stock banks to create their own information. If one accepts 
that theoretically emigration can affect microfinance, the next question to ask is: did it 
affect the microfinance services in Ireland in the nineteenth century?   
To answer this question one must look at who actually emigrated. From the 
available data it seems that the majority of the Irish emigrants were unskilled and this 
is supported by the age distribution of the migrants: 92 as they would have been too 
young to have acquired a marketable skill set. This can also be seen by Irish emigrant 
returns to the US were the bulk of Irish immigrants were classified as unskilled or low 
skilled.93 Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffery G. Williamson found that: 
Those who emigrated were bound to be more mobile than the population at large, 
because the costs of migrating were lower for the young and single. They had little 
investment in skills that were specific to firms, to industries, or to Ireland as a whole. It 
seems likely that the present value of emigration was much greater for these young, 
unskilled workers than for those who were more established, more skilled, and older.94 
 
The loan funds catered to lower socio-economic groups, and in the post-famine 
period it was these people who were more likely to emigrate. Emigration was also a 
contributory factor in the growth of national income per capita in nineteenth century 
Ireland.95 Emigration also played a role in ‘boosting Irish living standards’.96 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that emigration was a cause of the growth in 
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 Aidan Hollis and Arthur Sweetman, ‘The life-cycle of a microfinance institution: the Irish loan 
funds’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, xlvi (2001), p. 309. 
92
 Donald Harman Akenson, The Irish Diaspora: a primer (Belfast, 1996), p. 44. 
93
 Data derived from tables on the percentage distribution of immigrants to the United States from 
Ireland, by occupation, 1875-1930 in Thomas, Brinley, Migration and economic growth: A study of 
Great Britain and the Atlantic economy  (2nd edition, 1973, Cambridge), p. 384. 
94Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffery G. Williamson, ‘After the Famine: emigration from Ireland, 1850-
1913’ in The Journal of Economic History, liii, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), p. 589. 
95
 Estimates of Irish national income growth rates suggest slow growth, but national income per capita 
grew faster based on the fact of a continually decreasing population. 
96
 Kevin O’Rourke, ‘Emigration and living standards in Ireland since the famine’ in Journal of 
Population Economics , viii (1995), p. 408. 
 278 
real wages in Ireland in the period 1850 to 1914.97 As the demarcation between 
agricultural labourer and small farmer was blurred,98 increases in the wages of 
agricultural labourers would have meant an increase in income. 
The area of microfinance which experienced the greatest competition from 
emigrant remittances was microcredit. Remittances acted as a substitute for existing 
sources of microcredit. It must be asked how remittances could have acted as a 
substitute for microcredit. To do this it is necessary to determine what both 
microcredit and remittances would have been used for. This is difficult due to the lack 
of observable evidence, but from surviving qualitative evidence and evidence from 
some account books of the loan funds it appears that the uses of microcredit loans 
were varied and that some loans were for consumption purposes. The uses of 
remittances were also widely varied. Kerby Miller observed that: 
Many parents wanted money from the children sent abroad, both to finance further 
emigration and to bolster Ireland’s small farm economy. Although the inheriting son’s 
dowry acquired at marriage often financed his less fortunate siblings’ departure, whether 
from poverty or parsimony most parents relied on American remittances to pay their 
children’s passage. Usually an uncle or aunt in the New World financed the initial 
departure of an eldest son or daughter, who in turn was expected to send prepaid passage 
tickets and promise further assistance ( e.g. a place to live, help in finding employment) 
to his or her younger brothers and sisters. In addition, Irish parents wanted children to 
remit money for other purposes: to pay rents and shop bills, purchase holdings, enlarge 
acreage and livestock herds, or improve housing and living standards generally.99 
 
So it is probable that there was some crossover in usage. Indeed what is often 
deemed a disadvantage with remittances is that they are normally used on 
consumption spending rather than for investment purposes. In recent times The 
Economist has noted that ‘perhaps 90% of remittances to poor countries go on food, 
clothes, housing, education and health’.100 But if this was the case for nineteenth 
century Ireland it would not necessarily have been a bad thing. Samuel Munzele 
Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, from observing the effects of remittances on numerous 
countries, believed that: 
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Remittances may help improve economic growth, especially if used for financing 
children’s education or health expenses. Even when they are used for consumption, 
remittances generate multiplier effects, especially in countries with high 
unemployment…Whether remittances are used for consumption or buying houses, or for 
other investments, they generate positive effects on the economy by stimulating demand 
for other goods and services.101 
 
It is also worth emphasising that there is not a lot of evidence to suggest that 
remittances were used to purchase land. Schrier, in his study on remittances, showed 
how the purchase of land from the proceeds of remittances was uncommon.102 Schrier 
used the example of a Donegal woman who bought a neighbouring farm with 
‘American money’,103 but this, as he himself acknowledged, was an outlier. It is quite 
possible that ‘American money’ was used to pay some portion of the annuity 
repayments for land purchase that were discussed in chapter 7. As land purchase loans 
were made to ‘uneconomic’ farms, it would not be surprising if ‘American money’ 
was needed to repay the loan as on-farm activity would not have generated enough 
income to repay the loan instalments. In the CDB baseline reports many of the areas 
surveyed included remittances from relatives in America, as distinct from migratory 
labour earnings, as a source of farm income.104 It was these same farms that received 
state loans to purchase the holdings, so it is likely that remittances continued to be 
used to repay loans. 
Given that there was a crossover in microcredit loans and remittances in terms 
of usage, it is worth illustrating that the amount borrowed was in the region of the 
amount remitted. Unfortunately, we do not possess detailed information on average 
remittances, but the money order service operated under the same monetary ceiling of 
£10 as the LFB loan fund system, discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Given this 
information, which is shown in figure 8.18, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the 
average remittance sent via the Post Office money order service was similar to the 
average loan fund loan. 
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Figure 8.18  
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Given that the number of loans issued by LFB loan funds decreased in the post-
famine period while at the same time there was an increase in the supply of 
remittances, it is quite plausible that the remittance flow dislocated the existing 
microcredit flow. The existence of remittances may also have influenced the elites 
who organised the loan funds.105 As a result the existence of remittance flows may 
explain the decline of the loan funds both in terms of the amount of sums borrowed 
and the geographic decline of the LFB loan fund system. Given the unfavourable 
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in the post-famine period. 
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repayment terms in the loan funds, if they were replaced by more benign remittance 
flows, this would have enabled people to borrow less and to save more. The same 
argument regarding loan usage applies to the Raiffeisen credit co-operatives. 
Essentially remittances enabled people to save instead of borrowing.  
Finally, an important issue in remittance literature is how remittances are 
channelled.106 As was highlighted in this chapter, one of most accessible institutions 
that transferred remittances was also linked with a savings bank. The growth in 
financial services provided by the Post Office established a dominance of 
microsavings, and crowded out other microsavings providers. Although with the 
available evidence it is difficult to prove that remittances received via the Post Office 
were saved in the POSB, the continued growth of savings in the POSB would seem to 
suggest that some proportion of the remittances was saved. Cormac Ó Gráda has 
suggested that the growth in savings in the POSB may be a reflection of the extension 
of the POSB to areas where there had not previously been any savings facilities.107 
But such an argument does not take into consideration the link between the MO office 
and the POSB.  
 This leads to the issue of how remittances are channelled. The POSB was a 
one-dimensional financial institution in that it did not offer lending services to the 
public, but rather it lent solely to the government.108   The amount of deposits held by 
the POSB exceeded the amount of savings held by the LFB loan fund societies, 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, and Raiffeisen co-ops, discussed in chapter 6, which 
were established in the 1890s. Hollis and Sweetman suggest that the loan funds 
provided microsavings services in the pre-famine period, but the evidence from the 
post-famine period suggests that the loan funds were not mobilising savings.109  
What the POSB had, and what others microfinance providers lacked, was the 
confidence of depositors.110 This gave them greater security. No other microsavings 
provider could offer such security. The problem is summarised by Joanna 
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Ledgerwood in that ‘MFIs [microfinance institutions] providing credit services must 
select borrowers whom they trust to repay the loans. When collecting savings, 
however, it is the customers who must trust the MFI.’111 This may appear to be a 
trivial matter, but without deposit mobilisation a financial intermediary engaging in 
microcredit is not financially sustainable. It must rely on existing sources of capital 
which give it limited growth potential and possibly sows the seeds for future decline. 
If a microfinance provider is not financially self-sustainable it will be reliant on 
subsidies, and if these subsidies are withdrawn then the institution will be forced to 
cease operations. This is what happened to the Raiffeisen societies discussed in 
chapter 6. In effect, the post-famine era saw a growth in microsavings institutions, a 
product of the general improvement in living standards caused by emigration and the 
continued stream of remittances, at the expense of existing microcredit institutions. 
Emigration and remittances show the extent of the obligation which remitters 
felt towards their friends and family. Despite being several hundred miles away 
remitters continually sent assistance to their friends and family at home. But the 
remittance patterns also created a dependency culture in the west of Ireland, with 
households being reliant on remittances as a supplement to their own household 
income. This dependency culture encouraged and enabled people to stay in rural 
Ireland where indigenous resources alone would have only enabled them to eke out a 
subsistence existence. The emigration and remittances flows declined in the twentieth 
century, but the dependence culture remained, with the state replacing emigrants 
abroad. The existence of remittances also facilitated and perpetuated the cultural 
demand for secrecy in rural Ireland. People were loath to divulge their personal 
financial details, something which was detrimental to any attempt to encourage co-
operative banking. Remittances may also be an explanatory factor in the lack of 
mutual societies in rural Ireland. For example, the need to develop mutual livestock 
insurance societies was undermined by fact that in case of the death of livestock 
people could write letters to their relations asking them to provide the funds to replace 
deceased stock.112 Schrier has argued that remittances subsidised the Irish economy, 
                                                 
111
 Joanna Ledgerwood, Microfinance handbook: an institutional and financial perspective 
(Washington D.C., 1998), p.162 
112
 Arnold Schrier, Ireland and the American emigration 1850-1900 (Minnesota 1958, reprint 1997), p. 
116. 
 283 
or ‘at the very minimum made life in Ireland tolerable for a great proportion of the 
peasantry’.113   
Emigration continued to be a feature of Irish society until more recent times, for 
example, the inquiry into emigration in the 1950s was instigated in response to the 
continued emigration flows from Ireland post-independence.114 The continuation of 
emigration also saw a corresponding prolongation in remittance flows to Ireland, and 
figure 8.19 shows emigrant remittances as a percentage of Irish national income from 
1947-1966. 
Figure 8.19  
Emigrant remittances as a percentage of Irish National Income, 
1947-1966
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In Nineteen acres John Healy recounted the story of his American relatives who 
always sent remittances regularly at Christmas and Easter. His aunt even returned one 
year to visit the family in Mayo, bringing parcels of clothes as gifts. Healy, upon 
receiving a US State Department Journalism Scholarship, paid a visit to his American 
relatives in 1957. He had difficulty finding where they lived, as he had preconceived 
notions of them living the American dream and having a suburban house with a 
‘stoop’.115 Yet what he found was his relatives living in an apartment, not quite living 
the American dream. His aunt’s husband had died in an accident and her son had lost 
his business, allegedly through mafia influence, and was unemployed. It transpired 
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that his aunt was saving up two dollars a week from her social security cheque for the 
Irish remittance,116 despite having visited the family years previously and knowing 
that the Irish relatives were in a comfortable position. When he asked her how long 
things had been like that and how she had been sending home money from the benefit 
cheque, his aunt replied ‘a long time’.117 John Healy observed that: 
The world will never know how much these scared, brave, sometimes ignorant but 
always loyal emigrants to the New World sent home in dollars and parcels to the old 
people in the old country. No one will ever know the full extent of their sacrifices and 
how much they kept hidden from the old people who thought that America was indeed 
the land of opportunity where the streets were truly paved with gold.118  
 
It is difficult to determine how many other cases were like the one described by 
John Healy, but it is something which should be considered when discussing both 
Irish experiences of remittances and remittances in general. 
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Conclusion 
Never lend people money, it gives’em amnesia 
                              (Groucho Marx/ Spike Milligan) 
 
In this thesis we discussed the history of a number of microfinance institutions in 
nineteenth century Ireland. We saw the development and decline of the Irish loan 
funds and TSBs, the growth of the POSB, and the success of the joint stock banks. 
We found numerous attempts to imitate foreign financial institutions, almost all with 
limited or no success. We analysed how the state entered the long-term credit market, 
but misallocated resources. And we outlined how financial services developed that 
enabled the transfer of remittances, and how these interacted with microfinance 
institutions in Ireland. 
In sum, this study aimed to contribute a greater understanding of Irish economic 
and social history through the study of microfinance institutions that existed in the 
nineteenth century. Stanley Jevons, in the conclusion to his work The theory of 
political economy, stated that: 
I have ventured in the preceding pages to call in question not a few of the favourite 
doctrines of economists. To me it is far more pleasant to agree than to differ; but it is 
impossible that one who has any regard for truth can long avoid protesting against 
doctrines which seem to him to be erroneous. There is ever a tendency of the most 
hurtful kind to allow opinions to crystallise into creeds…I think there is some fear of the 
too great influence of authoritative writers in political economy. I protest against 
deference for any man, whether John Stuart Mills, or Adam Smith, or Aristotle, being 
allowed to check inquiry. Our science has become far too much a stagnant one, in which 
opinions rather than experience and reason are appealed to.1   
 
This thesis adhered to the view held by Jevons - except where he says 
economists and political economy we should read historians and history respectively. 
Each chapter of this thesis contained a conclusion relevant to the material 
presented, but to conclude this dissertation we shall look at a number of recurring 
issues that appeared throughout: legislation/formal constraints, institutional imitation, 
economic versus social goals, and the role of the state in the economy. 
 
1. Legislation/Formal constraints 
 An important consideration in all of the microfinance institutions we discussed in this 
thesis was the role of legislation. Legislation is important as it places a constraint on 
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the actions of economic agents. Ill-thought-out legislation, or socially motivated 
legislation, may only have short-term objectives in mind and may fail to take into 
consideration the long-term implications of the imposition of such constraints. Of all 
the institutions discussed in this thesis, only the joint stock banks were able to 
successfully overcome the legislative constraints, such as the restrictions on the 
number of partners, within the period of study. Although new constraints, such as 
limits on note issues, were imposed in the 1840s, these may have actually helped 
stabilise the banking sector. The TSBs began to shake off the shackles of government-
imposed savings limits towards the end of the period of study, but there still was an 
element of government influence on their investment portfolios. These are significant 
factors in explaining the success of these institutions, most of which are still in 
existence today.  
The major Irish banks that existed in 1914 gradually merged and consolidated 
their position. The Bank of Ireland (1783) merged with the Hibernian bank (1824) in 
1958, and then with the National Bank (1835) in 1966. This was followed by the 
creation of the Allied Irish Bank (AIB), formed by the merger of the Provincial 
(1825), Munster & Leinster (1885), and Royal (1836) in 1966.2 The Northern Bank 
(1824) was bought by the Midland Bank in 1965, and amalgamated with the Belfast 
Bank (1827) in 1968-69. The Ulster Bank (1836) remained as independent banking 
business until more recent times.  Two of the nineteenth century provident savings 
institutions that were designed to encouraged thrift, the TSBs and the Buildings 
societies, were merged in 1999. But there is no presence of the loan funds, Monts-de-
Piété, or the Raiffeisen banks in Ireland, north or south, today. This is despite the fact 
that the Monts-de-Piété are still in existence in France, although under the less pious 
name of Crédit Municipals, and Raiffeisen banks are still part of the German financial 
landscape. Can we explain this? 
Firstly, if we look at the LFB loan funds, almost their entire existence was 
regulated by the acts of parliament passed in 1823, 1836, 1838 and 1843.  The 
legislation relating to the loan funds placed significant impediments to future 
development and institutional evolution. The acts of parliament determined how much 
they could lend, how much they could charge for their services, and how much they 
could pay as interest on their capital. All of these factors are significant, as they 
                                                 
2
 F. S. L. Lyons, ‘Reflections on a bicentenary’ in F. S. L. Lyons (ed.), Bicentenary essays, Bank of 
Ireland 1783-1983 (Dublin, 1983), p. 210. 
 287 
forced loan funds to charge unprofitably low discount rates on low value loans, hence 
limiting their ability to compete and thereby limiting their profitability. This is 
significant because it restricted the ability of the loan funds to develop beyond simple 
discount banks. The institutions were designed in the belief that they would stop usury 
by undercutting the market, but the fact was that the institutions were financially 
unsustainable. But perhaps the most significant constraint was the £10 loan ceiling. In 
the first chapter we showed how comparable institutions in France did not impose 
similar lending ceilings. The French institutions actually received the majority of their 
income from making higher value loans, and the income from high value loans was 
able to cross-subsidise low value loans.  Arguably, if the loan funds were not 
subjected to these constraints Ireland could have developed a significant non-profit 
financial sector to challenge the dominance of the joint stock banks.  
Another significant impact of the loan fund legislation was that it imposed a 
central authority on the loan fund system, and this authority was given a monopoly on 
the stationery that was required to process the business of loan funds. This institution 
was important as it distorted incentives. It made savers and borrowers feel that the 
loan funds were government-backed institutions, but in reality they were not. There 
was a lack of reform both within the institution itself. It appears as though most of its 
work was undertaken by one man from the 1850s to the late 1870s, and that the 
legislation relating to it created an ideal situation for regulatory capture. The lack of 
reform enabled the supervisory body to become captured by the market and 
perpetuated a form of debt peonage, which it theoretically ought to have stopped.  
Legislative constraints on the LFB loan funds influenced their development in other 
ways, perhaps overlooked by the legislature. By not outlawing fines, it enabled a 
system of fines to be incorporated into the lending methodology of the loan funds and 
used as a revenue-generating instrument. No other commercial lender in Ireland had 
access to such ‘debt enforcement’ instruments. Fining was illegal in comparable 
institutions in England and Wales, where, coincidentally, there was a high number of 
legal actions to enforce debt repayment. 
A significant failure on the part of the legislation relating to loan funds and to 
TSBs was that it created a moral hazard. The fact that the liability of management of 
financial institutions was limited to very small sums, if at all, meant that management 
had no incentive to monitor the institutions for which they acted as trustees and 
managers. This created false confidence amongst savers as they felt that these 
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institutions had both the backing of governments - in the case of loan funds 
misleading stamps on stationery suggested they were government institutions - and 
were the responsibility of trustees. In a recent article Ó Gráda argued that the 
‘vulnerability to poor management and embezzlement’ in savings banks is partly 
explained by Ireland’s relative backwardness in comparison to the rest of the UK.3 On 
this point I beg to differ because the case of the TSBs and the loan funds illustrates 
the dangers of moral hazard. The fact that similar moral hazards occurred in Great 
Britain vindicates this point.  Perhaps it would be more apt to say that the dangers of, 
and damage caused by, moral hazard are greater in a relatively underdeveloped 
economy. 
The failures in the 1840s of both TSBs and loan funds are important, and give 
us a better understanding of the development of savings markets in Ireland. The LFB 
loan funds were uncompetitive in savings markets after the famine, and this meant 
that they did not have access to a significant amount of relatively costless information. 
Before the famine they had information advantages over competitors, but after the 
famine these advantages were eroded by both the fact that they experienced decreases 
in deposits and the fact that the joint stock banking sector was expanding. 
Savings banks were subject to significant legislative constraints, most 
noticeably the constraints on savings amounts and investment choices. TSBs were 
given some scope of investment once account balances went over the total limit, and 
were allowed to establish special investment departments. However, the low deposit 
ceiling was an impediment to their development. The most significant aspect of the 
savings bank question was the fact that they were loss making; the government was 
subsidising savings. The involvement of the state in these institutions augmented the 
moral hazard problems that are inherent in banking; there should have been no 
interference whatsoever with these institutions. Trustees were exonerated from 
liability for the management of these savings banks and as such had no incentive to 
monitor staff. Managers should have been forced to account for their own actions. If 
there was no government interference in these institutions there would not have been 
such incentive distortions. Another significant factor relating to the savings bank 
question was that it misallocated resources; money was saved in savings banks 
because there was a government guarantee. This crowded out other financial 
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intermediaries that did not possess equally strong state guarantees. If there were no 
constraints on investments in TSBs, there would have been no government guarantee 
but it would have less distortionary effects on the savings market. More people would 
have saved elsewhere in the financial sector, or used informal saving techniques. The 
fact that many people saved in the savings banks in the early nineteenth century is a 
reflection of the legislative constraints and state subsidies. The savings banks paid 
above market interest rates, rates which the private market could not match. It is also 
worth noting that the LFB was contemporaneous to savings banks, but this also meant 
that the government was supporting two financial institutions that were in competition 
with each other for deposits.  
As was shown in chapter 3, there was a view in Irish society, and amongst Irish 
historians such as J.J. Lee, that the Irish banks were conservative in their lending 
habits and that this conservatism was a reflection of business attitudes in Ireland.4 But 
this may not necessarily be the case. If we use the Verdier hypothesis on the 
development of universal banking,5 we can see that there was no significant 
competition for the joint stock banks in the savings markets from 1848 (when the TSB 
frauds occurred) to 1893 (when savings ceilings were raised in the savings banks). 
The fact that the private sector (the joint stock banks), did not experience competition 
from the public sector (savings banks), or the non-profit sector (loan funds), during 
this period enabled them to specialise as commercial banks. According to the Verdier 
hypothesis, increased competition and segmentation of the savings markets gave 
banks greater incentives to engage in universal banking, thus arriving at where many 
contemporaries and historians wanted the banks to go. But the fact that there was no 
competition or market segmentation was not the fault of the banks; the game could 
only be played with the agents that were given. The fact that the competition in the 
form of non-profit or public firms failed to materialise in this period is a direct result 
of the legislative framework that existed. 
The argument that I wish to put forward is that there should have been no 
restrictions placed on any of the public savings banks or the non-profit institutions at 
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all. In the first instance, the loan fund societies and the savings banks should have 
been allowed to operate unhindered. They would have eventually found their own 
level, or they would have failed earlier.  
 
2. Institutional imitation 
In this thesis we encountered a number of examples of institutional imitation, and of 
all the examples we observed only the joint stock banks were successful. So the 
question we should ask ourselves is: why the joint stock banks and nothing else? In a 
recent guide to microfinance Joanna Ledgerwood stated that the ‘first step in 
understanding the context in which a microfinance provider operates is to determine 
who makes up the financial system’.6 So essentially the first step one needs to do is 
some market research. The main reason why the joint stock banks were successfully 
imitated was because there was a greater understanding at the outset of what the 
existing banking supply was like and what the demand for the banking services would 
be in Ireland. The promoters of the joint stock banks knew that the private banking 
sector was weak, and that there was only one joint stock bank operating in the 
country. The Bank of Ireland was the incumbent joint stock bank, but it was operating 
on a unit bank basis. Scottish banking was imitated in full and adapted to local needs. 
The imitation went so far as to recruit Scottish expertise. A key factor to the success 
was the fact that there was a market opportunity. Joint stock banking was an 
innovation and was stronger and more competitive than anything existing in Ireland. 
Joint stock banking was robust, and in the latter nineteenth century converged towards 
Scottish trends.  
The experience of imitating Scottish banking is in marked contrast to the 
attempts to imitate French Monts-de-Piété and German Raiffeisen banks. Why did 
these imitations fail? Was it because there was a closer cultural affinity with Scotland 
and less so with the Continent? The answer is no. The reason for both their failures 
was because they never took the pre-existing market into consideration, nor did they 
appreciate the intricacies of the institutions they were imitating, nor the economic pre-
conditions necessary for these institutions to operate. 
Both propagators of the imitations failed to understand how it was the 
institutions had come to prominence in their homeland. The Mont-de-Piété case 
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showed genuine ignorance of the fact that monopoly status was required to maintain 
existence, but there was also a moral arrogance that implied that the imitation was 
better than the indigenous alternative. Other key oversights were regarding the 
importance of high value pawns to the Paris Mont-de-Piété, the fact that the Parisian 
Mont-de-Piété had a minimum loan limit, and the fact that the Paris Mont-de-Piété 
actually operated a de facto branch network. The enthusiasts behind the Raiffeisen co-
ops displayed similar ignorance. They did not appreciate the importance of savings in 
a savings and loans institution. They thought that it would be possible to imitate the 
lending mechanism and that savings was just an option. Other areas where the 
propagators did not appreciate the intricacies of the Raiffeisen societies was that they 
were integrated with other forms of co-operative enterprises, and that federated bodies 
enabled them to achieve economies of scale. In both cases the resulting imitations 
were superficial and flawed. 
 
3. Economic versus social goals 
The previous discussion on institutional imitation is linked with the issue of social 
versus economic motivation. In place of social we could also use ideological. In this 
thesis we have encountered a number of institutions that were promoted based solely 
on social preferences rather than on a basis of sound economic rationale. Firstly, we 
have the case of the loan funds and the Monts-de-Piété that were promoted and 
encouraged in the early nineteenth century. Their raison d'être was to combat ‘usury’, 
supply capital and use profits from lending to fund charitable ventures. There was a 
belief that the loan funds/Monts-de-Piété could be substituted for public poor relief. 
The logic of this analysis was flawed. The institutions, as designed, were never going 
to replace the poor relief expenditure. Firstly, there was an inherent conflict between 
the ‘commercial’ lending and the charitable functions. The commercial aspect of the 
venture was pro-cyclical, i.e. supply increased in booms and decreased in recessions, 
whereas the demand for poor relief was countercyclical, i.e. greatest in recessionary 
periods. The problem was that profits from the booms had to be saved and retained for 
recessionary periods, but the attitude was to disburse profits annually. Another key 
problem was that loans were capped at £10, so the profitability of the system was 
constrained. Given that the advocates of the systems, namely the authors of the 
published pamphlets referring to loan funds, looked to the French example, did they 
not realise that there was no upper ceiling in France? In fact the inverse was true. The 
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French Monts-de-Piété had a 3 franc minimum loan, as smaller loans are actually 
loss-making. The surety system, used by loan funds, was also likely to be adversely 
affected by a recession; in a recession people would be less willing to incur the risk of 
someone else’s debt obligations. Possibly a better alternative would have been to mix 
the Mont-de-Piété and the loan fund, impose no lending ceilings, and retain profits to 
build up a reserve fund to secure deposits. The commercial and charitable functions 
were incompatible; they should have been decoupled. 
In the case of the Mont-de-Piété the propagators undertook a pious, holier-than-
thou approach to pawnbroking, but failed to realise the intricacies of running a 
pawnbroking institution. Although pawning requires collateral, the pawnbrokers must 
still overcome problems of asymmetric information. The object of the pawnbroker is 
not to acquire pledges but to maximise redemptions. A defaulted loan is a hindrance 
to a pawnbroker as he or she must then try and recoup losses from the sale of the 
good. The cost of storage and auctioneering may actually result in a loss on the pawn. 
Therefore a pawnbroker would prefer to build up a personal rapport with borrowers, 
i.e. create information, to know who will repay or not. Another important issue is that 
low value items cost more per transaction than high value items. These subtleties were 
overlooked by the Mont-de-Piété propagators in their crusade against pawnbroking, a 
crusade that was lost. One last point regarding pawnbroking and the Irish Mont-de-
Piété aim to target the poor, it must be borne in mind that pawning requires that 
borrowers possess some intrinsically valuable assets. The poorest sections of society 
would not have such assets, so a Mont-de-Piété model automatically excludes them. 
Loan funds used personal security and this is what was innovative and useful about 
them, but they too were blinded by social goals. The key point that I wish to make is 
that Barrington’s Mont-de-Piété was socially motivated. He believed that he was 
fighting the good fight to combat usury. But the institution he created was 
ideologically motivated and as such failed to take into account the key issues that 
made the French system operable. The restrictions of loans to £10 meant that the 
Mont-de-Piété were financially unsustainable. 
The same arguments apply to the Raiffeisen societies. Plunkett et al wanted to 
fight ‘gombeenism’, and they thought that the Raiffeisen bank was the best way to go 
about it. That is all fine and well, except in their excitement to introduce Raiffeisen 
banks they gave no consideration to what actually made these institutions operate 
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successfully in Germany, how they fitted into the financial structure in Germany, and 
where they would fit in the Irish financial structure.  
The Raiffeisen banks in Germany were savings and loans institutions, had 
complementary trading powers, and had federated structures. In Ireland they were 
introduced as lending agencies, with little if any emphasis placed on saving. Why was 
this? Because the ‘gombeen man’ provided credit and he did not provide savings, but 
this was short sighted and it undermined the long-term development of Raiffeisen 
banks in Ireland.  Classic financial intermediation theory should have made them 
realise that savings and loans are interrelated, but the cooperative enthusiasts were 
arrogant in that they believed that their way was morally right and their efforts would 
be vindicated. They were wrong. Nor did they take into consideration the fact that the 
German financial structure did not resemble the one in Ireland. Given that there were 
vociferous cries against the Irish joint stock banks one would like to think they would 
have questioned why the German joint stock banks received the praise that they did. If 
the financial structure had been taken into consideration they would have realised that 
the Irish joint stock banks were deposit mobilisers, unlike their German counterparts. 
This is how the Raiffeisen banks were able to find a market in Germany, and this is 
why they would struggle in Ireland. This is partly why the Raiffeisen banks failed to 
establish themselves in Ireland, but the fact that no efforts were made to mobilise 
savings is more important. In fact, the Irish imitators used inter-bank loans rather than 
compete for deposits. This was financially unsustainable.7  
The savings banks, TSBs and the POSB, were other examples of socially driven 
microfinance institutions as governments attempted to encourage ‘thrift’ on a mass 
scale. The goal of thrift was so enticing that various governments were willing to 
subsidise the savings of the people. Verdier actually believed that governments were 
hungry for credit, and that this is the reason why national savings banks were 
established.8 But this view is too Machiavellian, as the evidence from the 
parliamentary debates show that contemporaries were more concerned with 
encouraging thrift. The problem with the ideologically motivated encouragement of 
‘thrift’ was that there was no cost assessment. The belief seems to have been that if 
                                                 
7
 For a more recent example see the case of Northern Rock, as it too had an over-reliance on the inter-
bank lending market. 
8
 Daniel Verdier, ‘Explaining cross-national variations in universal banking in nineteenth century 
Europe, North America, and Australasia’ in  Douglas J. Forsyth and Daniel Verdier (eds), The origins 
of national financial systems: Alexander Gerschenkron reconsidered (London, 2003), pp 28-29. 
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there were no facilities to save, then people would be spendthrifts. This view of 
personal saving is ideologically motivated, and the result was that people did use and 
abuse the savings banks that the state provided.  Abuses came in the form of 
manipulating the constraints (i.e. trust accounts). Another useful way to abuse the 
state savings system was to save when market rates were low, and withdraw when 
market rates were high.9 The government should not have entered the savings market 
as there was an existing private market, especially in Ireland where the joint stock 
banks were engaging in deposit mobilisation. Government intervention in the savings 
markets distorted the market and incentive structures, especially in the case of the 
TSBs where it created moral hazards. The government subsidised savings, and this 
was detrimental to market-orientated institutions. People felt unfairly treated by the 
joint stock banks, who all followed market rates, and public inquiries and public 
personalities questioned the low rates in the joint stock banks vis-à-vis government 
rates without questioning the fact that government rates were arbitrarily determined. 
 
4. Government intervention 
The first section of this conclusion dealt with government intervention in the economy 
in the form of legislative constraints. Here we will focus on the actions and policies of 
the state and its affect on the economy. Gerschenkron’s hypothesis on government 
involvement in an economy is that government policy can be a substitute for some 
economic structures necessary for economic growth. But the argument I wish to 
emphasise is that Gerschenkron’s argument can be turned around and that government 
actions do not always have positive effects. The main example that we saw in this 
thesis is the government land-purchase schemes. This policy was similar to the 
socially orientated motivations of the Monts-de-Piété, loan funds, Raiffeisen banks, 
and TSBs, in that the government implemented socially influenced economic policies 
without consideration for long-term economic development. The land purchase 
schemes were short-term solutions aimed at ending agrarian agitation in Ireland, but 
they created a long-term problem as they tied people to uneconomic landholdings. 
Admittedly, there was already a culture in existence that had strong affiliations to the 
land but this culture ought not to have been encouraged. If the state was willing to 
                                                 
9
 For an example of micro-arbitrage see the account of the POSB in India. This is the only 
acknowledgement that such incidents occurred, but assuming market rationality the same probably 
happened in Ireland; Thirty fifth annual report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p. 40. 
[C.5850], H.C. 1889, xxviii, 573. 
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invest large amounts of capital in Irish agriculture, perhaps it would have been better 
to attempt to relocate many of the people from uneconomic holdings. It could have 
provided funds for people to migrate either internally or abroad. It should have 
provided every possible incentive towards land consolidation and efficiency, but the 
government policy that was adopted did the opposite and created an agrarian culture 
that was dependent on state aid. The social value of land was emphasised in rural 
Ireland, but this should have been challenged. Non-agrarian programmes should have 
been promoted. Better targeted policies could have overcome cultural barriers to 
progress, if only there was a willingness to think beyond the immediate political and 
social concerns. 
The previous paragraph suggests that the supply of state intervention is at fault, 
but there is no smoke without fire - there was a continual demand for government 
intervention in the Irish economy. The propagators of co-operation, although 
ideologically motivated, were right to highlight the excessive faith of the Irish 
populace in the capacity of the state.  George Russell believed there was an excessive 
worship of the state in Ireland and he wrote: ‘I think the worst enemies Ireland has 
today are those who are forever supplicating state aid on her behalf’.10 There was a 
demand for land purchase schemes and there was a demand for other state services - 
effectively there was a dependency culture. But the actions of the state affected 
economic behaviour. It encouraged landowners to keep uneconomic farms and also 
distorted financial behaviour, with borrowers and savers encouraged not to maximise 
their returns. The state policies may have benefited individuals but it was detrimental 
to the development of the ‘Irish’ economy as it fostered cultural attitudes antinomic to 
economic development. In effect it delayed economic development.  
Finally, the role of the state illustrates the limitations of microfinance 
programmes. In the first chapter of this thesis we were introduced to the RLF which 
was created by the surplus fund raised by the London relief committee in the early 
1820s. The RLFs that were established were badly managed and wound up in the 
1840s. The surplus funds were in the trusteeship of the UK treasury until the 
establishment of the CDB in the 1890s. The CDB is an interesting experiment in 
terms of microfinance, in that it represents the use of capital raised by the London 
Relief Committee, which can be compared against the same use of capital under the 
                                                 
10
 George W. Russell (AE), Co-operation and nationality (Dublin, 1912), p. 79. 
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RLFs from 1822 to 1846. The difference between the uses of funds revolves mainly 
around the fact that the CDB operated on a centralised basis and the RLFs were 
purely decentralised. 
The CDB stated in its first report that it ‘was constituted with a view to bringing 
about a gradual and lasting improvement in the poor districts in the West of Ireland 
and not for the immediate “relief”.’11 So let us analyse one of these policies, the 
attempt to promote fisheries in the west of Ireland. In its second report the Board 
stated that: 
 
For the starting of a fresh fish trade a heavy capital expenditure is necessary for the 
purchase of large boats and expensive gear – a boat suitable for mackerel and herring 
fishing with complete trains of nets costing from £300 to £600 according to size. In the 
case of most fishermen in Ireland this amount is procured by a loan from the 
Reproductive or Sea and Coast Fisheries Funds, the terms of repayment by half-yearly 
instalments being very favourable.12  
 
It is worth reflecting on that statement. When the RLFs operated in the west of 
Ireland from 1822 to 1846, they were regulated by the Loan Fund Acts which placed a 
£10 restriction on loans. The practice of loan funds was also to issue loans for 20 
weeks, with weekly repayments. These restrictions would not have been suited to 
large capital investments. Due to the absence of monetary inflation in the nineteenth 
century it is possible to make a comparison between the first and second half of the 
nineteenth century. The RLF, as it was constituted in the early 1800s, could not have 
financed the large scale capital investment required to establish a fresh fish industry. 
This coupled with the absence of railways meant that fishery loans would not have 
been a profitable option for borrowers as there was a limited market value for fresh 
fish. If loans to purchase large boats were obtainable, market dislocation would have 
prevented the sale of fresh fish. In the latter nineteenth century the CDB attempted to 
overcome both these obstacles. The CDB was able to provide loans of amounts 
greater than £10, which enabled fishermen to make capital investments that they 
otherwise would not have been able to make. The CDB also helped finance 
infrastructure which again would not have been possible for borrowers from the RLF 
in the early 1800s. The CDB constructed piers and waterways, essential infrastructure 
for fisheries, and attempted to encourage railway companies to provide rail services. 
                                                 
11
 First annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, p. 5. [C. 6908], H.C. 1893-94, lxxi, 
525. 
12
 Second annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, for the year ended the 31st of 
December, 1893, p. 18. [C. 7266], H.C. 1893-94, lxxi, 583. 
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These policies would have enabled a subsidised fresh fish industry to develop. The 
CDB also established a number of fish curing stations in the west which laid the 
foundations for a cured fish trade.13 
The emergent point is that microfinance programmes are not an alternative to 
economic development policies, but they can complement such policies. Microfinance 
programmes alone cannot induce economic development, and in many cases a big 
push is still required.14 Ireland’s ‘big push’ was focused on economically 
unsustainable activities in the west, but the example above does illustrate the 
limitations of microfinance programmes in the absence of other economic reforms
                                                 
13
 Ibid, p. 19. 
14
 Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny,  ‘Industrialization and the Big Push’ in 
Journal of Political Economy, xcvii, no. 5 (1989) pp 1003-1026. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Table 2.4: Rates of discount on monthly loans in 1895  
Rate of discount Discount rate (%) Annualised 
interest rate (%) 
Number of societies 
7 ½ d in the £ 3.13 1.35 55 
7d in the £ 2.92 1.25 6 
6 d in the £ 2.50 1.07 20 
5d in the £ 2.08 0.89 2 
4 d in the £ 1.67 0.71 4 
 
Note: There are 240d in the £. 
 The annualised interest rate has been calculated by applying the following formula1: 
i=(d/(1-d))*100, and annualised by multiplying i by 5 (number of months in the loan term) and dividing 
by 12 (number of months in the year). 
The monthly interest of 1.5d in the £, was equal to 0.62%, annualised to 0.26% 
 
Source: Report of loan fund committee 1897, paragraphs 84-85, p. 15. 
 
A.1.1 Loan fund loans; examples of amortisation 
 
The following tables are examples of how loan fund loans operated. The template has 
been taken from Joanna Ledgerwood, Microfinance handbook.2 
The method that used by the loan funds is comparable to the flat method of 
calculating interest rates outlined by Ledgerwood. Ledgerwood described the flat 
method as follows: 
This method calculates interest as a percentage of the initial loan amount rather than the 
amount outstanding (declining) during the loan term. Using the flat method means that 
interest is always calculated on the total amount of the loan initially disbursed, even 
though periodic payments cause the outstanding principal to decline.3  
 
The following tables outline the flat method as used by loan funds in both weekly and 
monthly loans. 
 
Weekly loans: 
 
A1.1 Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; weekly loan repayments; discount 6d in 
the pound. 
 
                                                 
1
 Samuel A. Broverman, Mathematics of investment and credit (Toronto, 2004), p. 32. 
2
  Joanna Ledgerwood, Microfinance handbook: an institutional and financial perspective (Washington 
D.C., 1998), p. 141. 
3
 Ibid, p. 141. 
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Week Payments Principal Interest
Outstanding 
balance
£ £ £ £
0 10
1 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 9.5
2 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 9
3 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 8.5
4 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 8
5 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 7.5
6 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 7
7 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 6.5
8 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 6
9 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 5.5
10 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 5
11 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 4.5
12 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 4
13 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 3.5
14 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 3
15 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 2.5
16 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 2
17 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 1.5
18 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 1
19 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 0.5
20 0.5 0.4875 0.0125 0
10 9.75 0.25
Discount 0.25
Principal 9.75
  
A.1.2 Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; weekly loan repayments; discount 4d in 
the pound. 
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Week Payments Principal Discount
Outstanding 
balance
0 10
1 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 9.5
2 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 9
3 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 8.5
4 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 8
5 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 7.5
6 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 7
7 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 6.5
8 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 6
9 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 5.5
10 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 5
11 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 4.5
12 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 4
13 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 3.5
14 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 3
15 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 2.5
16 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 2
17 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 1.5
18 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 1
19 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 0.5
20 0.5 0.49165 0.00835 0
10 9.833 0.167
Discount 0.167
Principal 9.833
 
 
 
Monthly loans: 
 
A.1.3 Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; monthly loan repayments; discount 7.5d 
in the pound. 
 
Month Payments Principal Discount
Outstanding 
balance
£ £ £ £
0 10
1 2 1.9374 0.0626 8
2 2 1.9374 0.0626 6
3 2 1.9374 0.0626 4
4 2 1.9374 0.0626 2
5 2 1.9374 0.0626 0
10 9.687 0.313 30
Discount 0.313
Principal 9.687
 
 
 
 
A.1.4 Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; monthly loan repayments; discount 7d in 
the pound. 
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Month Payments Principal Discount
Outstanding 
balance
£ £ £ £
0 10
1 2 1.9416 0.0584 8
2 2 1.9416 0.0584 6
3 2 1.9416 0.0584 4
4 2 1.9416 0.0584 2
5 2 1.9416 0.0584 0
10 9.708 0.292
Discount 0.292
Principal 9.708
 
 
A.1.5 Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; monthly loan repayments; discount 6d in 
the pound. 
 
Month Payments Principal Discount
Outstanding 
balance
£ £ £ £
0 10
1 2 1.95 0.05 8
2 2 1.95 0.05 6
3 2 1.95 0.05 4
4 2 1.95 0.05 2
5 2 1.95 0.05 0
10 9.75 0.25
Discount 0.25
Principal 9.75
 
 
A.1.6. Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; monthly loan repayments; discount 5d in 
the pound. 
Month Payments Principal Interest
Outstanding 
balance
£ £ £ £
0 10
1 2 1.9584 0.0416 8
2 2 1.9584 0.0416 6
3 2 1.9584 0.0416 4
4 2 1.9584 0.0416 2
5 2 1.9584 0.0416 0
10 9.792 0.208
Discount 0.208
Principal 9.792
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.1.7. Loan amount £10; 20 week loan term; monthly loan repayments; discount 4d in 
the pound. 
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Month Payments Principal Discount
Outstanding 
balance
£ £ £ £
0 10
1 2 1.9666 0.0334 8
2 2 1.9666 0.0334 6
3 2 1.9666 0.0334 4
4 2 1.9666 0.0334 2
5 2 1.9666 0.0334 0
10 9.833 0.167
Discount 0.167
Principal 9.833
 
 
 
A. 1.2. Methodology used to calculate annual interest rates in the 1897 loan fund 
report. 
 
The methodology used to calculate annual interest rates was shown in appendix B of 
the 1897 report on loan funds.4 In appendix B an example was given of how to 
calculate annual rates of discount for monthly loans. An example was also given for 
weekly loans, but the methodology seems to have deviated from that used to calculate 
the rates for monthly loans. In essence what the report did was to calculate the 
discount charged for the use of an instalment over the combined number of days( e.g. 
28+56+…+140=420) in the loan term. The rate of discount was divided by 420, and 
then subsequently multiplied by 365 to give an annual rate of discount. The same 
approach was said to have been used to calculate weekly loans (e.g. 
7+14+…+140=1470), except the discount rates quoted in appendix B are not equal to 
the discount rates calculated using this approach. Instead it seems the rate of discount 
on the instalment was divided by 735 (1470/2). The various annual discount rates, 
calculated using this methodology, are shown below. The equivalent rates of interest 
are also shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Report of the committee appointed to inquire into the proceedings of charitable loan societies in 
Ireland, established under the Act 6 &7, vic. Cap 91. appendix B, p. 33. [C.8381], H.C. 1897, xxiii, 
383. 
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A.1.8. Discount of 4d on a loan of £1 for 20 weeks, repayable by 5 monthly 
instalments of 4s each 
Instalment Days Discount
0.2 28 0.016667
0.2 56 0.016667
0.2 84 0.016667
0.2 112 0.016667
0.2 140 0.016667
0.2 420 0.016667
Discount 420 
days (%) 8.33
Discount 1 day 
(%) 0.02
Discount 365 
days (%) 7.24
Interest (%) 7.81
 
 
 
A. 1. 9. Discount of 5d on a loan of £1 for 20 weeks, repayable by 5 monthly 
instalments of 4s each 
 
Instalment Days Discount
0.2 28 0.020833
0.2 56 0.020833
0.2 84 0.020833
0.2 112 0.020833
0.2 140 0.020833
0.2 420 0.020833
Discount 420 
days (%) 10.42
Discount 1 day 
(%) 0.02
Discount 365 
days (%) 9.05
Interest (%) 9.95
 
 
 
A.1.10. Discount of 6d on a loan of £1 for 20, repayable by 5 monthly instalments of 
4s each 
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Instalment Days Discount
0.2 28 0.025
0.2 56 0.025
0.2 84 0.025
0.2 112 0.025
0.2 140 0.025
0.2 420 0.025
Discount 420 
days (%) 12.50
Discount 1 day 
(%) 0.03
Discount 365 
days (%) 10.86
Interest (%) 12.19
 
 
Discount of 7d on a loan of £1 for 20, repayable by 5 monthly instalments of 4s each 
 
Instalment Days Discount
0.2 28 0.029167
0.2 56 0.029167
0.2 84 0.029167
0.2 112 0.029167
0.2 140 0.029167
0.2 420 0.029167
Discount 
420 days 
(%) 14.58
Discount 1 
day (%) 0.03
Discount 
365 days 
(%) 12.67
Interest (%) 14.80
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A. 1.11. Discount of 7.5d on a loan of £1 for 20, repayable by 5 monthly instalments 
of 4s each 
 
Instalment Days Discount
0.2 28 0.03125
0.2 56 0.03125
0.2 84 0.03125
0.2 112 0.03125
0.2 140 0.03125
0.2 420 0.03125
Discount 
420 days 
(%) 15.63
Discount 1 
day (%) 0.04
Discount 
365 days 
(%) 13.58
Interest (%) 15.71
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A.1.12. Discount of 6d on a loan of £1 for 20, repayable by 20 weekly instalments of 
1s each 
Instalment Days Discount
0.1 7 0.025
0.1 14 0.025
0.1 21 0.025
0.1 28 0.025
0.1 35 0.025
0.1 42 0.025
0.1 49 0.025
0.1 56 0.025
0.1 63 0.025
0.1 70 0.025
0.1 77 0.025
0.1 84 0.025
0.1 91 0.025
0.1 98 0.025
0.1 105 0.025
0.1 112 0.025
0.1 119 0.025
0.1 126 0.025
0.1 133 0.025
0.1 140 0.025
0.1 1470 0.025
Discount 1470 
days (%) 25
Discount 1 day 
(%) 0.017007
Discount 365 
days (%) 6.207483
Interest (%) 6.618314
Discount 735 
days (%) 25
Discount 1 day 
(%) 0.034014
Discount 365 
days (%) 12.41497
Interest (%) 14.17436
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A.2.13 Discount of 4d on a loan of £1 for 20, repayable by 20 weekly instalments of 
1s each 
Instalment Days Discount
0.1 7 0.016667
0.1 14 0.016667
0.1 21 0.016667
0.1 28 0.016667
0.1 35 0.016667
0.1 42 0.016667
0.1 49 0.016667
0.1 56 0.016667
0.1 63 0.016667
0.1 70 0.016667
0.1 77 0.016667
0.1 84 0.016667
0.1 91 0.016667
0.1 98 0.016667
0.1 105 0.016667
0.1 112 0.016667
0.1 119 0.016667
0.1 126 0.016667
0.1 133 0.016667
0.1 140 0.016667
0.1 1470 0.016667
Discount 
1470 days 
(%) 16.66667
Discount 1 
day (%) 0.011338
Discount 
365 days 
(%) 4.138322
Interest (%) 4.316972
Discount 
735 days 
(%) 16.66667
Discount 1 
day (%) 0.022676
Discount 
365 days 
(%) 8.276644
Interest (%) 9.023486
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Appendix 2.1: IAOS instructions for guidance of committee and secretary of 
agricultural banks, c. 1901.5 
 
1. The secretary should see that all applications for membership are properly filled in 
by the applicant, and his or her signature witnessed. These forms must be brought 
before the Committee, and if applicants are admitted, the form must be signed by 
the Chairman of the Meeting and the Secretary, the forms of application must be 
carefully preserved by the Secretary, as it may become necessary to prove 
membership later on. Unless these instructions are carried out the admission will 
be illegal, and the Society will have no power of legally binding is members by 
the rules. 
2. A copy of the Bank Rules should be given to each member, for which the 
Committee has power to charge sixpence. The Secretary should, however, be 
careful always to have on hands some copies of the Rules. 
3. It is desirable that a small entrance fee should be charged of either sixpence or one 
shilling. 
4. Before the first General Meeting can be held seven special members who signed 
the application to have the society registered, and who act as Committee 
temporarily, must admit applicants for membership who have duly signed the 
form. 
5. If there is another Bank in a neighbouring parish or district it would be desirable 
to exchange lists of members, so as to prevent anyone having borrowing powers in 
two Societies. If lists of sureties and borrowers were also exchanged it would tend 
to prevent the making of loans not properly secured 
6. At the first General Meeting the order of business shall be as follows. – 
(a) Election of permanent committee 
(b) Ratifying appointment of Trustees 
(c) Election of Treasurer 
(d) Election of Auditors 
(e) Other offices, if any. 
(f) The members shall then pass a resolution empowering the 
Committee to receive deposits and borrow money on their behalf 
for the purposes of the society. The resolution shall limit the 
amount up to which the Committee may in this way pledge the 
liability of the Society until the next General Meeting is held. 
Unless this is done the Committee will have no legal power to 
receive money for the purposes of the society 
(g) Any other general business of the society 
 
7. The secretary of the society shall keep in the Minute Book a record of the business 
done at each meeting of the Committee or of the Society. The Minutes shall 
record –  
(a) Date of meeting 
(b) Names of members of Committee present 
(c) Names of members admitted to Society at meeting 
(d) List of loans granted or refused 
                                                 
5
 Seventh report of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, Limited, for year ending 31st 
December, 1901, [Leaflet no. 2 b], pp 70-72. 
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(e) Any other business of which it is desirable a record should be kept, 
such as resolutions, amendments thereto, or notices of resolutions, 
any action taken with regard to any member, etc. 
 
The Secretary shall read the minutes of the preceding meeting at each meeting of 
the Committee, and they shall be signed by whoever may  act as Chairman for the 
time. The minutes of a general meeting can only be affirmed at the next general 
meeting. It is most desirable that the minutes should be correctly entered, as they 
furnish a record of the authority under which the Committee or Secretary may act. 
8. Before the Committee can take advantage of the resolution of the general meeting 
of members granting authority to borrow, they must pass a resolution nominating 
two members of Committee to act with the Secretary in executing any bond or 
security for repayment of money if borrowed from any public body or 
corporation. They must also pass a resolution authorising the Secretary to affix the 
seal of the Society to any such documents. 
9. The form of bond for repayment of loan supplied by the I.A.O.S. can be used for 
sums under £5 without a stamp. As the stamp duty on this form for sums over £5 
would exceed that required on the ordinary Promissory Note, it is better to use the 
latter for any sums exceeding that amount. The Secretary should be careful to see 
that all such forms are properly filled up, witnessed, and dated. It is not legal to 
date or sign business documents on Sunday. 
10. Two sureties are necessary in every case where a loan is granted. It is undesirable 
to accept as security property or land, as it would be difficult and costly to realise. 
Committees should be on their guard against cross sureties, i.e. A. and B. 
becoming security for C., C and B. for A., and A. and C. for B, as in that case no 
real security is offered. A borrower who is found to have divided his loan with his 
sureties is breaking his contract with the Society, and the loan committee have 
power to recall the loan. 
11. The Depositor’s card, if filled up, is a sufficient receipt for money lodged on 
deposit. Committees are advised to seek for local deposits in preference to 
borrowing from the Government or Joint Stock Banks. In case of the deposit being 
for a large sum, it is desirable to have an agreement or understanding with 
depositors about the notice required before withdrawal. 
12. If renewals of loans are to be entirely deprecated, and they should only be granted 
upon the most exceptional circumstances. As the borrower was granted the loan 
for a sufficient time to enable him to make his profit out of the loan before 
repayment, there is rarely any excuse for prolonging the time. 
13. In granting loans the length of time for which loan is asked should be adjusted to 
the purpose. The custom which prevails in some Societies of lending all loans for 
the full time allowable, i.e., twelve months is one which should be stopped. 
Repayment by instalments should be encouraged whenever the profits derivable 
from the loan come in gradually or when the borrower otherwise sees his way to 
do this. As interest is charged only on money actually in the borrower’s 
possession, a considerable saving is effected by repayment in instalments. 
14. An account should be opened in the nearest Joint Stock Bank, as it is much better 
to pay loans by cheque than to have the local Treasurer holding the funds. A 
Treasurer must, however, be appointed, whose duty it will be to lodge all moneys 
received in the Bank as soon as possible. Two or more members of Committee 
should be authorised to sign cheques, which should always be counter-signed by 
the Secretary. 
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15. The Committee should remember that an annual general meeting is necessary, and 
it should be summoned at the beginning of every year, as soon as the accounts 
have been audited. 
 
Appendix 2.2: Loan use in Raiffeisen Societies. 
 
The following information was taken from Bank organiser reports that were included 
in the correspondence of the IAOS and the Raiffeisen societies. Unfortunately not all 
records contain bank organiser reports, neither are the bank organiser reports available 
for a continuous number of years. 
 
Ballymoyer Credit Society 
 
1905- Buying and holding over stock 
1906 - Purchase of cattle, pigs, seeds and manures 
1913 - Calves and stock generally 
1916 – Purchase of livestock and seeds 
 
Source: (N.A.I. 1088/79/1, Ballymoyer Credit Society, Whitecross, Co. Armagh) 
 
Columbkille credit society 
 
1914 - Purchase of pigs, calves, cows, holding stock, repairing houses 
1918 - Milch cows, grazing cattle, calves, pigs, horses, hold over stock 
 
Source: (N.A.I. 1088/253a/1 and 1088/253a/2, Columbkille credit society) 
 
Corrigan Agricultural Bank 
 
1913- Purchase of cattle, “holding over” stock, purchase manures and seeds 
1914 - Purchase of cattle, calves, pigs, “holding over” stock 
 
Source: (N.A.I., 1088/280/1, Corrigan Agricultural Bank) 
 
Dromintee Agricultural Bank 
 
1904 - Purchase seeds and manures 
1905- Purchase of cattle, sheep, pigs, seeds, manures etc 
1906 - Stock purchase  
1907- Keeping over stock, Purchase pigs and cattle 
1911- Purchase livestock 
 
Source: (N.A.I., 1088/354/1, Dromintee Agricultural Bank) 
 
Killinagh Credit Society 
1909 - Purchase of stock, “holding over” stock, purchase seed 
1910 - Purchase of cattle stock, cash payments manures and seeds 
1911- Purchase of livestock, “holding over” stock, occasionally for manures and 
seeds 
1912 - Purchase of cattle, etc calves, pigs, “holding over” stock, purchase of seeds 
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1913 - Purchase of seeds, manures, cattle, pigs, “holding over” stock 
1914 - Purchase of cattle, pigs, “holding over” stock 
1916 - Purchase of livestock, “holding over” stock 
1917- Purchase of livestock, “holding over” stock until better agricultural conditions 
prevail 
 
Source: (N.A.I., 1088/552/1,Killanagh credit society, Co. Leitrim) 
 
 
Killeshandra Agricultural Bank 
 
 
1900 - purchase of cows, horses, sheep, pigs, etc. 
1905 - Purchase of cows, young stock, seeds 
 
Source: (N.A.I., 1088/549A/1, Killeshandra Agricultural Bank) 
 
 
Appendix 2.3: Congested District Board short and medium term loans.6 
Table A2.1 CDB terms for agricultural loans (March, 1903) 
Purpose of 
loan 
Amount of 
loan 
Period of 
repayment 
Rate of interest 
charged 
Amount of 
half-yearly 
repayment, 
(incl. interest) 
   Per cent  
Credit banks Advances of 
£50 as required 
(no limit fixed) 
1 ½ years 3 Interest only 
Purchase of 
Bee-keeping 
apparatus 
Up to £10 1 year 3 Repaid in one 
sum 
Purchase of 
livestock a 
£3 to £20 6 months to 
5years 
3 10s 6d to  
£2 3s 4d 
Purchase of 
fencing 
material 
£1 to £25 1 year to 10 
years 
3 10s 6 d to 
£1 9s 2d 
Purchase of 
out-office, 
carts, etc. a 
£1 to £25 1 year to 5 
years 
3 10s 6d to 
£2 14s 5d 
a- board’s estates 
Source: Appendix xxvii, Twelfth report of the congested districts board for Ireland, (1903) [C. 1622], Ir 
35182 c 4, p. 96. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Appendix xxvii, Twelfth report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland, p. 96[Cd.1622], H.C. 
1903, lv, 99. 
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Table A2.2 CDB terms for fishery loans (March, 1903) 
Purpose of 
loan 
Amount of 
loan 
Period of 
repayment 
Rate of interest 
charged 
Amount of 
half-yearly 
repayment, 
(incl. interest) 
     
For purchase 
of boats and 
fishing gear 
£1 to £5 2 years 2 ½  5s 2d to  
£1 5s 9d 
“ £5 to £20 3 years 2 ½ To £3 9s 7d 
“ £20 to £50 4 years 2 ½ To £6 12s 2d 
“ £50 to £100 5 years 2 ½ To £10 14s 
For purchase 
of large boats 
£200 to £500 6 years to 8 
years 
2 ½  £18 1s to 
£34 19s 5d 
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Table A2.3 CDB terms for industrial loans (March, 1903) 
 
Purpose of 
loan 
Amount of 
loan 
Period of 
repayment 
Rate of interest 
charged 
Amount of 
half-yearly 
repayment, 
(incl. interest) 
 £  Per cent £ 
Purchase of 
handlooms, 
knitting 
machines, etc 
£7 10s 
(average) 
3 years 2 ½  £1 6s 1d 
Purchase of 
spinning 
wheels 
£1 5s 6d 
(average) 
2 years 2 ½ 6s 7d 
Purchase of 
carpenter’s 
tools 
£1 1 ½ years 2 ½  6s 10d 
Purchase of 
materials for 
barrel making 
Up to £100 1 year 2 ½    
 
Annual average industrial loan from the CDB
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Appendix 3 : Mapping methodology and Maps 
 
The institutions studied in this thesis have been mapped using point coordinates (x,y) 
and projections were made using ARCgis software. Point coordinates for all of the 
maps below were obtained by matching place names with coordinates in 
GoogleEarth™, the Ordnance Survey Historical database and the Placenames 
Database of Ireland. The exact location of the institutions is unknown, and 
unknowable, but surviving information of the town or village where an institution was 
located enables us to map approximations using x y coordinates. Each map is an 
approximation of the location of a particular institution at a particular point in time. 
The methodology was to find the coordinates at the central point of the location. The 
resulting mapped representation gives us the radius of the location. Another difficulty 
with mapping was the slow introduction of standardised place names in Ireland.7 This 
problem has been mitigated by using the Ordnance Survey Historical database and the 
Placenames Database of Ireland. The following excerpts state the source of 
information for each set of maps. 
 
Loan fund societies, 1836-1911 
 
The coordinates for loan fund societies were obtained from a number of parliamentary 
papers relating to loan fund activity. The data for the years 1836 and 1838 relate to 
information regarding the number of loan funds that submitted rules to the clerks of 
the peace. In the context of loan funds discussed in this thesis, this includes RLFs 
associated with the London Relief Committee and loan funds that later registered with 
the LFB. Information on loan funds for the years 1841, 1851, 1861, 1871, 1880, 1895, 
1901 and 1911 was obtained from annual reports of the LFB.  
The maps for the years 1836 and 1838 only include information relating to the 
reports themselves and the number of loan funds found in a particular location. The 
maps from 1851 onwards attempt to measure the flow of loan funds by showing the 
locations where there was continuity between periods, where there were closures and 
where new societies opened. There were a number of cases of locations having more 
than one loan fund. This has been represented by making categories of locations that 
                                                 
7
 Chapter 2 in William Smyth’s thesis gives an account of the development of boundaries and place 
names in Ireland in the early nineteenth century: Smyth, William Anthony, ‘Sir Richard Griffith’s 
Three Valuations of Ireland, 1826-1864’ (PhD thesis, NUI Maynooth Department of History, 2008). 
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had one loan fund and locations that had two loan funds. As there were cases where 
there were more than one loan fund in one particular location, the closure of a loan 
fund is captured by the fact that the existing loan fund is classified as having one 
society, whereas in a previous period it had two. 
The coordinates for each loan fund was obtained from its spelt name in the LFB 
reports, but it was not possible to locate a small number of loan funds. These were 
loan funds that had generic titles such as the Dublin South Eastern (1851), the 
Wexford Temperance loan fund (1851 and 1861), the Johnstone Charitable loan fund 
located in Dublin (1851, 1861 and 1871), and the  Limerick Pery and Jubilee (1851, 
1861 and 1871, 1880, 1895, 1901, 1911). Each of these societies was included in a 
map, apart from the Wexford temperance loan fund, and they were assumed to have 
been located in the city rather than in a rural location.  
 
Joint Stock Banks 1861 to 1911 
 
The following maps were derived from the banking directories published in Thom’s 
Directory from 1861 to 1911. A number of joint stock banks were spatially correlated 
i.e. located in the same town. The methodology used to map this was to classify towns 
by the number of banks located in each town. The map legend illustrates how many 
joint stock banks were in a particular location at time T. At all periods the two 
outlying locations are Dublin and Belfast. The maps contain records of the number of 
bank branches and sub-branches. 
 
TSBs 1818 to 1911 
 
The following maps were derived from a number a sources. Firstly the information of 
the initial TSBs registered in 1818 was obtained from a parliamentary return.8 The 
information for 1830 and 1844 was taken from the savings bank compilations 
published by Tidd Pratt.9 The list of TSBs from 1861 to 1911 was taken from Thom’s 
Directory. The maps represent the approximate location of each TSB.  
From 1830 onwards each map contains four variables for the given year. The 
first variable is the number of TSBs that have ceased by year T, these are variables 
                                                 
8
 An account of the several banks for savings, established in Ireland, and registered, under the act 57 
Geo. III, cap. 105; specifying the date of each establishment, and the amount of the sums vested to their 
credit severally, in government securities, under the provisions of that act., H.C. 1818, (153), xvi, 381. 
9
 John Tidd Pratt, The history of savings banks in England, Wales, and Ireland (London, 1830); and 
John Tidd Pratt, A summary of the savings banks in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland (London, 
1846). 
 317 
recorded in a previous mapping period but that were not included in the list of the 
next mapping period. The second variable is number of TSBs not registered in year T-
1 (i.e. new). The third variable is number of TSBs that continued operating from one 
mapping period to the next (i.e. T-1 and T).  The fourth variable is the number of 
branches associated with the TSBs. Pratt recorded a number of branches associated 
with the Dublin savings banks. These have been added to the lists from Thom’s in the 
later years, as it was recorded that the Dublin savings bank had branches. Maps 
included in the work of Horne show that the Belfast savings bank had branches,10 but 
I was unable to find more detailed information of these so they have not been 
included.  
 
Maps of Raiffeisen societies, 1901-1920 
 
The methodology used to construct these maps was as follows. The names of societies 
were obtained from the IAOS annual reports for the years 1901, 1905, 1908, 1911, 
1914 and 1920 were used to indicate location. Coordinates were retrieved from 
Google Earth, and the Ordinance Survey historical database. In some cases society 
names did not indicate a location. Modern researchers are not the only ones who faced 
difficulties pinpointing co-operatives on the map. An IAOS inspector had a similar 
problem. In a memo to the IAOS Secretary, Mr. Moore asked: 
 
Could you give any idea of where this society is located I have searched all the maps at 
my disposal and the nearest approach to the name I can find is Ballymyre about 3 miles 
from Newtown Hamilton. Is this the place?...If I had a full list of the societies in Co. 
Armagh and Fermanagh I would try to mark them on map for future use.11 
 
For these societies I used the IAOS list of societies in the National Archive of Ireland 
and also the annual reports of the Registrar of Friendly Societies. The points in the 
maps represent the approximate geographic location of each society. 
The mapping methodology used was to highlight societies that ceased operating, 
societies that were inactive and societies that continued to remain active. This is done 
from 1905 until 1920, with the legend on each map explaining the variables. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Oliver H. Horne, A history of savings banks (London, 1947). 
11
 ‘Memo from Moore to secretary of IAOS re Ballymoyer Credit Society’, 15/6/1909 
(N.A.I 1088/79/1, Ballymoyer Credit Society, Whitecross). 
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Post Office Money order office and POSB, 1845-1911 
 
The methodology used to construct these maps was as follows. The names of societies 
were obtained from a parliamentary return in 1845 and from the postal directory in 
Thoms for the years 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 were used to indicate 
location. 
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1890-91, xciv, 1; 1901 census. [C. 875], H.C. 1902, cxx, 1; 1911 census[Cd. 
6258], H.C. 1912-13, cxi, 1. 
Census of Scotland 1861. Population tables and report. Number of the inhabitants, 
families, children at school, houses, and rooms with windows, in the civil 
counties and parishes, registration counties and districts, burghs, towns, 
villages, and islands of Scotland: also a classification of families according to 
their sizes, the number of persons they contain, and their relative house 
accommodation. [3013], H.C. 1862, l, 945; 1871 census. [C. 380], H.C. 1871, 
lix, 813; 1881 census. [C. 2957], H.C. 1881, xcvi, 143; 1891 census. [C. 
6390], H.C. 1890-91, xciv, 153; 1901 census. [Cd. 1257], H.C. 1902, cxxix, 
687; 1911 census. [Cd. 6097], H.C. 1912-13, cxix, 1. 
 
Census of Ireland 
 
Abstract of population of Ireland, 1821, H.C. 1822 (36), xiv, 737. 
Return of population of counties of Ireland, 1831, H.C. 1831-32 (60), xxxvi, 299. 
Return of population of counties of Ireland, 1831, H.C. 1833 (254), xxxix, 1. 
Census of Ireland 1831; Comparative abstract, 1821 and 1831, H.C. 1833 (23), 
xxxix, 3 
Abstract of census of Ireland,1841. [459], H.C. 1843, li, 319. 
Abstract of census of Ireland, 1841 and 1851 , H.C. 1851 (673), l, 327.  
Census of Ireland, 1861; Part V, General Report, Appendix, County Tables, Summary 
Index. [3204-IV], H.C. 1863, lxi,1. 
Census of Ireland, 1871; Part III, General Report, Appendix, County Tables, 
Summary Index. [C. 1377], H.C. 1876, lxxxi,1. 
Census of Ireland, 1881; Part V, General Report, Appendix, County Tables, Summary 
Index. [C. 3365], H.C. 1882, lxxvi,385. 
Census of Ireland, 1861; Part V, General Report, Appendix, County Tables, Summary 
Index. [C. 6781], H.C. 1892 xc,635. 
Census of Ireland 1901; Part II, General Report, with illustrative maps and diagrams, 
tables, and appendix. [Cd. 1190], H.C. 1902, cxxix, 1. 
Census of Ireland 1911; General Report, with Tables and Appendix. [Cd. 6663], H.C. 
1912-13, cxviii,1. 
 
 
Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners 
 
Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners General Report, 1841-42, H.C. 1842 
(567), xxv, 55; H.C. 1843, (621), xxix, 15; H.C. 1844, (178) [588-I]; [617], 
H.C. 1845, xxvii, 83; [706], H.C. 1846, xxiv, 1; [809], H.C. 1847, xxxiii, 131; 
[961],[961-II], H.C. 1847-48, xxvi, 1,41; [1082], H.C. 1849, xxii,1’ [1204], 
H.C. 1850, xxiii, 55; [1383], H.C. 1851, xxii, 333; [1499], H.C. 1852, xviii, 
161; [1647], H.C. 1852-53, xl, 65; [1833], H.C. 1854, xxviii,1; [1953], H.C. 
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1854-55, xvii, 1; [2089], H.C. 1856, xxiv, 325; [2249], H.C. 1857 Session 2, 
xvi, 33; [2395], H.C. 1857-58, xxiv, 401; [2555], H.C. 1859 Session 2, xiv, 
159;  [2696], H.C. 1860, xxix, 1; [2842], H.C. 1861, xxii, 1; [3010], H.C. 
1862, xxii, 1; [3199], H.C. 1863, xv, 247; [3341], H.C. 1864, xvi, 477; [3526], 
H.C. 1865, xviii, 383; [3679], H.C. 1866, xvii, 359; [3855], H.C. 1867, xix, 
121; [4024], H.C. 1867-68, xvii, 787; [4159], H.C. 1868-69, xvii, 119; [C. 
196], H.C. 1870, xvii, 111; [C. 369], H.C. 1871, xx, 335; [C. 562], H.C. 1872, 
xvi, 639; [C. 768], H.C. 1873, xviii, 295. 
 
Congestion Commission 
 
First Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the 
operation of the Acts dealing with Congestion in Ireland; Evid. and 
Documents; [Cd. 3267], xxxii, 621; Second report, [Cd. 3319], H.C. 1907, 
xxxv, 5; Third report, [Cd. 3414], H.C. 1907, xxxv, 337; Fourth report, [Cd. 
3509], H.C. 1907, xxxvi, 5; Fifth Report, [Cd. 3630], H.C. 1907, xxxvi, 261; 
Sixth report, [Cd. 3748], H. C. 1908, xxxix, 701; Seventh Report, [Cd. 3785], 
H.C. 1908, xl, 5; Eight Report, [Cd. 3839], H.C. 1908, xli, 5; Ninth Report, 
[Cd. 3845], H.C. 1908, xli, 487; Tenth Report, [Cd. 4007], H.C. 1908, xlii, 5; 
Eleventh Report, [Cd. 4097], H.C. 1908, xlii, 729. 
Final report of the royal commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the 
operation of the acts dealing with congestion in Ireland . [Cd. 4098] H.C. 
1908, xlii, 729. 
 
Congested Districts Board 
 
First annual report of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland. [C. 6908], H.C. 
1893-94, lxxi, 525; [C. 7266] , H.C. 1893-94, lxxi, 583; [C. 7522], H.C. 1894, 
lxviii, 681; [C. 7791], H.C. 1895, lxxix, 517; [C. 8191], H.C. 1896, lxviii, 53; 
[C. 8622], H.C. 1897, lxxii, 439; [C. 9003], H.C. 1898, lxxii, 481; [C. 9375], 
H.C. 1899, lxxvii, 755; [Cd. 239], H.C. 1900, lxviii, 183; [Cd. 681], H.C. 
1901, lx, 1; [Cd. 1192], H.C. 1902, lxxxii, 71; [Cd. 1622], H.C. 1903, lv, 99; 
[Cd. 2275], H.C. 1905, lxii, 229;  [Cd. 2757], H.C. 1906, xcvii, 355; [Cd. 
3161], H.C. 1906, xcvii, 493; [Cd. 3767], H.C. 1908, xxiii, 287; [Cd. 4340], 
H.C. 1908, xxiii, 443; [Cd. 4927], H.C. 1909, xvi, 1; [Cd. 5712], H.C. 
1911,xiii; [Cd. 6553], H.C. 1912-13, xvii; [Cd. 7312], H.C. 1914, xvi; [Cd. 
7865], H.C. 1914-16, xxiv; [Cd. 8076], H.C. 1914-16, xxiv; [Cd. 8356], H.C. 
1916. vi; [Cd. 8853], H.C. 1918, xxvi; [Cd. 9139], H.C. 1918, vii; [Cmd. 759], 
H.C. 1920, xix; [Cmd. 1409], H.C. 1921, xiv, 613. 
 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction 
 
First Annual General Report of the Department of Agriculture and Technical 
Instruction (Ireland), 1900-1901. [Cd. 838], H.C. 1902, xx, 511;  [Cd. 1314], 
H.C. 1902, xx, 817; [Cd. 1919], H.C. 1904, xvi, 435; [Cd. 2509], H.C. 1905, 
xxi, 261; [Cd. 2929], H.C. 1906, xxiii, 295; [Cd. 3543], H.C. 1907, xvii, 241; 
[Cd. 4148], H.C. 1908, xiv, 591; [Cd. 4430], H.C. 1908, xxii, 399; [Cd. 5128], 
H.C. 1910, viii, 617; [Cd. 5611], H.C. 1911, ix, 1; [Cd. 6107], H.C. 1912-13, 
xii, 1; [Cd. 6647], H.C. 1912-13, xii, 525; [Cd. 7298], H.C. 1914, xii, 241; 
[Cd. 7839], H.C. 1914-16, vi, 1;  [Cd. 8299], H.C. 1916, iv, 413; [Cd. 8574], 
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H.C. 1917-18, iv, 15; [Cd. 9016], H.C. 1918, v, 383; [Cmd. 106], H.C. 1919, 
ix, 715; [Cmd. 929], H.C. 1920, ix, 171; 
 
Estates Commissioners 
 
Report of the Estates Commissioners for the period November 1903 to March 1903; 
with Appendices; [Cd. 2742], H.C. 1906, xxv, 183; [Cd. 3148], H.C. 1906, 
xxv, 237; [Cd. 3692], H.C. 1907, xix, 187; [Cd. 4849], H.C. 1909, xxiii, 737; 
[Cd. 5423], H.C. 1910, xxi, 847; [Cd. 5888], H.C. 1911, xxix, 511; [Cd. 
6436], H.C. 1912-13, xxxiv, 227; [Cd. 7145], H.C. 1914, xxxvi, 485; [Cd. 
7663], xxiv, 379; [Cd. 8083], H.C. 1914-16, xxvi, 499; [Cd. 8456], H.C. 1917-
18, xv, 253; [Cd. 8766], H.C. 1917-18, xv, 337; [Cmd. 29], H.C. 1919, xxiv, 
137; [Cmd. 577], H.C. 1920, xix, 965; [Cmd. 1150], H.C. 1921, xiv, 661. 
 
 
Evictions 
 
Return, by provinces and counties (compiled from returns made to the Inspector 
General, Royal Irish Constabulary), of cases of evictions which have come to 
the knowledge of the constabulary in each of the years from 1849 to 1880, 
inclusive, H.C. 1881 (185), lxxvii, 725. 
Return of cases of eviction under Knowledge of Constabulary in Ireland, 1877-June 
1880, H.C. 1880, (254), lx, 361; Jan.-Jun. 1880, H.C. 1880, (281), lx, 365; 
1880, H.C. 1881, (2), lxxvii, 713; Jan-Mar. 1881, H.C. 1881, (285), lxxvii, 
721; April-Jun 1881, H.C. 1881, (320),lxxvii, 723; 1881, H.C. 1882, (9), lv, 
229; Jan-Mar 1882, H.C. 1882, (145), lv, 327; April 1882, H.C. 1882, (199), 
lv, 241; May 1882. [C. 3240[, H.C. 1882, lv, 245; Jun 1882. [C. 3277], H.C. 
1882, lv, 249; July 1882. [C. 3322], H.C. 1882, lv, 253; Oct. 1882. [C. 3416], 
H.C. 1882, lv, 257; Oct-Dec. 1882. [C. 3465], H.C. 1883, lvi, 99; Jan-Mar. 
1883. [C. 3579], H.C. 1883, lvi, 107; April-Jun 1883.[ C. 3770], lvi, 111; July-
Sept. 1883. [C.3892], H.C. 1884, lxiv, 407; Oct-Dec 1883. [C. 3893], H.C. 
1884, lxiv, 411; Jan-Mar 1884 [C. 3994], H.C. 1884, lxiv, 415; April-Jun 
1884. [C. 4089], H.C. 1884, lxiv, 419; July-Sept. 1884 [C. 4209], H.C. 1884-
85, lxv, 29; Oct-Dec 1884. [C. 4300], H.C. 1884-85, lxv, 33; Jan-Mar. 1885. 
[C. 4394], H.C. 1884-85, lxv, 37; April-Jun. 1885. [C. 4485], H.C. 1884-85, 
lxv, 41; July-Sept. 1885. [C. 4618], H.C. 1886, liv, 29;  Oct-Dec. 1885 
[C.4619], H.C. 1886, liv, 33; Jan-Mar. 1886. [C.4720], H.C. 1886, liv, 37; 
April-Jun. 1886. [C. 4875], H.C. 1886, liv, 41; July-Sept. 1886. [C. 4946], 
H.C. 1887, lxviii, 51; Oct-Dec, 1886. [C. 4947], H.C. 1887, lxviii, 51; Jan-
Mar 1887. [C. 5037], H.C. 1887, lxvii; April-Jun 1887. [C. 5095], H.C. 1887, 
lxviii, 63; July-Sept 1887. [C. 5289], H.C. 1888, lxxxiii, 433; Oct-Dec. 1887. 
[C.5405], H.C. 1888, lxxxiii, 437; Jan-Mar. 1888. [C. 5404], H.C. 1888, 
lxxxiii, 437; April-Jun 1888. [C. 5498], H.C. 1888, lxxxii, 447; July-Sept 
1888. [C. 5583], H.C. 1888, lxxxii,453; Oct-Dec. 1888. [C. 5642], H.C. 1889, 
lxi, 545; Jan-Mar 1889. [C. 5700], H.C. 1889, lxi, 551; April-Jun 1889 [C. 
5784], H.C. 1890, lxi, 557; July-Sept 1889. [C. 5935], H.C. 1890, lx, 1; Oct-
Dec. 1889 [C. 5936], H.C. 1890, lx,7; Jan-Mar 1890 [C. 6018], H.C. 1890, lx, 
13; April-Jun 1890 [C. 6093], H.C. lx, 19; July-Sept 1890. [C. 6231],  H.C. 
1890-91, lxv, 1; Oct-Dec. 1890 [C. C. 6262], H.C. 1890-91, lxv, 7; Jan-Mar. 
1891. [C. 6345], H.C. 1890-91, lxv, 13; April-Jun. 1891. [C. 6481], H.C. 
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1890-91, lxv, 19; July-Sept 1891. [C. 6580], H.C. 1892, lxv, 477; Oct-Dec 
1891. [C. 6581], H.C. 1892, lxv, 483; Jan-Mar 1892. [C. 6667], H.C. 1892, 
lxv, 489; April-Jun 1892 [C. 6784], H.C. 1892, lxv, 495; July-Sept 1892. [C. 
6872], H.C. 1893-94, lxxiv, pt II, 451; Oct-Dec 1892. [C. 6882], H.C. 1893-
94, lxxiv, pt II, 457; Jan-Mar. 1893 [C. 6995], H.C. 1893-94, lxxiv, pt II, 463; 
April-Jun. 1893. [C. 7099], lxxiv, Pt II, 469; July-Sept. 1893. [C. 7210], H.C. 
1893-94, lxxiv, pt II, 475; Oct-Dec. 1893 [C. 7273], H.C. 1893-94, lxxiv, pt II, 
481; Jan-Mar 1894. [C.7364], H.C. 1894, lxxii, 63; April-Jun 1894. [C. 7462], 
H.C. 1894, lxxii, 69; July-Sept. 1894. [C. 7617], H.C. 1895, lxxxii, 129; Oct-
Dec 1894. [C. 7618], H.C. 1895, lxxxii, 135; Jan-Mar. 1895. [C. 7724], H.C. 
1895, lxxxii, 141; April-Jun. 1895. [C. 7850], H.C. 1895, lxxxii, 147; July-
Sept 1895. [C. 7965], H.C. 1896, lxix, 615; Oct-Dec 1895. [C. 7966], H.C. 
1896, lxix, 621; Jan-Mar. 1896. [C. 8058], H.C. 1896, lxix, 627; April-Jun 
1896. [C. 8166], H.C. 1896, lxix, 633;  July-Sept 1896. [C. 8293], H.C. 1897, 
lxxiii, 315; Oct-Dec 1896. [C.8321], H.C. 1897, lxxiii, 321; Jan-Mar 1897 [C. 
8467], H.C. 1897, lxxiii, 327; April-Jun 1897. [C. 8556], H.C. 1897, lxxiii, 
333; July-Sept. 1897. [C. 8689], H.C. 1898, lxxiv, 171; Oct-Dec 1897. [C. 
8726], H.C. 1898, lxxiv, 177; Jan-Mar 1898. [C. 8878], H.C. 1898, lxxiv, 183; 
April-Jun 1898. [C. 8968], H.C. 1898, lxxiv, 189; July-Sept 1898. [C. 9099], 
H.C. 1899, lxxix, 679; Oct-Dec 1898, [C. 9168], H.C. 1899, lxxix, 685; Jan-
Mar. 1899. [C. 9274], H.C. 1899, lxxix, 691; April-Jun 1899. [C. 9447], H.C. 
1899, lxxix, 697; July-Sept 1899. [Cd. 11], H.C. 1900, lxix, 657; Oct-Dec 
1899. [Cd. 51], H.C. 1899, lxix, 657; Jan-Mar 1900. [Cd. 163], lxix, 669; 
April-Jun 1900. [Cd. 298], H.C. 1900, lxix, 675; July-Sept 1900. [Cd. 400], 
H.C. 1900, lxix, 681; [Cd. 472], H.C. 1901, lxi, 535; [Cd. 946], H.C. 1902, 
lxxxiv, 871; [Cd. 1429], H.C. 1903, lvii, 487; [Cd. 1918], H.C. 1904, lxxx, 
915; [Cd. 2375], H.C. 1905, lxv, 967; [Cd. 2832], H.C. 1906, c, 1411; [Cd. 
3331],H.C. 1907, lxx, 1137; [Cd. 3922], H.C. 1908, xc, 1281; [Cd. 4491], 
H.C. 1909, lxxiii, 769; [Cd. 5054], H.C. 1910, lxxvi, 843;  [Cd. 5563], H.C. 
1911, lxv, 483; [Cd. 6059], H.C. 1912-13, lxxi, 657; [Cd. 6649], H.C. 1912-
13, lxxi, 673; [Cd. 7297], H.C. 1914, lxv, 491; [C.d 7826], H.C. 1914-16, liii, 
15; [Cd. 8201], H.C. 1916, xxii, 335. 
Return of the number of families evicted other than for non-payment of rent, 1871-78, 
H.C. 1878, (25), lxii, 451; 1877-79, H.C. 1880, (132), lx, 379. 
Return of number of ejectments in Ireland for non-payment of rent, 1878 and 1879, 
H.C. 1880, (246), ;x, 349; Jan-Jun 1880, H.C. 1880, (246-I), lx, 351. 
 
Friendly Societies 
 
Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in Ireland, for 1857, H.C. 1857-58, 
(449), l, 257; H.C. 1867-68, (492), xl, 713; H.C. 1867, (492), (492-I), xxxix, 
759,825; H.C. 1870, (11), (11-I), lxi, 411,421; H.C. 1870, (471), lxi, 425; H.C. 
1871, (460), (460-I), lxii, 413, 415; H. C. 1872, (350), liv, 269; H.C. 1873, 
(369), lxi, 291; H.C. 1874, (391), lxii, 321; H.C. 1875, (378), lxxi, 353.  
Reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, for the year ending 31st 
December 1895. Part A, H.C. 1896, (94), lxxviii, 1; H.C. 1897, (97),(97-
I),(97-II), (97-III) lxxxii, 1,283,499, 553; H.C. 1898, (150), (150-I), (150-II), 
(150-III), lxxxvii, 1, 207,385, 451; H.C. 1899, (79), (79-I),(79-II), xci, 1, 181, 
377; H.C. 1900, (30), (30-I),(30-II), lxxxi, 1, 165,365; H.C. 1901, (35), lxxii, 
1; H.C. 1902, (109), xcvi, 1; 1903, (77), lxvi, 1; H.C. 1904, (55), lxxxix, 1; 
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H.C. 1905, (41), lxxv, 1; H.C. 1906, (55), cxii, 1; H.C. 1907, (49), lxxviii, 
lxxix; H.C. 1908, (208), xcvii, 185; H.C. 1909, (105), lxxix, 181; H.C. 1910, 
(171), lxxxii, 189; H.C. 1911, (159), lxxvi, 171; H.C. 1912-13, (123), lxxxi, 
lxxxii; H.C. 1913, (89), lvii, 173; H.C. 1914, (121), lxxvi, 1; H.C. 1914-16, 
(139), (139-IV), lix, 1; H.C. 1916, (30), xxiv, 171; H.C. 1917-18, (101), xxvii, 
421; H.C. 1918, (119), (119-I), x, 311, 467; H.C. 1919, (189), (189-I), xxxix, 
527, 605; H.C. 1920, (128), xxxvii, 1; H.C. 1921, (140), xxvii, 665. 
Full list of Friendly Societies as Registered at December 31st, 1905, H.C. 1907, (49), 
lxxviii, 199. 
List of Societies and Branches registered, with their Registered Offices membership 
and Funds, at 31st December, 1910, with Summary of annual returns received 
for 1910; with memorandum containing explanatory notes and general 
information on the work of Friendly Societies during 1910; and a comparison 
with the Summary Tables published for the year 1905 (No. 49 of 1907), H.C. 
1912-13, (123-I.-XII.), lxxxi, 193, lxxxii, 1. 
The guide book of the friendly societies registry office 1893 (London, 1893). 
The guide book of the friendly societies registry office for the use of officers and 
members 1910 (London, 1910). 
 
Parliamentary debates 
 
Hansard, series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (Commons), 5 (Lords). 
 
Land Commission 
 
Report of the Irish Land Commissioners for the period from 1st April, 1899, to 31st 
March, 1900. [Cd. 294], H.C. 1900, xvii, 143; [Cd. 690], H.C. 1901, xvii, 215; 
[Cd. 1186], H.C. 1902, xxi, 325; [Cd. 1673], H.C. 1903, xviii, 1; [Cd. 2168], 
H.C. 1904, xvii, 1;  [Cd. 2648], H.C. 1905, xxii, 1; [Cd. 3113], H.C. 1906, 
xxv, 1; [Cd. 3652], H.C. 1907, xix, 1; [Cd. 4242], H.C. 1908, xxiii, 1; [Cd. 
4809], H.C. 1909, xxiii, 579; [Cd. 5321], H.C. 1910, xxxi, 681; [Cd. 5795], 
H.C. 1911, xxix, 331; [Cd. 6354], H.C. 1912-13, xxxiv, 41; [Cd. 6979], H.C. 
1913, xxx, 253; [Cd. 7575], H.C. 1914, lxv, 581; [Cd. 8042], H.C. 1914-16, 
xxiv, 225; [Cd. 8481], H.C. 1917-1918, xv, 421; [Cd. 8742], H.C. 1917-18, 
xv, 533; [Cmd. 19], H.C. 1919, xxiv, 219; [Cmd. 572], H.C. 1920, xix, 1045; 
[Cmd. 1064], H.C. 1920, xix, 1149. 
 
Loan Fund Board Reports 
 
First annual report of the Commissioners Of the Loan Fund Board of Ireland, H.C. 
1839 (578), xxix, 619;  [260], H.C. 1840, xxviii,39; [319] H.C. 1841 Session 
1, xii, 109; [392], H.C. 1842, xxiv, 247; [470], H.C. 1843, xxviii, 29; H.C. 
1844, (445), xxx, 45; H.C. 1845, (365), xxvi, 233; H.C. 1846, (218), xxii, 385; 
H.C. 1847, (532), xvii, 335; H.C. 1847-48 (347), xxix, 433; [1095], H.C. 
1849, xxiii,27; [1240], H.C. 1850,xxv, 59; [1370], H.C. 1851, xxiv, 39; 
[1509], H.C. 1852, xviii, 553; [1638], H.C. 1852-53, xli, 331; [1766], H.C. 
1854, xx, 197; [1937] H.C. 1854-55, xvi, 117;1856 [2085], H.C. 1856, xix, 
165; [2211],  [2211], H.C. 1857 Session 2, xvii, 49; [2384], H.C. 1857-58, 
xxiii, 565; [2521], H.C. 1859 Session 2, x, 425; [2625], H.C. 1860, xxxiv, 
741; [2834], H.C. 1861, xxvii, 601; [2989], H.C. 1862, xix, 214; [3169], H.C. 
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1863, xxviii, 553 ; [3337], H.C. 1864, xxxi, 315; [3485], H.C. 1865, xxviii, 
553; [3644], H.C. 1866, xxiv, 443; [3838], H.C. 1867, xix, 295; [4013], H.C. 
1867-68, xxi, 127; [4143], H.C. 1868-69, xvii, 365; [C.76], H.C. 1870, xvii, 
337; [C.325], H.C. 1871, xvi, 123; [C.525], H.C. 1872, xviii, 381; [C.753], 
H.C. 1873, xxi, 269; [C.953], H.C. 1874, xv, 231;  [C.1186], H.C. 1875, xxi, 
89; [C.1468], H.C. 1876, xxi, 1,; [C.1704], H.C. 1877, xxvii, 91; [C.2070], 
H.C. 1878, xxv, 97;  [C.2290], H.C. 1878-79, xxi, 1; [C.2566], H.C. 1880, 
xviii, 531; [C.2898], H.C. 1881, xxviii,553; H.C. 1896, (243), xxiv, 363; 
[C.8725], H.C. 1898, xx, 351;  [C. 8920], 1898,xx, 375; 1899 [C.9261], 1899, 
xviii, 313; [Cd. 207], H.C. 1900, xvii, 287; [Cd. 555], H.C. 1901, xvii, 367; 
[Cd. 1047], H.C. 1902, xxi, 475; [Cd. 1512], H.C. 1903, xviii, 397; [Cd. 
1993], H.C. 1904, xvii, 421; [Cd. 2419], H.C. 1905, xxii, 339; [Cd. 2880], 
H.C. 1906, xxv, 489; [Cd. 3463], H.C. 1907, xix, 407; [Cd. 4004], H.C. 1908, 
xxv, 485; [Cd. 4650], H.C. 1909, xxvii, 929; [Cd. 5183], H.C. 1910, xxxvii, 
969; [Cd. 5641], H.C. 1911, xxx, 739;  [Cd. 6196], H.C. 1912-13, xxxv, 1; 
[Cd. 6835], H.C. 1913, xxxviii, 933; [Cd. 7379], H.C. 1914, xxxvii, 373; [Cd. 
7912], H.C. 1914-16, xxv, 7; [Cd. 8385], H.C. 1916, xii, 539. 
 
Postmaster General Reports 
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